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Abstract
Questions about the political role of the military in democratisation constitute a 
central theme in comparative politics of developing countries. Scholarship on 
Indonesian politics is no exception. It has focused on this problem particularly after 
the late 1980s when social demands for democratisation become increasingly assertive. 
How has the military responded to these new challenges threatening the dominant role 
of the military in politics during the last decade? This study aims to investigate this 
issue.
It analyses various dimensions of military adaptation to the new political 
circumstances. It focuses on five arenas of adaptation—political power, military 
doctrine, policy, ideology, and civil-military discourse—in order to elucidate military 
responses in a comprehensive way. The study also takes into account comparative 
perspectives, especially the case of the Latin American military in which officers 
developed a doctrine of political activism—like in Indonesia—to legitimise their 
"permanent" involvement in politics. Their response to democratic pressure provides a 
perspective in drawing a boundary between Indonesian particularities and common 
attributes of a political military.
The study argues that military adaptation cannot be explained by a simple 
linear continuum of negative-positive adaptations to democratic pressures, and also 
cannot be judged by looking at only one arena. Adaptation was in progress in all 
arenas above, albeit with differences in direction, pace and scope. Military responses 
were mixed, as certain military officers became reform-minded while others took 
hardline approaches in the face of democratic pressures. As the demand for change 
increased, initiatives of adaptation in doctrinal and discursive arenas were gradually 
taken by reform-minded officers who saw the need for reviewing the role of the 
military in order to ensure its institutional survival in society. However, this 
phenomenon—which was discernible in intra-military and civil-military discourses— 
was unable to overcome negative adaptation in other arenas. The primary reason for 
this lay with President Soeharto who attempted to strengthen control over top military 
leaders to preserve his political interests against growing demands for regime opening. 
It was these top officers who initiated negative adaptation in some arenas. The study 
details the development of such contradictory responses of the Indonesian military, 
and its reflections in the civil-military discourse on the political role of the military.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This is a study about the Indonesian military in politics during the last decade 
of Soeharto's authoritarian government (1988-1998). It is concerned with how the 
military—which had established the authoritarian polity—responded to the growing 
social demand for democratisation during this period.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s set the scene for challenges to right-wing authoritarian regimes in developing 
countries, which had legitimised their rule by insisting on the need for strong 
government both to defend the nation from the threat of communist subversion and to 
provide maximum political support—i.e. stability—for economic modernisation. 
Authoritarian polities in Latin America, Asia and Africa faced similar societal 
challenges to open up the political system, as the principle premises of 
authoritarianism were significantly undermined. Scholarship on third-world 
democratisation has spent the last decade examining the process in which 
authoritarian regimes are eroded by such pressures for change. One particular focus in 
this scholarly attempt is civil-military relations in democratisation; investigating the 
response of the military—a part of the authoritarian old guard—to the demands for 
political liberalisation and 'civilianisation.' This thesis attempts to contribute to this 
scholarly endeavour by examining the case of the Indonesian military under the late 
Soeharto regime.
Until his resignation in May 1998, Soeharto—who had replaced former 
President Sukarno in the chaotic political situation in the mid-1960s—dominated 
Indonesian politics for more than thirty years. With significant backing provided by the 
military, or ABRI, which justified its day-to-day political intervention in the name of 
securing political stability, General Soeharto established his authoritarian political 
system, named the New Order.1 As the antithesis of Sukarno, who favoured
1 The Indonesian military before the New Order consisted of three services—the army (TNI-AD), the navy 
(TNI-AL) and the air force (TNI-AU). When the Soeharto regime was launched in 1966, the police force was 
integrated into the military and the new four-service military forces were named as ABRI, an abbreviation 
of Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (Armed Forces of Republic of Indonesia). In April 1999, under 
President Habibie, however, the police was again separated from the military, as a part of political reform 
in the post-Soeharto era. The name, ABRI, was also abolished and replaced with TNI, or Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia. In this study, which covers the Soeharto era, I use the term "ABRI" to refer to the military. I also
1
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nationalist adventurism and radical mass mobilisation, the new system led by 
Soeharto claimed that economic modernisation was the key for prosperous national 
life and required political stability for its implementation. Based on this logic, ABRI 
formulated the doctrine of "dual function," or dzvifungsi. This doctrine insists that, 
apart from its normal defence function, the Indonesian military has a sociopolitical 
mission to promote national development. This doctrine has legitimised the 
involvement of soldiers in non-military fields—legislature, bureaucracy, regional 
government, to name but a few—and also encouraged the repression of government 
critics. Three decades of New Order stability might not have ben achieved without the 
military's political control being rationalised by the idea of dzvifungsi. Dzvifungsi—a 
euphemism for military surveillance of non-military affairs—has, however, been 
challenged as the rising middle class and a growing popular political movement have 
started to demand democratic reforms, including military withdrawal from politics. A 
segment of the government elite also began to see the need for promoting political 
deregulation in order to accelerate economic development in the era of the global 
economy. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, international criticism of the 
military's abuse of human rights has increased. ABRI was therefore under strong 
pressure to diminish its political involvement since the late 1980s.* 2 How did ABRI 
respond to these demands during the late New Order era, and what were the 
dynamics behind these responses? These are the core questions of this study.
In seeking to answer them, we examine the changing patterns of civil-military 
discourse concerning military involvement in political affairs. The 32 years of the 
Soeharto polity were authoritarian in essence; space for party politics was highly 
restricted by the government and regime critics were repeatedly repressed by the 
military. However, this does not mean that there was no change in the perceptions of 
civilian and military elites regarding the authoritarian practices of the regime, including 
military domination of politics. Ignoring this point not only prevent accurate 
understanding of everyday political life under the authoritarian rule but also leads us 
to simply conclude that the regime had been static since its foundation. Even if the 
fundamental regime structure seemed to remain unchanged, political actors' 
perceptions of regime practices may not be static. Only by investigating these aspects 
can provide a basis for analysing dynamic interactions of political tension, conflict and 
adaptation in the reproductive process of a political system. Under authoritarianism, 
regime maintenance involves continuous governmental efforts to (re)legitimise the 
system in the face of changing social circumstances that may undermine the regime's 
rationale. In the late New Order, this aspect was most clearly reflected in the enlarging 
public discourse on 'political openness;’ a demand to democratise the political
use the term "military" as interchangeable with the army because of its dominant power among the four 
services and its inclination to speak as if it were ABRI during the New Order period.
2 Consult Chapter 2 for references to the factors encouraging democratic demands.
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structure. One core target of this movement was military involvement in politics under 
the doctrine of dwifungsi. The interaction of civilian and military elites on this issue is 
the focus of our analysis in this study.
Setting Puzzles
In pursuing the study, the following questions will be investigated:
(1) How has the unintended political impact of economic development—such as the 
rise of the middle class, student movements and NGOs—contributed to the 
strengthening of critique of the regime? Why—and in what ways—did the criticism 
of dwifungsi develop in the public political arena during the final decade of the New 
Order?
(2) How had dwifungsi been legitimised under the Soeharto polity, and in what ways 
has ABRI attempted to adjust its doctrinal interpretation to maintain its legitimacy 
in facing growing democratic pressures?
(3) How had the political change (or new political paradigms) in the late New Order 
shrunk the room for the traditional dwifungsi practice institutionalised in the early 
period of the Soeharto polity, and in what ways has ABRI attempted to adapt— 
positively and negatively—dwifungsi practice to the changes in political 
environment?
(4) How has civil-military communication regarding dwifungsi been structured—i.e. 
what approaches have been developed by critics to effectively delegitimise 
dwifungsi and what theories have been invented by military officers to counter the 
critical discourse? What were the discursive obstacles for constructing a viable 
dialogue among political elites regarding the future relevance of dwifungsi?
(5) In what ways, should the dwifungsi problem be assessed in comparison with third- 
world militaries which had similarly developed their doctrines of political activism 
but finally been forced to abandon them after civilians took the control of the 
government? What are the lessons and implications of the experiences of these 
countries for the case of Indonesia?
These questions require indepth examination of officers' perceptions of both
ABRI's role and the political environment. Here, we need to look at the discursive
marketplace of dwifungsi-democmtisation problems developed by the military officers.
My study, which deals with this intra-military communication, is based primarily on
the materials I have collected during fieldwork in Indonesia. They include internal
3
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military documents, officers' writings, and my interviews with military and civilian 
elites.3
Thesis Structure
To examine the above questions, the thesis is organised in a thematic rather 
than a chronological way. Historical development is of course significant but my main 
focus is not on the historical outcome itself. Unlike studies which are primarily 
concerned with the description of the political process, my interest lies in clarifying the 
dynamics of institutional adaptation to the changing environment. This standpoint 
focuses on the entire process of how an institution perceives challenges arising from 
environmental change and how it attempts to survive by adapting institutional 
practices. Therefore, chapters are arranged to cover the arenas of adaptation, namely 
political power, military doctrine, policy, ideology, and discourse. Arguments in each 
chapter are intended to illustrate the development of such challenge-adaptation 
interaction. Indonesianists may be attracted by the details of developments within 
ABRI while comparativists may discover that certain Indonesian features are relevant 
to the study of civil-military relations in the third-world democratisation more 
generally.
The focus of Chapter 2 is on the development of the political power game. This 
chapter examines the politics of escalating dwifungsi criticism in society. Why did 
dzvifungsi become a central topic of open critical debate in political society? How could 
such political space be expanded under the authoritarian New Order regime? As we 
will show, societal demands for democratisation were not sufficient open up of 
dwifungsi criticism. Several factors—both within the regime and society—contributed 
to the breaking of the taboo dwifungsi debate which had been in place during the first 
twenty years of the New Order.
The third chapter details ABRI's doctrinal adaptation during the New Order, 
especially after the demand for democratisation was intensified in the final decade. 
Doctrinal analysis is helpful to simultaneously examine individual officers' perceptions 
and the military's institutional political thinking.4 We will discuss how ABRI 
institutionalised its political activism by attempting to strengthen the legitimacy of 
dwifungsi doctrine, and how its legitimation has been adjusted and manipulated in 
order to maintain the relevance of dwifungsi in the changing society.
Chapter 4 examines policy adaptation. Among various practices in which ABRI 
has been involved, the shooting of civilians—or human rights violations—illustrates the
3 Interviews were conducted mostly in Jakarta during 1996-1998. Because of the sensitivity of the issues, 
some quotations from my interviews will be provided without identifying the name and the date.
4 See Chapter 7 for the utility of doctrinal analysis in current study of civil-military relations.
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most militaristic face of dzvifungsi which guides ABRI’s primary mission to the conduct 
of internal security. We will examine how this issue, which had neither been discussed 
openly in society nor investigated transparently before, gradually became a legitimate 
issue in public debate since the late 1980s. The growing concern for human rights was 
encouraged by the changes in the international political system—i.e. the end of the 
Cold War and the subsequent trend toward respect for universal values. How did 
ABRI respond to such a new political paradigm under the New Order regime? We will 
discuss the civil-military struggle over the policy accountability concerning ABRI's 
human rights abuses, and the ways in which ABRI adapted its organisational 
procedures to incorporate human rights values.
Chapter 5, on the other hand, looks at ABRI's ideological development during 
the late Soeharto era, and particularly examines the adaptation of hardline military 
ideology in a way that justified the repression of popular democratic movements. 
Political society had insisted that, in the age of globalism, ABRI’s permanent control of 
politics was irrelevant as the threat of communist subversion had disappeared. We 
seek the how and why of ABRI's reformulation of old vigilance ideology to rationalise 
military repression of the popular democratic movements which emerged since the late 
1980s. We find the factors in the contexts of both Soeharto-ABRI relations and ABRI's 
institutional inertia.
Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, Chapter 6 attempts to clarify 
the structure of dzvifungsi discourse developed among the New Order elites. Our focus 
is on elite criticism, rather than popular protest, as the popular demand for the 
elimination of dzvifungsi was generally perceived by military officers as unacceptable, 
at best, and as a security disturbance, at worst. However, 'debate' on the dzvifungsi 
problem continues between civilian elites and serving officers, and we will highlight the 
function of this political space—which is generally seen as too limited in the eyes of 
outer-regime activists—in undermining ABRI's claim for the permanency of dzvifungsi. 
We analyse several systematic approaches employed by elite critics to delegitimise 
dzvifungsi and ABRI's counter-theories against them. Exploring these discursive styles 
also leads us to assess the characteristics of intra-military communication on dzvifungsi 
problems. In what ways have serving officers discussed the issues within their circles, 
and how are reformist views presented among them—if not aired in the public? 
Understanding the discursive structure may help us think about the problems of New 
Order civil-military dialogue and the future prospects for the construction of mutual 
trust between civilian and military elites.
Chapter 7 attempts to understand dzvifungsi problems in a comparative 
context. We particularly look at the case of Latin America where various militaries 
also developed a doctrine of political activism—the so-called National Security 
Doctrine (DSN)—which played a significant role in the processes of military 
intervention in, and extrication from, politics. I point to significant similarities between
5
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dwifungsi and DSN in terms of officers' role perception, doctrinal missions, political 
orientations, and modes of doctrinal legitimation. Various lessons and implications for 
the Indonesian military are thus derived from the Latin American experience, 
promoting our understanding of civil-military relations coloured by the military 
doctrine of political activism like dwifungsi.
Based on this examination, the concluding chapter provides answers to each 
question listed above. It also discusses the reflection of our arguments in the current 
transition to the post-Soeharto regime.
Throughout the thesis, we examine military responses to democratic pressures 
during the late Soeharto era by focusing on the role of the dwifungsi doctrine which 
became a central topic for civil-military debate during that time. The study also hopes 
to provide a basis for analysing post-Soeharto civil-military relations.
**********
6
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Chapter 2
The Dwifungsi Debate in the Late 
New Order Polity: Political Power 
and Democratic Movement
The debate about dwifungsi was a major element of New Order political 
discourse during the period of so-called keterbukaan—political openness—which 
started in the late 1980s. Intellectuals and regime critics took advantage of the 
opportunity that keterbukaan provided to discuss the question of ABRI's involvement in 
politics. In this chapter, we examine the growing scope and depth of dwifungsi criticism 
in society and attempt to show how political events in the last decade strengthened 
the political autonomy of critical discourse on dwifungsi under the authoritarian New 
Order polity.1 To this end, this chapter chronologically investigates the pattern of 
interaction between the development of the dwifungsi debate and the process of 
political change—namely the political power struggle and emerging democratic 
movements.
We first provide an overview of the authoritarian model of the early New Order 
and describe the established practice of dwifungsi in order to assess the background of 
keterbukaan. Then, the process by which the demand for political opening gradually 
incorporated the dwifungsi issue is examined. It is generally understood that 
keterbukaan encouraged public criticism of dwifungsi. But, as we will show, it was not a 
simple co-evolution that linked societal demands for democratisation and criticism of 
dwifungsi. How has political space for the open dwifungsi criticism been produced, 
suppressed, and strengthened during the period of keterbukaan—and why? These are 
the working questions of this chronological chapter. In-depth contextual analysis of 
each major issue in the dwifungsi debate will be the focus of Chapter 6 which examines 
the discursive problems in a thematic way.
1 By political autonomy of critical discourse, I refer to the viability of political 'space' available for critics 
to express regime criticism under the authoritarian system without being subjected to intervention by the 
regime administrators. Weak autonomy means that the space is not sustainable due to its dependence on 
external factors—such as inner-regime contestations. In this chapter, this concept is frequently employed to 
evaluate the strength of dwifungsi criticism as a democratic movement.
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Military Domination and Regime Contradictions before Keterbukaan
The structure of military rule in Indonesia was established in the early period of 
the New Order.2 The abortive coup in September 1965 resulted in the concentration of 
power in the hands of Maj-Gen Soeharto (the Commander of the Army Strategic 
Reserve Command, or Kostrad) who had led the army troops which crushed the coup 
attempt. Soeharto's military accused the communist party (PKI) of leading the coup 
and encouraged students and Muslims to join in the army-orchestrated anti-PKI 
campaign throughout the archipelago. Pressured by the military which claimed that the 
political order could not be restored under the current situation, President Sukarno 
finally authorised Soeharto to take any necessary measures to restore law and order in 
March 1966.3 The PKI, which had exercised considerable political influence under the 
Sukarno regime, was quickly eliminated. It was the military which had the dominant 
power in determining the direction of post-1965 Indonesian politics. Following the 
official transfer of the presidency from Sukarno to Soeharto in March 1968, Soeharto 
consolidated military rule by emphasising 'stability and order' as the necessary 
preconditions for economic recovery and development—that had long been sidelined 
by Sukarno in pursuing his anti-Western foreign policies.
Unlike the previous regime led by Sukarno who—as the leader of national 
independence—favoured populist mobilisation of political forces to consolidate 
national integration and pursue his radical domestic/foreign policies, Soeharto's 
Indonesia made economic modernisation the primary goal of the government in order 
to 'save' the nation from the disastrous economic situation during the final years of 
Sukarno. The military's political control was justified as necessary to safeguard 
national stability as the foundation for economic development and modernisation. It 
was against this background that the concept of dwifungsi was created by ABRI to 
legitimise its involvement in non-military affairs, which was seen as an embodiment of 
ABRI's 'historical mission' to protect national unity since the independence war.4 Since
2 For an account of civil-military relations during the first decade of the New Order, see Crouch (1988).
3 Sukarno's 'instruction' to Soeharto was conveyed through a letter, dated 11 March, which was called 
Supersemar (Presidential Letter of 11 March). The letter authorised Soeharto to handle the political 
situation. However, Supersemar is still a controversial issue because of a suspicion that Sukarno wrote the 
letter under duress. Regardless of the truth, Soeharto banned the PKI on the day after the issue of the letter. 
PKI supporters became political prisoners, if they were arrested, or became the victims of military- 
supervised killing. The most commonly accepted estimate of the death toll was between 250,000 and 500,000 
(Crouch 1988:155).
4 The Indonesian army had played a political role since the revolutionary war (1945-1949) against Dutch 
colonialism when the demarcation between political and military affairs was obscure. During this period, 
the army cultivated its self-image as the national guardian1 which fought for "100 percent independence," 
contrary to civilian leaders who tended to negotiate with the Dutch to achieve partial independence. 
Although the military was not directly involved in the government during the parliamentary democracy 
period (1949-1958), it became one of the most powerful political forces during Sukarno's Guided 
Democracy period (1958-1965). But it was during the New Order that the military dominated the political 
process. Soeharto's military emphasised that its political control was inevitable as it had played the role of
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Dzvifungsis primary goal in the New Order polity was the maintenance of national 
stability for economic development, several political programs were introduced to this 
end.
Political repression and ideological surveillance were the major tools of 
constructing and maintaining the New Order regime. Soon after the 1965 coup attempt, 
the army established a security agency, the Operational Command for the Restoration 
of Security and Order (Kopkamtib)—headed by Soeharto himself—which conducted a 
wide range of internal security activities, including the ideological screening of party 
candidates and government employees, elimination of communist remnants, and 
suppression of campus and labour activists. With this 'military within the military' as 
the core of ABRI's repressive apparatus, everyday politico-ideological surveillance was 
institutionalised in the country's social life.* 5 Kopkamtib's activities were backed by the 
military area commands which controlled political life in each geographic territory.6 In 
remote areas of the archipelago—like Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor (annexed in 
1975)—security operations against separatist elements became standard practice 
which terrorised many local residents. In urban areas, military repression targeted the 
press, students, intellectuals, Islamic groups and labour and legal activists, who were 
often labelled as anti-Pancasila.7 Mass demonstrations were repeatedly repressed by 
security forces. The 1974 Malari Affair, the 1977-8 student movements and the 1984 
Tanjung Priok incident were notable cases.8 In the name of establishing a stable
national guardian since independence, and that dwifungsi was the doctrinal reflection of such a military
mind. We will examine the detailed process of dwifungsi's doctrinal formulation in Chapter 3.
5 Regarding Kopkamtib's techniques of surveillance, see Tanter (1990).
6 There are ten area commands (Kodams) in the ABRI structure and they control their responsible 
territories. See Appendix 1 for the territorial command map. Under each Kodam, there are several Korems 
(regional commands)—except Kodam Jaya/Jakarta—and each Korem supervises Koramils (district 
commands) in its own territory. This territorial system enabled ABRI's everyday control of political affairs 
throughout the archipelago^
7 Pancasila is a set of five principles declared by Sukarno in 1945 to oppose to the idea that Indonesia 
should be an Islamic nation. It consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian 
democracy based on consultation and consensus, and social justice. The first principle refers to God rather 
than Allah, thus implying that the 'Pancasila state' guarantees Indonesia as a multi-religious nation. The 
fourth principle, however, can be exclusionary if the state identifies the opposition as not based on 
'Indonesian democracy.'
8 In 1974, the largest street demonstration since the establishment of the New Order took place. Student 
activists opposed the government policy of introducing massive foreign investment, which they thought 
might undermine the opportunity for indigenous businesses and only benefit Chinese Indonesians who had 
close ties with Soeharto. Street demonstration in Jakarta (on 15 January) during the visit of Japanese Prime 
Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, led to a huge riot which was repressed by ABRI. This event was called the 
Malari Affair. See Crouch (1974) for details. The large student demonstrations in Jakarta during 1977-8 to 
oppose Soeharto's reelection in 1978 and demand the elimination of government corruption and ABRI's 
dwifungsi were also repressed by ABRI. After this incident, the government introduced the so-called 
Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK) which banned student political activities on campus and strengthened 
state control over the university administration. The Tanjung Priok incident occurred in September 1984 
when security troops shot Muslim demonstrators and killed at least dozens of them in Tanjung Priok, North 
Jakarta. Muslim groups believed that the repression was part of anti-Islam operations led by the Catholic 
ABRI Commander, General Benny Moerdani, and the death toll was several hundreds.
9
Chapter 2
political system, ABRI relied on repressive political control with the doctrinal backup 
of dwifungsi.
Together with the repression of opposition, social participation in the formal 
political structure was tightly restricted. To ensure the regime's stability, the influence 
of the existing political parties was reduced drastically by establishing a governmental 
party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, or Functional Group), which all public servants were 
forced to join and support. Since the first New Order election in 1971, Golkar always 
held a large parliamentary majority, while other political parties were compelled to 
merge into two—the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development 
Party) consisting of the old Islamic parties, and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, 
or Indonesian Democratic Party) which integrated secure-nationalist and Christian 
parties.9 ABRI members were also appointed' to the parliament (DPR) where they sat 
as members of the ABRI "fraction" (F-ABRI) both at national and regional levels as 
part of the dwifungsi mission to ensure political stability in the legislative sector. ABRI 
members also penetrated non-military administrative bodies, occupying key positions 
from Department Ministers to village heads. Sending officers to non-military sectors, 
called kekaryaan, was justified as a necessary measure to secure the smooth 
implementation of the government’s development projects and to overcome alleged 
civilian incompetence in handling government tasks.10 The implementation of 
dwifungsi—namely the backing for Golkar, kekaryaan penetration, and military 
representation in the parliament—tightly restricted political participation.
The development of the New Order regime was, however, not free from internal 
conflict. First, within the elite structure, the rivalries between officers frequently 
undermined the regime's cohesion. In the early 1970s, the antagonism between Maj-Gen 
Ali Moertopo, who had served Soeharto as his personal adviser since the 1950s, and 
General Soemitro who had led Kopkamtib culminated in the Malari Affair.* 11 In the 
early 1980s, several prominent retired officers, including Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, to 
whom the dwifungsi concept is often attributed, accused Soeharto and ABRI of
9 The history of New Order elections can be traced by consulting Crouch (1971), Liddle (1978), 
Suryadinata (1982), Silalahi (1988), and King (1994). No comprehensive analysis of the 1997 election has 
been published.
10 Regarding the kekaryaan practice, see MacDougall's (1982) (1986) empirical study. In 1971, for example, 
among higher central bureaucracy, 44 percent of cabinet members, 41 percent of Secretary Generals, and 73 
percent of Inspector Generals were active-duty officers. Regional governments were also penetrated by 
military members. In 1977, 78 percent of provincial governors were army men, and more than half (155) of 
Indonesia's 294 bupati (regent) and mayors were ABRI men (Jenkins 1984:47).
11 Soeharto had relied heavily on a group of personal advisors (Assistant Pribadi, or Aspri) for his early 
New Order policy-making, including the annexation of East Timor. Officers in Aspri, like Ali Moertopo 
and Maj-Gen Sudjono Humardhani, with their think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), provided enormous input to Soeharto. The dominant role of the Aspri was resented by many officers 
outside their circle, including Soemitro. Soemitro was said to be unhappy with the Aspri officers’ business 
links to Chinese and foreign partners, and was sympathetic towards student demands in the Malari Affair. 
Soemitro was replaced just after the incident. Soemitro's suspicions of Ali Moertopo and CSIS are described 
in his biography (Ramadhan 1996:286, 307-311).
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misleading the nation and established a critical group consisting of fifty members— 
including retired officers and civilian intellectuals—calling themselves Petisi 50 
(Petition of 50).12 Soeharto’s inner circle of officers—such as Admiral Sudomo, Lt-Gen 
Yoga Sugomo and Maj-Gen Benny Moerdani—labelled these retired officers as sakit 
hati (sick at heart) generals.13
Intra-regime friction re-emerged in the late 1980s. From 1983 to 1988, Moerdani, 
as ABRI Commander (Pangab), consolidated his power base by establishing the 
Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), subsuming the role of Pusintelstrat and many of 
the intelligence functions of Kopkamtib. Soeharto’s reliance on Moerdani's hardline 
ABRI was significant for the strengthening of political controls during 1984-1985 in 
which the government forced all social organisations to accept Pancasila as their sole 
ideological basis in 1984 and imposed five political laws to further restrict political 
participation in 1985.14 Soeharto, however, began to find that he had become too 
dependent on ABRI and started to widen his power base by relying less on ABRI in 
non-security affairs. Under Soeharto's Fourth Development Cabinet (1983-1988), 
Sudharmono, the head of the state secretariat (Sekneg), was given increased 
presidential trust. Sekneg had authority over development allocations and allocated
12 Petisi 50 was found in 1980 in response to Soeharto's speech at Pekanbaru which said that ABRI would 
continuously support Golkar in the next election in 1982. Petisi's members included Ali Sadikin, a retired 
navy admiral and the popular ex-Govemor of Jakarta. They openly criticised Soeharto's arbitrary use of 
Pancasila as a tool of repressing anti-regime opinions, and demanded that ABRI, as the 'national' guardian, 
return to the 'original intention' of dwifungsi, which was—according to them—to be neutral in conducting 
its political mission and 'stand above all groups' in elections. Petisi 50 called for the 'purification of 
dwifungsi.' See Kelompok Kerja Petisi 50, Melihat Kembali: Pernyataan Keprihatian—5 Mei 1980, Seri 
Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa No.7, 1991. Nasution was a former Army Chief who declared in 1958 
that the Indonesian military would take a middle way (falan tengah) between the military rule and an 
apolitical role. This speech is said to be the origin of the concept of dwifungsi. For the emergence of the 
critical retired officers, see Jenkins (1984), especially pp.171-187 on Petisi 50 and ABRI's severe pressure 
on these retired officers since then.
13 All of these Soeharto loyalists served in intelligence-security sectors within ABRI. Sudomo had been 
running Kopkamtib after Soemitro since 1974, and had been deputy commander of ABRI since 1978. Yoga 
had been the head of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) which was directly responsible 
to the President since 1974 and served as Kopkamtib Chief from 1978 to 1980. Moerdani was the head of 
the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat)—ABRI's intelligence body—since 1977 and deputy head of 
BAKIN since early 1978.
14 The Pancasila project was resented by Muslim groups which could not accept the idea of placing 
Pancasila over Allah. It was a big blow for the PPP whose constituency was mainly in the Muslim 
population. ABRI led by Moerdani, a Catholic, was viewed by many Muslims as antagonistic to them. This 
suspicion was encouraged by the Tanjung Priok incident above. On the other hand, the 5 political laws 
concerned (1) general election, (2) composition of the DPR and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) 
(the nation's highest legislative body—consisting of all DPR members plus additional members appointed by 
the President—which meets once every five years to elect the president and vice-president), (3) political 
parties and Golkar, (4) referendum, and (5) social organisations. Among other things, the laws: (1) banned 
debate over Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) during election campaigns, and limited 
discussion to issues related to national development; (2) decided to allocate 100 appointed seats 
(previously 75) for ABRI in the DPR, while the total number of the DPR rose to 500 (from 460) and 1000 
(from 920) for the MPR; (3) determined Pancasila as the sole fundamental principle for parties and Golkar;
(4) set several requirements which made it almost impossible to hold a referendum to revise the UUD45; and
(5) authorised the government to dissolve any social organisation which disturbed law and order or 
promoted ideas contrary to Pancasila and UUD45 in whatever form.
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much of it for the strengthening of the business activities of indigenous Indonesians, or 
pribumi, with the resulting decline of budget allocations to ABRI's business activities. 
Also, as the Golkar Chairman during 1983-1988, Sudharmono attempted to make 
Golkar more independent from ABRI, by recruiting new cadres from the ranks of 
business who might provide financial support for Golkar, which would in turn reduce 
ABRI's influence in Golkar administration.15 Against this background, Moerdani moved 
to block Soeharto's attempt to appoint Sudharmono as the vice-president in 1988, as 
seen in the 'interruption' of the MPR meeting by a F-ABRI member, Brig-Gen Ibrahim 
Saleh, who openly objected Sudharmono’s vice-presidency.16 This move was not 
successful and exacerbated the cleavage between Soeharto and Moerdani. In this 
context, Soeharto's decision to abolish Kopkamtib in late 1988 was widely seen as his 
attempt to weaken ABRI's institutional power base. The period between 1988 and 
1993 saw a deepening conflict between Moerdani's group and Soeharto's Palace circle 
now led by Sudharmono.17
Apart from elite contradictions, the New Order faced the need to accommodate 
historical and social change. Two decades of the Soeharto polity since the mid-1960s 
produced an environment which delegitimised authoritarian practices. First, the very 
'success' of economic development had created a new middle-class layer which 
embraced critical intellectuals and legal activists who became the base of the critical 
sector in political society. Second, in the mid-1980s, Indonesia was required to 
implement a series of deregulation policies as its economy moved from resource-export 
and import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation.18 This process inevitably 
demanded that Indonesia facilitate political transparency to attract more foreign 
investments for further economic growth. Third, it was ironic that Soeharto’s 
'successful' implementation of his political program in 1984-1985 undermined the 
rationale for prioritising 'security' in political life because it now seemed irrelevant to 
rely on the regime slogan of 'threat to Pancasila’ in repressing political groups which 
had already accepted that philosophy. Finally, military officers who had participated 
in the independence war gradually reached their retirement age in the mid-1980s, and 
ABRI was inherited by post-revolutionary generation officers, like Try Sutrisno, who 
became Pangab in 1988. Since dzvifungsi had been largely legitimised as ABRI's 
historical right to participate in national affairs arising from its role in the 
independence war, the change in generation inevitably raised a reasonable question in 
society about ABRI's continuous dominance in politics; why should the younger
15 About the rise of Sudharmono, see Pangaribuan (1995:58-59).
16 We will discuss ABRI's other tactics in the anti-Sudharmono campaign in Chapter 5.
17 Moerdani was replaced by his ally, Try Sutrisno (Army Chief), as Pangab but remained a powerful force 
as Minister of Defence and Security in the 1988-1993 Cabinet. About their cleavage with Soeharto, see 
Crouch (1992). It coloured the development of keterbukaan as we discuss in the following sections
18 For the political impact of this industrial transformation, see Robison's (1986) vivid work.
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generation officers who did not participate in the independence war also enjoy the 
political 'privileges' given to the 1945-generation officers.
These social changes all contributed to the erosion of the legitimacy basis of 
New Order authoritarianism. Growing social demands for political democratisation 
resonated with the intra-elite conflict above and led to the genesis of keterbukaan in the 
late 1980s. How did the keterbukaan slogan evolve in political society, and how did it 
incorporate criticism of dwifungsi in its scope? We will scrutinise the first phase of the 
interaction between keterbukaan and the dwifungsi debate in the next section.
Keterbukaan and Dwifungsi
The keterbukaan era was sparked by a comment in May 1989 by the retiring US. 
ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, who said that Indonesia would need 
openness in politics commensurate with the success of economic openness and 
deregulation.19 Surprisingly, Wolfowitz's comment was quickly taken up by some 
members of the DPR from the ABRI and Golkar fractions who called on the DPR to 
discuss the need for political openness. They invited the outspoken former Kopkamtib 
Commander, General (ret) Soemitro, to a hearing of Commission II (Internal Affairs) of 
the DPR, led by Maj-Gen Samsuddin from F-ABRI, to talk about the openness idea on 
21 June and again the following week.20 This signalled that permissible political 
discourse now included regime criticism in public, creating a new and uncharted 
political space in the New Order polity, especially when Samsuddin said that he had 
not received a warning from ABRI Headquarters, implying a tolerant posture of the 
ABRI leadership towards this debate.21 It was widely believed that Defence Minister 
(Menhankam) Benny Moerdani and Pangab Try Sutrisno intended to use this new 
development in the DPR to put pressure on Soeharto, from whom they had become 
increasingly estranged. For the next few months, media coverage of keterbukaan 
dominated political discourse.
Initially the demand for political openness was not linked directly to the role of 
ABRI. Perhaps this was one reason why several officers contributed to the opening up 
of political space to discuss critical issues in the public. An indication of military 
thinking was revealed in December 1989, when the Army Chief of Staff (KSAD), 
General Edi Sudradjat, addressed the military academy (Akabri). Reflecting the new
19 "Paul Wolfowitz: Keterbukaan Politik Semakin Diperlukan," Pelita, 11 May 1989; "Keterbukaan Sama 
Dengan Stabilitas: Paul Wolfowitz Tidak Merasa Memuji Indonesia Berlebihan," Suara Pembaruan, 13 
May 1989. On the development of keterbukaan in general, see Lane (1991) and Schwarz (1994).
20 The invitation to Soemitro followed his well-circulated article published the previous month in the Far 
Eastern Economic Review (FEER), which openly insisted on the need for political reforms to end 
authoritarian practices. See his "Aspiring to Normal Politics," FEER, 6 April 1989. Maj-Gen Samsuddin 
was the Chairman of F-ABRI.
21 "DPR Akan Terus Bicarakan Keterbukaan dan Pembaruan," Suara Pembaruan, 2 July 1989.
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mood of political debate, he emphasised that unilateral decisions imposed by the 
government on the public were becoming counter-productive, and argued that ABRI 
officers in the current context needed the ability to accommodate the exchange of 
views and to conduct a rational political debate.22 Two months later the Jakarta Post 
wrote in an editorial that "some of the DPR members thought General Sudradjat's 
statement represented a new policy line that had been agreed upon within the army."23 
As if emphasising ABRI's new policy line, an ABRI intellectual, Maj-Gen Z.A. Maulani, 
the Commander of the Kalimantan Military Command (Kodam VI/Tanjungpura), said 
that even debating dzvifungsi was not taboo.24 This approach was echoed by the 
Interior Minister (Mendagri) Gen (ret) Rudini who endorsed the initiative of F-ABRI in 
the ongoing political debate by saying "F-ABRI's vocal role is due to its commitment to 
the Constitution (UUD45) and ABRI's dzvifungsi ."25 These comments were all viewed 
as messages indicating that ABRI was not against the escalation of 'regime' criticism.
The new trend was well reflected in a dialogue between top ABRI leaders and 
intellectuals in mid-May 1990.26 In this two-day forum, both ABRI and the intellectual 
participants insisted on the need to give attention to the widening social gap between 
the rich and the poor. This consensus was well publicised in the media and seemed to 
confirm that reform-minded officers were now in leadership positions. From the 
perspective of the Soeharto-ABRI antagonism at that time, it was understandable that 
the Moerdani group tried to popularise the problem of the social gap (kesenjangan 
sosial) which implied that Soeharto's policy management should be criticised. Some 
commentators even regarded these officers as "intellectuals in uniform" whose 
perceptions were not so different from civilian intellectuals.27 The dialogue aired two 
new ideas which resonated powerfully in the political society. First, that open civil- 
military communication could be institutionalised, and second, that the new 
'intellectual' officers were revisionists regarding the country's political-economic life. It 
was only after this that the political marketplace was opened for a public debate 
about dzvifungsi.
President Soeharto did not remain passive as the ABRI leaders encouraged 
public criticism directed at the regime. In early November 1990, Soeharto gave an
22 FEER, 18 January 1990. Edi Sudradjat was regarded as loyal to Benny Moerdam.
23 "Dual Function Pep Talk," Jakarta Post, 12 February 1990.
24 "Pangdam VI: Bicarakan Dwifungsi Tidak Tabu," Angkatan Bersenjata, 28 March 1990.
23 "Kevokalan ABRI Karena Komitmen Pada Demokrasi," Suara Karya, 10 April 1990. Rudini served as 
Army Chief during 1983-1986 under Moerdani's period of ABRI Commander. In the Fifth Development 
Cabinet (1988-1993), Rudini was appointed as Mendagri.
26 This dialogue had been held annually between the military leadership and intellectual figures since 1988. 
In the 1990 meeting, the ABRI side was represented by Try Sutrisno and Lt-Gen Flarsudiono Hartas (Chief 
of ABRI's Social and Political Staff, or Kassospol). The intellectual figures were, among others, Christianto 
Wibisono (business consultant and columnist) and Kwik Kian Gie (a prominent economist affiliated with 
the PDI). Both were Chinese Indonesians and regarded as outspoken intellectuals. The meeting was covered 
by several newspapers but the names of other participants were not provided. Like Sutrisno, Hartas was a 
close ally of Moerdani.
27 See "Dialog Pimpinan ABRI dan Cendekiawan," Suara Pembaruan 16 May 1990.
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important speech in which he turned the spotlight onto ABRI. Receiving a visit from 
high-ranking officers following an ABRI Leadership Meeting (Rapim ABRI), he 
emphasised that ABRI's role in society should be tut wuri handayani.28 Although ABRI 
repeatedly said that tut wuri handayani was not a new term because it was already 
part of ABRI's ethical codes, critics kept asking whether or not Soeharto wanted ABRI 
to 'return to the barracks' and to what extent ABRI was actually changing its current 
posture in line with the President's request. Since it was Soeharto, as President and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who seemed to be implying a need to shift 
ABRI's posture, it inevitably gave critics some ammunition to question ABRI’s 
implementation of dwifungsi. For them, whatever the interpretation of tut wuri 
handayani, it at least contained a suggestion that ABRI should somehow reduce its 
presence in the political arena. From the perspective of critics, Soeharto’s statement 
allowed them to seek visible changes in the ABRI-dominated political structure. A 
place to legitimately argue about the dwifungsi problem was provided in the country’s 
public political discourse.
The demand for ABRI to practise tut wuri handayani reflected Soeharto's 
strategy of relying more on civilian support. A month after his speech, Soeharto 
sponsored the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) 
in December 1990 29 The ABRI leaders were very suspicious of ICMI partly because of 
their ideological concern that political mobilisation of Islamic forces could undermine 
the Pancasila-based state system, but mainly due to (1) a suspicion among Moerdani's 
circle that Soeharto was attempting to counterbalance ABRI by creating ICMI for the 
securing of his political power, and (2) their concern that the chairman of ICMI, 
Professor B.J. Habibie (Minister of Research and Technology), Soeharto’s long-time 
associate, would consolidate his independent power base outside of military control 
and challenge ABRI in the presidential and vice-presidential elections in 1993. 
Soeharto’s tut wuri handayani statement was followed by his overt rapprochement to 
Islam in 1991. Shortly after ICMI's establishment, President gave permission to Muslim 
school girls to wear the jilbab (religious veils) to classes. Then, in June, Soeharto himself 
made the pilgrimage to Mecca and became a haji, and in November, an Islamic bank— 
the Bank Muamalat—was established. In the eyes of the military leadership, led by 
Moerdani and Try Sutrisno, these actions were a clear indication that Soeharto no
28 A Javanese expression to describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn 
to walk. This is one of three educational principles introduced by Ki Hadjar Dewantara who was the 
founder of Taman Siswa, an educational institution established in 1924. Together with tut wuri handayani, 
there are: ing madya mangun karsa which respectively means "to be a driving force of children when in their 
midst" and ing ngarsa sung tuladha which means "to lead from the front." These concepts constitute part of 
ABRI's 11 Leadership Principles (see Appendix 2). See, also, Soeharto's autobiography (1989:426) about 
his understanding of them.
29 According to Hefner (1993:24), Try Sutrisno is said to have advised Soeharto to turn down the approval. 
About ABRI's negative response to the creation of ICMI, see Ramage (1995:132-149).
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longer wanted to rely fully on them in securing his political power and was trying to 
find a base outside ABRI.
Soeharto's attempt to undermine the Moerdani-Sutrisno influence was also 
apparent after ABRI troops fired on thousands of demonstrators in Dili, East Timor, 
on 12 November 1991.30 One day after the incident, Try Sutrisno condemned the 
demonstrators for causing chaos and claimed that the troops were forced to shoot 
when the mob attacked soldiers brutally. However, Soeharto—as ABRI's Supreme 
Commander—quickly decided to dismiss two officers, Brig-Gen Warouw and Maj-Gen 
Sintong Panjaitan, who, although not directly involved in the shooting, were considered 
formally responsible for violations taking place within their areas of command.31 It 
was the first time in the New Order period that general-ranking officers were held 
responsible for the shooting of civilians by their troops. In addition, soldiers directly 
involved in the shooting were court-martialled. Soeharto's measures were resented by 
many ABRI officers who believed that the shooting was proper. As a result, officers 
began to feel that Soeharto was not willing to protect ABRI's institutional interests.32 It 
was also noted that the two dismissed senior officers were both Christians and 
regarded as aligned with Moerdani.
The Dili incident was a perfect opportunity for political society to question the 
military's repressive behaviour. In the DPR’s Commission I, this problem was quickly 
raised by the Interior Minister, Rudini, and Marzuki Darusman, an outspoken young 
Golkar parliamentarian. Rudini argued that ABRI's repressive approach could destroy 
political awareness in society. This comment by the Interior Minister was welcomed at 
the DPR meeting and Marzuki likewise stressed that it was time to end the repressive 
approach in conducting dwifungsi,33 The comments by the reform-minded retired 
general and the Golkar member of parliament—who were both supporters of 
keterbukaan—showed that although ABRI had encouraged the move toward more 
political openness, the new atmosphere could also be used to criticise ABRI itself. 
Reacting to the new turn in the debate, Moerdani's Chief of Staff for Social and 
Political Affairs (Kassospol), Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas, insisted on the irrelevance of 
'Western' human rights concepts applied in Indonesia where the cultural background 
was different.34 The enlarging critical discourse continued to target ABRI as was
30 The demonstration was planned to coincide with a visit of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. 
Marchers were shot as they approached the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Human Rights Watch /Asia 
(1994:22) assessed the death toll as nearly 100, while Amnesty International (1994:50) estimated that the 
number was around 270, while the Indonesian official account was at least 50. For the international 
pressure over Indonesia's repression in East Timor, see, for example, Feith (1993).
31 Warouw was the Commander of East Timor Operations (Pangkolakops) and Sintong Panjaitan was 
Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana.
32 We will discuss this perception in detail in the next chapter.
33 "Perlu Konsensus untuk Ubah Model Pendekatan Keamanan," Pelita, 10 December 1991. We will fully 
discuss the development of debate over ABRI's repressive approach—or so-called pendekatan keamanan 
(security approach)—and human rights perception in Chapter 4.
34 "Hendaknya Kita Tak Terpengaruh Oleh Hak Asasi Versi Barat," Suara Pembaruan, 14 December 1991.
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apparent in a conference held by the Indonesian Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda 
Indonesia) soon after the Dili incident. Despite the title of the conference, "ABRI's 
Regeneration and National-State-Social Life," media reports indicated concern about 
ABRI’s repressive practice.35 It seemed that, following his tut wuri handayani statement, 
Soeharto's decision to punish ABRI for the Dili case again gave an opportunity for 
political society to openly criticise dwifungsi and bring it up as a central issue for the 
keterbukaan movement.
Above all, the evolution of keterbukaan in the early stage (1989-1991) was 
largely a function of the deepening antagonism between Soeharto and Moerdani's 
ABRI. The weakening regime cohesion had effectively provided a space in political 
society to conduct critical debates under the slogan of keterbukaan. As long as criticism 
was considered to undermine Soeharto's political legitimacy, for example, the 
increasing gap between the rich and the poor, or more generally the regime's 
authoritarian structure, ABRI had allowed critics to express their views. On the other 
hand, Soeharto had played the leading role in bringing dwifungsi problems into the 
scope of keterbukaan. Flis attempt at marginalising Moerdani's ABRI was reflected in 
his statement about tut wuri handayani and decision to sack two generals in the Dili 
incident, which both contributed to the opening up of the dwifungsi question in the 
public as a legitimate theme in the current keterbukaan atmosphere. In this way, the 
early development of keterbukaan was principally a result of Soeharto-ABRI friction as 
each side encouraged public criticism of the other. This was the characteristic of this 
first phase of the dwifungsi-keterbukaan interaction.
Breaking Old Taboos
The Soeharto-ABRI antagonism was reflected in the June 1992 general election 
in which ABRI reduced its support to Golkar whose vote fell from 73 percent in 1987 
to 68 percent. The ABRI leadership also 'tolerated' retired officers giving support to the 
PDI.36 While ABRI’s reduced commitment to Golkar was explained by ABRI leaders as 
the embodiment of dwifungsi s ideal to perform as the 'national guardian'—who should 
be neutral towards all political parties—and its respect for parliamentary life, it was 
also an effective reminder to Soeharto that the established New Order political system 
could not be maintained without ABRI's active support.
35 Kompas, in three related articles, noted that the conference was timely because of the Dili shooting (3 
January 1992).
36 Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, former Chief of Staff of Defence Ministry (1973-75) and 
Ambassador to the United States, 9 August 1996. However, it certainly did not break ABRI's ties with 
Golkar, as many retired officers still became the Golkar candidates and several provincial leaders came 
from ABRI. Although Golkar obtained the majority votes in the 1992 election, what was prominent was the 
rise of the PDI which increased from 10 percent in 1987 to 14 percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its 
votes from 16 percent in 1987 to 17 percent in 1992. See Appendix 3 for the electoral result.
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However, there was an unintended consequence. ABRI's appeal for 'neutrality' 
during the election encouraged political society to argue about the way to promote 
ABRI's neutrality in parliamentary life. In June, a vocal politician from the PPP, Sri 
Bintang Pamungkas, proposed that ABRI's dual function should be reviewed every five 
years in the parliament. The DPR's Commission II brought the ABRI issue up for 
internal discussion. On 8 July, a long-standing critic of the New Order, Arbi Sanit (a 
political scientist at the University of Indonesia [UI]), was invited to the commission's 
hearing. He argued that 100 ABRI members in the legislative body were too many, and 
asserted that, even without members of parliament, ABRI could still be a pressure 
group and thus maintain dzvifungsi. Professor Miriam Budiardjo, also from UI, argued 
at the same hearing that the phased reduction in the number of ABRI members in the 
DPR would represent progress in the democratisation process.37 Their statements were 
welcomed by the media at large, enabling them to broach a taboo political issue in the 
country's political discourse.38
Military officers reacted negatively to these demands. Brig-Gen (Police) 
Roekmini, one of the reform-minded officers in F-ABRI, who had strongly supported 
keterbukaan in general, this time raised an objection. She stressed that debating 
dzvifungsi, including ABRI's involvement in the DPR, was not relevant and not realistic. 
The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam), retired 
Admiral Sudomo, maintained that it was not impossible to reduce ABRI's seats in the 
DPR, but added that strong reasons and agreement among all four factions in the DPR 
would be needed first. In his view, if the purpose of the reduction was just to 
encourage democracy, that would not constitute a strong reason.39 Stimulated by these 
statements, the debate on F-ABRI reactivated the broader dzvifungsi discourse, albeit in 
a more cautious manner.
In this process, Soeharto was an active participant and again intervened to curb 
the debate. Speaking at the 19th anniversary of the National Youth Committee (KNPI) 
on 22 July, the President said that ABRI's participation in the DPR and MPR was 
intended to involve ABRI in the policy-making process in order to avoid a situation 
where ABRI might raise their guns against unwelcome policies.40 This primitive threat 
was more a warning against the escalating critical debate in society, than a defence of 
ABRI's position in the parliament. In fact, in his independence day address a month 
later, Soeharto reopened the issue by suggesting that the number of F-ABRI could be 
adjusted.41 These messages from above were soon deciphered in many ways by 
intellectuals and political elites. State Secretary (Sekneg) Maj-Gen (ret) Moerdiono
37 "Jumlah Anggota DPR yang Diangkat Sudah Waktunya Ditinjau Kembali," Kompas, 9 July 1992.
38 For example, Jakarta Post devoted its editorial to this event with the title "Breaking old taboos", 10 July 
1992; Suara Pembaruan (10 July 1992) in its editorial suggested that it was a sign of democratisation.
39 "Reaksi Pro dan Kontra Soal Pengurangan ABRI di DPR," Media Indonesia, 10 July 1992. Italic added.
40 "Lagi, Soal ABRI," Media Indonesia, 24 July 1992.
41 "Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR/MPR Bisa Disesuaikan Lewat Konsensus," Kompas, 16 August 1992.
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decoded Soeharto's signal as a response to questions in society about the size of F- 
ABRI. He added that the important thing in ABRI's dual function was to maintain its 
socio-political role, not the practical number, implying a possible cut in the number.42 
Sabam Sirait, a vocal PDI politician, then responded by saying that ten percent, i.e. 50 
seats, would be enough for F-ABRI while Marzuki Darusman of Golkar pushed this 
line further, by arguing that ABRI's representation should eventually be limited to the 
MPR.43
The debate about ABRI's representation in the parliament was not new. The 
essence of this argument could be found in the criticisms made by the Petisi 50 group in 
the early 1980s. Yet, this time, there were telling differences in the surrounding political 
environment. First, the practice of dwifungsi was being debated in the national 
legislative body under the name of the government-endorsed keterbukaan program. 
Second, the critical campaign was not led by a single group, such as Petisi 50, but had 
widespread support. Third, the debate was seemingly converted to technical issues, 
rather than matters of principle and thus effectively prevented the debate being 
labelled as anti-dwifungsi by ABRI. Fourth, but most importantly, it was Soeharto 
himself who gave the first go-sign after the 1992 election to 'break the taboo,' by 
suggesting the reduction of the F-ABRI. For ABRI, escalation of the criticism during this 
period revealed that: critical actors were no longer limited to certain small groups, 
which made it difficult for ABRI to pinpoint its counter-attack, as it had in the past 
against Petisi 50; and the DPR's initiative in support of keterbukaan—which had also 
been supported by ABRI—now involved a 'legitimate' movement against ABRI's 
traditional political interests. Significantly, such developments reflected Soeharto's 
counter-use of keterbukaan in his attempt to undermine the political influence of the 
military.
A few months later, ABRI's response to Soeharto was highlighted in the vice- 
presidential election at the MPR session in March 1993. In February, Kassospol Let- 
Gen Harsudiono Hartas announced ABRI's nomination of the Pangab, General Try 
Sutrisno, as the next vice president. In facing ABRI's high-profile challenge, Soeharto— 
who is said to have favoured Habibie—finally accepted the fait accompli, choosing Try 
as his running mate for the Sixth Development Cabinet. This event, which illustrated 
ABRI's challenge to President, was another 'breaking of a taboo,' as it had been a New 
Order practice for ABRI to wait for Soeharto to nominate his own vice-presidential 
candidate. Thus two taboos were broken during this short period, reflecting the 
Soeharto-ABRI cleavage. Meanwhile the dwifungsi issue was largely initiated by 
Soeharto in his contest with ABRI.
42 "Soal Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR: Berhak, Masih Perlu, Jumlah Tak Soal, Sebagai Demokratisator," 
Suara Pembaruan, 16 August 1992.
43 "ABRI di DPR Cukup 10%," Media Indonesia, 18 August 1992; "ABRI di DPR/MPR: Yang Penting 
Peranan, Bukan Jumlah," Suara karya, 18 August 1992.
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However, ten years of Moerdani's domination within the military ended in 
March 1993 when Soeharto reshuffled his Cabinet. Soeharto quickly moved to install 
loyal officers to the top military positions, which resulted in a massive personnel 
reshuffle in early 1993. This reshuffle was marked by the long-anticipated rise of an 
academy (AMN)-generation officer to the highest position in ABRI when Edi 
Sudradjat, a graduate of AMN in 1960 (Class 1), replaced Try Sutrisno as Pangab. 
This marked the beginning of a new phase in the dzuifungsi debate—one generated by 
'internal change' within ABRI and not just the product of Soeharto-ABRI antagonism.
Back-to-Basics and Professionalism
When Edi Sudradjat was promoted to Pangab in February 1993, he still held 
his current position as KSAD. Then he took Moerdani’s post of Menhankam too in 
March after the Cabinet reshuffle. Not only did the coupling of Pangab and 
Menhankam posts recall the pre-1983 situation before Moerdani became Pangab, but 
even more surprising was the fact that a single person occupied the three top military 
posts—Pangab, Menhankam and KSAD. Edi's pre-eminence, however, did not last 
long. On 8 April, General Wismoyo Arismunandar (AMN 63), a brother-in-law of 
Soeharto's wife, was appointed as the new KSAD and in May General Feisal Tanjung 
(AMN 62) succeeded to the post of Pangab. Edi was thus reduced to the function of 
Menhankam.44 Both were seen as closely allied to Soeharto. These leadership transfers 
in a very short time provided further stimulus to public debate regarding the new 
outlook of ABRI represented by new-generation officers.
A noted reform-minded military intellectual, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, recognised 
that "changes happening these days have a special colour in that it is the first time that 
all the command and staff functions from the Minister of Defence downward are 
occupied by the 'young generation' of officers who graduated from Army, Navy, Air 
Force and Police academies." Regarding dzvifungsi, he pointed out that "it is indeed 
possible that there may be a certain change in the implementation of kekaryaan (posting 
officers to non-military jobs) as the modernisation process of society requires more and 
more specialisation and differentiation."45 It was also suggested in an editorial of the
44 Thus, Edi was kicked 'upstairs' from KSAD to the less-powerful post as Menhankam within this short 
time. This was a part of Soeharto's efforts to eliminate Moerdani’s men from the top military structure. 
Feisal’s promotion was said to be recommended by Habibie to Soeharto. Feisal had known Habibie for a 
long time. Feisal’s Islamic orientation also met with Habibie's desire to cultivate support for his ICMI. We 
discuss this issue later in this chapter.
45 "Change of ABRI Personnel Healthy Move," Jakarta Post, 10 April 1993. In April, three other service 
chiefs were replaced. Vice Admiral Tanto Koeswanto became the new Chief of Staff of the Navy, replacing 
M. Arifin. Air Vice-Marshal Rilo Pambudi became the new Chief of Air Force, replacing Marshal Siboen, 
and Lt-Gen Banurusman became the new Chief of the National Police, succeeding Gen Kunarto. Sayidiman 
himself was an advisor of ICMI.
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ICMI-affiliated Republika that: "with their professionalism, today’s officers are capable 
of anticipating the change of the era. They are more prepared to face future challenges 
which are far more complicated than in the past and, by their nature, impossible to be 
handled by the military. This generation also understands civilian language and ways 
of thinking because they have grown up with peers who are now in civilian jobs. Thus 
we have no obstacle to mutual dialogue as Indonesians are no longer oriented to past 
merit, but to professionalism. This will purify the practice of dwifungsi that is still 
questioned by outsiders [non-ABRI]."46 This comment cautiously expressed 'hopes' 
about the new-generation officers, but its essential purpose was to downgrade any 
privileges ABRI had claimed in the past, by emphasising the new officers' similarity 
with their civilian counterparts. Here, the concept of professionalism which has long 
been associated with ABRI’s self-esteem is tactically borrowed by civilians and 
reinterpreted to limit ABRI’s special position in sociopolitical life.
Defending itself from this attempt to neutralise dwifungsi, ABRI’s newspaper 
quickly responded: "ABRI is professional military plus. The 'plus’ consists of its high 
consciousness that we are called on to defend the nation not only in the military field, 
but also in ipoleksosbud areas. ABRI formulates this role in the doctrine of dual 
function."47 ABRI's localised conception of professionalism represented an effort to 
reassert control of the public debate which was threatening to erode ABRI's 
interpretation of its role.
The dwifungsi debate took a new turn when Edi Sudradjat introduced his 
"back-to-basics" concept. Officially the concept first appeared in 1992 when Army 
Chief Edi Sudradjat received Lt-Gen Wismoyo as his new deputy on 22 August48 It 
was formally adopted as part of Edi's campaign to launch a moral movement aiming 
to refocus the army on its basic professional tasks and to correct several deviations 
within the army structure 49 Media reactions, however, produced a new opportunity 
for extending the debate about ABRI's role by discussing the meaning of back-to- 
basics. A cover story in Tempo (29 May 1993), for example, began as follows. "All key 
posts in ABRI Headquarters were occupied by new people, and the concept of 'back to 
basics' became popular. What is 'back to basics' and how should it be practised?" A 
noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, argued that "the concept implied a declining direct 
political role for ABRI. Edi Sudradjat has proposed the idea to develop ABRI as a 
security tool and it seems to follow the ideas of retired General A.H. Nasution who
46 "Profesionalisme dan ABRI Pasca-45," Republika, 10 April 1993.
47 "ABRI dan Demokrasi," Angkatan Bersenjata, 13 April 1993. Ipoleksosbud is a military term combining 
five terms; ideology, politics, economy, society and culture.
48 Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Pengegkan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back to Basics), TNI-AD, 
Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.41. Deviations ranged from the declining work ethic and discipline of the officer corps 
to the coordination of the command system. This classified document is hereafter called the Edi Paper. We 
will fully examine this project in the next chapter.
49 Ibid., p.41.
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claimed soldiers should not intervene in all fields."50 The press also adopted the 
technique of locating this issue in a gray zone of hinted criticism. Kompas commented, 
for example, that "as depicted in ABRI's self-motto that 'we are loved by the people' 
(rather than scared by people), ABRI is nothing without the people. And because ABRI 
is a fully armed group, it has to have strict discipline. Without this, ABRI is nothing 
more than a gang which intimidates the people. This is the 'basic' of ABRI."51
The back-to-basics idea raised two central questions: what was the purpose of 
this campaign?, and; what was the implication for dwifungsi practice? Regarding the 
purpose, the new Pangab, General Feisal Tanjung, answered defensively in an 
interview that '"back to basics' means refunctionalisation of ABRI as freedom fighters 
and professional soldiers. It does not mean we now have deviations from basic 
norms."52 This assessment illustrated there was no single interpretation about its 
purpose, even within ABRI's top echelon since the Edi Paper clearly mentioned that 
there were certain deviations within the military. Reflecting this, Soeharto warned in 
September that differences of opinion within ABRI, if aired publicly, would give the 
impression of conflict or tension which could create unrest among the people.53 The 
second question about the implications for dwifungsi was raised again by Soeharto 
who repeated his tut wuri handayani instruction 54 The coupling of tut wuri handayani 
and the back-to-basics concept was perceived in political society as a signal that 
Soeharto wanted ABRI to curtail its political role.
The escalation of the dwifungsi debate in this period—involving regeneration 
issues, the question of professionalism, and the back-to-basics concept—finally 
prompted ABRI to rein in the debate. Police Brig-Gen Roekmini, a prominent advocate 
of keterbukaan in the DPR, provided an interpretation which reflected ABRI's official 
approach.55 She stated, in a long article in Angkatan Bersenjata, that the recent critics 
could be divided into three groups. The first group consisted of those who viewed 
ABRI’s extra-defence role as unconstitutional military intervention. They considered 
dwifungsi as a political concept to legitimise and defend ABRI's political power, and 
they always placed ABRI in opposition to democracy, arguing ABRI's presence limits 
democratic life. The second group consisted of those who were similarly unhappy with 
dwifungsi, stemming from their confusion about dwifungsi and kekaryaan in the extra-
50 "Dua Jenderal dari Lembah Tidar," Tempo, 29 May 1993.
51 "ABRI Kembali ke "Basic,"" Kompas, 17 May 1993.
52 "Setelah Pelajaran yang mahal Itu,” Tempo, 29 May 1993. The freedom-fighter refers to the role played by 
the military during the independent war. It is a symbol of ABRI's nationalist orientation.
53 "Soeharto Wants Common Stand on ABRI's Dual Role," Jakarta Post, 28 September 1993.
54 "ABRI Harus Tahu Menempatkan Diri," Merdeka, 12 July 1993; "ABRI Diminta Lapangkan Jalan 
Wujudkan Aspirasi yang Sah," Pelita, 12 July 1993.
55 "Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Motivasi dan Perkembangannya," Angkatan Bersenjata, 5 October 1993. 
Angkatan Bersenjata is an ABRI-owned newspaper.
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military field.56 From their perspective, kekaryaan disturbed their careers, and could not 
be accepted in terms of professionalism. The third group accepted dzuifungsi as a 
concept which could not be separated from the Pancasila democratic system. They not 
only located ABRI in the context of national history, but also considered ABRI's 
presence as a 'must' to prevent national disintegration in this plural society. She then 
went on to claim that the first and second groups had recently interpreted back-to- 
basics as if it meant "back-to-the-barracks," a concept associated with the military in 
Western democracies. Having denied the alleged decline of ABRI's political 
commitment, her article clearly articulated the ABRI view that back-to-basics was not 
intended to question dzuifungsi.57
The questions of ABRI's political role, however, continued to be highlighted in 
two events. First, the Golkar Congress was held in late October 1993. In accordance 
with Soeharto's wishes, the Congress elected Harmoko as its first civilian chairman. 
This civilianisation of Golkar invited an extraordinary attack by the Deputy Head of 
F-ABRI, Maj-Gen Sembiring Meliala, who said that Harmoko and Habibie were nothing 
without the President and when the President was no longer in power, they would 
vanish.58 The emergence of Harmoko certainly created a controversy regarding the 
prospects of the civilian sector in countering ABRI. Kompas, for example, argued that 
neither civilians nor ABRI today had revolutionary experience. Their ability was equal 
in their respective professional fields; thus the newspaper concluded that rethinking of 
ABRI's political role was needed.59
Second, in January 1994, ABRI's central intelligence agency, BAIS, which had 
been developed by Benny Moerdani, was liquidated and replaced with the less
56 ABRI had insisted that kekaryaan was one form of dwifungsi implementation and, therefore, public 
criticism should not be directed at dwifungsi as a whole. We will discuss this interpretative problem in the 
next chapter.
57 Roekmini's counter-argument was also followed by a claim by ABRI that the concept of professionalism 
as used by civilian critics in the recent debate was only applicable in western societies. This had led to 
misunderstanding in judging ABRI's case. See "Profesionalisme ABRI Jangan Sampai Tidak Dimengerti 
Rakyat," Angkatan Bersenjata, 6 October 1993; "Prajurit Pejuang dan Pejuang Prajurit, Memberi Makna Bagi 
Profesionalisme,” Angkatan Bersenjata, 6 October 1993.
58 For Sembiring's comment, see "Mayjen TNI RK Sembiring Meliala: 1000 Orang DPR/MPR Jangan 
Dianggap Togog," DeTik, 27 October - 2 November 1993. Rudini also claimed that the procedures of the 
Congress led by Habibie were not transparent and democratic. The Coordinating Minister of Political and 
Security Affairs (Menko Polkam) Soesilo Soedarman soon responded that Sembiring's and Rudini's 
comments were only individual opinions. "ABRI Tak Persoalkan Hasil Munas," Suara Merdeka, 30 October 
1993. More directly, Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Head of ABRI's Information Centre: Kapuspen) rebutted 
Sembiring's assessment as wrong and said that it exceeded the limits of the individual's right to free speech. 
See "Pemyataan RK Sembiring Dinilai Keliru," Kompas, 31 October 1993. Syarwan was a close ally of 
Feisal Tanjung. Against this, Professor Juwono Sudarsono at UI saw Sembiring’s comment as representing 
ABRI's main-stream view. See "Army General's Comment Whips Up Indonesian Storm," Reuters, 1 November 
1993.
59 "Kilas Balik Hubungan ABRI-Sipil Dalam Golkar," Kompas, 20 October 1993. A similar argument was 
made by Merdeka's two-day special issues. "Sipil Tak Perlu 'Minder' Dengan Generasi ABRI," Merdeka, 5 
October 1993; "Kalangan Sipil Sudah Menyadari Kekeliruannya," Merdeka, 6 October 1993. In assessing 
the implication of Harmoko's leadership of Golkar, however, it should be remembered that whether a leader 
is civilian or military is far less important than whether he is close to the President.
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powerful BIA (Badan Inteligen ABRI: ABRI Intelligence Agency). The end of BAIS saw 
the dismantling of the 'military within the military/ in an institutional sense, and of 
Moerdani's powerful personal network. Justifying the charge, Sudomo said that "it was 
time to reconstruct the intelligence sector which has deviated from its 'basic' task as 
seen in its direct involvement in land disputes, granting permits for fisheries and 
manipulation of sociopolitical organisations."60
ABRI's previous attempt to depoliticise and reinterpret the concept of back-to- 
basics was not successful as unwelcome aspects of the dwifungsi debate continued. 
Backed both by the Golkar civilianisation and the BAIS liquidation, the concept of 
back-to-basics started to provide a legitimate way to talk about the downsizing of 
ABRI's political role, regardless of ABRI's attempts to derail this possibility. Sri 
Bintang Pamungkas, for example, borrowed this concept to express his strong criticism 
of dwifungsi: "considering today's very peaceful situation [in politics], back-to-basics 
of course equals back-to-the-barracks, because the basic function of the military is 
national defence."61 Retired military officers also called for a reduction of ABRI's 
political role. Lt-Gen (ret) Suhardiman, a member of Golkar's Central Leadership 
Council, called for the virtual abolition of ABRI's political role when he argued that 
"the debate on back-to-basics, whether you like it or not, brings up the problem of 
dwifungsi. I think the sociopolitical function of ABRI should be conducted via Pepabri, 
and will not require Kassospol any more in the structure of ABRI."62 A less radical 
interpretation was proposed by retired Lt-Gen Soebijakto, former governor of the 
National Defence Institute (Lemhannas), who insisted that the Indonesian military 
under its first Commander, General Sudirman, only engaged in politics at the national 
level, and was not concerned with such posts of governor, regent (bupati) or 
ambassador. According to him, this was the meaning of 'basic' in the context of back- 
to-basics.63 Retired Lt-Gen Hasnan Habib also rejected an interpretation which limited 
back-to-basics to an internal technical adjustment, and insisted it was rather a policy 
statement concerning dwifungsi practice, responding to the problems evident in the Dili 
incident and other cases of military repression.64
Reflecting this tendency to utilise the back-to-basics concept as an opening to 
limit dwifungsi, General Edi Sudradjat himself finally claimed in February 1994 that 
"the concepts of back-to-basics and tut wuri handayani today are manipulated by 
certain groups of people for their own interest."65 He regretted that some people were 
deliberately misreading the term "back-to-basics" as if it was "back-to-the-barracks"
60 "Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi," Kompas, 18 January 1994.
61 "Konsensus Peran Sospol ABRI?," Forum Keadilan, 17 February 1994. Forum Keadilan in this issue 
provided a special coverage on back-to-basics.
62 Ibid. Pepabri is the Association of Retired Soldiers.
63 "ABRI Modern Tak Perlu Peran Sospol," Forum Keadilan, 17 February 1994.
64 "Back to Basics," Forum Keadilan, 17 February 1994.
65 "Manipulasi 'Back to Basic' dan 'Tut Wuri Handayani' Menyesatkan," Kompas, 22 February 1994.
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and particularly mentioned the name of Sri Bintang Pamungkas, whose outlook he 
deemed too westernised.66 Edi's posture was soon adopted as ABRI's official answer 
to the recent back-to-basics debate. ABRI's official history, 50 Tahun ABRI, recalled 
the dispute and also endorsed Edi's line that "the concept developed outside of ABRI 
and reflected the interests of certain groups [pihak tertentu].”67
For the ABRI leadership, back-to-basics had no implications for limiting ABRI's 
political role. Nonetheless, the use of the term "back-to-basics" had opened 
opportunities to extend the debate over dwifungsi. The concept not only provoked a 
political debate regarding its interpretation, but also supplied a useful umbrella for the 
media and society to use this opportunity to introduce wider criticisms concerning 
ABRI's role in the current political scene. The same could be said about tut zvuri 
handayani, the new generation, and professionalism which also became common 
concepts in the recent civil-military dialogue. The societal 'takeover' of these concepts 
in the evolving dwifungsi debate during this period effectively expanded the arena of 
permissible political debate concerning the proper role of ABRI in the polity. Although 
Soeharto still played a role in triggering the dwifungsi debate, the development of the 
debate was largely carried by political society which had sought effective ways to 
pressure ABRI since the early keterbukaan period.
ABRI Representation in the DPR
The next major phase in the dwifungsi discourse can be found after the MPR 
decision to reduce F-ABRI seats from 100 to 75 in June 1995. This stage showed the 
increasing autonomy of dwifungsi criticism as a social movement. As seen above, the 
reduction of the F-ABRI was a product of the 1992 debate in which Soeharto and the 
ABRI leadership had concluded that F-ABRI was still needed, but the number could be 
reconsidered. Before discussing this development, it is important to assess the political 
background leading to the decision to scale down F-ABRI which represents one of the 
strategic pillars of ABRI's political engagement.
General Edi Sudradjat's statement in February 1994 regarding the manipulation 
of the back-to-basics and tut wuri handayani concepts was a response to the growing 
influence and assertiveness of the political media which had enjoyed partial freedom 
under the keterbukaan phenomenon. For regime leaders, however, the amount of 
political leeway accorded to the media was still a function of regime stability as 
determined by them. Subsequent events in 1994 indicated that they had decided to put 
the media on a shorter leash. It was symbolic that Soeharto on 16 August, the eve of
66 "Antara Basic dan Barrack," Editor, 3 March 1994.
67 Pusjarah ABRI, 50 Tahun ABRI, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1995, n.p..
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independence day, declared that "keterbukaan surely has a limit."68 Soeharto's desire to 
re-regulate political life had been evident two months earlier when three major 
weeklies—Tempo, Editor and the tabloid DeTik—were banned by the Minister of 
Information (and Golkar Chairman) Harmoko who cancelled their printing permits 
(SIUPP).69
The banning of the three magazines on 21 June resulted in demonstrations in 
Jakarta, demanding the reissue of the SIUPP for the banned magazines. 
Demonstrations were, however, soon repressed by security forces. Since then, Soeharto 
seemed to replace his keterbukaan rhetoric with the more familiar ketertutupan 
(closeness) style. This was the background of his speech on 16 August, and it was 
followed by three events which indicated a further tightening of political control. First 
was the recalling from parliament of two outspoken politicians, Bambang Warih 
Kusuma from Golkar and PPP's Sri Bintang Pamungkas in January and February 
1995.70 Secondly, three journalists from Independen, an underground magazine 
published by the newly created association of sacked journalists, AJI, were arrested in 
March—two of them former Tempo journalists. Shortly thereafter, PWI, the sole legal 
journalists union, decided to expel thirteen PWI members associated with AJI, warning 
that any media group which continued to employ AJI members would lose its SIUPP.71 
Thirdly, in May, a soothsayer Permadi—who the previous year had allegedly 
predicted that Soeharto would be replaced by Megawati in 1997—was arrested on the 
charge of insulting the Prophet Mohammed by describing him as a dictator, in an 
academic seminar at Gajah Mada University (UGM) in April.72
This series of actions illustrated that the state still held the capacity to resort to 
repressive measures—without risking an intra-regime split—against democratic 
movements, regardless of growing criticism from the international arena and domestic 
civil society. In an attempt to wrongfoot his critics, Soeharto shrewdly moved to soften
68 Even during the 1992 general elections and 1993 MPR session, two key events with potential for stirring 
political instability, Soeharto did not refer to the need to retreat from keterbukaan.
69 The official reason was provocation of instability in the case of Tempo, without mentioning any 
particular article, and administrative problems at the other two magazines. However, it was widely 
believed that Tempo's article which revealed the conflict between Habibie and Finance Minister Marie 
Muhammad over the budget to purchase 39 German warships became the trigger. See "Jerman Punya Kapal, 
Indonesia Punya Beban," Tempo, 4 June 1994. This story was soon taken up by other magazines while Edi 
Sudradjat was reported as saying Habibie's demands were too high. This media-exposed picture of intra­
regime conflict between Habibie, on the one hand, and Mar'ie and Edi with the backing of a segment in 
ABRI, on the other hand, was said to have made Soeharto angry, leading to his order to punish the three 
magazines.
70 The recall was decided by the party leadership councils, undoubtedly under pressures from the 
government.
71 Among those expelled were Goenawan Mohamad, managing editor of the banned weekly Tempo, Fikri 
Jufri, former Tempo editor-in-chief and editor of the monthly Matra, and Eros Djarot, managing editor of 
Detik.
72 Megawati Sukarnoputri—a daughter of Sukarno—had been the chairperson of the PDI since December 
1993. We discuss the issues of Megawati's PDI later in this chapter.
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his image by making concessions in a liberal direction. The F-ABRI reduction in June 
was therefore in fact made in the context of re-regulating politics.
It is worth noting that the bill to cut the number of ABRI representatives in 
parliament, which was submitted on 23 April 1995 and passed by the DPR on 15 June, 
was not in response to pressure from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) whom 
Soeharto, on 21 February, had publicly assigned the task of conducting research on 
ABRI's representation in the DPR and the electoral system in general. Without waiting 
for the research results which were finally announced in 1997, Sekneg Moerdiono, 
Interior Minister Yogie S. Memet and Pangab Feisal Tanjung submitted the bill, 
undoubtedly with Soeharto's approval. Actually, in February and March, when the 
idea was still under consideration, Kassospol Let-Gen Moh. Ma'ruf had stated— 
possibly as a delaying tactic—that it would be necessary to wait until LIPI produced 
its results.73 This indicated that the decision came from the highest levels just before 
the submission of the bill, rather than from any consensus within the ABRI leadership, 
and it gave rise to speculation that there was a gap between Soeharto's loyalist officers 
and ABRI’s corporate interests.74 If the aim was to create an image that the regime was 
still committed to the promotion of democracy, the timing of the bill was quite rational 
even though LIPI was left behind.
The reduction of F-ABRI provoked an active debate in the mass media. When 
the idea first appeared in February, Moerdiono reiterated that it was not intended to 
review dwifungsi, but was just a technical review concerning the proper number of F- 
ABRI seats.75 This attempt to prevent a possible spillover of the debate and stifle 
critical views on dwifungsi was, however, easily side-stepped by the media which 
provoked a tsunami of dwifungsi debate. In response, the new Army Chief, General 
Hartono, who was installed in the post in February 1995, quickly warned the public 
not to link ABRI's sociopolitical role with the number of F-ABRI seats.76 Remarks made 
by Moerdiono and Hartono well reflected their anxiety about the increasing autonomy 
of the public debate over ABRI's role in society.
73 "LIPI Akan Minta Pendapat Orsospol dan Pakar ABRI Siap Wakilnya di DPR Dikurangi," Republika, 24 
February 1995; "Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik," Tiras, 16 March 1995.
74 About such speculation, see Gatra's report "Dua Puluh Lima Kursi untuk Demokrasi," in the May 6 
Edition. The existence of this gap was evident in an August 1995 poll conducted by Forum Keadilan which 
showed only 47 percent of ABRI respondents supported the reduction of F-ABRI members. See "ABRI Bicara 
Demokrasi," Forum Keadilan, Edisi Khusus 50 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, August 1995.
75 "Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan Jumlah Anggota ABRI di 
DPR," Kompas, 22 February 1995.
76 "Sorotan Terhadap Peran Sospol ABRI Jangan Dikaitkan Dengan Jumlahnya," Merdeka, 11 March 1995. 
Hartono's promotion to KSAD, replacing Wismoyo, was followed by a reshuffling of top posts during 
February and March, affecting more than 160 officers. Like Feisal Tanjung, Hartono was also a santri 
(devote Muslim) officer, and his promotion was seen as indicating Soeharto's inclination to place loyal 
Muslim officers in ABRI's leadership positions in the process of reconstructing the ABRI structure after the 
Moerdani era.
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Indeed, on April 25, two days after the bill was submitted, YLBHI's Mulyana 
W. Kusumah circulated a press release on the F-ABRI problem.77 He argued, inter alia, 
that the plan to reduce the number of ABRI appointees in the DPR should also cover 
the regional parliaments. He went on to assert that although such a reduction in ABRI 
representation in the DPR certainly would not decrease ABRI's bargaining power in 
real politics, it surely would push forward the idea of redefining dwifungsi practice. On 
the same day, Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution cynically stated that: "it looks as if ABRI now 
recognises that getting seats in the DPR without being elected is unconstitutional, and 
is also alien to the concept of dzuifungsi.”78 A critical view was also presented, before 
the bill's submission, by Arbi Sanit who suggested that reducing the military presence 
in the DPR was vitally needed, arguing that the higher the number of appointees, the 
lower the level of democracy. He also proposed that the reduction could be made 
incrementally, so eventually, after four or five elections, there would be no appointed 
members in the DPR.79 The idea of limiting ABRI’s participation to the MPR was also 
expressed by Afan Gaffar, a political scientist at the Gajah Mada University, who 
urged that—in return for reducing the number—it would be possible to give ABRI a 
veto-power in the MPR, which could be used to thwart efforts to replace Pancasila 
and also assure the military that it could continue to protect its vital interests.80
The idea of liquidating ABRI from the DPR was of course challenged by both 
moderates and conservatives in ABRI. Gen (ret) Rudini represented a middle-of-the- 
road position. Although reform-minded on most issues, as a former Army Chief, he 
also defended traditional ABRI positions. He argued that abandoning ABRI's presence 
in the DPR was not acceptable because ABRI, which also consists of citizens' had 
already given up (melepaskan) its voting rights in return for holding seats in the DPR. 
But if the voting rights were restored for ABRI, that would invite a return to the 
negative situation witnessed in 1955 when the army was split along partisan lines.81 
Rudini's interpretation of F-ABRI's raison d'etre, that is to avoid intra-ABRI conflict, 
seemingly strayed from official ideology which insists that ABRI s sociopolitical 
function is legitimised in order to safeguard the nation, i.e. UUD45 and Pancasila, not 
for the sake of avoiding in-house conflict. However, this point was further elaborated 
by the ABRI spokesman, Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Kapuspen), who emphasised 
practical rather than historical reasons for not restricting ABRI. He argued that F-ABRI 
was needed to fight against any threat to Pancasila, and in order to perform this
77 Siaran Pers Yayasan LBH Indonesia Menanggapi Usulan Pengurangan Anggota ABRI di DPR-RI (No. 
010/SP/YLBHI/IV/1995).
78 "AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pemah Minta Diangkat," Kompas, 26 April 1995.
79 "Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik," Forum Keadilan, 30 March 1995. Some members in the two 
opposition parties also showed a similar line of thinking. See comments of B.N. Marbun of PDI and Yusuf 
Syakir of PPP in "Politicians Debate ABRI seats in the House," Jakarta Post, 26 February 1995.
80 "Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik," Forum Keadilan, 30 March 1995.
81 "AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pemah Minta Diangkat," Kompas, 26 April 1995
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function effectively, the reduction in seats should not be too much.82 Similarly, Maj- 
Gen (ret) Samsuddin, a keterbukaan advocate in the F-ABRI who subsequently lost his 
position, emphasised the legal justification of the F-ABRI system which he saw as 
based on the National Consensus in 1967 Law No. 20/1982 and the 1985 political 
law.83 These ideas were also supported by the 'civilian incompetence' theory. The 
political scientist, Amir Santoso of UI, also a director of the military-linked Centre for 
Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), noted the recent critical mood toward 
dwifungsi and the presence of F-ABRI, and argued that the demand to reduce ABRI's 
kekaryaan role was not the will of every social stratum, since the grass-roots people still 
needed ABRI because the authority and level of professionalism of civilians was still 
too weak. Moreover he pointed to the fact that the attendance of F-ABRI members in 
the DPR was higher than the other three fractions, thus contributing more to 
parliamentary life.84
The varying opinions above certainly illustrate that even an essentially technical 
issue like cutting the number of F-ABRI seats could easily be transformed into a matter 
of principle as the dwifungsi debate developed. This implied that even after 30 years of 
dwifungsi institutionalisation, there was still a large gray zone in interpreting its 
legitimacy. Perhaps reflecting this fact, the mass media frequently brought A.FI. 
Nasution, the founder of dwifungsi, into the debate to judge whether or not the current 
situation met with the original intent. This time, Nasution contributed to the debate by 
reiterating his views in an article entitled Tut Wuri Handayani.85 His argument could be 
summarised as follows.
First, there is no restriction for ABRI to enter the DPR—since UUD45 recognises 
that all citizens have the right to vote and be elected. Recalling Indonesia's first election 
in 1955 where he himself was a member of the Preparatory Committee, Nasution 
emphasised the fact that he rejected Sukarno's proposal to appoint military 
representatives in parliament because, according to him, it was the people who should 
nominate and elect the parliamentary members. Thus if military men want to be 
parliamentarians, they should be non-active during the campaign and go through the 
electoral procedure. If elected, they should give up their commissions and become 
politicians, but if not, they could return to active military service. However, the MPR is 
different since the UUD45 provides for functional group representation in the MPR.
82 "Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik," Tiras, 16 March 1995.
83 "Mayjen (purn.) Samsudin: Jangan Buat Pressure Terhadap MPR," Tiras, 16 March 1995. The so-called 
National Consensus—which was adopted by the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in 
1967—allowed the military to have representatives in the DPR. Law No.20/1982 legalised ABRI's 
dwifungsi doctrine, and,—as seen above—the political law (Law No.2/1985) determined 100 seats for F- 
ABRI.
84 "Yahya Muhaimin: Sipil harus Peduli Dwifungsi," Republika, 7 March 1995. However, even though 
attendance is high, their participation is rare because—according to Muchtar Pakpahan, a prominent 
labour activist—the fraction's majority—middle-ranking officers—hesitates to speak in deference to higher­
ranking officers. See Muchtar Pakpahan, DPR RI Semasa Orde Baru, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1994, p.148.
83 Gatra, 17 June 1995.
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Thus ABRI should only involve itself in big political issues ("P" besar) in the MPR, but 
not small ones ("p'kecil) in the DPR.86 The two important points here are: rejection of 
ABRI's 'appointed' seats in parliament; and approval of 'semi-active' military 
personnel—whose status is non-active during the election but can be re-activated if not 
elected—participating in elections. In the evolving debate on dwifungsi, the former was 
often raised by military critics. Yet the latter has never enjoyed large support in either 
critical circles or among dwifungsi old guard supporters.87 It should be noted here that 
despite his symbolic presence as the dwifungsi creator-critic, Nasution’s ideas did not 
become a major force in the ideological marketplace.
Even so, the fact that Nasution—now the only senior military officer who had 
ever exercised command over Soeharto during his military career—energetically 
contributed to the critical side in the debate provoked Soeharto's negative reaction and 
counter-interpretation concerning F-ABRI's rationale. In his address at the leadership 
meeting of FKPPI, on June 18, Soeharto censured dwifungsi critics as follows.88
There are some individuals who still raise the question of ABRI representation in the 
DPR. They wrongly interpret dwifungsi as if it is enough to be in the MPR, but ABRI's 
presence in the DPR is also a 'must' because Indonesia is based on Ketahanan 
Nasional which is strongly linked with development programs formulated on the 
basis of the cooperation between the government and the DPR. Thus if ABRI were to 
be excluded from the DPR, Ketahanan Nasional would also be in trouble. Those who 
insist that it is sufficient for ABRI to be represented in the MPR forget the fact that 
today's interpretation of dwifungsi is different from that of the pre-New Order 
period. Today, ABRI is recognised as a sociopolitical force equal to other 
sociopolitical forces in society, whereas in the past ABRI was just called on to play a 
sociopolitical role 89
Here, Soeharto turned to Ketahanan Nasional as the source of legitimacy for ABRI's 
institutional involvement in the legislative body. Though this logic seems to lack a 
plausible explanation for the link between occupying parliamentary seats and securing 
Ketahanan Nasional, F-ABRI is interpreted here as being an organic part of Ketahanan 
Nasional, and therefore an unquestioned national doctrine. It in effect implied that 
Soeharto read the criticism of F-ABRI as aimed at undermining the basic national 
doctrine or the national foundation, alarming critics who had developed different 
versions in deciphering F-ABRI's raison d'etre and the art of dwifungsi. Needless to say, 
the main target was Nasution, the original interpretor of dwifungsi.
As seen above, the decision to reduce F-ABRI seats inevitably raised the 
question of ABRI's legitimacy in conducting its non-military role. This stimulated a
86 However, political manoeuvring between Sukarno and Nasution at that time should be noted. If military 
representatives were appointed by Sukarno, his influence would be maintained among officer-politicians.
87 We will further examine the discourse of ABRI's electoral participation in Chapter 6.
88 "Ajakan Mulat Sarira," Media Indonesia Minggu, 25 June 1995. FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri 
Pumawirawan Indonesia) is the Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI Veterans.
89 Ketahanan Nasional (National Resilience) is a national doctrine of Indonesia which encompasses 
security-political-social-economic aspects to maintain Indonesia's autonomy in international society.
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vigorous public political debate and finally invited Soeharto's reactive defence of 
ABRL W hat was perceivable in this period was the growing autonomy of dwifungsi 
criticism in the country's political discourse. The F-ABRI debate in 1995 indicated that 
the dwifungsi issue had already developed to the point which could not be handled by 
ABRI w ithout Soeharto's backup. By now, of course, Soeharto had rid himself of 
Moerdani and appointed a military leadership of his own choosing.
Nevertheless, in real politics, it was commonly understood that F-ABRI's 
num erical reduction would not affect ABRI's actual political power. Since ABRI's 
institutional power basis—largely originating from its territorial security structure, 
intelligence netw ork, and sociopolitical com m and line extending from ABRI 
Headquarters down to the village level—remained untouched, critical intellectuals were 
generally pessimistic about curbing military influence in the political arena.90 Though 
ABRI’s share of the parliamentary seats would formally decline after 1997, it was not 
difficult to suspect that ABRI might try to compensate for the loss by channelling its 
efforts through Golkar. In fact, Golkar-ABRI relations soon become a central political 
issue and invited another round of dwifungsi debate.
Golkar-ABRI Relations Revisited
The empowered critical segment in political society then found a target in ABRI 
when the new military leadership under Feisal Tanjung overtly sided with Golkar in the 
1997 election. ABRI's support to Golkar in the post-M oerdani era brought about a 
significant change in the constellation of elite politics.
Golkar's Supremacy over ABRI?
In the m idst of the F-ABRI debate, Harmoko, the first civilian chairman of 
Golkar, seemed to disparage ABRI's role in Golkar. He claimed that his own political 
success demonstrated that the civil-military distinction was not valid in Golkar by 
maintaining that "once one becomes a Golkar candidate, h e /she  is a member of the 
Golkar Big Family (KBG), and no longer w ith ABRI."91 However, some significant mass 
organisations—such as FKPPI, Pepabri and Pemuda Panca Marga (the Youth of Five 
Duties, or PPM)—belonged to both KBG and the ABRI Big Family (KBA). Apart from
90 We will fully discuss the issue of territorial command in the dwifungsi discourse in Chapter 6.
91 "Wawancara Harmoko: Tidak Ada yang Terpukul, Tidak Ada yang Kalah," Forum Keadilan, 25 May 
1995. The concept of Big Family (Keluarga Besar) is an expression of Indonesian political culture. Political 
organisations often express their links with subordinates (organisations and individuals) by using the term 
'"family." Therefore, the Golkar Big Family refers to the aggregation of Golkar-affiliated organisations in 
the government and society. The same can be applied to ABRI which has its own Big Family. On the political 
culture of the Big Family, see Shiraishi (1997).
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this overlap in membership between the two Big Families, ABRI had been eager to 
influence non-KBA mass organisations in KBG by placing KBA members in leadership 
posts.92 From these facts, Flarmoko's statement could not easily be accepted by the 
ABRI side.
As seen above, the civilianisation of the Golkar chairmanship in 1993 was a 
hard fact for ABRI. In response, ABRI strove to have KBA members elected as heads 
of Golkar Regional Leadership Councils, both at provincial (Tingkat I) and prefectural 
(kebupaten/kotamadya: Tingkat II) levels. This strategy was successful and resulted in 
seventy-eight percent of Tingkat I and seventy percent of Tingkat II leaders being KBA 
members.93 Under such circumstances, it was not difficult to imagine that Harmoko’s 
leadership might be threatened from below. It was in this context that Harmoko 
emphasised the independence of Golkar from ABRI.
Flarmoko's remark soon stimulated a debate. At the end of June 1995, a well 
publicised panel discussion was held in Jakarta and attended by a huge number of 
DPR politicians from Golkar, PPP and PDI. On this occasion, Gen (ret) Soemitro 
insisted that ABRI refrain once again from backing Golkar in the 1997 general elections, 
as it had in 1992. Of course it was not the first time that outspoken retired officers, 
including Soemitro, had spoken against ABRI's traditional commitment to Golkar. 
However, considering the timing and occasion of his comment, his remark was picked 
up by the mass media.94
Harmoko quickly reacted at a meeting of Golkar cadres where he insisted that 
ABRI itself did not support Golkar in any case because its members were individuals 95 
His implication was that ABRI as 'an institution' had no role in supporting Golkar. He 
argued that active ABRI members could not join Golkar unless they retired first, but 
ABRI-affiliated mass organisations, such as Pepabri, FKPPI, LVRI (the veterans' 
legion), could channel their political aspirations through Golkar as members of KBG. 
Such an interpretation placed KBA between Golkar and ABRI and also distinguished 
between ABRI and KBA. By denying ABRI’s direct support for Golkar, Harmoko’s 
argument was intended not only to rebut Soemitro but also to protect the autonomy of 
the Golkar leadership which could be questioned if it admitted ABRI's strong support 
for Golkar. Ironically, Harmoko's argument echoed an ABRI-created interpretation 
intended to rebut criticism that Golkar was a tool of ABRI. This time it was 
reproduced by Harmoko to defend Golkar's independence. In early July, Harmoko
92 For the details of this strategy to place KBA individuals in KBG organisations, see Badjoeri Widagdo 
(Letkol Inf), "Pendayagunaan Keluarga Besar ABRI dalam Memantapkan Demokrasi Pancasila," Widya 
Dharma (Majalah Sesko ABRI), No.16, 1991, pp. 21-61. A well-known example is Pemuda Pancasila (PP) 
which is a Golkar-affiliated organisation that also defines itself as a "moral" member of KBA, whereas 
FKPPI and PPM are seen to be "biological" members of KBA. See "PPM: Menampik Ekslusivisme," Pancasila 
Abadi, 15 January 1995. Pancasila Abadi is PP's official magazine.
93 "Turun Naik Flubungan ABRI-Golkar," Gatra, 8 July 1995.
94 See Gatra s report, "Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak," in the 8 July edition.
95 "Harmoko: ABRI Tidak 'Back Up' Golkar," Suara Merdeka, 25 June 1995.
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reinforced his previous comment in an interview with a weekly magazine.96 By 
emphasising the difference between ABRI as 'organisation' and 'individuals/ Harmoko 
firmly denied the link with the military as an organisation and stated that Golkar had 
only been backed by its cadres. Obviously the cadres included organisations under 
KB A, but he implied the supremacy of Golkar vis-a-vis ABRI in Golkar's management.
The military side soon raised objections. The Secretary-General of Pepabri, 
retired Maj-Gen Abdul Kadir, in an official letter, showed his distaste for Harmoko's 
explanation. Kadir claimed that it was baseless to see Pepabri as a unit of Golkar. 
Similarly, Achmad Tahir, head of LVRI, told Harmoko directly that not all members of 
LVRI channel their political aspirations through Golkar, as around ten percent of its 
800,000 members (or 11 million if their families are included) supported other political 
organisations.97 From the active military side, KSAD General Hartono further 
complicated the debate by saying that Pepabri as a mass organisation (ormas) was not 
part of any political organisation (orsospol), because only individuals in ormas may 
become cadres or members of orsospol.98 At this stage Harmoko claimed that it was 
legitimate to say that the ormas in KBG supported Golkar in elections and therefore 
they were Golkar cadres. For Hartono, however, it was not ormas, but just individuals 
(orang-orang) within the ormas who supported Golkar and became its cadres—so the 
ormas, in this case Pepabri and others in KBA, were not subordinated to Golkar. 
Hartono's remark did not deny ABRI's commitment to Golkar, but only rejected 
Golkar's control over KBA organisations affiliated to the KBG. It was in these 
circumstances that the dispute between Harmoko and KBA became apparent99
This Harmoko issue encouraged a more general debate on Golkar-ABRI 
relations. Afan Gaffar of UGM branded the recent argument regarding ABRI's link with 
Golkar as superficial, since it was common public knowledge that ABRI had strong 
commitment to Golkar.100 He labelled ABRI and Golkar as loro-loring atunggal, a 
Javanese expression for 'two but one.' Referring to Harmoko's statement that Golkar 
had never been backed by ABRI, Afan suggested that this was only for campaign 
purposes. Yahya Muhaimin at UGM also believed that it was impossible for Golkar to 
win elections without ABRI's backing at the Korem and Koramil levels.101 Up to this 
stage, a large portion of the intellectual participation in the debate seemed to be 
governed by a cynical view of Harmoko's statements. The mood changed, however, 
after Maj-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Assistant to the ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs,
96 "Harmoko Menjawab Tuduhan," Gatra, 8 July 1995.
97 Both comments are from "'Diskusi' Harmoko dan Para Jenderal," Media Indonesia Minggu, 25 June 1995.
98 "KSAD Jenderal TNI R. Hartono: ABRI Akan Siapkan yang non-ABRI untuk Meneruskan Karya ABRI," 
Forum Keadilan, 17 July 1995.
99 In the above interview, Hartono insisted that certain people in Pepabri were not satisfied with 
Harmoko's management of Golkar. It should be noted that, unlike Feisal, Hartono had no role in placing 
Harmoko as the Golkar chairman in 1993.
100 "Golkar dan ABRI," Forum Keadilan, 17 July 1995.
101 See "Ada Apa di Sekitar Hubungan Golkar-ABRI?," Forum Keadilan, 17 July 1995.
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or Assospol Kassospol) shifted the focus of debate from the Harmoko issue to the 
principle of dwifungsi in late September.
Syanuan's Initiative
The lingering speculation that many ABRI officers were not satisfied with 
Harmoko's leadership of Golkar was clouded by the perception that General Feisal 
Tanjung had been close to the Habibie-Harmoko line. Before the Golkar Congress of 
1993, Feisal had announced that ABRI would not nominate a candidate for Golkar 
Chairman—a comment supporting Flabibie's effort to promote Golkar civilianisation, 
and reversing General Edi Sudradjat's previous statement that ABRI was ready to 
provide ten to twelve candidates for the race for the chairman's post.102 It was in 
September 1995, when disharmony between ABRI and Golkar emerged in the public 
spotlight, that the ABRI Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, again pursued 
rapprochement with Golkar under Harmoko. At a seminar entitled 'ABRI and Golkar,' 
held by the Discussion Forum for Political Journalists on 28 September, Maj-Gen 
Syarwan Hamid insisted that ABRI could not be neutral in politics because ABRI as a 
sociopolitical force needed to choose a partner to promote national well-being, and for 
this reason, ABRI's position was close to Golkar.103 Five days later, Kapuspen Brig- 
Gen Suwamo Adiwijoyo, who inherited this post from Syarwan the previous March, 
asserted that: "if ABRI is asked to be neutral, it would mean that ABRI should 
abandon its principles (to maintain stability) and that is impossible."104 On the same 
day, just after a meeting with Soeharto, Feisal Tanjung further pushed the position 
taken by his staff by saying that "KBA surely sides with Golkar, so ABRI, through the 
KB A, must channel its aspirations to Golkar."105
Assessing ABRI as a whole, this rapprochement could be seen as an adjustment 
by Cilangkap—no doubt on Soeharto's instruction—to overcome the apparent gap 
between ABRI and Golkar. Feisal's statement effectively reversed Hartono’s previous 
explanation on the KBA-Golkar relationship. So too the comments of Syarwan and 
Suwamo rejected ABRI's standard claim to 'stand above all groups.' Whatever their 
intentions, one obvious risk of proclaiming ABRI's proximity to Golkar was that it 
would raise the question of dwifungsi. This time, the dispute focussed on two
102 "Mencari Ketua, Menyiapkan Suksesi," Tempo, 8 May 1993.
103 "ABRI Tidak Bisa Netral Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol," Kompas, 30 September 1995. Syarwan was 
promoted to Assospol Kassospol in June 1995, replacing Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo. Hari was then appointed 
to F-ABRI together with Maj-Gen Haris Sudamo, East Java Military Commander (Pangdam V/Brawijaya) 
and Maj-Gen Theo Syafei, the Commander of ABRI's Staff and Command College (DanSesko ABRI). Haris 
was replaced by Maj-Gen Imam Utomo, a close ally of Hartono, while Theo's post was taken by Maj-Gen 
Yunus Yosfiah, a figure close to Feisal. Theo, a Protestant officer, had close links with former Menhankam 
Benny Moerdani and Edi Sudradjat, and was therefore a target of Feisal and Hartono who were installed 
in the ABRI leadership as part of Soeharto's de-Moerdani-sation program.
104 "ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral," Kompas, 4 October 1995.
1.05 "Pangab: ABRI Salurkan Aspirasinya ke Golkar," Bernas, 4 October 1995.
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dimensions. One was the old argument about ABRI's neutrality in conducting 
divifungsi. The other was the concern about a sectarian tendency in the ABRI 
leadership.
Neutrality in Question
For many political observers, Syarwan's statement recalled Soeharto's famous 
speech at Pekanbaru in 1980—similarly two years before an election—when he said 
that as a defence force ABRI was neutral, but as a sociopolitical force it should side 
with forces which defend Pancasila and UUD45.106 Since Syarwan’s and Feisal's 
comments were made just before the 50th ABRI Anniversary on October 5, the 
argument exploded in the mass media and invited a huge outpouring of criticism from 
intellectuals.
The PDI and PPP reacted immediately. In the DPR Commission II, led by Maj- 
Gen Hari Sabamo of F-ABRI, Subagyo from the PDI strongly criticised Syarwan's 
comment as contradicting Law No.20/1982 which stated the official stance of ABRI 
on the dual function.107 "If ABRI cannot be neutral and only wants to work with a force 
which really respects Pancasila and UUD45," he asked, "does it mean PDI and PPP 
are not Pancasilaist and Constitutionalist?" He warned that Syarwan's comment 
would not only confuse people, but also invite social unrest. The PDI Head, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, also showed her displeasure by warning that ABRI’s stabilising and 
dynamising role should not end with merely becoming the implementor of government 
policy.108 A similar criticism arose from PPP members who claimed that divifungsi 
would lose its principles if it sided with Golkar, since all political parties already 
accepted Pancasila as their sole principle in the mid-1980s.109
Apart from the political parties, which would be directly harmed by ABRI's 
siding with Golkar, the mass media also focused on the issue. Soon after Syarwan's 
statement, Suara Merdeka, the leading Semarang newspaper, accused him of arbitrarily 
dichotomising ABRI as a defence force and a sociopolitical force. Its editorial cynically 
argued that, "however ABRI defines its role, it does not change the reality that ABRI 
was bom from the rakyat (people), and thus must be neutral toward Golkar, PDI, and 
PPP, which all represent the people."110 Riswanda Imawan of UGM also stressed that
106 See Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 21 Maret 1980 Di Pakanbaru, 
Jakarta: Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6-7. The debate over Soeharto's speech is vividly analysed in 
Jenkins (1984).
107 The law stated that "ABRI—as a social force—shall work together with other social forces in 
performing its tasks of safeguarding national independence and people's welfare..., and promoting Pancasila 
democracy and constitutional life based on UUD45” (Article 28/Law No.20/1982).
108 For Subagyo's comment, see "Aspirasi Politik Keluarga Besar ABRI Tetap ke Golkar," Suara Merdeka, 4 
October 1995. Megawati's account is from "ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral," Kompas, 4 October 1995.
109 A comment of Matori Abdul Djalil, the former Secretary-General of the PPP, quoted from "Langkah 
Mundur Jika ABRI Tetap Memihak Golkar," Bernas, 1 October 1995.
110 "ABRI Tak Bisa Hanya Memihak Salah Satu Kekuatan Sospol," Suara Merdeka, 1 October 1995.
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the PPP and PDI were the products of the New Order just like Golkar, and claimed 
that Syarwan's announcement further blurred the legitimacy of dwifungsi which should 
be implemented in a neutral way as a tool for the state, not for the ruling political 
party.111 Concern was also expressed in Kompas which ran four long articles in its 
October 5th edition, based on a panel discussion entitled "Reflections on the 50th- 
anniversary of ABRI." Kompas concluded that: "ABRI has already abandoned its 
neutrality, but given the fact that every political party now accepts Pancasila as its 
sole ideology, ABRI should reconsider its siding with one party and maintain the 
neutrality that is crucial to deter sectarian politics."112
From revolutionary generation officers, the 'deviation' argument was typically 
heard. Navy Lt-Gen (ret) Ali Sadikin, the head of the critical Petisi 50 group, declared 
that ABRI today was not the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia but the 
Armed Forces of Golkar (AB-Golkar), and insisted on the need to return to the spirit of 
Indonesia's first Army Commander Gen Sudirman who said: "the politics ABRI 
supports is the politics of the nation, not politics of the government."113 More direct 
censure came from Lt-Gen (ret) Kemal Idris, a man widely believed to have been one of 
the founders of the New Order political system in the mid-1960s under Soeharto. For 
him, Syarwan's comment was unacceptable and illustrated the arrogance of power 
which made power-holders believe "I can do no wrong." According to this former 
Commander of Kostrad (the army's elite strategic reserve command), Syarwan’s view 
was not in accord with the intention of dwifungsi as officially formulated at the second 
Army Seminar in 1966, in which he himself had been deeply involved.114
The opposition point of view was argued by a respected ABRI intellectual, Maj- 
Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, former Pangdam VI/Tanjungpura (1988-1991) and former 
secretary-general of the Ministry of Transmigration, who was now Habibie’s advisor on 
ABRI and defence-security issues.115 Appearing in Kompas, his argument questioned 
the current tendency to assume that ABRI-Golkar segregation would automatically 
promote democracy. He argued that ABRI was badly needed by Golkar to function as 
a binding force (pengikat) to hold together the various elements and factions within 
Golkar. He feared that Golkar's sectarian politics might explode if it freed itself from 
ABRI, which in turn would undermine the prospects for democracy.116
111 "ABRJ's Political Stance a Setback, Scholar Says," Jakarta Post, 6 October 1995.
112 Diskusi Lima Pulu Tahun TNI/ABRI: Kredibilits ABRI adalah Segala-galanya," Kompas, 5 October 
1995. The Panelists were: Gen (ret) Rudini, Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto Prawirasubrata (former governor of 
Lemhannas), Syarwan Hamid, Juwono Sudarsono (vice governor of Lemhannas), Yahya Muhaimin, 
Marzuki Darusman, Indria Samego and Mochtar Pabottingi (the latter two from LIPI).
113 "Yang Terbaik Bagi Rakyat, Terbaik Bagi ABRI,” Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995.
114 "Kemal Idris: ABRI Terlalu Terlibat di Segala Bidang,” Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995. About the 
significance of the 1966 Army Seminar in formulating the dwifungsi doctrine, see Chapter 3.
115 Maulani's Golkar assessment might be not unrelated to the Habibie-Golkar tie.
116 See "ABRI Ernas dan Tantangannya," Kompas, 6 October 1995.
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While these opinions were essentially aimed at the operational problem of 
ABRI's political role, Arbi Sanit commented on principles. "There is nothing wrong with 
Syarwan's abandoning of neutrality because it is a natural consequence of having the 
dual function idea." The simple fact, according to Arbi Sanit, was that as long as 
dwifungsi existed, ABRI could not be neutral.117 His approach was to seek the cause of 
the problem in the existence of dwifungsi itself, rather than in its implementation. His 
analysis reflected the voice of civilian reformers who disagreed with those who argued 
that it was implementation, not principle, which was the source of the problem.
As the Golkar-ABRI debate fostered a critical mood in political society, General 
Feisal Tanjung returned to a simple pragmatic attitude. In a magazine interview, he 
asserted that there was no political activity without having partners; thus 'ABRI- 
Golkar’ was a practical concept from this perspective. Asked further about how to 
distinguish between sociopolitical and defence forces, the ABRI Commander declared 
that they were overlapping and hardly distinguished.118 Despite frequent voices from 
ABRI leaders saying that ABRI as a sociopolitical force sides with Golkar whereas 
ABRI as defence force remains neutral, Feisal's statement suggested that the distinction 
had no meaning in the practical world, and ABRI's backing of Golkar would continue 
regardless of doctrinal niceties. In the public eye, this amounted to ABRI's rejection of 
self-defined legitimacy of dwifungsi.
Concern about the Sectarian Politics
Another aspect of ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar in 1995 was the growing 
influence of ICMI led by Habibie. This was related to what seemed to be the ongoing 
Islamisation of ABRI and its potential to erode the basis of Pancasilaism in the New 
Order's secular political practice. The top three men in ABRI, i.e. Feisal, Hartono and 
Syarwan, were widely seen as ICMI-affiliated figures.119 It is significant that they 
openly promoted closer ties to Golkar which was led by Harmoko who was also a 
member of ICMI's Advisory Board. This network of connections was enough to boost 
suspicions among secular officers within ABRI and in society about further 
Islamisation and ICMI-isation of political life and the threat this might poise to their 
political position. Such a concern was reflected in the creation of a new political 
association, the Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony (YKPK), soon after 
ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar. On 23 October 1995, Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang 
Triantoro (former Kassospol [1985-87] under Moerdani), in his capacity as the general
117 "Arbi Sanit: Memiliki Tanggungjawab Penuh," Bisnis Indonesia, second week, October 1995.
118 "Feisal Tanjung: Dwifungsi Lestari Sepanjang Masa," Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995.
119 Hartono was East Java Kodam Commander when ICMI was established in Malang (East Java), 
December 1990, and since then he was viewed in ICMI circles as an ICMI activist. He himself acknowledged 
ICMI as a national political organisation equivalent to the PDI. See his interview with Forum Keadilan, 
"Aku Bukan Satu-satunya yang Islam di ABRI," 2 March 1995.
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chairman, announced the establishment of YKPK and explained at a press conference 
that it was motivated by growing concerns about national unity and integration.120 
This new grouping attracted much attention in political society, partly because it was 
seen as opposed to the sectarian ICMI and partly due to its high-profile 
participants.121 The establishment of YKPK was of course welcomed by the secular 
military officers, with General Edi Sudradjat describing it as "excellent because they 
are very much concerned with building up the national spirit."122 It was also publicly 
endorsed by MPR Chairman, Lt-Gen (ret) Wahono, Minister of Transmigration 
Siswono and Minister of Environment Sarwono, who were all commonly regarded as 
being in the 'nationalist' camp within the Cabinet. Equally interesting was the emerging 
prominence of senior officers who retired in the age of keterbukaan, such as Bambang 
Triantoro, Kharis Suhud and Samsuddin. The presence of these discontented officers 
significantly boosted the political role of retired offices in the organised public arena 
which had long been dominated by Petisi 50 figures. This phenomenon was encouraged 
by the growing concern about the split between ICMI and non-ICMI in political life, 
which was most recently facilitated by the ABRI-Golkar fusion led by Feisal and 
Syarwan.
It was not the first time for Edi Sudradjat to express his nationalist concerns 
during that year. In facing the visible decline of ABRI's credibility in society, Edi had 
stressed three times during the preceding three months the need for strengthening 
nationalism within ABRI—thus demonstrating his concerns about the sectarian 
tendencies within the military and its overt alliance with one particular political party. 
In July and again in August 1995, Edi warned that ABRI was now thought of as a "tool 
of the rich" given the reality that some ABRI members had close ties with business 
tycoons and therefore conveyed the impression that ABRI was not above 
manipulation.123 On 8 September, addressing an ABRI Seminar, entitled "Actualisation 
of Struggle Values on the Occasion of Indonesia's Golden Anniversary and 50 Years of 
ABRI," Edi reiterated the need to cleanse ABRI and set it above suspicion in both the 
economic and political fields.124 Edi's demand for housecleaning and heavy emphasis
120 See Tiras's special report, "Dari Hotel Aryaduta Sampai ke Enteos Club,” in its 2 November edition.
121 They included, for example, Lt-Gen (ret) Kharis Suhud (former Speaker of DPR/MPR, 1988-1993), Maj- 
Gen (ret) Samsuddin (former Head of F-ABRI), Gaffar Rachman (former Secretary General of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, or NU, the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia), Hasjim Wahid (brother of Abdurrahman 
Wahid, the NU Chairman), Marzuki Darusman (former Golkar politician now Deputy Chairman of 
National Human Rights Commission, or Komnas HAM, established by Soeharto after the Dili incident), and 
Kwik Kian Gie (prominent PDI economist).
122 "Menhankam: YKPK Sudah Lama Dinanti," Kompas, 25 October 1995.
123 "Kredibilitas ABRI Tergantung Sikap ABRI Sendiri," Kompas, 21 July 1995; "ABRI: Berdagang, Jangan 
Berdagang,” Forum Keadilan, 28 August 1995. Golkar had been backed by many business tycoons, including 
the Soeharto family.
124 "ABRI Harus Bersih dan Berwibawa," Bernas, 9 September 1995. The proceedings of this seminar were 
later documented with a different title, "Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa dalam Rangka 
Menyukseskan Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua" (Makalah Hasil Seminar Nasional 50
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on nationalism and probity apparently signalled his displeasure with the current 
leadership style in ABRL
The Islamisation of the ABRI leadership itself was already a political topic 
since Hartono replaced General Wismoyo—a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife—as 
KSAD in February 1995. The appointment of Hartono established the 'Feisal-Hartono 
duet' with the blessing of ICMI. Nevertheless, the concern about sectarian politics 
became somewhat more visible and intensified after the ABRI-Golkar rapprochement 
and the launching of YKPK with its counter-emphasis on nationalism unaffiliated with 
a particular religion.125 Interestingly, Golkar members who joined YKPK were 
apparently among those marginalised by Harmoko due to their closeness with former 
Golkar chairman, Wahono. Of course in public, YKPK Chairman Bambang Triantoro 
denied the alleged intention to curb the runaway influence of Habibie and his ICMI, but 
in an interview he admitted that his 68-member grouping shared the thinking of Gen 
(ret) Moerdani—a leading anti-ICMI figure—though he was not involved directly in the 
establishment of YKPK.126
Bambang's movement which was endorsed by Edi and 'shared' by Moerdani 
was soon viewed as an anti-ICMI rainbow group (kelompok pelangi). In response, 
Syarwan Hamid questioned the significance of YKPK. When asked about ABRI's 
perception of ICMI, he said that many in ABRI hoped that ICMI could bring Muslims— 
who comprised eighty-eight percent of the Indonesian population—into the 
mainstream of national development. At the same time, in replying to a question about 
the emergence of YKPK which enjoyed support from a group within ABRI, Syarwan 
warned that if it did not contribute to the national interest, the system would ostracise 
it and cause it to fade away before it could develop.127 The gap in Syarwan’s 
assessments of ICMI and YKPK was quite contrary to that of Defence Minister who 
saw the establishment of YKPK as fulfilling a 'need' to deepen the comprehension of 
the Archipelagic Concept, or Wawasan Nusantara, which respected national integration 
rather than group interests. According to Edi Sudradjat, Wawasan Nusantara was of the 
utmost value, but was now in question due to the manoeuvring of certain interest 
groups.128 An actual attempt of the ABRI leadership to stifle YKPK occurred in 
connection with the First National YKPK Discussion held in Surabaya on 8-9 January 
in 1996, with the opening ceremony chaired by Wahono. Maj-Gen Iman Utomo, a close
Tahun ABRI, 6-8 September 1995, Sesko ABRI, Bandung). The content of this document will be examined in 
Chapter 4 for our analysis of ABRI's nationalist perception in the age of international interdependence.
125 For the social backgrounds of YKPK members, see "Profile YKPK: Merah, Kuning, Hijau, di Langit 
YKPK," Tiras, 2 November 1995.
126 "New Group to Counter Habibie Influence," Reuters, 25 October 1995. Bambang explained that both he 
and Moerdani were concerned about some groups in the regime which put religious interests before 
national causes (Interview, 16 December 1996).
127 "Mayjen Syarwan Hamid: Yang tak Bermanfaat akan Layu Sebelum Berkembang," Republika, 9 December 
1995.
128 See his interview in "Ini Kan Suatu Kebutuhan," Tiras, 2 November 1995.
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ally of Hartono, who had commanded Kodam V/Brawijaya, East Java, appealed to 
his soldiers, veterans, and Golkar members not to attend the discussion. All this 
showed that the emergence of YKPK reflected different perceptions and policy stances 
within ABRI, especially between the heads of two organisation, the Defence Ministry 
(Dephankam) and ABRI, and this gap was basically rooted in their contrary views on, 
and links with, ICMI.
After all, two issues discussed above, i.e. neutrality and sectarian problems, 
provided major themes in the debate as ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar became 
apparent. The rejection of neutrality by Syarwan and Feisal reinvigorated a political 
debate on ABRI’s dwifungsi legitimacy. Moreover, a concern for the sectarian 
resurgence—which is examined here as the second dimension of ABRI's approach to 
Golkar—led to the formation of a new political movement countering ICMI’s growing 
influence. Both provided perfect opportunities to expand political space for the 
concerned retired officers who became very assertive in the debate about the ABRI 
problem.
ABRI as a Golkar Cadre
If the divergence in perception between Menhankam, on the one hand, and the 
ICMI-aligned Pangab and KSAD, on the other hand, became increasingly apparent 
from early 1995, it was soon followed by signs of another gap, this time between Feisal 
and Hartono. In March 1996, when addressing a Golkar meeting in Central Java, where 
Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, or Mbak Tutut, the President's oldest daughter and a 
Chairperson of Golkar's Central Leadership Council, was also present, Hartono made 
a controversial statement in front of 5,000 Golkar cadres. He said: "every ABRI 
member is a cadre of Golkar and there is no need for them to be dubious about stating 
their allegiance to Golkar." Giving extraordinary praise to Mbak Tutut, he further said 
that: "as a Golkar cadre, my duty is to receive advice and instruction from Mbak 
Tutut."129 Next day, on 14 March, at the Sabilil Muttaqien Pesantren (Islamic School) 
in Magetan, East Java, this former Commander of East Java again expounded his 
theory of ABRI-Golkar relations. After a speech by Mbak Tutut, Hartono, who was 
wearing a Golkar yellow jacket, declared in front of Golkar supporters that "Kodim 
commanders and regional police chiefs are members of Golkar's regional advisory 
council, which means that all their staff are also Golkar members." Since not only local
129 "KSAD: Setiap Anggota Abri Kader Golkar," Kompas, 14 March 1995. Officially Siti Hardijanti was 
only one of eight chairpersons (Ketua-Ketua) under General Chairperson (Ketua Umun) Harmoko. Thus 
Hartono's statement which bypassed Harmoko in declaring ABRI-Golkar fusion could also be understood 
as a statement of his personal loyalty to Siti.
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commanders, but even the ABRI Commander was a member of the Supervisors' 
Council, he concluded that all ABRI members were in fact Golkar cadres.130
Although ABRI leaders often pointed out that ABRI had established Golkar, 
Hartono's remarkable statement was the first in which a high-ranking military officer 
had implied ABRI's subordination to Golkar in such an explicit way. It was also quite 
contrary to Hartono's own previously expressed views which, as seen above, had 
rejected Harmoko's statement—that the KBA was an organisation of Golkar cadres— 
by insisting that only individuals in the KBA were Golkar cadres. However, this re­
interpretation of Golkar-ABRI relations was quickly corrected by the Cilangkap circle 
in the following days, indicating that Hartono had overstepped ABRI's standard civil- 
military theory, and also exceeded his capacity as Army Chief by talking as if he 
represented all four services within ABRI.
The next day General Feisal Tanjung explained that ABRI members who joined 
Golkar did so to 'supervise' it, meaning he rejected Hartono's view on subordination, 
and it was only the KBA—not ABRI as a whole—that was affiliated with Golkar.131 
Hartono’s apparent eagerness to receive instructions from one of the Golkar 
Chairpersons and his view that ABRI members from top to bottom were cadres of 
Golkar was thus neutralised by Feisal who felt it necessary to restore the KBA to its 
position as an intermediary between Golkar and ABRI. Then on 17 March, Syarwan 
Hamid, who was recently promoted to Kassospol ABRI, replacing Lt-Gen Moch 
Ma'ruf, made an official announcement on behalf of the Pangab.132 The military 
spokesman for sociopolitical affairs firmly announced that it was the KBA which 
became a Golkar cadre, and said that Hartono's statement was made in his personal 
capacity, not as Army Chief.133 Such dissociation from Hartono's statement that
130 "Hartono: Frivolous Questions About Golkar Allegiances Cause of Concern," Kompas Online, available 
http: c http :// www.kompas.com/>, 15 March 1996.
131 "Feisal Tanjung: ABRI Tetap ABRI," Kompas, 16 March 1996.
132 Along with Syarwan's promotion, a large scale personnel change was conducted during January and 
February 1996 which affected about a hundred officers. Prior to this major personnel rotation, replacement 
of the Special Force Commander (DanKopassus) occurred in December 1995. Presidential son-in-law Brig- 
Gen Prabowo Subianto (Deputy Commander of Kopassus) replaced Maj-Gen Soebagyo as the Commander 
of Kopassus, while the latter moved to Pangdam IV/Deponegoro. Both Prabowo and Soebagyo were said to 
be closer to Hartono than to Feisal. Prabowo and Hartono jointly operated a political think-tank, CPDS. 
According to Feisal, ABRI would have no major reshuffle until the general elections in May 1997. However, 
there were subsequent waves of personnel rotation in March and August 1996, contradicting Feisal's 
earlier statement. These changes generated a concern about ABRI's weakening cohesion. It was Maj-Gen 
Theo Syafei who openly questioned this issue. At a DPR meeting in March, this anti-ICMI general pointed 
out the growing distortion in the current personnel management caused by political influence; he was 
referring to Soeharto's political manoeuvring, which had placed loyal officers to top military posts. Theo 
insisted that the recent reshuffling resulted in the "inflation of generals" (inflasi jenderal) and a shortage in 
the number of posts available for the general-ranking officers. See Forum Keadilan's special report on this 
issue,” Bila Gerbong Mutasi Macet di Atas," in the 25 March edition. Edi Sudradjat responded to Syafei by 
saying that the question now was whether the pace of transfer was too fast or not, admitting the problem in 
personnel management. See "Pangab Mengenai Tiga Letjen tak Punya Jabatan," Kompas, 6 March, 1996. 
Maulani also agreed that the pace of transfer during this period was abnormal. See his "Regenerasi ABRI 
1995-1996," Profile Indonesia (Jurnal Tahunan CIDES), No.2, 1996, p.139.
133 "ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol dan Hankam," Suara Pembaruan, 18 March 1996.
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"ABRI members are Golkar's cadre from Pangab to Kodim" gave rise to two questions 
in the political community. First was speculation about the gap between the Habibie- 
Harmoko-Feisal-Syarwan line and the Siti-Flartono line. The other was the fact that 
Hartono's extreme statement consequently allowed Cilangkap to drop its inhibition 
about declaring its backing for Golkar. In other words, by correcting Hartono's extreme 
theory, both Feisal and Syarwan obtained a chance to adopt a position somewhere 
between Hartono and their own previous stance. Now there was no hesitation to 
declare openly that ABRI supported Golkar, though denying its subordination to 
Golkar.
This new position, however, soon alarmed the Defence Minister. When asked 
about Hartono's controversial statement and the subsequent explanation by Syarwan 
Hamid, Edi Sudradjat implied his disagreement by saying that ABRI should work with 
other sociopolitical forces and not just Golkar to help develop the nation.134 Referring 
to the Law No.20/1982, Edi stressed ABRI's neutral attitude towards all political 
parties and the supremacy of the law over any other considerations.135 Edi's critical 
stance was also backed by several retired generals and civilian leaders. For example, 
Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib argued that: ’’if ABRI sides w ith one group, it does not 
need F-ABRI any more." "Law No.20/1982," Hasnan continued, "neither allows 
civilian nor military supremacy, so ABRI can never be a cadre of the civilian Golkar."136 
A YKPK activist, Maj-Gen (ret) Samsuddin, also stressed the inconsistency w ith 
ABRI's official doctrine, by maintaining that ABRI's triple commitment—Pancasila, 
Constitution and "people's security and prosperity"—was the basis of ABRI's 
dynamising role in society, thus precluding ABRI from siding with one group whatever 
it was.137 Criticisms were also aired in the PDI which had actually experienced ABRI's 
heavy intervention in its East Java Chapter in regard to the leadership split between 
pro- and anti-Megawati factions. PDI legislator Marcel Beding voiced concern that if 
Hartono's statement became official policy, a whole range of political laws would have 
to be overhauled, and F-ABRI would have to be scrapped because ABRI would be able 
to channel its aspirations through Golkar. Sophan Sophian of the PDI added that if 
Hartono's view prevailed, the PDI would withdraw its support for ABRI's divifungsi.138 
The Petisi 50 soon sent a letter to the DPR, saying that H artono’s stance contradicted
134 "ABRI tidak Hanya Berjuang dengan Golkar," Suara Pembaruan, 25 March 1996.
135 Edi's comment, however, should be interpreted in the context of power struggle with the pro-ICMI 
forces, rather than as a simple legal argument. Note that he had suggested the nomination of ABRI 
candidates for the position of the Golkar Chairman in 1993, which would work to secure ABRI's influence 
in Golkar.
136 "Sekadar Menghebohkan Hubungan ABRI-Golkar," Forum Keadilan, 8 April 1996.
137 Ibid.
136 "Army Stance on Golkar Draws Fire," Jakarta Post, 15 March 1996.
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the spirit of ABRI as codified in Sapta Marga and Sumpah Prajurit, and asking that 
the DPR demand that Soeharto review Hartono's position as Army Chief.139
Responding to these criticisms, Syarwan and Hartono finally restored an 
interpretation which technically segregated 'individual' from 'institutional' 
participation. It is obvious, according to Syarwan, that Law No.20/1982 required 
ABRI to work together with other sociopolitical forces to develop the nation, thus 
making the relations among them like a family where every family member should be 
treated equally. However, variations exist within the family, as if it has a father, 
mother, brother and so on. It was in reference to this family metaphor that Syarwan 
justified ABRI's right to choose, primus inter pares, a partner (mitra) such as Golkar, 
whereas in the family as a whole there is impartiality.140 Hartono's reasoning was more 
direct, as seen in his interview with the weekly Tiras a few months later. In defending 
his earlier position, Hartono argued that ABRI as an institution and the members of 
ABRI should be understood as separate and distinct. "The former cannot differentiate 
one group from others, but the latter can do so; thus Hartono as an individual is a 
cadre of Golkar."141
These interpretations differentiating between individuals and institutions 
seemed to reflect ABRI's determination to acquiesce in Soeharto's political program 
involving Golkar-ABRI cooperation to ensure that the coming general election could run 
smoothly and predictably as a necessary step to secure his presidential re-election in 
1998. However, ABRI's pursuit of this Soeharto project, led by Feisal, Syarwan and 
Hartono, was inevitably accompanied by the built-in cost of highlighting the dwifungsi 
problem in society. Since ABRI officers had rationalised dwifungsi as necessary to 
safeguard the 'national' interest and therefore required it to stand 'above all groups,' 
ABRI’s declared siding with Golkar during this period was seen as an implicit rejection 
of dwifungsi legitimation. As we have seen, debate on this issue exploded and 
expanded discursive space in political society to legitimately—and directly—criticise 
the core principle of dwifungsi.
Furthermore, ABRI's overt backing for Golkar under the Feisal-Hartono 
leadership had three consequences: (1) it exacerbated the split within the elite (namely 
between ICMI and secular-nationalist camps); (2) it strengthened ABRI's public image 
as a mere tool of Soeharto's private interests; and (3) it brought to the surface the 
cleavage within the military leadership—respectively between Feisal and Hartono, who 
had different partners in Golkar, and between them and Edi Sudradjat. From this 
moment, a visible trend in the dwifungsi discussion was its growing focus on the second
139 "Petisi 50 Menggugat Hartono," Indonesia-L (Online Mailing List), Available E-mail: 
<apakabar@clark.net>, 29 March 1996. Literally, Sapta Marga is ABRI's Seven Pledges to dedicate itself 
for the national interest, and Sumpah Prajurit is the Soldiers' Oath. Both are ABRI’s traditional ethical 
codes. See Appendix 2 for details.
140 "Debat: Dalam Sospol, ABRI Netral atau Tidak?," Forum Keadilan, 22 April 1996.
141 "Kasad Jenderal (TNI) R. Hartono: Pakai Jaket Kuning, Itu Hak Saya," Tiras, 7 November 1996.
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aspect, while the first and third aspects resulted in an increase in the number of elite 
actors—especially retired officers—who publicly criticised policy deviations by the 
military leadership. This contributed to the maintenance of autonomous space for 
critical discourse in the Soeharto regime. Facing these movements, the ABRI leadership 
was totally unable to control the deepening and widening of dwifungsi criticism. One 
result of this was the dogmatisation of ABRI's response to critics.
The July 27 Riot and Red-Purge
ABRI's dogmatic response to critics was very apparent in the so-called '27 July 
Affair' which saw ham-fisted and praetorian state intervention in the affairs of the 
leading opposition party, the PDI, which involved the ouster of Megawati as leader of 
the party. This event illustrated Soeharto's political strategy to defeat the charismatic 
daughter of Sukarno in preparing for the 1997 general election and the 1998 
presidential election. We will see how ABRI's obvious subordination in this scenario 
reignited the debate on dwifungsi and how ABRI responded in a dogmatic way. In 
order to assess these developments, this section investigates the 27 July Affair and the 
next section examines the critical debate.
Megawati was elected as the PDI chairperson at the end of 1993. It was 
Soeharto who had ordered the overthrow of the former party chair, Soerjadi, whose 
achievement of boosting PDI votes in the 1992 general election encouraged him to be 
assertive in demanding several reforms to the electoral system and presidential 
selection procedure (from 'consensus' to voting) at the 1993 MPR sessions. Having 
received orders from Soeharto, Pangab Feisal Tanjung intervened in the party congress 
at Medan in July 1993 but it failed to dislodge Soerjadi. ABRI then pressured the PDFs 
regional councils to put forward an alternative candidate for the party chairperson. 
Ironically, they nominated Megawati and ABRI soon reacted to prevent the party 
officially endorse Megawati as the party chairperson. The struggle continued until 
December 1993 when ABRI finally approved a party conference in Jakarta which 
decided on Megawati as the new head of the PDI.142
It was three years later that another PDI Congress was set up in Medan by 
General Feisal Tanjung, clearly under the instruction of Soeharto—this time to topple 
Megawati and reinstate Soerjadi. This congress was held on 20-22 June and officially 
backed by the Interior Minister Yogie SM and Feisal Tanjung who insisted that the PDI 
leadership conflict was still unsolved. The rebel congress elected former PDI chairman
142 Main officers who were involved in this affair were Brig-Gen Agum Gumelar (Director of Internal 
Affairs' Section in BAIS and simultaneously Kopassus Commander), Maj-Gen Hendropriyono (Pangdam 
Jaya) and Colonel Zacky Anwar Makarim (Assistant of Intelligence at Kodam Jaya). See footnote 39 in 
Chapter 5 about Agum's prominent role in this event.
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Soerjadi to replace Megawati, and soon received government endorsement. Megawati 
then filed legal suits against senior government and military officials, including Yogie 
and Feisal, alleging they manipulated the congress in order to divide the party. She 
also launched a daily 'free speech forum' (mimbar bebas) at the party headquarters in 
central Jakarta. The forum was joined not only by Megawati's PDI supporters, but also 
student groups and NGOs which demanded democratisation. Bambang Widjojanto of 
the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) defined the movement as "people's 
power"—suggesting an analogy with the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines— 
and formed an alliance named MARI with other noted democratic activists.143
As the free speech forum developed from an intra-party protest to an anti- 
Soeharto grass-roots movement, the ABRI leadership started to view the problem in 
security terms, warning Megawati supporters to stop the forum. Having received a 
request from Soerjadi to gain control of the PDI headquarters, Pangdam Jaya Maj-Gen 
Sutiyoso announced on 25 July that any political action which disturbed law and order 
would be repressed. The following day, Syarwan warned that the forum had already 
evolved beyond a free speech meeting and was manipulated by an anti-government 
movement.144 The next morning around 800 government-supported Soerjadi cadres 
and other unidentified men—with the help of security forces, possibly including elite 
Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in mufti—physically took over the PDI building, 
sparking a two-day mass riot and clashes with military troops. Brig-Gen Zacky, as the 
Director of BIA’s Internal Affairs Section, was also in charge of cleaning up Megawati- 
supporters in Jakarta. Nearly 200 people were arrested during the first day of the riot, 
and many of these remain missing.145 A few days later, Maj-Gen Sutiyoso issued a 
'shoot-on-sight' order to his soldiers.
It was Cilangkap's interest to shift pub he attention from the ABRI-manipulated 
Medan Congress to the alleged masterminds (dalang) of the riot. At a special meeting 
held on 29 July, Feisal and Police Chief Dibyo Widodo reported to Soeharto that it 
was the PRD (People's Democratic Party) which had plotted the riot.146 This was 
followed by an intense campaign to link PRD with communism, the bete noire of the
143 MARI's (Majelis Rakyat Indonesia: People's Council of Indonesia) founding members included Muchtar 
Pakpahan of SBSI, the unofficial trade union; Mulyana W. Kusmah of FLBHI, another legal aid institute, 
and also the secretary general of the newly established independent election monitoring group, KIPP, led by 
former Tempo editor, Goenawan Mohammed; Budiman Sujatmiko of PRD, a student NGO which had 
recently declared itself to be a political party, and Yulius Usman of PUDI, another unofficial political party 
led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas. MARI soon declared its anti-divifungsi manifesto.
144 "Pangdam Jaya: Ganggu Kamtibnas, Aksi Politik akan Dihentikan," Kompas, 26 July 1996; "Kassospol 
ABRI: Aksi-aksi Akhir-akhir ini Merupakan Gerakan," Snara Pembaruan, 26 July 1996.
145 Harian Terbit, extra-edition, 28 July 1996. According to the final report of the National Human Rights 
Commission (Komnas HAM), the riot resulted in 5 deaths, 149 injured, and 23 missing. For the full Komnas 
document, entitled "Pemyataan Komnas Mengenai Peristiwa 27 Juli," see Santoso (coordinator), Peristizva 
21 Juli, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) and Aliansi Jumalis Independen (AJI), 1997, pp.59-65. 
The government banned this book on 14 February, 1997.
146 The PRD was one of the most active participants in the mimbar bebas. The PRD had escalated its anti- 
New Order campaigns since the previous year and also led several labour-student demonstrations.
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New Order government. Syarwan Hamid and his assistant, Maj-Gen Suwamo 
Adiwidjojo, explained that the riot had nothing to do with the Megawati-Soerjadi 
conflict, but was engineered by a third party (pihak ketiga)—identified as the PRD, 
whose political manifesto, organisational structure and action strategy resembled those 
of the banned PKI.147 Internal dissemination of this theory within ABRI was conducted 
in more intense and direct ways. Kapuspen Brig-Gen Amir Syarifuddin wrote that 
previous riots and demonstrations—Irian Jaya in March, Ujung Pandang and West 
Kalimantan in April, Surabaya in July, and of course Jakarta on 27 July—had all been 
instigated by the communist PRD, while ABRI’s Territorial Staff (Ster ABRI) concluded 
its analysis by insisting on the need to tighten regional security surveillance in 
anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of the ultra-left PRD.148 It 
seemed that ABRI was presenting the incident as a security disturbance led by the 
communist PRD in order to counter widespread perceptions that the incident was a 
consequence of ABRI following Soeharto's order to topple Megawati, the only 
politician with a chance to threaten Soeharto's stranglehold on Indonesian politics. 
Armed with this justification—saving the nation from communism—ABRI launched a 
security operation to crush the hantu PKI (PKI ghost).
Initially criticism of ABRI was mainly focused on this dogmatic ghost-hunting 
and the use of extreme military means as reflected in Maj-Gen Sutiyoso's order. A day 
after the riot, on 31 July, MPR/DPR Speaker, Lt-Gen (ret) Wahono, asserted that ABRI 
should limit its repressive behaviour because dwifungsi only succeeds when ABRI has 
public support.149 Former KSAD Gen (ret) Rudini also insisted that the time had 
passed when ABRI could invoke the spectre of communism to justify repressive 
measures, and ABRI—if it wanted to do so—had to show strong evidence to support 
its accusations. Otherwise, he said that ABRI and the government would lose the 
people's trust.150 Rudini's point was seized on by government critics who openly 
wondered why, if ABRI claimed to have known for some time that the PRD was 
communist, it waited until 27 July to smash the group. It was widely perceived that 
ABRI had acted in response to a request from the President who wanted to overthrow 
the mimbar bebas because it was talking about corruption at the nation's highest level.
The ghost-hunting strategy, however, generated new problems. Probably relying 
on a report in the weekly Sinar, the spokesman for East Java's Brawijaya regional 
military command, Lt-Col Soebagio, announced that ABRI had found that 25 percent
147 See "Pemerintah akan Tindak Pelaku Kerusuhan 27 Juli" and "Gerakan Destruktif Ditunggangi 
Marxisme," both in Kompas, 31 July 1996.
148 See Amir Syarifuddin, "Mewaspadai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di Indonesia," Darma 
Putra, Vol.37, 1996, pp.24-29; Staf Teritorial ABRI, Tinjauan Teritorial, No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997, 
pp. 11-19. Darma Putra is Kostrad's internal magazine, and Tinjauan Teritorial is the quarterly report of 
Ster ABRI (ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section). Ster was headed by Territorial Assistant (Aster 
Pangab) Maj-Gen Arie J. Kumaat at that time.
149 "Ketua DPR/MPR: ABRI Harus Kurangi Reaksi-reaksi Represif," Kompas, 1 August 1996.
150 "Rudini: Semua Pihak Harus Menahan Diri," Kompas, 2 August 1996.
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of the PRD's key activists were the offspring of people who had links with the 
outlawed PKI. He also referred to ABRI's ongoing investigation of the PRD's alleged 
connection with the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which he suspected had financed 
them.151 The following day, however, Syarwan Hamid revised this allegation by 
indicating that the PRD was supported by some Australian labour organisations 
without mentioning the ALP. Although backed by Soeharto’s public announcement that 
the PRD resembled the PKI, the inaccuracy of ABRI's accusations was undeniable and 
strongly condemned by government critics.152 Moreover, the immediate replacement of 
Lt-Gen Soeyono, Chief of General Affairs (Kasum), who was hospitalised during the 
riot, following a motorcycle accident, suggested that the military might not have been 
united on the matter of 27 July. Soeyono, a former presidential adjutant, implied in his 
interview with a weekly magazine that a gap existed within ABRI about its role in the 
government-manipulated political infighting.153 Clearly, the July 27 incident and the 
subsequent security operation revealed ABRI's internal problems both in terms of 
information gathering and operational conduct, which were naturally interpreted by 
mass media as reflecting ABRI’s internal disharmony.
Meanwhile, the ABRI-launched anti-communism campaign began to be 
exploited in intra-elite political manoeuvring. The report on the PRD—which was sent 
from CIDES and reprinted in Sinar—attempted to verify the communist nature of the 
PRD, but it seemed to backfire when the director of CIDES, Adi Sasono, himself was 
rumoured as being involved in the PRD and communist activities, which he of course 
denied.154 The invisible war still continued as a theory linking the PRD and Liberation
151 "Australian Labor Party's Link with PRD Studied," Jakarta Post, 5 August 1996. Sinar, in its August 3 
edition, printed an organisation map of the PRD, which showed the ALP's indirect link with the PRD via 
Amnesty International. This allegation, however, ignored the fact that the ALP government was headed by 
Keeting who was very sympathetic to Soeharto. The map was not the original work of Sinar, but a reprint 
of a paper sent to some press centres by a fax from the Centre for Information and Development Studies 
(CIDES), the think-tank of ICMI. This CIDES paper emphasised the PRD’s links with the PKI, by suggesting 
the PRD's closeness to Sabron Aidit, a nephew of an ex-PKI leader, D.N. Aidit. However, D.N. Aidit, who 
died 30 years ago, only had a younger brother (no nephew) whose name was Sobron (not Sabron) who 
lives in Paris.
152 YLBHI, for example, declared in a statement that ABRI allegations about ex-PKI offspring in the PRD, 
such as Budiman Sudjatmiko, Garda Semiring, and Andi Arief were inaccurate because none had fathers 
linked with the PKI. In fact, their fathers were, respectively, an activist in the Hisbullah Moslem movement 
during the independence war, a retired army officer, and a member of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). See 
"Soeharto Labels PRD Insurgent," Jakarta Post, 8 August 1996. Inaccuracy of ABRI information, especially 
the BIA source, is suggested in Peristiwa 27 Juli, p.39.
153 Soeyono, replaced by Lt-Gen Tarub on 8 August, recalled that he was informed by Police Chief Dibyo 
Widodo that Soeharto was angry with him, and that he was not considered supportive of the operation of 
July 27. When asked about why an ardent anti-communist campaigner, who had alerted attention to alleged 
communist infiltration in society earlier in the year, would have his loyalty questioned, he answered that it 
was perhaps related to the "killing the sitting duck games." This was a popular expression to describe a 
trend to exclude officers close to the former ABRI leadership during the Edi Sudradjat and Benny Moerdani 
eras. See "Ini Killing the Sitting Duck Games,” Tiras 22 August 1996. It was also alleged that Soeyono 
rejected a request for funding (around 500 million rupiah) from Maj-Gen Sutiyoso to conduct the July 27 
operation. "Dan Letjen Soeyono pun Diganti," Tiras, 22 August 1996. Tiras experienced severe pressure 
from ABRI's information section when this edition was published.
154 "Adi Sasono: Dagelan Kalau Saya Diisukan Ikut PRD," Media Indonesia, 23 August 1996.
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Theology—which was allegedly introduced by radical Catholic groups—soon spread. 
This theory implied that the PRD's activity was a product of cooperation between left- 
wing and radical Catholic elements.155 It was also in this context that YLBHI, in mid- 
September, received insistent demands from some Islamic groups to reopen the 
investigation of the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim 
people were killed at the time when ABRI was under the leadership of General Benny 
Moerdani, a Catholic. ABRI's political project was quickly exploited by civilian 
political struggle, and this greatly complicated the issue, as it blurred the origin of the 
problem—i.e. ABRI's intervention in the PDI.
The PRD case revealed that the politics of symbolism was a shared method in 
the political game regardless of ABRI or non-ABRI affiliation. In celebrating Pancasila 
day on 1 October, Jakarta's main street, Jalan Soedirman, was decorated with large 
colourful posters warning of Bahaya Laten Komunisme (danger of latent communism) 
presenting a chronological portrait of alleged communist insurgencies; Madium 1948, 
G30S/PKI 1965, and PRD 27 Juli 1996.156 From ABRI's perspective, it was hoped that 
invoking the powerful symbol of a resurgent communism would allow it to neutralise 
any civilian activist who still insisted on the removal of severe political regulations and 
the diuifungsi system. For civilian democratic forces, this situation was a major setback 
for democratisation.157
Reflections of the PDI Affair in the Dwifungsi Debate
In terms of the diuifungsi debate, the PDI incident provided ammunition for the 
critical retired generals whose role was spotlighted in the Golkar-ABRI debate earlier in
155 The fact that the PRD leader, Budiman Sudjatmiko, was arrested at the house of Romo Sandyawan, 
director of a Catholic-linked NGO, Jakarta Social Institute, became the basis of this theory. It was argued 
that Romo was a follower of Liberation Theory which took a Marxist approach to social problems. See 
"Bayang bayang Teologi Pembebasan," Gatra, 31 August 1996. Din Syamsuddin of the CPDS argued that the 
situation of East Timor could be the fertile soil for liberation theology in Indonesia, and criticised Romo’s 
backing of Budiman. See "Romo Sang Pelindung," Gatra, 31 August 19%. Amir Santoso, the director of the 
CPDS, more broadly argued: "many Muslims now believe that the coalition between left-wing and secular 
groups is aimed at undermining the political influence of Islam and replacing Soeharto-ABRI which is 
thought to give an opportunity to Islam." See his article "Kegeraman 27 Juli," Forum Keadilan, 9 September 
1996. They saw the shadows of CSIS—a think-tank led by Chinese Indonesians (many of whom were 
Catholics}—and Benny Moerdani, who associated with the CSIS after retirement, in the recent emergence of 
secular-nationalist groups.
166 personai observation, Jakarta, 1 October 1996. Note that the posters put the PRD next to the 1965 event, 
deliberately omitting other cases during the last 30 years, which were claimed by ABRI as communist-led 
events. This was to make a propaganda that says the current issue is as serious as the attempted coup in 
1965. We will examine ABRI's ideological projects in Chapter 5.
157 Both Buyung Nasution and Goenawan Mohammad believed that, under the anti-PRD campaign, ABRI 
could easily arrest them regardless of possible international criticism. Buyung also said that KIPP’s activity 
to enlighten people about the need for fair conduct of the 1997 election virtually stopped due to these 
pressures, whereas Goenawan insisted that KIPP just decided to take a low-profile approach. Interviews 
with Buyung Nasution, 11 September 1996; Goenawan Mohammad, 5 December 1996.
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the year. Throughout the affair—from the Medan congress to the 27 July operation, the 
shoot-on-sight order, and the red-purge campaign—the old soldiers had voiced 
concern about what they saw as ABRI's deviation from its doctrinal origins. It was 
during this short period that society firmly witnessed the intensifying conflict between 
various retired officers and the current military leadership. Under these circumstances, 
civilian intellectuals led by LIPI publicised the first systematic demands in the history 
of New Order for dwifungsi reform. This demonstrated that dwifungsi's critics not only 
enjoyed an autonomous political space to conduct their campaigns under the 
authoritarian system but that they were now also capable of turning the civil-military 
debate in a way that prevented ABRI from reacting dogmatically.
Prominence of Retired Generals
It was soon after the Medan congress that the high-profile YKPK with 
Abdurrahman Wahid in attendance held a press conference on 1 July 1996 to announce 
their statement of concern, entitled 'Return to the Glorious Ideals of the Nation.' The 
statement was signed by 24 public figures, including civilian activists from mass 
organisations, and submitted to Wahono, Speaker of the DPR/MPR. A few days later, 
General Edi Sudradjat backed the move by stating that national stability could never 
be built on authoritarianism.158 Criticism from retired officers grew louder following the 
subsequent repression and red-purge during July and August. In response, Soeharto 
was said to have complained that retired officers often voiced ideas opposing 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and that they made statements which were not 
consistent with their actions and views when they were on active duty.159
It was Edi Sudradjat who first responded to Soeharto's reported remarks by 
insisting on the need for constructive criticism from retired officers to fertilise 
democracy, whereas Lt-Gen (ret) Solichin GP, former Akabri Governor, defended 
outspoken figures such as Bambang Triantoro, Kharis Suhud, and A.H. Nasution by 
saying, "...they criticise for the well-being of the nation, so the regime should not 
consider those who criticise as the enemy; it will be a loss for everyone in the country." 
Nasution himself defended the criticism by retired officers, arguing that if one is still 
committed to Pancasila and UUD45, being critical is quite logical.160
158 "Menhankam: Stabilitas Nasional tak Dibangun di Atas Kekuasan yang Otoriter," Kompas, 6 July 1996.
159 Soeharto's comment was not announced by himself, but through Tantyo AP Sudharmono, son-in-law of 
former vice president Sudharmono and the head of youth wing in MKGR, one of three founding 
organisations of Golkar, who had just had a meeting with Soeharto and quoted his words at a press 
conference. However, those who knew Soeharto questioned the credibility of Tantyo's comment. Gen (ret) 
Benny Moerdani, for example, argued that "such a comment could never come from Soeharto because it was 
totally against his political style." Interview, 23 September 1996.
160 For the above comments, see "Criticism from Retired Officials Needed, Edi Says," Jakarta Post, 13 
September 1996; "Letjen TNI (Purn) Solichin GP: Sikap Kritis Semata-mata Membantu," Kompas, 25 
September 1996; "AH Nasution: Ketidakadilan Sosial Musuh Paling Besar," Suara Pembaruan, 28 September 
1996.
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In response, Menko Polkam Lt-Gen (ret) Soesilo Sudarman, who also headed 
Pepabri, supported Soeharto's remarks by maintaining that some retired officers 
tended to behave in inconsistent ways if judged from Pepabri's view. Sudomo also 
showed his annoyance, saying,"... if retired generals want to correct the nation and its 
development, they should direct their views to the president rather than advertise their 
problems in the mass media, as I have suggested to Petisi 50." General Feisal Tanjung 
echoed this stance toward outspoken retirees. Recalling the 27 July riot, he saw the real 
problem as arising from the ideological distortion generated by the so-called "rainbow 
alliance" (aliansi pelangi) with the communist PRD as its rising-star. He then blamed 
recent political-security fluctuation on the PRD which he branded as radical and anti- 
New Order-ABRI; thus he concluded, in a dogmatic way, that the group was trying to 
replace Pancasila and UUD45. He stated that this unfavourable political condition 
was facilitated by individual retired officers, stressing that they were deviating from 
military discipline and loyalty."161
Feisal's remarks, however, invited harsh reactions from retired officers.162 As if 
challenging Feisal, retired generals became more assertive in criticising dwifungsi, not 
only in the media but particularly at ABRI’s internal meetings. In early September, the 
1996 ABRI Seminar was held. The seminar was designed by Cilangkap to receive 
masukan (input) from several experts regarding ABRI's policy preparation for the 
Seventh Development Cabinet starting from 1998. Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib objected 
to a statement written in ABRI’s draft paper for the Broad Outlines of State Policy 
(GBHN) and requested its revision. Pointing to the original statement that said that the 
emerging criticism of dwifungsi in society was caused by a dichotomy between civilians 
and the military, Hasnan asserted that the real reason was not the dichotomy, but 
rather ABRI’s obvious domination of national life, which restricted people's political 
participation. Dwifungsi, he continued, cannot stand on legal legitimacy alone but 
should be based on the legitimacy given by the hearts of the people. Furthermore, 
objecting to a section that claimed that Pancasila ideology was now threatened by 
communism, he contended that the threat was rather due to the government's arbitrary 
interpretation of Pancasila.163
161 For above comments, see "Di Depan Presiden Soeharto, Soesilo Akui Ada Purnawirawan Kurang 
Koiisisten," Republika, 26 September 1996; "Ketua DPR Sudomo: Bila Ingin Melakukan Koreksi, Lebih Baik 
Langsung ke Presiden," Kompas, 26 September 1996; "Pangab, Soal Purnawirawan tak Konsisten: Mereka 
Ekstradisiplin dan kontraloyalitas," Republika, 27 September 1996. Feisal, however, did not identify the 
retired officers.
162 Special coverage on this issue can be found, for example, in "Aksi dan Reaksi Para Mantan Jenderal," 
Forum Keadilan, 7 October 1996, and in the weekly tabloid, Swadesi, "Tuding-menuding Siapa yang Tidak 
Konsekuen Melaksanakan UUD45 dan Pancasila" (4-10 October 1996). For the next few months, 
interviews of outspoken retired generals—who all condemned Feisal's statement—appeared in the media.
163 See Hasnan Habib, "Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita-VII (Tanggapan)," paper 
prepared for ABRI Seminar, Jakarta, 3 September 1996. This ABRI seminar is discussed in the following 
chapters in detail.
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Two months later, ABRI’s Staff and Command College (Sesko ABRI) held a 
seminar, entitled 'Actualisation of ABRI's Sociopolitical Role,' to which noted retired 
officers and civilian intellectuals were invited. Gen (ret) Rudini, who had established 
the private Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI), on this occasion claimed 
that the concept of dwifungsi should be renewed to cope with new social 
developments.164 Lt-Gen (ret) Harsudiono Hartas, former Kassospol, also argued that 
dwifungsi now deviated from its ideal. If such deviation continued, he concluded, it 
might also undermine ABRI's traditional value as a freedom-fighter.165
On the same day as the Sesko ABRI seminar, the Army Staff and Command 
College (Seskoad) in Bandung also held a panel discussion on dwifungsi. One of the 
panelists, Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, presented a critical approach to the current 
conduct and interpretation of dwifungsi, but from a different angle. He argued that 
ABRI's role as stabiliser and dynamiser in national life should be redefined because the 
former was no longer the monopoly of the military in present stable conditions, and the 
latter was needed to realise tut wuri handayani. Moreover, he pointed to the influence 
of business-capitalist groups in ABRI as, for example, in land conflicts and industrial 
relations where ABRI sided with capitalist groups. He warned that the coalition 
between ABRI and various business and conglomerate interests had created a 
condition which was far from the army’s original ideal, and undermined popular 
acceptance of dwifungsi.166 Ironically, judging from the patterns of previous debates, if 
these arguments by Hasnan, Rudini, Hartas, and Maulani had been presented by 
civilian critics and NGOs, ABRI might have accused them of being too westernised, 
ignoring history, or possibly anM-dwifungsi and thus anti-Pancasila and subversive. 
These retired generals played an important role in countering in the growing dogmatism 
of the ABRI leadership. Responding to the intensive criticism at ABRI-sponsored 
seminars, Feisal Tanjung merely claimed that it was an irony of dwifungsi that its 
success invited criticism.167
The LIPI Report: Civilian Control of the Dwifungsi Debate
As if to confirm Feisal's remark, a civilian group led by LIPI completed a 2-year 
research project concerning the political role of ABRI, and held a seminar in the end of 
February 1997. This event can be assessed as the second stage of the evolving 
dwifungsi debate after the Jakarta riot, following the series of internal military meetings.
164 See Rudini, "Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI,” paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung, 4- 
5 November 1996.
165 "Penerapan Dwifungsi ABRI Masih Sering Menyimpang," Kompas, 5 November 1996.
166 See Z.A. Maulani, "Implementasi Fungsi Sospol ABRI pada Masa Kini dan Masa yang Akan Datang," 
paper presented at the panel discussion, Forum Kajian Dwifungsi ABRI, Seskoad, Bandung, 5 November 
1996.
167 "Pangab Tentang Dwifungsi: ABRI Dipaksa Tanggung Beban dari Keberhasilannya Sendiri," Kompas, 
23 November 1996.
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When it was announced in February 1995 that LIPI had been asked by President 
Soeharto to conduct the research, pub he reaction was basically cynical because LIPI, a 
civilian organisation operating under the government, was hardly expected to produce 
any drastic reform proposal.168 Despite such speculation, the LIPI report—edited by a 
research team coordinated by Dr Indria Samego—soon became a focus of dzvifungsi 
discourse by proposing that F-ABRI should be abolished by the year 2007. This was 
the first official voice from 'within' a governmental organ that proposed total 
dismantling of military representation in the DPR by setting definite time limit.
The report compiled civilian views of dzvifungsi, not only at the national level, 
but also including regional political elites as the target of research. The result provided 
an extensive analysis of current dzvifungsi problems approached from various 
perspectives.169 Backed by empirical data which distinguished it from typical petition- 
style papers, this civilian study presented systematic reform proposals. Among other 
things, the proposal to totally demilitarise parliaments both at the national and 
regional levels by 2007 attracted the attention of political society because of its 
similarity to the ideas of outspoken retired officers. Indria Samego promptly explained 
that: "in almost all regions we surveyed, members of F-ABRI were too numerous and 
they are assessed by the people as lacking regional commitment due to their prior 
loyalty to the military command structure."170 In legitimising its proposal, and 
presumably to avoid possible attack, LIPI emphasised two points. One, the study was 
conducted on the direct orders of orang nomor satu (No.l man: Soeharto), and two, it 
was empirically oriented and melihat dari dalam (viewed from within), asserting LIPI's 
objectivity and apolitical stance.171 LIPI's approach aimed to prevent ABRI from 
employing its usual dogmatic approach to shutdown communication.
Here, one interesting aspect was that, to defend its proposal, Indria actively 
borrowed ABRI's own conceptual distinction between kekaryaan and dzvifungsi, which 
was originally invented to blur criticism of ABRI's takeover of non-military jobs, as we 
saw earlier in a statement by Brig-Gen Roekmini concerning "back-to-basics." Now 
using ABRI's own weapon, the LIPI team emphasised that kekaryaan was not ABRI's 
sociopolitical role and therefore it was not dzvifungsi that was being questioned, but
168 "Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan, Jumlah Anggota ABRI di 
DPR," Kompas, 22 February 1995. When the project was announced by Sekneg Moerdiono, he emphasised 
the point that LIPI was a government body which should behave in responsible ways.
169 For the contextual analysis of the report, see Chapter 6.
170 Author's observation at the seminar, entitled "Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997: Pengkajian 
Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang Politik dan Sosial Budaya," LIPI, Jakarta, 26 February 1997.
171 See Indria Samego (coordinator), "Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya," paper 
presented at the Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997 Pengkajian Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang 
Politik dan Sosial Budaya, LIPI, Jakarta, 25-27 February 1997. In the evolving dzvifungsi discourse, critical 
opinions from civilians had frequently been attacked by ABRI as the 'outsider’s view,' implying that such 
criticisms were not based on Indonesian values, and thus could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and thus a 
legitimate target of security operations. As seen above, such an 'interpretational overstretch' was most 
recently applied in the case of the PRD which overtly criticised dzvifungsi in its political manifesto.
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kekaryaan as a structural reality.172 Carefully managing the debate in order to avoid 
being labelled as anti-New Order, LIPI castigated the real institutional impediment 
which in fact resulted from dzvifungsi. In other words, dwifungsi language was 
reproduced to criticise dzvifungsi. In the developing dzvifungsi debate since the beginning 
of keterbukaan in the late 1980s, civilians now seemed to have established a discursive 
technique to criticise ABRI in a way that did not initiative a dogmatic response. For the 
first time, it seemed that civilians were controlling dzvifungsi discourse.
In fact, military reactions to the proposal were mostly technical, moderate and 
defensive. Z.A. Maulani, who participated in the seminar as a panelist, commented in 
a weekly magazine that LIPI's study was generally acceptable but he regarded setting a 
time-limit as unviable. Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, emphasised 
his group's contribution to the DPR by pointing to social demands that ABRI remain in 
the parliament.173 Maj-Gen Prabowo Subianto, Kopassus Commander, also responded 
by saying that whether dzvifungsi should be limited or not depends on the people, not 
ABRI, but regarding the LIPI study, he questioned the validity of the methodology 
which did not include the voices of non-elites. Brig-Gen Slamet Supriyadi, who 
replaced Amir Syarifudin in the Kapuspen post in March, echoed ABRI's official 
rebuttal of this type of criticism. It was predictable, he said, that society would 
become more and more critical of the role of ABRI in the future, but whatever the 
situation, political power was neither dominated by civilians nor the military because 
ABRI's participation was adjusted in a proportional way.174 From the civilian side, a 
noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, joined the criticism. Mentioning a point in the LIPI 
study that called on ABRI to encourage better governance, he questioned how it would 
be possible to play such a role if ABRI was—as suggested by LIPI—restricted to the 
defence-security field.175
Regardless of the feasibility of the reform proposal, the fact that the LIPI team 
provoked an open debate on military withdrawal from the parliament put sufficient 
pressure on the Cilangkap circle for it to disseminate a 'correct' interpretation of 
dzvifungsi prospects. Another seminar at Lemhannas regarding the future role of ABRI 
was held one month after the LIPI seminar. Let-Gen Hendropriyono argued that it was 
a fact that reorientation and redefinition of ABRI's political role were needed as ABRI, 
in facing globalisation, experienced the erosion of traditional values, especially 
semangat kejuangan (spirit of struggle). However, dzvifungsi should remain because it 
aimed to promote democratic practice in national political life where societal
172 See Indria's interview, "Peran Itu Hams Jelas," Gatra, 8 March 1996.
173 See, for Maulani's comment, "Gugatan Baru Untuk Dwifungsi ABRI," and Hari's interview "Perlu 
Reformasi Kultural," both in Gatra, 8 March 1997.
174 Both comments are from "Dwifungsi Jalan Terns," Tiras, 24 April 1997.
175 See his article, "Mengakhiri Dwifungsi?," Gatra, 8 March 1996.
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democratic forces were still weak and fragmented.176 This well-publicised seminar 
proposed an official version of the adaptation of dzvifungsi to growing democratic 
demands, as if in response to LIPI's challenge, although it avoided reference to the year 
2007 and only provided a conceptual explanation. This seminar marked ABRI’s final 
acceptance of the need for reforming dzvifungsi, but the questions of scope, pace and 
degree of reform remained.
The next major stage of the dzvifungsi debate could be seen after the fall of 
Soeharto in May 1998. As we will see later, ABRI faced tremendous pressures to 
eliminate dzvifungsi from ABRI's organisational practice. Dzvifungsi would not only 
become an open topic for political discussion but became the principal target of 
political reform under the Habibie government. Why did it become so? In order to 
understand this development, we need to look at political events between the general 
election in May 1997 and the last day of Soeharto’s rule on 21 May 1998. ABRI's 
internal unity was threatened and some elements turned to terror in handling the 
political situation. 'Disunity and terror' significantly weakened the military 'capacity 
and legitimacy' to lead the pace and direction of the post-Soeharto political 
reconstruction. The demand to abolish dzvifungsi soon become a dominant discourse in 
political society. In the final two sections, we scrutinise developments up to Soeharto's 
presidential re-election in March 1998 in order to elucidate why dzvifungsi was on 
collision course.
The 1997 General Elections: Dzvifungsi as 'Destabilisor' and the End of New  
Order Corporatism
The general election of 1997 required military backing for the purpose of 
securing Golkar's landslide victory in the face of the growing public discontent with the 
regime's ouster of Megawati. ABRI's subordination to this project, as alluded to earlier, 
was accompanied by the intensification of dzvifungsi criticism and a certain 
dogmatisation of the military response to democratic movements. Pub he criticism now 
included the demand for substantial reform of dzvifungsi. The military's apparent 
inability, and even unwillingness, to maintain political stability during the eight months 
prior to the election day on 27 May resulted in an unprecedented series of mass riots 
spread around the archipelago.177 Political society strongly suspected ABRI of
176 Cited from Hendropriyono, "ABRI Sebagai Prajurit Pejuang Menghadapi Era Globalisasi," paper 
presented at the seminar "Perspektif Peranan ABRI Memasuki Abad 21," Lemhannas, Jakarta, 11 March 
1997. For media coverage on this seminar, see "Dwifungsi Masih Relevan Untuk Dikaji," Suara Pembaruan, 3 
April 1997. Hendropriyono at that time held a civilian post, Secretary for Operational Control of 
Development (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan, or Sekdalopbang) which was directly 
under Soeharto, but he was still on active-duty. He participated the seminar on behalf of Syarwan Hamid.
177 Notable riots are as follows: Situbondo (10 October 1996), Dili (24 December), Tasikmalaya (26 
December), Sanggau Ledo (30 December - 2 January 1997), Tanah Abang (9, 27 January), Pontianak (29
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engineering some of the riots, and two cases in particular were confidently described 
by the media as being provoked by the military. This inevitably reinforced the public 
distrust of 'dzuifungsi as stabilisor;' the very rationale of the New Order military in 
politics.
First, following the riots in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, which were both 
known as NU strongholds, the NU leader and a major opponent of ICMI, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, claimed that riots had been instigated as part of what he called 
Operasi Naga Hijau, or Operation Green Dragon (green referring to Islam), which— 
according to Wahid—was a government attempt to discredit the NU and Wahid 
himself. This operation was portrayed as the next step after Operasi Naga Merah 
(Operation Red Dragon, referring to the PDFs symbolic colour of red) that had already 
toppled Megawati. In countering such pressure, Wahid publicly stated that he would 
form a coalition with the 'professional' side of the military to counter the 'political' 
side, implying ABRI's partial involvement in the riots.178 A few days after the 
Tasikmalaya case, he insisted that: "there is an indication that the two riots were 
engineered by officers who used their staff in Korems to discredit my NU."179 Of 
course such a conspiracy theory was denied by Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid who asserted 
that Indonesia was no longer employing methods characteristic of the Kopkamtib 
era.180 Instead, he suggested that the riots were masterminded by intellectuals, but 
avoided mentioning the names which were, according to him, already known to 
intelligence staff.181 Despite these measures, no one was actually identified as the 
dalang and the rioting broke out in other places after Tasikmalaya. Suspicion about 
ABRI's riot engineering also grew in political society.182
January), Rengasdengklok (30 January), Rancaekek (31 January), Bandung (2 February), Sungaikunyit, near 
Pontianak (18 February), Pekalongan (24-26 March, 6 April), Temanggung (6 April), Rembang (6 April), 
Waning Buncit and Bekasi (20 May) Ciputat (23 May) Banjarmasin (23 May).
178 For Wahid's covert operation scenario, see special reports in Sinar (11 January 1997), Forum Keadilan 
(10 February 1997), and Tiras (23 January 1997). See his comment on a coalition in "Gus Dur Predicted 
Presidential Election Will be Influenced," Jakarta Post, 30 January 1997.
179 Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, 30 January 1997. It was not surprising if ICMI-linked generals 
found interest in discrediting Wahid. Situbondo, for example, was in the territory commanded by Maj-Gen 
Imam Utomo (Pangdam Brawijaya) and his chief-of-staff, Brig-Gen Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto at that time. 
Apart from Imam's closeness to Hartono, Muchdi was later known as Prabowo's partner. The anti-Wahid 
posture of the Hartono-Prabowo line was also strongly reflected in the orientation of their think-tank, 
CPDS, which saw Wahid as undermining Islamic aspirations by keeping ties with CSIS and Benny 
Moerdani (communication with a CPDS staff member, 18 September 1996).
180 This comment implied that Syarwan identified Kopkamtib as an organisation which had instigated 
social riots to achieve certain political goals. This was the implicit criticism of Moerdani and his followers 
who had developed Kopkamtib until the late 1980s.
181 See "ABRI tak 'Main Api,"' Kompas, 17 January 1997. Sudomo, former commander of Kopkamtib, then 
expressed his opinion that Tasikmalaya could have been instigated by the group of extreme right (Islamic 
fundamentalists), such as younger generation of Darul Islam which was destroyed in 1960s. Syarwan 
denied this account since it was against his image-making that those who were involved in the riot were not 
Muslims but the radical left. See "Ekstrem Kanan tidak Terlibat," Republika, 22 January 1997.
182 After field research, Komnas HAM also concluded that pihak ketiga (third party) instigated the riots in 
Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo in West Kalimantan. See "Third Party Masterminded Riot, Rights Body 
Says," Jakarta Post, 9 January 1997. These facts invited a view among Jakarta-based journalists that "the
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Second, in the case of riots in Tanah Abang, Jakarta in January, Syarwan's 
earlier comment that ABRI was not involved in the riot was questioned by the mass 
media when local preman (hoodlums) living in the crowded Tanah Abang district 
spoke about their closeness to one of the rising generals, Maj-Gen Prabowo—although 
he denied the allegation in a national daily.183 However, when another riot happened 
in Ambeno, 300 kilometres from Dili, in mid-February, Prabowo’s link with the rioters 
was again publicised, because it was pemuda members of Garda Paksi Timor Timur, a 
Kopassus-established pro-integration organisation, who started the riot. This time, he 
was forced to explain his relationship with the youth organisation and announced that 
Kopassus never gave them military education or training, but only trained them in 
discipline and nationalism.184 Whatever the relationship was, the disclosure that one 
army agency had an overt link with rioters in one case and a possible tie in the other 
sufficiently clouded Syarwan's efforts to eliminate the impression that elements in 
ABRI were main api (playing with fire).
Repeated announcements—during the eight months prior to the election—that 
riots were instigated by pihak ketiga, without successfully identifying the actor, posed 
questions about ABRI's principal role as the political stabilisor. Reflecting such an 
assessment, Christianto Wibisono, a critic of dzvifungsi who also signed the YKPK-led 
"Statement of Concern on 1 July," wrote a lengthy article in which he concluded that: "it 
is nothing more than a myth to think that dwifungsi is a system unique to Indonesia, as 
always emphasised by ABRI. Rather it is not different from the military's political 
involvement typically seen in other praetorian military regimes."185 His argument which 
labelled dwifungsi as a myth was surely a reflection of the reality that political society 
no longer accepted ABRI’s claim to be the national stabilisor.
In the wake of continuing riots, the general elections of 1997 resulted in a 
victory for Golkar which got 74 percent of the votes (325 seats in the DPR), up from 68 
percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its share to 23 percent (S9 seats) from 17 
percent in 1992, whereas the PDI, badly hit by a leadership battle between the ousted 
Megawati and government-backed Soerjadi, saw its share drop dramatically to 3 
percent (11 seats) from 14.9 percent in the last election (Appendix 3). As a result, the
plotters' "hit-and-run" tactics were more professional than ABRI's territorial staff. "If we think of who 
could make such a job, there is only one answer; the special unit within the military." Communications with 
anonymous journalists, January-February 1997.
183 "Danjen Kopassus: Saya Paling Anti-Preman," Suara Pembaruan, 26 January 1997. The Tanah Abang 
case was one of inter-gang conflict. Hercules, gang known as one of the largest preman groups in Jakarta, 
embraced many pemuda (youth) from East Timor, allegedly overlapping with those who were brought from 
East Timor by military officers to conduct pro-integration Timorese campaigns in Jakarta. Eagle Unit or 
Ninja is their code name in East Timor (Tempo, 7 March 1992). About Hercules, Timorese pemuda and their 
connection with the security apparatus, see "Preman Menguasai Tanahabang," Kompas, 2 February 1997.
184 "Danjen Kopassus: Ada Kelompok yang Sengaja memicu Huru-hara," Kompas, TJ February 1997. Beyond 
such training, Garda Paksi Chairman, Marcal de Almeida, admitted that the organisation was set up with 
financial assistance from Prabowo to help find decent jobs. See "Viqueque Street Brawl Arrests Rise to 
109," Jakarta Post, 15 February 1997.
185 "Mitos Dwitunggal-Dwifungsi," Suara Pembaruan, 12 December 1996.
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New Order polity was transformed to a de facto two-party system which consisted of 
the governmental alliance, Golkar and F-ABRI, which together occupied 80 percent of 
the DPR seats and one weak opposition party, the PPP. The election results also 
signified the virtual elimination of the PDI whose seat-share was only 2.2 percent. 
Therefore, the 1997 elections succeeded in securing the victory of Golkar but failed 
significantly to retain the New Order’s traditional 'corporatist strategy’ in which the 
political opposition was represented in the parliament by two tiny parties.186 The 
government's failure to neutralise the opposition power of Megawati circles—due to 
the simple exclusion of them from parliamentary politics—resulted in the further 
expansion of opposition ’outside’ formal political channels. Subsequent growth of the 
student movement strongly reflected public distrust of formal political mechanisms. It 
was in this process that street politics, which was confronted by the military's security 
operations, began to give priority to the elimination of dwifungsi as the core target of 
the movement, together with the removal of Soeharto. The elite demand for dwifungsi 
reforms in recent years was now in synergy with the expanding student movement 
which raised the clear slogan of abolishing dwifungsi. The 1997 general election, in this 
sense, provided significant momentum to such dynamics.
The 1998 MPR Sessions and Declining Cohesion within the Military
Once the election was over, Soeharto's military now focused on a new 
assignment with new players. Soeharto's command was obvious: securing his 
presidential re-election at the general session of the MPR in March 1998. The President 
made leadership changes to this end, but they significantly diminished ABRI's capacity 
to cope with the mounting social distrust of its political role.
The first wave of personnel transfers came soon after the 1997 election, when 
Hartono was replaced as KSAD by the Kostrad Commander and former presidential 
adjutant, Lt-Gen Wiranto, on 6 June.187 Wiranto was succeeded at Kostrad by another 
ex-adjutant, Maj-Gen Soegiono, who had commanded the Presidential Security Squad 
(Paspampres). Finally, Pangdam IV/Deponegoro Maj-Gen Soebagyo, a close associate 
of Hartono and a former Presidential bodyguard, was elevated to Deputy Army Chief 
(WaKasad) under Wiranto. Two significant facts could be perceived in this first post­
election reshuffle.
First, through the transfers, Soeharto-loyalists, or Palace generals, dominated 
key positions in the security apparatus of ABRI: Wiranto as Army Chief, Widodo as
186 About the New Order's long attempt to establish a corporatist network of interest articulation and 
political control, see, for example, King (1982) and MacIntyre's (1988:17-20) theoretical review.
187 Hartono was appointed to replace Harmoko as Minister of Information whereas the latter became 
Minister for Special Affairs, a post newly created by Soeharto, while retaining the Golkar Chairmanship. 
In October, he was appointed as Speaker of DPR/MPR.
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Police Chief, Prabowo as Kopassus Commander, and Soegiono as Kostrad 
Commander. Except for Prabowo, who was a son-in-law of Soeharto, all were former 
adjutants/bodyguards of Soeharto.188 The leadership change within ABRI was 
Soeharto's final step to personalise the military command in order to secure his 
presidential re-election. It was perceived as a signal that dwifungsi practice would 
further become a tool of preserving Soeharto's personal political interests.
Second, Wiranto's promotion effectively smoothed the way for Akabri- 
graduates, as represented by Soebagyo (Akabri 1970) who became the first Akabri 
officer with a three-star rank, followed by Soegiono (Akabri 1971) whose promotion 
also made him a three star-general.189 These officers only knew Soeharto as national 
leader, since their military schooling began after 1967 when Soeharto was already 
acting president. The rise of Akabri officers was also seen when Lt-Gen Syarwan 
Hamid and another 53 general-rank officers from all four services were transferred to 
F-ABRI for the DPR 1997-2002.190 This move, which replaced the top two 
sociopolitical staff and four Kodam Commanders, was followed by a massive 
overhaul of ABRI's strategic posts, affecting nearly 300 officers. What attracted the 
attention of political society was the new sociopolitical leadership consisting of Lt-Gen 
Yunus Yosfiah (an AMN graduate of 1965) who replaced Syarwan and Maj-Gen 
Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri 1973) who succeeded Budi Harsono. Bambang's 
function as the eventual spokesman for ABRI's future political program was generally 
welcomed in the political community, as an indication of Cilangkap’s willingness to 
deepen civil-military communication.191 It was the largest wave of personnel change
188 Maj-Gen Prabowo is the husband of Soeharto's second oldest daughter, Siti Hedijat Hariyadi. Soeharto 
relied much on Prabowo in handling internal military affairs—e.g. personnel transfers—especially after the 
fall of Moerdani. As we will discuss in later chapters, the rise of Prabowo, who had special access to the 
President, since the mid-1990s had created uncertainty in the promotion system within the army and become 
a major source of internal friction.
189 The National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional: AMN) was established in 1958 as a 3- 
year school. Since 1969, however, the program extended to 4 years with the new name, the Military 
Academy (Akademi Militer: Akabri). So the graduates after 1970 are called the Akabri generation. Wiranto 
graduated from the last AMN class in 1968.
190 Among others, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan (Seskoad Commander), Maj-Gen Budi Harsono (Assospol 
Kassospol), Maj-Gen Sedaryanto (Pangdam I/Bukit Barisan), Maj-Gen Namoeri Anoem (Pangdam 
VI/Tanjungpura), Maj-Gen Tayo Tarmadi (Pangdam III/Siliwangi), Maj-Gen Imam Utomo (Pangdam 
V/Brawijaya), Maj-Gen Ahmad Rivai (Pangdam IX/Udayana). For the complete list, see ”54 Jenderal Akan 
Isi Kursi F-ABRI DPR-RI," Media Indonesia, 12 July 1997. Syarwan was the only three-star general among 
them, implying that he would eventually lead F-ABRI in the MPR session in March 1997.
191 See Salim Said, "Dari Syarwan ke Yunus dan Yudhoyono," Republika, 16 July 1996. Bambang 
Yudhoyono, during his stint as Korem Commander in Yogyakarta, established contact with academic circles 
and intellectuals. Yunus was viewed as a temporary bridge to Bambang, given the fact that Yunus's 
promotion was against the direction of generation change, or regenerasi, which was insisted on by the 
ABRI leadership in explaining this reshuffle. Syarwan was an AMN graduate of 1966. Apart from the 
generation change, significant political aspects of this massive transfer were: (1) the replacement of six of 
the ten regional commanders and eight of the ten regional chief-of-staffs; and (2) the total reshuffle of 
Kostrad's top six positions. The former implied the elimination of Hartono-appointed officers while the 
latter worked to undermine the substantial power of Wiranto who was the Kostrad Commander before 
being promoted to KSAD.
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since Hartono became KSAD in 1995. In August, Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim 
(Akabri 1971) became the head of BIA (KaBIA) and in September, Brig-Gen Sjafrie 
Sjamsoeddin (Akabri 1974)—a close associate of Prabowo—replaced Sutiyoso as 
Pangdam Jaya. These post-election personnel changes reinvigorated the debate on the 
declining legitimacy of dwifungsi, as the Akabri graduates had even less claim to 
historical legitimacy than the AMN graduates.
The hard fact was that the leading generation had changed and a group which 
had not been involved during the national crisis of the mid-1960s when the New Order 
regime was established was now in charge of the army. This invited further questions 
about the legitimate role of ABRI in future political life and the rationale of dwifungsi. 
As Indonesia's political community emphasised the professionality and modernity of 
this Akabri group and distinguished it from preceding military generations, the 
changing of the guard could in turn be an opportunity for dismantling ABRI's historical 
legitimation of dwifungsi. It was Gen (ret) Rudini who drew attention to the nature of 
the new generation of leaders in ABRI. He wrote that the Akabri-generation lacked 
"basic principles,' namely a historical commitment which justified the privileges of the 
preceding generations to play a dominant role in politics.192
In the view of the Minister of Defence and Security, such privileges were not 
limited to the broadly defined right of political intervention, but also included many 
opaque organisational practices. General Edi Sudradjat stressed to the succeeding 
generation that ABRI officers and their families were forbidden to conduct any 
business activity. "If there is one who is doing business," he said, "the commander 
should discipline him." "If he is not disciplined, the commander will instead be 
disciplined, as written in the military discipline rules."193 Whether or not Edi's 
comment had any specific target was not clear, but the perception that the officers of 
the new generation should gradually relinquish social privileges was well reflected in 
Edi's unusual remark which resonated widely in society. Since one of the features of 
the Akabri generation officers was their high educational level, and some in key posts 
even held overseas Master's degrees, it was expected that their approach to dwifungsi 
management would be less dogmatic and more responsive to social change than then- 
predecessors.194 One observer of ABRI politics, Josef Kristiadi, head of the political
192 "Kolom Rudini: Angkatan 70-an Tanpa Prinsip Pokoknya," LPSI Online, available http: 
<http ://w w w .lpsi.o rg />, Edisi No.2, 21 August 1996. For the media coverage of Akabri-generation 
officers, see "Bintang-bintang ABRI Zaman Baru," Gatra, 25 November 1995; "Empat Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI 
dalam 50 Hari," Republika, 18 March 1996; "Meneropong Bintang Yang Kian Kemilau," Forum Keadilan, 9 
September 1996
193 "Perwira ABRI dan Keluarganya Tetap Dilarang Berbisnis," Media Indonesia, 16 July 1997. Perhaps 
having felt the need to defend his fellow soldiers, Pangab Feisal Tanjung soon responded by saying they can 
do business "if" they have special permits both from Pangab and Menhankam. See "Pangab: Perwira ABRI 
Boleh Berbisnis Dengan Izin Khusus," Suara Pembaruan, 22 July 1997. It was not, however, a strong 
argument since Edi had already rejected such a possibility.
194 Overseas Masters degree holders were, for example, Feisal's adviser, Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo (Akabri 
1970) (MAs, Georgetown University and Manchester University); Maj-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri
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department in CSIS, noted that figures around Wiranto—such as Bambang and the 
two Aguses—recognised a need to redefine dwifungsi, and such a mood had been 
getting stronger within ABRI.195 It was perceived that not a small number of ABRI 
officers recognised the danger of the increasing personalisation of military commands 
by Soeharto, which weakened ABRI's capacity to protect its 'corporate' interest—i.e. 
promoting social legitimacy of dwifungsi. The rise of new intellectual officers, therefore, 
involved a potential challenge to the current Soeharto-ABRI relations constructed 
under the Feisal-Hartono leadership.
The possibility of such a move within ABRI was of course acknowledged by 
Soeharto himself. His balancing strategy had typically been implemented in a manner 
both to avoid ABRI as a whole becoming a cohesive challenger, and to keep every actor 
dependent on him. Quick personnel transfers and the continuing recomposition of 
ABRI's leadership had been the means to achieve this end. The recent series of 
reshuffles between 1995 to 1996, and tactical switching from the non-Islamic 
Moerdani-Edi line to the ICMI-affiliated Feisal-Hartono line, and then the less 
controversial Wiranto-led middle-way represented Soeharto's style. Even in this last 
case, Soeharto did not forget to put Soebagyo—a friend of Prabowo—directly under 
Wiranto.196 For those who were concerned about Prabowo's political ambitions backed 
by Soeharto, Wiranto—who was regarded as a more professionally oriented officer— 
was the man to support, although he was a former Presidential adjutant. Soeharto, the 
master of 'divide-and-rule' strategy, let the intra-military competition go on in order to 
create the power balance which would make both sides rely on him. The new military 
leadership was arranged by Soeharto, based on this strategy, to ensure the smooth 
presidential and vice-presidential elections in March 1998.
Two lessons from the last two elections (in 1988 and 1993) were also reflected 
in this leadership change. First, Syarwan's move to F-ABRI seemed intended to ensure 
that F-ABRI did not take any independent action against Soeharto as happened in 
1988 when—as seen above—a F-ABRI member, Brig-Gen Ibrahim Saleh, openly 
objected to Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice-president at the MPR session. 
Second, Yunus's appointment as Kassospol was also seen as following a similar
1973) (MA in Management, Webster University); and Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah (Akabri 1973), 
nephew of former vice president Umar Wirahadikusumah, who assisted in ABRI's strategic planning, as 
Deputy Assistant for General Planning (Waasrum Pangab) (MA in Public Policy and Management, Harvard 
University). They worked together to design the back-to-basics curriculum in 1993, whereas Bambang and 
Agus Wirahadikusumah also coordinated the 1996 Army Seminar which formulated the Army's strategic 
plan for the next GBHN. We will fully examine their roles in the next chapter.
195 "Wawancara J. Kristiadi: ABRI Sangat Tergantung pada Pangti," Tempo Interaktif, Online, available 
http: <http://www.tempo.co.id/min/07/utama2.htm>, Edisi 07/02,19 April 1997.
196 The relationship between Soebagyo and Prabowo was cultivated when they served as Commander and 
Deputy Commander of Kopassus. Also an officer who had a link with CPDS, Brig-Gen Robik, Head of Army 
Information Service (Kadinaspen AD), soon announced that the new leadership under Wiranto would 
continue Hartono's policy line. See "Tidak Ada perubahan Kebijakan di TNI-AD," Angkatan Bersenjata, 17 
June 1997.
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tactical line. In 1993, as mentioned earlier, Kassospol Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas 
announced Try Sutrisno as ABRI's candidate for vice-president, virtually ensuring 
Soeharto's reluctant endorsement. In contrast to Hartas who was an anti-Habibie 
general, Yunus was considered a Habibie supporter, especially after expressing his 
admiration for Habibie in a magazine interview.197 Thus he was most unlikely to 
mobilise ABRI to resist Soeharto's wishes by opposing Habibie. As a result, Habibie 
was now guarded by military allies, i.e. Feisal, Syarwan and Yunus, which reflected 
Soeharto's calculations in regard to the vice-presidential race. These moves showed 
Soeharto's approach of alon-alon asal kelakon (slow but sure) to avoid the kind of ABRI- 
Soeharto antagonism that had been experienced in the vice-presidential elections in 
1988 and 1993. Other conditions being equal, Soeharto's control of Kassospol and F- 
ABRI ensured that his wishes would be respected.
Together with these arrangements, ABRI was also given a direct order by 
Soeharto regarding its desired posture. The Supreme Commander asserted that 
dwifungsi needed to be carried out with full caution because the Indonesian people 
were now enjoying political stability and economic development.198 This was viewed 
as a sign that Soeharto would not allow ABRI a free hand, and would pay special 
attention to keeping ABRI quiet and united in the run-up to the MPR event.
These developments well illustrated Soeharto's preparation to use ABRI as a 
tool for his political interests. Key ABRI figures who worked for Soeharto's blueprint to 
endorse Habibie as vice-president—along with Soeharto's re-election—were Feisal 
Tanjung, Syarwan Hamid, Yunus Yosfiah, Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. It should 
be noted that officers like Wiranto and Bambang Yudhoyono adopted a very low- 
profile during this period.
The disastrous currency crisis, which started in Thailand in July 1997, soon 
affected Indonesia. The value of Rupiah dropped dramatically. Amid the economic 
meltdown, it was reported that CSIS—which had shown its support for re-election of 
the incumbent vice-president, Try Sutrisno—expressed strong opposition to Habibie. 
Key ABRI figures quickly responded to the move to renominate Try Sutrisno. Pangab 
Feisal Tanjung attacked Sofyan Wanandi—an ethnic Chinese businessman who sat on 
the Board of CSIS—by saying Sofyan was not interested in helping the government to 
solve the national crisis because he did not join the "I Love Rupiah" movement.199
Further pressure came from Sjafrie when Kodam Jaya 'accidentally' found an 
alleged PRD document after a bomb blast in the apartment of a young radical activist.
197 He said that his idol is Habibie whom he believed capable of leading the nation. See Yunus' interview, 
"Wawancara: Dari Suksesi Hingga B.J. Habibie," Tiras, 14 July 1997.
198 "Dwifungsi ABRI Dilaksanakan dengan Hati-hati," Media Indonesia, 29 July 1997.
199 This movement was a scheme in which Feisal had asked conglomerates to bring their overseas U.S. 
dollars back to Indonesia and convert them to devalued Rupiah to prove their sense of nationalism. For 
details, see "Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan," Forum Keadilan, 23 February 1998. For an English 
source, see Human Rights Watch (1998a).
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The document—an e-mail message—stated that Sofyan had offered financial support 
to the group's activities. Sjafrie's Kodam Jaya interrogated Sofyan and suggested the 
possibility of calling in other CSIS associates, which in turn led to speculation that 
Benny Moerdani would also be questioned.200 Meanwhile, Sofyan's interrogation led to 
a series of Muslim youth demonstrations in front of CSIS, asking for the dissolution of 
the think-tank and the re-interrogation of Sofyan and his brother, Yusuf Wanandi, 
whose name was also said to be mentioned in the above document. However, it was 
widely believed that the demonstrations were not spontaneous but mobilised by the 
security apparatus and possibly by Sjafrie and Prabowo, who had been eager to 
organise radical Muslim youth under Kopassus authority. Perhaps such high-profile 
political manoeuvring was not unrelated to Wiranto's elevation to Pangab in February, 
which—in the eyes of Prabowo circles—would reinforce the consolidation of Wiranto's 
leadership against the Prabowo group.201 Actively backing Soeharto's project was one 
way to show loyalty to the Supreme Commander, which in turn might be helpful to 
underline one's competitor's relative lack of loyalty. Prabowo seemed to take this 
strategy. Three days after Wiranto's installation ceremony, Prabowo broke the Muslim 
Ramadan fast along with about 5,000 guests, including many representing radical 
Islamic groups, and warned them that a political conspiracy of certain groups was 
behind the current economic crisis. He distributed a list of Chinese-owned Asian 
business groups, and asked these Muslims to fight with ABRI against this 
conspiracy.202 One of Sutrisno supporters, Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang Triantoro, stressed 
that the pressure on the CSIS could hardly be separated from the conflict over the vice­
presidency.203 At the same time, the pressure could not also be separated from
200 Sjafrie quickly denied the speculation and Moerdani himself—in front of many press reporters at the 
ceremony to install Wiranto as the new Pangab in February 1998—frankly asked Zacky (KaBIA) of such a 
possibility. He confirmed that it was baseless speculation. See "Kali Pertama L.B. Moerdani 'Terbuka' 
Kepada Wartawan," Jawapos, 21 February 1998. Both Moerdani and Zacky have excellent connections 
with the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), in developing BAIS and BIA.
201 Feisal Tanjung became Menko Polkam, replacing Soesilo Sudarman. Wiranto's promotion to Pangab was 
followed by the promotion of Soebagyo as KSAD. It was also announced that Prabowo would become 
Kostrad Commander and Bambang Yudhoyono would take the post of Kassospol after the MPR session in 
March. Meanwhile, Wiranto's attempt to consolidate his power could be seen, for example, in the 
replacement of Lt-Gen Tamlicha Ali by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo as Assistant for General Planning to Pangab 
(Asrenum Pangab) in January. Widjojo's previous position as the political-security adviser to Pangab was 
occupied by his friend, Maj-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah.
202 See "Soal Permainan Politik di Balik Krisis Rupiah Mereka Pengkhianat," Rqpublika, 24 January 1998. 
'"Us' and 'Them': Muslim Activists Say It's Time to Seize Economic Power," PEER, 12 February 1998. On 8th 
of February, a large Muslim meeting was held at the A1 Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. Anti-CSIS speeches were 
given and it was labelled as a 'conspirator' or traitor of the nation. Speakers called for a closing of the 
ranks of Islam and ABRI against them. See "Dibentuk Front Solidaritas Nasional Muslim Indonesia," 
Kompas, 9 February 1998. As mentioned in the above PEER article, Prabowo, in particular, had a close link 
with one of these radical groups at the meeting, the Indonesia Committee for World Muslims (KISDI), which 
was actually involved in the CSIS demonstrations. For KISDI's anti-CSIS declaration in which the think- 
tank was named as a Frankenstein and a Vampire which should be kicked out from the land of Indonesia, 
see an article in its internet homepage, "Kebohongan Liem Bian Koen," KISDI Interaktif, Online, available 
http: <http://www.kisdi.com /edisil/aktuall.htm >, 8 February 1998.
203 "Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan," Forum Keadilan, 23 February 1998.
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Prabowo’s effort to demonstrate his ability to achieve Soeharto's goals in the ongoing 
patrimonial competition with Wiranto.
Amidst the escalating attack on anti-Habibie circles, Wiranto made a public 
statement, insisting that society should not be influenced by those who tried to bring 
up ethnic-religious sentiments.204 The Muslim bandwagon, however, did not stop. It 
was just a day after Wiranto's announcement that the Indonesian Ulemas Council 
(MUI), a key government-appointed Islamic body, declared jihad against "a group of 
irresponsible people who dominate 70 percent of country's economy even though they 
are only four percent of the total population, in order to prevent their political 
conspiracy to topple the government and Islam."205 The target was obviously the 
Chinese minority. This series of events was enough to bury the possible emergence of a 
call to re-nominate Try Sutrisno.
Then, the day after the jihad declaration, Feisal announced that ABRI already 
had a candidate for vice president even it was still too early to disclose his name. On 
the same day, Kassospol Lt-Gen Yunus Yosfiah stressed that ABRI would not repeat 
the past 'mistake'—referring to Kassospol Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas' nomination of 
Try Sutrisno as ABRI's vice-presidential candidate before the MPR session in 1993— 
which he said did not follow the constitutional mechanism.206 It was Yunus who also 
pushed aside the possibility of any 'interruption' by a F-ABRI member at the 
forthcoming MPR session, like that of Maj-Gen Ibrahim Saleh who objected to 
Sudharmono's nomination as vice-president in 1988.207 Instead, Yunus stated that 
ABRI's criteria for the vice-president were the same as those of Golkar, while the ABRI 
spokesman Brig-Gen Abdul Wahab Mokodongan ultimately took the approach of asal 
bapak senang (as long as the boss is happy) by insisting that even if Soeharto picked 
Amien Rais, ABRI would follow this.208 With the full backing of the palace generals, 
Habibie was finally selected as the vice president for 1998-2003. However, ABRI as a 
whole had to bear the price of the deepening social suspicion towards ABRI which 
now seemed to only function as a tool for preserving Soeharto's political interests. The 
growing internal split within ABRI—especially between Prabowo and Wiranto—which
204 See, for example, "Jangan Sebarkan Sentimen SARA,” Kompas, 10 February 1998.
205 "MUI Serukan Jihad Nasional," Republika, 11 February 1998. The ICMI newspaper, Republika, also 
conducted a campaign which linked such a conspiracy theory with CSIS, by fully using its editorial for 
three days to write about the role of CSIS in manipulating politics during the Ali Moertopo era.
206 See "ABRI Has Candidate In Mind for Veep, Feisal Says," Antara, 12 February 1998 and "Soal Calon 
Wapres ABRI Tidak Ingin Ulangi Masa Lalu," Media Indonesia, 12 February 1998.
207 See, for example, "Kassospol Tepis Kemungkinan Anggota F-ABRI Interupsi,” Kompas, 27 February 
1998.
208 "Kassospol ABRI: Stabilitas Tidak Ditentukan oleh Wapres yang ABRI," Republika, 26 January 1998. 
"ABRI's Trust in Soeharto Part of a 'Strategic Plan,'" Jakarta Post, 3 February 1998. Amien Rais, chairman of 
Mohammadiyah (the country's second largest Muslim group), was a popular opposition leader who had 
publicly insisted on the need for presidential succession since the early 1990s. It was, of course, 
inconceivable that Soeharto would nominate Amien Rais.
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was fuelled by Soeharto's divide-and-rule strategy effectively incapacitated both sides 
to emphasise ABRI's commitment to an independent role in political life.
In conducting Soeharto's major regime projects since 1996—i.e. removal of 
Megawati, Golkar's electoral victory, Soeharto's re-election and Habibie's election to 
the vice-presidency—ABRI's role had been sharply criticised as pemadan kebakaran (a 
fire brigade) and as alat mati pemerintah (a dead tool of the government). Both phrases 
suggested that the military had no independent mind to promote 'national' interests 
and merely played the security role when ordered by the government. Such perceptions 
particularly accumulated during the Feisal era, but even after the leadership change, 
the split among top generals effectively blocked ABRI from taking the initiative to meet 
the demands of society, although there were now several reform-minded officers in the 
top ranks.209 The cost of this was high. ABRI lost the final chance to restore dzvifungsi 
legitimacy. Wide public demands for the total eradication of dwifungsi spread around 
the country soon after the fall of Soeharto on 21 May, following the wave of student 
demonstrations which played a key role in ending the three decades of the New 
Order.210
Conclusion
The period of keterbukaan was one in which ABRI was forced to adapt its 
doctrine to meet new challenges, but the process was not smooth. The debate over the 
proper implementation of dwifungsi was initially a by-product of a struggle between 
President Soeharto and ABRI under the leadership of General Moerdani but is soon led 
to widespread questioning of dwifungsi by members of political society. We saw the 
arguments about back-to-basics, tut wuri handayani, the rise of AMN-Akabri 
generation officers, and the military relinquishing 25 parliamentary seats, on the one 
hand, which all contributed to the breaking of taboos in the dwifungsi debate with 
implications of possible change in ABRI's political involvement. But, on the other hand, 
cases such as the media crack down, Golkar-ABRI fusion, the attack on vocal retired
209 Their activities and political thinking since the early 1990s are discussed in the following chapters.
210 The political process leading to the fall of Soeharto involved various complex factors and the 
description of these is beyond the scope of our discussion here. However, it should at least be noted that the 
nation-wide student movement demanding the resignation of Soeharto escalated after his presidential re- 
election. ABRI responded to it with two contradictory approaches—i.e. 'dialogue' led by the Wiranto circle 
and 'terror' (including kidnapping of activists) led by the Kopassus circle. The latter approach also 
involved the provoking of riots, like that in Jakarta during 13-15 May 1998, which allegedly intended to 
prepare the ground for the reimposition of Martial Law and reinstitution of Kopkamtib—with Prabowo as 
its commander—as the last measure to protect Soeharto. This scenario was scrapped as Soeharto finally 
decided to resign from the presidency on 21 May. Pangab Wiranto immediately removed Prabowo 
supporters from their commands, but the issues of kidnapping and riot-provoking contributed to the total 
breakdown of ABRI's credibility in society, and the social demand for the elimination of dwifungsi became 
predominant in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. See Chapter 5 (footnote 74) for the student abduction by 
Kopassus. For a detailed observation of the final days of Soeharto, see Mietzner (1999).
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officers, the shoot-on-sight order, and the red-purge campaign all suggested a degree of 
continuity with ABRI's long-time hardliner approach before the keterbukaan era. There 
was a degree of institutional inertia at work here and an inclination to rely on the 
established praetorian methods that had worked in the past. However, it is in this 
context that the series of new approaches (emerging in the 1990s) can be assessed as a 
reflection of the declining utility of ABRI's simple reliance on such methods.
The debate about dwifungsi was largely started by President Soeharto. Our 
discussion revealed that, in the early stage, the trigger of the debate was mostly 
Soeharto's statements. Kopkamtib's abolition, tut zvuri handayani and the reduction of 
F-ABRI were initiated by Soeharto, and thus effectively legitimised political society to 
expand political space for critical discourse on dwifungsi under the authoritarian 
regime. However, it was also Soeharto who preserved dwifungsi's traditional 
approaches such as intervention in opposition party affairs, repression of popular 
political movements, support for Golkar, and the elimination of elite opponents to 
secure Soeharto's presidential re-election. From Soeharto's standpoint, these two 
directions were not contradictory as they were both aimed at consolidating his 
political power. However, viewed from the perspective of dwifungsi legitimation, the 
two involved a serious institutional contradiction, as the former implied the decline of 
military's political influence in general while the latter suggested an increasing—or at 
least an unchanging—role of ABRI in protecting Soeharto's political interests. Both 
tendencies contributed to the dwifungsi dispute in the public arena.
In this chapter, we have seen how the dwifungsi criticism in political society 
gradually reached point where ABRI could no longer curb its direction. Prior to 
keterbukaan, especially when the New Order was still in the process of establishing a 
political system based on ideological conformity to Pancasila, regime criticism— 
including attacks on dwifungsi—was easily identified as anti-Pancasila (i.e. anti­
national philosophy), or ideological subversion which should be defeated by security 
operations. Under these circumstances, any social movement to criticise dwifungsi was 
regarded as taboo and could not be durable, except the one by the disenchanted 45 
generation officers—such as Ah Sadikin, A.H. Nasution and Soemitro—who claimed 
that the dwifungsi created by their generation had been 'misconducted' by the current 
officers. This strictly limited political space for dwifungsi criticism was, however, 
gradually opened in the keterbukaan era.
Public criticism under keterbukaan originally aimed to activate the role of the 
DPR as a democratic check on the government's power. ABRI, led by Moerdani, 
supported this movement because it could be used for attacking Soeharto. On the other 
hand, Soeharto countered ABRI's manoeuvres by raising issues which would initiate 
public argument about ABRI's dwifungsi in the context of keterbukaan. In this way, the 
first step to incorporate dwifungsi criticism under the scope of keterbukaan was largely a 
'by-product' of the contestation between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI. However, this
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process effectively widened elite participation in dzvifungsi criticism in the public 
arena. It was in this process that respected intellectual officers—such as Gen (ret) 
Rudini, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, and Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. 
Maulani—began to participate actively in the public discourse on dwifungsi. As an 
unintended consequence of the antagonism that encouraged both Soeharto and ABRI to 
give—obviously with different reasons—legitimacy to the keterbukaan campaign, the 
dwifungsi criticism gradually began to enjoy larger autonomy and ABRI found it 
increasingly difficult to curb the escalating critical debate and demands for dwifungsi 
reform. Two events further helped promote political autonomy of dwifungsi criticism 
under the authoritarian New Order polity. One was the rise of a new generation of 
officers and the other was ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto's personal interests 
during the final few years.
Critics in the 1990s increasingly questioned the legitimacy basis of dwifungsi, 
since the new generation (especially the Akabri generation) had no role in the 'struggle 
history of nation-building' which had legitimised earlier military involvement in 
politics.211 They claimed that political privileges should not be given to the current 
military officers who were no longer superior to civilians in service to the nation. In 
addition, Soeharto's elimination of Moerdani's influence within ABRI and the resulting 
subordination of the military leadership to Soeharto also strengthened the autonomy of 
critical discourse on dwifungsi in the public arena. Like the case of generation change, 
the legitimacy basis of dwifungsi was seriously challenged by political figures who 
argued that dwifungsi was now no more than pemadam kebakaran. The development of 
this argument—notably since the toppling of Megawati in 1996—also did not rely on 
the free political space created by the conflict between Soeharto and ABRI, as in the 
early stage of the keterbukaan movement.
Throughout these developments, we examined how the previously tabooed 
dwifungsi criticism had been transformed into a popular political debate under the 
New Order regime, with the growing capacity for civilian critics to control the direction 
of the debate. Our next focus is on ABRI’s internal process of developing dwifungsi 
doctrines, in order to clarify the foundation of ABRI's organisational political thinking 
which has directed officers' response to the critical discourse of dwifungsi. How has 
ABRI's mind-set been shaped and influenced the pattern of dwifungsi interpretation? In 
what ways have changes—both internal and external to ABRI—been perceived and 
reflected in ABRI's dwifungsi re-interpretation? How have dwifungsi s 'historical 
privileges' been challenged, eroded, manipulated, maintained and reproduced by the 
'non-privileged' generation of officers in their attempts to secure the legitimacy of 
dwifungsi. These are the major questions we will examine in the next chapter.
211 The history of struggle refers to the pre-New Order Indonesia which experienced the independent war 
(1945-49), a communist upheaval in Madium (1948), a series of separatist movements (1957-59), and the 
failed communist coup in 1965.
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Chapter 3
Dzvifungsi as Military Role Belief: Doctrinal 
Evolution and Interpretative Adaptation
The previous chapter examined the political process in which the legitimacy of 
dwifungsi had been questioned in line with escalating societal demands for democratic 
keterbukaan. Our next focus is on ABRI's internal manufacturing of dwifungsi 
legitimation. Whether a political activity is perceived as legitimate or not (both by the 
subject and object) is a significant factor which influences political behaviour, and 
ABRI has endeavoured to expand the modes of legitimation as it faces changes both in 
ABRI and society'. By examining this process, we can assess not only the manner in 
which ABRI has legitimised its doctrine of political activism but also the types of 
resources ABRI has mobilised for this end, and how it has become difficult for ABRI to 
secure these resources since the mid-1980s and particularly the 1990s.
This chapter first examines the making of dwifungsi's doctrinal framework 
which reflected and fortified ABRI's role in the New Order, especially up to the mid- 
1980s. We then analyse how the established interpretation of dwifungsi faced an 
internal challenge—namely the generation change of the officer corps—which forced 
ABRI to seek further legitimation of dwifungsi, and how new logics were introduced to 
this end. Here, the notion of professionalism played the significant role. We then look 
at the process in which the adjusted dwifungsi legitimation gradually awakened the 
officers' perception about the gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's 
political interests. Such an assessment was officially presented in the early 1990s 
under the initiative of General Edi Sudradjat who promoted the intra-military program 
called "back-to-basics." In the following two sections, we examine how ABRI officers— 
especially those who had been affiliated with the military education sector— 
endeavoured to reconstruct interpretations of both dwifungsi and the political 
situation, in their attempt to produce a viable legitimation of ABRI's political role in 
response to the growing social pressure for democratisation. This process also 
illustrated how the reform-minded officers identified contradictions between ABRI's 
long-term institutional interests and Soeharto's short-term political strategy in the final 
years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, we investigate the evolution of 
ABRI's role perception and the way in which factors both internal and external to
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ABRI influenced its pattern as reflected in dwifungsis doctrinal and interpretative 
formulas.
Laying the Doctrinal Foundations, 1966-1982
The New Order's civil-military relations model was first designed at the 
second army seminar of 1966, when ABRI leaders systematically fused several military 
doctrines based on anti-Communism, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45). 
ABRI's ideological and doctrinal foundation was further developed and virtually 
completed by 1982 when the ABRI leadership published a guidebook which provided 
the first comprehensive official explanation of dwifungsi.1 In subsequent doctrinal 
writings, ABRI modified and strengthened the established framework of 1982 
according to the needs of the time, but its core was invariable during the New Order 
period. Let us examine developments until 1982.
The second army seminar in August 1966 revised the doctrinal format 
adopted by the first seminar in April 1965 during the Soekamo era. This 1965 doctrine 
was largely coloured by the radical and revolutionary concepts favoured by the 
President. It, for instance, defined the role of the army as an "instrument of revolution" 
which constituted part of the national progressive-revolutionary forces integrated 
under the Golongan Karya (Functional Groups)—led by President Soekamo—in 
establishing a Pancasila-based socialist nation in Indonesia.2 The army also identified 
itself as both a sociopolitical force and a military force, insisting on the construction of 
a socialist nation based on Pancasila as the primary goal of the former function.3 Thus 
the first army seminar distinguished between sociopolitical and defence roles of the 
army and also claimed that the former role was performed as a member of Golongan 
Karya.
Needing to formulate a new posture after the defeat of the PKI and the 
subsequent fall of Soekamo, General Soeharto, in November 1966, formally abolished
1 According to Dr. Kristiadi of CSIS, no equally comprehensive work appeared after the 1982 guidebook, 
and dwifungsi indoctrination within ABRI was conducted based on this material in the late New Order. 
Interview, 25 March 1997. The guide book is entitled Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia Tentang Dwi Fungsi ABRI, Jakarta: Dephankam, 1982.
2 Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Qakti" (Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat Tgl 2 s /d  9 April 1965 di 
Seskoad, Bandung), Departmen Angkatan Darat, 1965, pp.4,11. This doctrinal paper is the product of the 
first army seminar. The concept of Golongan Karya was depicted in UUD45 which stated that all 
functional groups had rights to participate in politics. It was introduced into the political system by 
Soekarno when he formed the National Council (Dewan Nasional) in 1957, aiming to consolidate his 
political power and limit the space for party politics which was seen as a cause of instability. Golongan 
Karya consisted of several 'functional' groups and the army was given this status with the resulting 
expansion of its formal role in politics. For details, see, for example, Sundhaussen (1982:134-135) and 
Suryadinata (1989:8).
3 Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Qakti," p .ll.
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the doctrinal format designed at the first army seminar and adopted the results of the 
second seminar as the army's official doctrine.4 Old revolutionary military doctrines 
under the rubric of Tri Ubaya Qakti (TUQ were revised and ABRI's total commitment 
to all fields of national ’modernisation’ was asserted .5 The new TU£ doctrine 
illustrated ABRI's perception of its political engagement at the beginning of New Order, 
when no other political force could counter ABRI's political dominance. It remained the 
foundation of ABRI's political role perception during the New Order period.
The first chapter of the new TU£, entitled "Conceptual Foundations for the 
Army's Struggle," depicted ABRI's commitment to the New Order. Among other things, 
it insisted that "the military possesses basic tasks in the defence field and also in all 
areas of social life, and it wishes to play a vital role in the process of modernisation."6 
Moreover, it stated that "the military's role-expansion (meluaskan peranannya) was 
forced (terpaksa) by conditions leading to the national crisis, and consequently the 
military became a strategic social force in national politics." The doctrine, however, 
stressed that the military did not seek unlimited power because: "it—as a freedom- 
fighter—always desires to be a constitutional force and a champion of democracy-"7
In clarifying the subsequent development of ABRI's ideology, four aspects 
revealed in the New TUC should be noted here. First, since the beginning, or more 
precisely since the first army seminar, the military described itself as both a defence 
force and a non-military (or social) force, thus laying the basis for the dwifungsi 
conception which was not yet devised.
Second, the perception that ABRI's role-expansion in the New Order resulted 
from the national crisis was obviously aimed at cultivating its legitimacy, but it 
simultaneously left room for the logical loss of legitimacy once the crisis was over. The 
concept of role-expansion used in the doctrine indicated that the role played by ABRI 
in the New Order would not be the same as its original role. This, in effect, provided 
space for subsequent criticism of dwifungsi. 'Crisis legitimacy’ and consequent 'role- 
expansion' were used to justify military involvement in politics at the first stage of the 
New Order, but they were highly vulnerable to changed circumstances when the crisis
4 See Surat Keputusan Men/Pangab Nomor: KEP-1169/11/1966 tanggal 11/Nopember 1966, in Doktrin 
Perjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Qakti" (Hasil Seminar AD ke-II Tanggal 25 S/D 31 Agustus 1966), 
Seskoad, Bandung, 1966, pp.13-14. Hereafter called the New TUC^  Paper.
5 Tri Ubaya Qakti literary means Three Sacred Vows, consists of three sub-doctrines in the 1965 (1st 
Seminar) version—Doktrin Kekaryaan TNI-AD (Doctrine of the Non-Military Function of the Indonesian 
Army), Doktrin Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of Indonesian Revolutionary War), and Doktrin 
Pembinaan Potensi Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of Fostering Potential for Indonesian 
Revolutionary War). The New TUC in 1966 is based on three renewed sub-doctrines, i.e. Doktrin 
Pertahanan Darat Nasional (National Land Defence Doctrine), Doktrin Kekaryaan (Non-Military 
Functional Group Doctrine), and Doktrin Pembinaan (Fostering Doctrine) plus, as their practical doctrine, 
Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta (PERATA), or People’s Total War Doctrine. This doctrinal package 
effectively relinquished revolutionary terminology which accompanied the image of left-wing radicalism 
(Ibid., pp.10-12).
6 Ibid., p.17.
7 Ibid., p.17-21.
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had passed.
Third, the military, however, claimed long-term legitimacy for its involvement 
in non-military affairs by insisting on the need of political stability for economic 
development—a national goal. It was argued that the military had no choice but to 
take responsibility for building the New Order. "Without it, economic stability would 
never be achieved, and the military's role was demanded by the historical need 
(panggilan sejarah).”8 Here, ABRI insisted on its total commitment to the New Order 
project of national economic development, and since it was a long-term goal, the 
military found it legitimate to engage in non-military affairs on a permanent basis, not 
just during the emergency. This 'permanency' was a notable characteristic of the New 
Order military thinking standardised in the 1966 doctrine, that could not be found in 
the 1965 version. The new doctrines also interpreted the military’s new role as the New 
Order builder by employing the concept of panggilan sejarah, in order to emphasise the 
strong legitimacy of such a role as a continuation of its nation-building role since the 
independence war. That the leading officers in the military at that time had 
participated in the independence war in fact encouraged them to stress this rationale. 
These two aspects—developmentalism and historicism—therefore backed the military 
assertion of the long-term legitimacy of its political involvement, while the 'crisis 
legitimacy' could only provide a short-term justification.
Finally, the original army perception that its political engagement was 'forced' 
by national conditions showed that ABRI's political involvement was not motivated by 
professional concerns, but by the alleged lack of alternative civilian forces capable of 
handling national affairs. Lt-Gen Panggabean—the deputy army commander and the 
head of the seminar organising team—strongly emphasised that ABRI was forced to 
act by the lack of civilian political capacity.9 There was also no single reference to 
military professionaiisation in this new TUC document consisting of 126 pages, even in 
the section on military education. This fact should be noted before we later discuss the 
nature of the argument about professionalism in the 1990s, which proposed an 
interpretation insisting that ABRI's political role was motivated by its professional 
commitment.
Based on this posture, the new TU£ document presented four sub-doctrines 
as follows:
• Doktrin Pertahanan Darat Nasional (Hanratnas) or National Land Defence 
Doctrine. This doctrine defined the army's basic defence burden which emphasised 
the twin use of purely military operations and social mobilisation (social weapons 
system, or sipersos) in conducting internal/external security missions, especially to
8 Ibid., p.20.
9 Panggabean, the deputy army commander at that time, later succeeded Soeharto as the army commander in 
1968 and ABRI commander in 1971. The comment cited above is from Panggabean, "Pidato Pembukaan Ketua 
Seminar AD ke-II/1966," in Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966, Bandung, Seskoad, 
1966, p.61.
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counter internal subversive actions and security disturbances;10
• Doktrin Kekaryaan or Non-Military Function Doctrine. This doctrine manifested 
ABRI's non-military function in a quite basic way without mentioning actual 
programs. It argued that ABRI—as a functional group (golongan karya) of a social 
force (kekuatan sosial) based on Pancasila—was eager to involve itself in constructing 
democracy inspired by UUD45 to fight against dictatorship and autocracy. In 
implementing this task, it said, ABRI provided security for both the executive and 
legislative branches to defend Pancasila ideology in the ideological, religious, 
cultural, political, social, economic, and military fields;* 11
• Doktrin Pembinaan or Fostering Doctrine. This doctrine fostered the above two 
doctrines. It stated the necessity for Pancasila education in all governmental and 
private educational institutes, indoctrination of mass organisations, political 
organisations and Golkar, and the utilisation of the mass media. It was also argued 
that kekaryaan (sending army personnel to non-military posts) should be 
implemented to benefit national economic development and the people's 
prosperity.12
• Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta (Perata) or People's Total War Doctrine. This 
doctrine implemented the above three doctrines comprising the new TU£. It 
emphasised, among others, the weak national economy and geographical diversity 
which made the army's defence strategy dependent on low-technology intensive 
social mobilisation of the "total people" and territorial activities led by Kodams 
(Military Area Commands) to fight against infiltration and subversion.13
In addition, the new TU£ renewed the Doctrine of National Defence and 
Security (Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, or Hankamnas) which was the 
trans-service and mother doctrine of Hanratnas. It first stated that the PKI and its 
supporters were still active and that the major internal threats were infiltration and 
subversion, both in the mental and physical senses, conducted by social groups which 
were reluctant to accept Pancasila and UUD45, and opposed to the transformation 
from Old Order to New Order.14
In this way, the threat perceptions mentioned in Hankamnas during this 
embryonic period of the New Order clearly illustrated that the goal of military
10 Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD, pp.40-41. Sipersos was designed to mobilise two non-military 
organisations; People’s Resistance (Wanra) and Civil Defence (Hansip). However, this army doctrine 
remained essentially unchanged since the first seminar, given the basic continuity of the defence environment 
and the army's available resources.
11 Ibid., pp.45-46. For the Golongan Karya role under the New Order, the doctrine stated that the army 
needed to restructure its organisations to penetrate its programs in ideological, religious, sociocultural, 
political, and economic fields. See Buku Petundjuk Tentang Pokok-Pokok Doktrin Kekaryaan, Jakarta: 
Mabesad, 1966, p.16.
12 Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD, pp.52-60.
13 Ibid., pp.65-115. Perata was based on the concept of Territorial War which was applied during the war 
of independence for the total mobilisation of resources in a given territory to conduct guerrilla warfare 
against the Dutch force. Later, the guerrilla strategy was transformed to anti-guerrilla operations for 
internal security surveillance. For details, see Nasution (1970).
14 Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD, pp.31-38. Under Hankamnas doctrine, each service had its own defence 
doctrine, namely the army's Hanratnas, the navy's Pertahanan Maritim Nasional (National Maritime 
Defence, Hanmarnas), the air force's Pertahanan Udara Nasional (National Air Defence, Hanudnas), and 
police's Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat (Security and Social Order, Kamtibmas). Hankamnas 
coordinated the all four doctrines.
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operations was essentially political, i.e. a smooth transition to the Soeharto regime. 
Significantly, the doctrines described above were all intended to back up Hankamnas' 
political goal. In this doctrinal environment, ABRI's defence structure was easily 
transformed into a political control mechanism. Maj-Gen Soemitro—the head of the 
syndicate formulating New Order military doctrines—clearly stated at the seminar 
that all doctrines in the new TU£ were intended to deal with the PKI and its Marxist- 
Maoist ideology.15 This doctrinal characteristic should be noted in light of our 
discussion of the current dwifungsi interpretation.
It was just three months later that the four army doctrines were rearranged 
under the over-arching military doctrines of Hankamnas and Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI 
(ABRI's Struggle Doctrine) at a nine-day seminar held by the Department of Defence 
and Security (Dephankam) in November 1966. The two ABRI doctrines are jointly 
called Catur Dharma Eka Karma (CDEK), forming ABRI's integral doctrine under the 
New Order.16 Therefore, the army version of Hankamnas in August was reframed in 
this CDEK scheme. More systematised explanations and definitions were given in 
Hankamnas, but the basic threat perception expressed in the previous version of this 
doctrine was replaced by a more abstract and hypothetical one.
In the August version, the PKI was clearly depicted as the main doctrinal 
target, as seen above, but this time, there was no reference to the PKI in the 
explanation of the Hankamnas objective—instead, the threat was defined as any 
challenge to the Pancasila ideology.17 It was obviously a revision intended to make the 
doctrine more durable in the anticipated PKI-free political environment of the next 
decades. What was also interesting was that the second doctrine in CDEK, i.e. Doktrin 
Perjuangan ABRI, was not explained in the CDEK document, but was replaced by 
Doktrin Kekaryaan ABRI which took up nearly half the space, as if it was identical with 
Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI. Thus, the actual contents of the CDEK document consisted 
of the Hankamnas and Kekaryaan doctrines, which could be understood as statements 
of ABRI's military and sociopolitical roles. Though the term dwifungsi had not yet been 
invented, this scheme was the basis of the New Order's concept of dwifungsi which
15 Soemitro was also army commander in East Java at that time. For his speech, see "Sambutan Ketua 
Sindikat Tri Ubaya Cakti," in Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966, Bandung, Seskoad, 
1966, pp.261-273. General Nasution, at that time the Head of MPRS (the provisional version of the MPR) 
also argued that the new TU£ was to wipe out PKI supporters who emerged through Nasakom (the doctrine 
to fuse nationalist, religious, communist forces advocated by Soekarno) which he said contradicted 
Pancasila and Sapta Marga. See A.H. Nasution, "Sambutan Ketua MPRS Pada Seminar AD ke-II/1966," in 
Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966, Bandung, Seskoad, 1966, p.168. This document— 
composed of 18 articles written by the major seminar participants, including civilian intellectuals—is 
extremely helpful to assess the personal views (rather than institutionally adopted views) during the 
building stage of New Order regarding the future role of ABRI.
16 CDEK (Four Missions, One Deed) meant that four services were joined by one doctrine. This first 
Dephankam seminar in November 1966 later produced a doctrinal paper, Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan 
Nasional dan Doktrin Perdjuangan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, "Tjatur Darma Eka Karma," Staf 
Pertahanan Keamanan, 1967. Hereafter called the CDEK document.
17 Ibid., p.35.
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proposed two functions in a non-zero-sum fashion, a perception only attainable under 
a military-led political regime.18 The up-graded Kekaryaan doctrine confidently argued 
that the non-military role was not a trade-off with ABRI’s capacity as a military force, 
since ABRI was after all the foundation of all state power.19
In this way, ABRI's official stance in politics was formulated during the first 
two years of the New Order. ABRI manifested its commitment to everyday political 
life to ensure political stability for economic development, while the actual programs 
were not provided at the two seminars in 1966 and 1967. ABRI inevitably faced 
challenges as the political society soon perceived that the reality of dwifungsi was little 
other than political domination, given the appointment of ABRI personnel to many key 
non-military posts at the national and regional levels, even though party politics was 
formally restored after the 1971 election. This was the birth of kekaryaan criticism. By 
1977, more than 20,000 ABRI members were posted to the civilian sector, occupying 53 
percent of the top posts in the central government and 76 percent of all 
governorships.20 Although the parliament in 1967 affirmed ABRI's commitment in daily 
political life, it did not legitimise ABRI's domination of the executive branch.21 These 
developments illustrated the process in which ABRI—which declared its formal 
political involvement without mentioning actual political projects at the second army 
seminar—had gradually revealed the real shape of its political engagement in the 
subsequent years. Once the projects became apparent, criticism inevitably emerged 
within ABRI and society. To cope with the rising criticism, the ABRI leadership 
intensively developed dwifungsi doctrines during 1977 to 1982, resulting in at least five 
internal works on dwifungsi.
First, in March 1977, Defence M inister/ABRI Commander 
(Menhankam/Pangab) General Panggabean ordered his staff to formulate the Doctrine 
of Sociopolitical Operations, "as guidance for the successful conduct of kekaryaan.''22 
The doctrine advocated that ABRI's sociopolitical operations should be based on the 
"prosperity approach" rather than "security approach."23 On the other hand, ABRI's
18 Maynard (1976:156) also saw CDEK as in fact embodying the dwifungsi concept.
19 The CDEK paper, p.57.
20 Details of the posts in the central government are as follows: Ministers/Heads of High State Institutions 
(42%); Secretaries General (73%); Inspectors General (29%); Directors General (78%); Heads/Chiefs of 
Non-departmental Institutions (44%); and Ministerial Secretaries/Assistant Ministers (84%). Data is from 
Notosusanto (1984:378-379). Percentages of ABRI governors were: 73% (1968-73); 76% (1973-78); 59% 
(1978-83); 51% (1983-88); 44% (1988-93); and 48% (1993-98).
21 In the 1967 negotiation to establish new laws on elections, composition of the MPR/DPR, political 
parties and functional organisations, it was argued by the Deliberation Committee (Panitia Musyawarah 
Kelompok)—consisting of the main groups in the parliament—to reaffirm the appointment of ABRI members 
to the MPR/DPR in what was called the 'National Consensus of 1967.' The Consensus finally became a 
decision of the Speaker of the Parliament on 16 December 1967. About the process, see Notosusanto 
(1984:136-138).
22 Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Nomor: KEP/04/III/1977 Tanggal 5-3-1977 in Doktrin Operasi Sosial 
Politik, Dephankam, 1977.
23 Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik, pp.10, 23. The concepts of security and prosperity approaches had no
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organic cooperation with each member of ABRI's Big Family (KBA) was first depicted 
in the doctrinal format.24 KBA was expected to consistently support ABRI's conduct 
of kekaryaan activities. The doctrine's emphasis on the increasing role of KBA was 
aimed at promoting indirect measures in order to alleviate the growing public suspicion 
about diuifungsi.
Second, in October 1977, another attempt was made to provide legal 
justification of the conduct of diuifungsi. The document, "The Legal Basis of Diuifungsi 
and Identity of ABRI," first noted that the influx of western political literature now 
encouraged the Indonesian people to view ABRI’s role in politics critically, and warned 
that this would result in ABRI being seen as a foreigner (orang using) in its own 
society.25 In responding to this tendency, the document mobilised cultural relativism. It 
said every country had its own culture which influenced its political style, although 
terms like democracy, representative, election, and the military were universally used. 
Unlike the West, the document continued, which was based on the dualism of 
individual and society, Indonesia saw them in harmony due to the culture of Bhineka 
Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) which could only be attained by gotong-royong 
(mutual help), musyawarah (deliberation) and kekeluargaan (family atmosphere). Thus 
the military role should be assessed in this context too.26 Such an insistence was not 
new in the thinking of ABRI but was now more frequently used in facing the visible 
linkage of foreign criticism and domestic complaints about diuifungsi. Then, apart from 
the cultural legitimation, the document listed several presidential instructions and MPR 
decisions which 'ordered' ABRI to play a bigger role since 1945, repeating the 
established interpretation that it was responding to the needs of the people rather than 
being motivated by ABRI itself. On legality, it admitted that diuifungsi could not be 
found in UUD45 in an explicit way, but neither could the existence of political parties 
and elections be found there. The document also attributed weaknesses in the 
implementation of diuifungsi to society. "If there is anything wrong with diuifungsi 
conducted by ABRI members," the document concluded, "it is a reflection of social
clear definitions, but they roughly referred to the ways ABRI responded to sociopolitical change. The 
security approach saw it in terms of security, thus tried to repress any change which might threaten status 
quo. The prosperity approach, on the other hand, looked at the change as a reflection of national 
development, which should not be treated as a threat but as a positive social dynamism. Criticism of 
security approach late became a topic of popular political discourse in the late 1980s, as we will discuss in 
the next chapter.
24 Ibid., pp.14-15. About ABRI’s Big Family (Keluarga Besar ABRI—KBA), see Chapter 2. For example, the 
Organisation of Wives of Soldiers, Bureaucrats in the Defence Department, Pepabri (Association of Retired 
Soldiers), FKPPI, and the League of Veteran are the members of KBA.
25 Dasar Hukum Dwi Fungsi dan Identitas ABRI, Dephankam, 1977, pp.6-7.
26 Ibid., pp.7-8.
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problems because excessive activities of karyawan are not the policy of ABRI."27
Though ABRI’s culturalism was apparently adopted in this document, it was 
not enough to explain the reasons for maintaining the current style of military 
intervention. In fact, civilian criticism that claimed that the implementation of 
dwifungsi was nothing more than militarism still enjoyed considerable support within 
political society.
In order to counter such an argument, ABRI—more specifically the karyawan 
section in Dephankam (Skar Hankam) headed by Let-Gen Daryatmo—then moved to 
strengthen the official rationale of current kekaryaan activities in 1978.28 This time, 
ABRI responded to criticism by saying that ABRI's involvement in legislative bodies 
both at the national and regional levels, and its filling of jobs, such as governors, 
regents and village heads, were all based on the "trust" (kepercayaan) given by the 
people to ABRI in order to foster security, effectiveness, and efficiency needed for 
national development29 This 'social-contract' legitimation was followed by a historical 
legitimation—as seen in the new TU£—which insisted that de facto dwifungsi had 
existed since the birth of the military in 1945 to safeguard the nation, as if emphasising 
that its current position was an expression of ABRI's 'natural right.'30 This was to 
replace the concept of role-expansion explained at the time of 1966.
Coupled with these social-contract and historical-right emphases, the 
document stressed that ABRI's kekaryaan was not militarism—interestingly by 
employing 'western literature' on politics.31 In this line, what was also notable in this 
document, compared with previous versions of kekaryaan papers, was that ABRI 
formally adopted the technical separation of dwifungsi from kekaryaan, envisaging that 
the latter could be withdrawn in certain circumstances without risking the former.32 
Though these references were not new in public speeches by officers at that time, it was 
probably the first time that this distinction was codified in an official instruction 
paper. In facing nearly a decade of criticism of dwifungsi, ABRI finally established an 
interpretation which detached the problematic kekaryaan from the over-arching
27 Ibid., p.18.
28 Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Dephankam, March 1978. It said at the beginning that 
the purpose was to rebut the growth of criticism toward kekaryaan of ABRI within society (p.4). The 
doctrine regarding kekaryaan was exceptional among several ABRI doctrines, because it was repeatedly 
upgraded or supplemented during the previous decade. This 1978 version was the fourth attempt following 
the August 1966, November 1966, and November 1975 versions. The 1975 version was Doktrin Kekaryaan 
ABRI (Kep. Menhankam/Pangab 40/XI/1975 tanggal 17-11-1975), Dephankam, 1975. Such frequent 
revisions certainly indicated the high sensitivity of this political doctrine to public criticism.
29 Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, p.10.
30 Ibid., p .ll.
31 The sociologist, Morris Janowitz, defined two types of militarism, i.e. designed-militarism and reactive 
militarism. The document insisted that neither were applicable to the case of Indonesia where ABRI's 
involvement was from the beginning (Ibid., pp.20-26). As seen below, along with Janowitz, ABRI officers— 
even among Akabri generation officers—selectively make use of western political scientists, such as 
Huntington, Amos Perlmutter and others from the functionalist school, to back up dwifungsi legitimation.
32 Ibid., pp.42-43.
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diuifungsi ideology as a way to meet such criticism.
This interpretation, however, did not effectively respond to demands for an 
actual reduction of kekaryaan appointments and the excesses of dwifungsi. During this 
period, as discussed in the previous chapter, major criticism was expressed by a group 
of retired officers including A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Dharsono, and other 
disenchanted generals who had in the past contributed to the creation of the New 
Order in the mid-1960s.33 This new development became a central issue in ABRI’s 
annual leadership meeting (Rapim ABRI) in March 1980, held a few months before the 
birth of Petisi 50.
Before to the meeting, which was led by Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf, 
ABRI prepared a document to be used for the discussion at the Rapim. It asserted that 
some individuals (oknum-oknum) within ABRI had jeopardised ABRI's diuifungsi and 
kekaryaan, encouraging misunderstanding among ABRI members that diuifungsi was 
solely the responsibility of karyawan officers.34 Regarding the problem of retired 
officers, the document insisted on the need to make these officers supportive of ABRI's 
current policies, and for this end, called for the strengthening of control over retired 
officers through Pepabri35 The document branded the activities of LKB as an attempt 
to discredit diuifungsi and kekaryaan by criticising the presence of F-ABRI.36 In 
defending the kekaryaan activity, the ABRI leadership explained that the total number 
of active officers being sent to kekaryaan posts during the Second Defence Strategic 
Plan (Renstra Hankam II) 1979-1983 was originally set to be 10,000 but was actually 
only 6,879 in February 1980, thus indicating the declining kekaryaan role according to 
the need of the time.37 Finally, the Rapim document listed some policy priorities, 
among which were: (1) to produce further materials on dwifungsifkekaryaan for officer 
education; (2) to enhance civic-mission programs of kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat
33 In response, Fosko-AD (the Army's Communication Forum) was formed by the army to establish a 
communication channel for retired officers who became increasingly critical of the ABRI leadership. 
Another grouping, LKB (Institute for Constitutional Awareness), was not Army-sponsored but was led by 
Nasution as the advisor, Ali Sadikin, and Dr. Hatta, the country's first vice president who declared 
Indonesia's independence together with Soekamo in 1945, as well as several of the most prominent retired 
officers and civilians. For details, see Jenkins (1984:102-112) and also Sundhaussen (1981). Later in 1980, 
Petisi 50 was established.
34 Pelaksanaan Kebijaksanaan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 1979/1980 dan Kebijaksanaan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 
1980/1981 (Pada Rapat Pimpinan ABRI 1980), Dephankam, March 1980, p .4 ,19. This document was signed 
by Lt-Gen Kharis Suhud, ABRI's Chief of Kekaryaan Staff (Kaskar Flankam), who—as seen in the previous 
chapter—later became a critical figure in YKPK.
35 Ibid., pp.10, 25. Pepabri's role included its mobilisation of members to support Golkar during the 
elections. All retired officers are automatically registered as the member of Pepabri, but their commitment 
varies. Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, for example, argues that channelling government instructions via 
Pepabri cannot be accepted, and this is a reason for not joining Pepabri himself. Interview, 9 August 1996.
36 Ibid., p.13.
37 Ibid., p.16. However, according to the data mentioned in this report, in Renstra Hankam 11973-1978, the 
total number of posted serving officers was 8,107, revealing the fact that ABRI set the higher target at the 
beginning of the Second Strategic Plan. If both active and retired personnel (organic and non-organic, in 
ABRI terms) are included, the total number of kekaryaan posts during the First Renstra was 22,245 whereas 
at the time of this meeting, it was 17,167.
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(integration of ABRI and the people) for the dissemination of the dwifungsi principle; 
and, interestingly, (3) to avoid providing candidates for regional governmental heads 
from F-ABRI and give these opportunities to the Golkar faction.38 We discuss the 
second and third decisions before coming back to the first.
The emphasis on kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat clearly reflected the growing 
criticism that ABRI had become a tool of the government and its dwifungsi was merely 
implemented in the form of kekaryaan. This perception conflicted with ABRI's role belief 
as the people's military. It was in this context that Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf 
launched a new program called 'ABRI Masuk Desa' (ABRI in the village, or AMD) in 
1980. This annual civic-mission project sent ABRI units to the villages to assist 
community development in various fields.39 Apart from the perceived need for 
doctrinal adjustment, AMD was a significant attempt to indoctrinate younger- 
generation soldiers who had entered the military not as freedom-fighters but for career 
reasons, and thus lacked spiritual commitment to dwifungsi management. AMD was 
intended to provide an opportunity for them to communicate with the rakyat. 
Moreover, it was also notable that AMD was designed to support the Total People's 
Defence System as a channel to mobilise the rakyat. It was also easily transformed into 
a grass-roots surveillance tool, given the political control aspect of this doctrine.
On the other hand, the decision adopted by the Rapim document to avoid 
providing F-ABRI candidates for the positions of local governmental heads was a 
significant decision which could drastically cut the quantity of kekaryaan activity if 
fully implemented. This decision too reflected Yusuf s attempt to respond to the recent 
criticism of kekaryaan-heavy dwifungsi practices. Giving up ABRI's occupancy of 
regional government heads implied that ABRI—more specifically Kaskar Hankam Lt- 
Gen Kharis Suhud—already perceived Golkar as a reliable tool for maintaining local 
political stability as it seemed to imply that ABRI's civilian allies could replace ABRI 
officers. This itself indicated a significant perceptional change concerning New Order 
civil-military relations, but in this document it was still not clear how ABRI would deal 
with Golkar. The above description, on the one hand, suggests that ABRI began to see 
Golkar as an independent force, which in effect allowed ABRI to stand above all 
political groups.' However, on the other hand, it could also be understood as ABRI's 
re-emphasis of its backing for Golkar in regional political management.
This raised the issue of whether ABRI 'stood above all groups’ or linked itself
38 Ibid., pp.22, 24, 26. Concerning the third decision, it did not however eliminate the possibility that the 
Golkar faction would nominate ABRI member as the candidate.
39 The project carries out many labour intensive works such as digging tertiary irrigation canals, making 
new village paths and erecting bridges, schools, village meeting halls, religious centres. However, it also 
aimed at disseminating information and conducting public discussions concerning ideology, and Yusuf's 
ABRI believed that AMD, under the slogan of kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat, was very essential for the 
preservation of ABRI's dwifungsi. See Kemanunggalan TNI-ABRI Dengan Rakyat Menghadapi Dasa Warsa 
1980-an, Dephankam, 5 October 1980, pp.22-24.
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directly with Golkar. Given Yusuf's general outlook, the former possibility seemed 
strong. During this time, Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf was regarded as a dwifungsi 
revisionist who insisted on ABRI's solidarity with the people and its stance as 'above 
all groups,’ which, according to Jenkins, was regarded by Soeharto and his closed 
military advisors as unrealistic.40 It seems, therefore, that Yusuf's influence was 
strongly reflected in these policy initiatives. However, the new approach which was to 
have been formally adopted at the Rapim was largely neutralised by Soeharto's 
"Pekanbaru" speech at the opening of the Rapim.41 Soeharto declared that ABRI as a 
defence force should stand above all social groups whereas as a social force it should 
choose partners who truly defend Pancasila.42 Moreover, he insisted that dwifungsi's 
task was to ensure a successful election in 1982 and, in this context, that ABRI should 
acknowledge when to behave as a defence force and when to act as a sociopolitical 
force 43 This was to encourage ABRI to side with Golkar in the 1982 election, in its 
capacity as a sociopolitical force. Yusuf’s attempt was therefore rejected by Soeharto. 
As seen in the previous chapter, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid—in facing criticism of his 
speech backing Golkar in 1995—referred to the Pekanbaru speech to justify himself.
Coming back to the first decision in ABRI's Rapim document, the most 
comprehensive internal guidebook of dwifungsi was prepared under the leadership of 
Gen Yusuf in 1982.44 It was comprehensive in the sense that all major doctrinal papers 
in the past 16 years were integrated in this 131-page book, and also instructions and 
explanations for the wide range of dwifungsi activities were given to each command 
level in a systematic way. In light of our discussion, the following points are important.
First, the source of dwifungsi legitimation was now widened. The guidebook 
argued that there were five approaches to understand the root of dwifungsi—namely 
historical, philosophical, legal, wawasan nusantara (i.e. geostrategic), and ketahanan 
nasional (i.e. national defence)—and asserted that they were mutually reinforcing.45 The 
key concepts in each legitimacy source were: revolutionary war and the PKI’s coup 
attempt (historical); Pancasila, Sapta Marga and keluarga (philosophical); Articles 2 
and 30[1] in UUD45, MPR decisions, and laws on elections/DPR members (legal); 
national integration in a plural society (wawasan nusantara); total defence (ketahanan 
nasional).46 All were asserted as the factors encouraging ABRI to actively involve itself
40 See Jenkins (1984:138-159).
41 ABRI's Rapim 1980 document was prepared on 10 March 1980, and the decisions above were supposed 
to be adopted during the Rapim. Soeharto's speech was made on 27 March, the first day of the Rapim.
42 See Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 21 Maret 1980 di Pekanbaru, 
Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6-7.
43 Ibid., pp.8-9.
44 Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Tentang Dwifungsi ABRI (No. 
SKEP/614/VI/1982 Tanggal 1 Juni 1982), Dephankam, 1982. Hereafter the guidebook.
45 Ibid., pp.15-30.
46 Article 2 in UUD45 referred to the functional group representatives in the MPR, while article 30[1] 
stated that all citizens had rights and duties to participate in national defence. Here, ABRI interpreted 
national defence as including political management.
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in non-military affairs. During the past 16 years of the New Order, ABRI had 
developed its doctrinal interpretation to strengthen dwifungsi legitimation. This 
institutional effort was aimed at maintaining the 'permanency' of diuifungsi 
commitment which was first set by the new TU£ doctrine in 1966 by emphasising the 
need of political stability for the rescue of national economy. After 16 years of New 
Order development, ABRI needed to diversify the sources of dwifungsi legitimacy in 
order to insist on its relevance and counter—in various ways—the critical discourse in 
the public.47
Second, the implementation of kekaryaan was distinguished from dwifungsi, 
endorsing an interpretation adopted in the 1978 kekaryaan doctrine. However, the goals 
of the two were explained as the same, leaving the nature of the distinction between 
the two vague. This conceptual uncoupling became ABRI's standard interpretation and 
it convinced the officers that social criticism of kekaryaan did not undermine the 
relevance of dwifungsi's permanent political engagement.
Throughout the book, it seemed obvious that ABRI's dwifungsi doctrine tried 
to oversee all fields of social activity for the fulfilment of ABRI’s institutional role- 
belief as the guardian of Pancasila and stabiliser-dynamiser of national development. 
This was the perception first formulated in the 1966 doctrine, which now seemed to 
have various logics to defend it. Dwifungsi's doctrinal framework was virtually 
completed by this time. As discussed below, the subsequent internal development of 
dwifungsi was largely on the level of interpretation, absorbing numerous criticisms and 
re-inventing various logics to counter these critical arguments. Such a conceptual 
involution of dwifungsi was practised by post-revolutionary officers who inherited the 
leadership of ABRI after the mid-1980s, and it was they who were in charge of 
managing the legitimacy of dwifungsi in the face of expanding social pressure for 
democratisation. In this process, two phenomena significantly coloured the nature of 
dwifungsi interpretation. One was the implantation of the professionalism concept and 
the other was the global trend toward democratisation which required ABRI to defend 
dwifungsi in facing the challenge of universalism. We discuss them in the following 
sections.
47 In Chapter 6, we will examine how ABRI strategically employs these different sources in the dwifungsi 
discourse depending on the context. The growing social criticism was reflected in the 1982 report of the 
National Defence and Security Council (Wanhankamnas), a presidential advisory body, which 
recommended the ABRI leadership to review the implementation of dwifungsi. The Council stated that there 
was still a worry in society that dwifungsi would some day become militarism and totalitarianism, and, 
although dwifungsi was already accepted in the GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy) in 1978, such a 
concern would remain as long as the dwifungsi implementation was not strictly regulated by laws. See 
Perkiraan Strategik Nasional ]angka Pendek 1983-1985: Aneka Bidang Politik, Sekretariat Jenderal, Dewan 
Pertahaan Keamanan Nasional, 1982, p.24. The weight of the recommendation from the Council can be 
assessed by the fact that Wanhankamnas' prime role is to prepare the GBHN, including broad defence and 
security considerations, which become the president's policy directive issued by the MPR (Lowry, 1996:16).
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Infusing the Concept of Professionalism
As seen earlier, the creation of the New Order and the legitimation of 
dwifungsi were the product of military officers who had participated in the 
independence war during 1945-1949. Having emphasised their historical role as the 
defender of the nation, the second army seminar at Seskoad in 1966 declared that the 
military role-expansion under the New Order was a panggilan sejarah. The rise of a new 
post-revolutionary generation in ABRI, therefore, could potentially undermine the basis 
of dwifungsi legitimation. It was particularly in the early 1970s that Seskoad 
acknowledged the necessity to fill the gap between the two generations after 
conducting a survey which targeted all students of Seskoad who had joined the 
Regular Course of the Year 1971-1972 (KR IX). This KR IX was the first time that the 
proportion of younger generation students reached nearly 50 percent of the total 
number of Seskoad students. The survey—which was soon expanded outside of 
Seskoad under the full responsibility of Z.A. Maulani (at that time, Major and himself 
a member of the younger generation)—found that there was a big gap between the two 
generations. The younger side was said to have the following problems: (1) their 
motivation to join the army was economically-financially oriented; (2) mentality was 
too formalistic, risking ABRI's identity as 'freedom-fighter;' (3) the 1945 values were 
only thought as the legacy of the older generation; (4) they were easily directed 
(terarah) by non-ABRI groups, so possibly influenced by conflicting ideologies; (5) their 
career path was different from the older generation, which might produce immature 
leaders in the near future.48 Based on the result of this research, the third army seminar 
was held in 1972 to bridge the perceptional gap between 1945-generation and 
academy-generation officers, and to transfer the spirit of the freedom-fighter to the 
post-revolutionary generation of soldiers. Try Sutrisno was one of the representatives 
of the younger generation officers at the seminar, and earned a good reputation as the 
leading new generation officer.49
It was since the early 1980s that these academy-generation officers had 
started to occupy several key military positions. Along with this process, ABRI 
launched internal projects to rationalise the military system. Leading to the 
rationalisation, dwifungsi was also first codified in the form of law. By securing 
dwifungsi s legal status under the Law No.20/1982, the ABRI leadership could avoid
48 See Sejarah Seminar TNI-Angkatan Darat III dan Lahirnya Dharma Pusaka 45, Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, 
1973, pp. 27-28.
49 For the very detailed process of the seminar, the above document is valuable. For a brief explanation, 
Notosusanto (1974) is useful. When Try became KSAD in 1986, the spirit of 1972 Seminar was again 
confirmed. See Try Sutrisno, "Ceramah Proses Perumusan Dharma Pusaka 45," Yudhagama, No.27, 31 
October 1986, pp.5-18. Here, by providing a detailed map of how the 1945 values had been transferred, he 
insisted that the process was going well. As we see later, some other leaders had an opposite view.
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giving the impression that the process of rationalising ABRI would risk undermining its 
political commitment. The "Operation Rationalisation" was largely handled by General 
Benny Moerdani, who had succeeded Yusuf as Pangab in 1983.50
The split of functional responsibility between Dephankam and ABRI 
Headquarters, and the consolidation of power under Moerdani were soon explained 
by the ABRI leadership as the process of reorganisation (reorganisasi), aiming at 
dismantling the top-heavy, politicised, and inefficient command structure which was a 
legacy created by the 1945 Generation officers. This project was followed in 1985-1986 
by the replacement of the existing territorial military structure with a simplified ten- 
Kodam system. Before this reorganisation, ABRI had sixteen Kodams and they were 
under the command of four Kowilhans (Area Defence Commands). Moerdani's 
streamlining project abolished the Kowilhan system and merged sixteen Kodams into 
ten, enhancing the strategic importance of lower level commands, especially at the 
Korem level which was now given major combat forces for the first time (at least one 
infantry battalion). It was inevitable that Moerdani's policy package generated a fear 
of unemployment among the officer corps who found that the rationalisation reduced 
the number of posts and higher ranks available for them. As anticipated, ABRI's total 
number of general-grade officers decreased by about 200 in 1985 from nearly 500 at its 
mid-1970s peak.51
Recalling this time, Gen (ret) Rudini—the Army Chief during this period— 
claimed that those who were displeased with the reorganisation were persuaded by an 
explanation that reorganisasi was not rationalisation but professionalisation.52 
Moerdani also took every opportunity to explain that his reform was intended to
50 When Moerdani was promoted to Pangab, the dual-posting of Pangab and Menhankam and the integrated 
Hankam/ABRI structures were all abolished based on the Law No.20/1982. Dephankam, headed by the 
Minister Gen Poniman, was mainly in charge of administrative matters whereas ABRI, led by Pangab 
Moerdani, inherited all of the command and operation responsibilities, formerly held by Dephankam, which 
gave the levers of power and authority to the Pangab. In this new configuration, Hankam—unlike every 
other ministry of importance—lost its own independent eyes and arms outside the capital and across the 
vast territory of Indonesia. See The Editors (1984:146). As a result, Dephankam was clearly relegated to a 
secondary position (Haseman 1986:892).
51 FEER, 24 October 1985. See also Indonesia Reports (No.l, November 1984, p.3) for the officers' concerns 
about their post-retirement jobs affected by the reorganisation. Reorganisation of the military had a special 
meaning in the Indonesian history as seen in the cases of 1948, 1950 and 1956 where the officers to be 
discharged reacted violently against the army authority. For these events, see Sundhaussen (1982). Utrecht's 
detailed study (1980:21-105) argues that the reorganisations and rationalisations (re-dan-ra) until the end 
of the 1950s failed mainly due to the strong patrimonial tradition within the army, especially the bapak- 
anakbuah (father-children) relationship.
52 Interview with Rudini, 4 September 1996. In ABRI, the term rationalisation had a negative connotation 
as it was associated with demobilisation and a reduction in senior positions. Rudini's emphasis on 
professionalisation aimed to counter this. Before the reform was implemented, however, Rudini had clearly 
explained that the planned reorganisation was intended to streamline ABRI, revealing his shifting 
interpretation of reorganisation after facing internal questions. See Rudini's earlier speech in 1984, 
"Ceramah Pembekalan Kasad bagi Siswa Sekolah Staf & Komando Gabungan ABRI Susreg ke-X dengan 
Judul 'Reorganisasi TNI-AD,'" Yudhagama (Media Komunikasi Pembinaan TNI-AD), No.17, 31 March 1984, 
pp.4-11.
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create an "efficient and professional ABRI."53 Indeed, the reorganisation was packaged 
with slogans such as KEEM (kecil tetapi efisien, efektif dan modern: small but efficient, 
effective, and modem) and PEEM (profesional, efisien, efektif dan modern: professional, 
efficient, effective, and modem), which matched the self-identity of the academy- 
generation officers whose military schooling at the AMN produced a sense of 
professionalism which could not be shared with the 1945 Generation officers. By 
emphasising this point, Moerdani and Rudini attempted to transform ABRI into a 
compact organisation without risking internal cohesion. In this process, the concept of 
professionalism was apparently implanted into the organisational values of ABRI, and 
it inevitably influenced the subsequent interpretation of dwifungsi doctrine.
The way in which the concept of professionalism was infused into the 
interpretation of dwifungsi, however, had some variations. For Gen Moerdani, who 
started the professionalisation movement, "the new generation officers are—unlike the 
1945 Generation—trained as the 'soldier-with-dwifungsi' so the nature of ABRI is 
inevitably prajurit pejuang Indonesia modern (modern Indonesian warrior-soldier)."54 
Although this only added adjectives to the standard notion of prajurit pejuang 
(warrior-soldier), Moerdani’s emphasis on the modernity was aimed at 
professionalising the officer corps.55 Recalling his leadership period, Moerdani argued 
that "professionalisation was to improve the quality of ABRI personnel and 
organisation in order to effectively conduct its defence function," therefore "it is wrong 
to link professionalism and dwifungsi because professionalism is the hankam concept, 
nothing to do with the sospol role."56
This perception indicated that the former Pangab clearly saw the boundary 
between the two functions, and professionalism was only attached to the former side. 
For Moerdani, however, "it does not mean that the process of professionalisation 
undermines dwifungsi because the latter is based on the logic of politics, not something 
affected by military training."57 What should be noted here is the point that Moerdani 
believed that professionalism did not weaken dwifungsi, not because the former 
strengthens the latter but because the two are totally different matters. If we suppose 
that this perception was projected at least initially during Moerdani s ABRI leadership, 
we could see some changes in interpretation regarding the relationship between the two
53 See Moerdani's biography written by Pour (1993:479).
54 Moerdani (1992:69). Italic added.
55 The term pejuang literally means a fighter for a principle, implying the freedom-fighters' spirit, whereas 
prajurit refers to the soldier as profession. So in the ABRI language, the term prajurit pejuang emphasises 
ABRI's self-esteem as "soldiers with the spirit of warrior" to distinguish themselves from other militaries. 
Similarly, the term pejuang prajurit was used to stress ABRI's traditional mentality that soldiers were 
warriors first before being professional soldiers. These concepts have always been utilised when ABRI 
denies the perceptional gap between the two generations and asserts the continuing legitimacy of dwifungsi 
regardless of the generational change. About the interaction of two concepts, see Notosusanto (1984:171- 
173) which became the established reference of dwifungsi theory among ABRI officers.
56 Interview with Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani, 23 September 1996.
57 Interview, 23 September 1996.
82
Chapter 3
concepts in the subsequent development.
In August 1986, a well-publicised ABRI seminar was held under the 
chairmanship of Lt-Gen Try Sutrisno, the leading post-revolutionary generation officer 
at that time who had replaced Gen Rudini as KSAD. The theme of the seminar was 
"Based on the Fighting Spirit of the 1945 Generation, the Next Generation is 
Determined to Make National Development Successful" and the conclusions were 
intended to be reflected in GBFIN 1988 as ABRI's contribution.58 Regarding dwifungsi, 
the seminar stated that "it was built into the ABRI system from the beginning and its 
quality has been improved until today to encourage ABRI's professionalism both in the 
fields of defence-security and social-politics."59 Here dwifungsi and professionalism 
were linked and the latter was conceptually fused with the conduct of the 
sociopolitical role.
Such an interpretation was further strengthened by Try in December when he 
expounded his ideas about professionalism at Seskoad.60 Quoting Huntington's classic 
work, Try argued as follows:
There is a universality of military professionalism, since its aspects such as 
management of violence, commitment to the nation, and esprit de corps are the 
fundamentals of any military institution.... However, as the characteristic of the 
nation varies, the form of military commitment to the nation also differs.... In ABRI 
which also shares such universality, its commitment to the nation is expressed in 
Sapta Marga in order to devote ABRI’s spirit to Indonesia's national unity based on 
Pancasila and UUD45... and it is in this context that ABRI is different from other 
militaries.61
Based on this logic, he further explained
I think improvement of professionalism is the most important thing in today’s ABRI 
because through this process we can strengthen the leadership capacity which forms 
ABRI's posture as pejuang prajurit and prajurit pejuang.... In facing various challenges 
of national development which become more and more complex, we have no choice 
but to professionalise ourselves in conducting the second function (along with the 
first function)... and today's situation requires professionalism of karyawan staff and 
other ABRI members in the sociopolitical field/2
These assessments illustrated how ABRI started to utilise the concept of 
professionalism to tackle the problems concerning dwifungsi.
Try's views were supported by a report aimed at improving standards of 
Akabri. The report—which compared domestic and foreign military educations—noted
d8 The seminar published a document, Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI untuk Menyukseskan Pembangunan 
Nasional, Mabes ABRI, 1986.
59 Ibid., p.67. Moerdani was still Pangab at that time. Presumably he agreed with this assessment. The 
conflicting interpretation is not a matter for us as we now attempt to see the evolving process.
60 See Try Sutrisno (Letjen TNI) "Ceramah KASAD Ten tang Kepemimpinan dan Profesionalisme ABRI," 
Yudhagama, No.28, 31 January 1987.
61 Ibid., pp.6-7.
62 Ibid., p.10.
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that, "like ABRI, the civilian-controlled Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) has a 
strong loyalty to the nation, making JSDF the tool of the state power (alat kekuasaan 
negara) but unlike ABRI whose commitment is toward Pancasila, UUD45, and Sapta 
Marga, JSDF's commitment is only to the constitution, and as a result, there is no 
dwifungsi.”63 The ideas underlying this were: (1) the military commitment to the nation 
is a universal phenomenon but its character varies depending on the nation (in this 
case, Indonesia and Japan); (2) as Indonesia is based on Pancasila and UUD45, it is 
this fact that produces dwifungsi when the military shows its commitment to the 
nation; and (3) since the commitment to the nation is the key to any military 
institution, professionalisation of ABRI would not undermine semangat kejuangan and 
dwifungsi.
In this way, the comparison of ABRI—which was politically active and "less- 
professional"—and a civilian-controlled but professional military did not provide 
negative implications for the former, but rather fortified ABRI's established self-esteem 
inherited from the revolutionary generation, while at the same time appealing to the 
professional identity of the new generation in ABRI. In this sense, the succeeding 
generation established the notion that dwifungsi and professionalism were mutually 
compatible and did not involve a trade-off. This replied to earlier civilian hopes that 
professionalisation would somehow modify ABRI's commitment to dwifungsi.
Once the concept of professionalism was incorporated into the language of 
dwifungsi, it was then employed to explain dwifungsis prospects in facing new social 
demands. This was reflected in the assessment of Mabes ABRI’s sospol sector regarding 
the problem of generation change, which was expressed soon after Try's promotion to 
Pangab in 1988.64 This report stated, among other things, that "the spirit of service 
(semangat pengabdian) possessed by the 1945 Generation has enabled it to develop 
dwifungsi, but it is in this context that the problem of regeneration has a special 
meaning for dwifungsi, especially for the sospol function, and its preservation becomes 
one of the most difficult matters for the following genera tion."b 5 The success of 
dwifungsi, the report continued, could be judged by whether or not karyawan tasks were 
performed successfully in non-hankam institutions, including both executive and 
legislative bodies. In this sense, excesses in its implementation should be corrected, the 
placing of ABRI kekaryaan had to be selective, and their conduct should also be more 
professional.66 Coupled with the karyawan problem, "today's social environment which
63 See G. Simanora (Kol Czi), "Laporan Studi Banding Tim Akabri ke Jepang, Korea Selatan dan Muangthai 
(Proyeksi Akabri Tahun 2000)," Yudhagama, No.24, 31 January 1986, pp.15-16.
64 Laporan Perkembangan Sosial Politik (No.06/Lapbangsos/VII/1988), Mabes ABRI, August 1988. This is 
a monthly report of Ssospol (Staf Sospol), signed by Assospol Kassospol Maj-Gen Muchtar, providing 
analysis on the latest political developments. It is notable that regeneration was covered in this issue, 
implying its political significance perceived by the sospol sector within ABRI.
65 Ibid., pp.1-2.
66 Ibid., p.4.
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is getting modernised requires ABRI personnel to become more professional in order to 
be capable of managing dwifungsi in a sophisticated way, particularly in the sospol field 
and other non-hankam areas."67
These assessments all indicated that professionalism was becoming a kind of 
panacea for the dwifungsi issues of the time, both in conceptual and practical terms. 
Conceptually, professionalism was said to form the identity of the new-generation 
ABRI and also to facilitate the indoctrination of the 1945 spirit inherited from the 
older-generation officers, as if re-legitimising dwifungsi’s eternal relevance regardless of 
revolutionary experience. At the practical level, professionalism was interpreted as: 
the means to achieve better kekaryaan-sospol conduct; the means to overcome the 
"excesses;" the key to maintain ABRI's leadership role in society; and the basis for 
claiming that dwifungsi implementation would be adjusted depending on the level of 
national development. The expanding utilities of the concept of professionalism 
obviously contributed to the interpretative management of dwifungsi within ABRI.
Further development of ABRI's adaptive professionalism could be seen when 
the concept of national discipline was apparently absorbed into this professionalism- 
dwifungsi paradigm. The National Discipline Movement (Gerakan Disiplin Nasional— 
GDN) itself was a government's social policy campaign which attempted to tackle the 
increasing crime rate and the perceived decline of social norms and morality, 
apparently resulting from rapid economic growth and urbanisation.68 Since GDN 
provided a perfect opportunity for ABRI to project its self-image as the most 
professional-disciplined group in society, this program was not unrelated to dwifungsi 
in the eyes of the ABRI leadership and allowed it to demonstrate its leadership role in 
society. A book was soon published by ABRI's Information Centre (Puspen) with the 
title "ABRI's Dwifungsi and National Discipline" in 1990.69 This material consisted of 
ABRI's explanation of the link between dwifungsi and national discipline, and included 
32 interviews conducted by Puspen with noted intellectuals, ministers, business 
leaders, and local administrators regarding their opinions about the two concepts.
In the introduction, Pangab Try Sutrisno insisted that "dwifungsi is permanently 
needed as long as Indonesia exists on the earth and ABRI is committed to its 
professionalism. To illustrate its work, ABRI plays a role in improving national 
discipline and it is the motivation of this book."70 Interestingly, however, despite Try’s 
outward-looking posture in linking dwifungsi and national discipline, many of the 
interviewees in this book essentially linked the two issues in an inward-looking 
manner, i.e. emphasising the need of further discipline within ABRI. For example,
67 Ibid., p.5.
68 This campaign involves programs such as neighbourhood watch, rehabilitation of criminals, moral 
regulation of car drivers, and promotion of other public morals.
69 Dwifungsi ABRI dan Disiplin Nasional, Jakarta: Puspen ABRI, Mabes ABRI, 1990.
70 Ibid., p.8. Italic added.
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Interior Minister Gen (ret) Rudini, who was replaced by Try as KSAD in 1986, argued 
that ABRI still needed to improve internal-moral discipline (disiplin bathiniah), which 
might prevent behaviour like corruption.71
Whatever the source of indiscipline, the discipline campaign soon became a 
theme of dwifungsi implementation, both for the national project and the internal 
reform program.72 The former was well reflected in the 1990 Army Seminar and the 
following ABRI Seminar. The latter was crystallised in the back-to-basics movement, 
led by Try's successor, General Edi Sudradjat, in 1993, and the subsequent study 
initiative taken by Seskoad with Akabri-generation officers. Through these 
developments, the professionalism argument under the dwifungsi concept further 
expanded its scope—as notably seen in its new commitment to the management of 
human resources (sumber daya manusia: SDM) in non-military sectors.
The 1990 Army Seminar at Seskoad was regarded as one of the major 
seminars held by the army leadership, following those in 1965, 1966, and 1972. The 
seminar discussed the most outward-looking theme in the history of army seminars— 
the Strategy for the Development of Human Resources in the Second Long-Term 
Development Plan.73 This, to some extent, reflected the changing patterns of civil- 
military relations in the last 25 years. ABRI had originally been pre-occupied with 
establishing its institutional posture in the state and society, but was gradually 
compelled to shift its attention to broader developments in society in order to catch-up 
with the multiple impacts of capitalist development. Although this issue was 
obviously beyond the capacity of the military profession in a normal sense, it was 
incorporated in ABRI’s all-encompassing doctrinal design due to the nature of the 
dwifungsi thinking which had pushed ABRI into a role for which it was not 
professionally prepared. Under these circumstances, it seemed inevitable that the 
military's policy initiative became conceptual rather than practical, and even tended to 
insist on traditionalism as reflecting the fear of losing leadership in society.
Such aspects were visible at the 1990 army seminar. In the opening session, 
Pangab Try Sutrisno maintained that:
As we anticipated at the ABRI seminar in 1986, the world is now in transition, 
mainly due to the development of transportation, telecommunication and 
information, which leads to the post-industrial society characterised by the era of 
information.... As a result of this development, change in one country easily affects 
other countries, making it hard to avoid the influx of foreign influence (experiences 
and thoughts) into our society.74
71 Ibid., p.43.
72 For the public dissemination of ABRI's discipline campaign, see, for example, "Pangab Jenderal Try 
Sutrisno: Tingkatkan Kadar Disiplin di Lingkungan Satuan ABRI," Kompas, 18 January 1990; "SMA 
Taruna Nusantara: Membina Disiplin dan Wawasan Kebangsaan," Kompas, 13 July 1990; "Disiplin 
Nasional Merupakan Tuntutan Kebutuhan Masyarakat," Angkatan Bersenjata, 9 November 1990.
73 See Buku Petunjuk Seminar TNI-AD Tahun 1990 "Strategi Pembangunan Sumber Daya Manusia Dalam 
Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap ke-Dua," TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990.
74 See Pengarahan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia Pada Acara Pembukaan Seminar TNI
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In facing these challenges, Try insisted on the need for building strategic values to 
improve human-social quality, particularly in eight areas—struggle motivation, 
knowledge of science, professionalism, creativity, discipline and responsibility, 
physical health, and harmony with the natural environment.75
Needless to say, these targets were essentially far from defence policy. 
However, by emphasising struggle, professionalism, and discipline, which were all said 
to be the pillars in defending national values from the invasion of foreign values in the 
era of free information flow, the ABRI leadership was reinventing a space for further 
dwifungsi missions. It was in this context that dwifungsi was linked with SDM in the 
seminar. Try asserted that: "as a logical consequence, dwifungsi (which is based on 
struggle motivation) becomes a 'service' (pengabdian) of ABRI in our efforts to defend 
Indonesia’s national aspirations and direction."76 In developing this argument, he 
further emphasised that: "the national aspirations are realised in the forms of 
Pancasila and UUD45 which provide the philosophy of harmony and equilibrium for 
our society, based on kekeluargaan and gotong-royong, to avoid confrontation and 
domination. Therefore, in developing SDM, our social structure does not distinguish 
civilian and military matters in a dichotomous way."77 Try, in this way, relied on 
traditionalism in order to construct a new logic that dwifungsi would have a significant 
role in promoting SDM.
His remarks reflected ABRI's concern during this period that the improvement 
of SDM in the industrialising society would inevitably invite a conclusion which 
emphasised rational allocation of human resources and functional specialisation of 
social sectors, which would hardly fit with the image of dwifungsi. The foreign-value 
threat and the mythification of national character became ABRI's linguistic weapons in 
meeting this challenge. In this communication pattern, terms such as "declining 
nationalism" and "negative influence of foreign values" were fully mobilised.78
Based on the result of this army seminar, Mabes ABRI held an armed forces 
seminar in 1991 in order to produce the basis of ABRI's policy stance for the GBHN 
1993 and the second 25-year long-term development plan (PJPT II). The army 
seminar's arguments were used to incorporate the concept of SDM into ABRI's long-
AD Tahun 1990 di Bandung, Tanggal 15 Desember 1990, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp.5-9. In this 5-day 
seminar, 20 papers were discussed but there were only 4 papers arguing political aspects. These were 
presented by Alfian (from LIPI), Sarwono Kusumaatmadja (Minister of Reform of State Apparatus), Harry 
Tjan Silalahi (Director of CSIS), and Juwono Sudarsono (UI). Feisal Tanjung was Seskoad Commander at 
that time.
75 Ibid., pp.9-10.
76 Ibid., p.12.
77 Ibid., p.16.
78 At the closing session, Try emphasised that these aspects were the major themes of discussion during the 
seminar. See Sambutan Pada Penutupan Seminar TNI Angkatan Darat Tahun 1990, Seskoad, Bandung, 18 
December 1990, pp.9-10.
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term doctrine and to face the perceived tantangan globalisasi (challenges of 
globalisation). The major arguments were as follows.
First, ABRI's own SDM condition was explained. It was claimed that an 
efficient ABRI could not be fully realised due to budgetary constraints, which led to the 
deterioration of ABRI's six basic capacities—i.e. intelligence, defence, security, 
territorial, sospol, and back-up system.79 Second, the seminar assessed that the 
security challenges in PJPT II would still be the latent extreme-right or extreme-left 
movements and GPK (security disturbance movements) in remote areas, whereas the 
political problems centred on issues concerning human rights, keterbukaan, legal justice, 
freedom of expression and association, and democratisation.80 In facing these two 
challenges, the seminar emphasised the significance of improving ABRI's SDM and 
concluded that it would need to have a higher level of professionalism which should be 
integrated with leadership ability, national discipline, dwifungsi, and kemanunggalan 
ABRI-Rakyat.81 The concepts of dwifungsi, professionalism, and discipline were all 
juxtaposed—as seen in the previous sentence—and formulated as ABRI's posture to 
counter the problems in the next few decades.
Given the new assessment in the environmental shift, ABRI's place in it, and 
ABRI's internal tasks, Menhankam Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani then moved to finetune 
ABRI's doctrinal position by introducing the doctrine of Hankamneg (Pertahanan 
Keamanan Negara—National Defence and Security) the following year. This doctrine 
standardised the military interpretation that: globalisation would provide threats to 
Indonesian nationalism; SDM needed to be improved to counter this; 'professionalism 
and discipline' in society are the keys to improve SDM; and thus ABRI's dwifungsi 
could contribute to the promotion of these two abilities.82 In this way, ABRI’s external 
projection of its professionalism began to involve the concept of SDM which 
emphasised the threat of foreign-values and the need for up-holding "Indonesianness" 
through the "disciplined" rakyat. Importantly, in the eyes of the ABRI leadership, this 
SDM scheme secured the place of dwifungsi as a tool for managing social 
transformation pushed by the global wave of capitalist development. Such aspirations 
were actually reflected in ABRI's official 5-year Strategic Plan (Rencana Strategi— 
Renstra), as SDM was placed as the prime goal during the period of 1989-1993
79 See Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap Kedua (Hasil Seminar ABRI 
1991), Mabes ABRI, September 1991, p.40. These six components are the basis of Hankamnas doctrine 
designed in Law No.20/1982.
80 Ibid., p.64. ABRI's evolving threat perception will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
81 Ibid., p.112.
82 Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia, Jakarta: Dephankam, 5 October 1991. 
Moerdani also split the responsibilities of doctrinal developments between Menhankam and Pangab in 
1992. Now, the new doctrine of Hankamneg (Pertahanan Keamanan Negara: National Security and Defence) 
was defined as the basic doctrine authorised by Menhankam, and CDEK which was renewed in 1988 
became ABRI's main doctrine for which the Pangab was responsible. See Keputusan Menteri Pertahanan 
Keamanan (No: KEP/17/X/1991) Tentang Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia.
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(Renstra IV), following themes such as "Regrouping" (Renstra I 1974-1978), 
"Kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat" (Renstra II 1979-1983), and "KEE and 
Professionalism" (Renstra III 1984-1988).83
As we have seen, all of these strategic targets linked to the dwifungsi 
management, and the concept of professionalism had played the important role 
particularly since the mid-1980s in the process of reproducing the legitimacy of 
dwifungsi missions. As mentioned earlier, however, such an extemalisation of the 
professionalism concept ran parallel to ABRI’s internal reform programs. We now shift 
our attention to them, among which the most notable was the back-to-basics campaign 
which also provoked a public debate on dwifungsi.
Back-to-Basics and the Awakening of Corporate Interests
The first systematic attempt made by an academy-generation officer to 
delineate internal problems with the potential seriously to undermine the army's 
institutional integrity in conducting military operations, including sociopolitical ones, 
was issued in 1993, following the decision in the Rapim ABRI 1992 to improve the 
moral standard of the officer corps. Based on this, KSAD Edi Sudradjat formed a task 
force which formulated a document, entitled "Basic Ideas about the Maintenance of 
Fundamental Norms for Soldiers," with its campaign name of "Back-to-Basics."84 This 
43-page paper consisted of four parts, namely: basic ideas about back-to-basics; 
environmental factors influencing the army; identification of problems; and the 
conceptual measures to tackle these problems.85 Edi explained that there had been 
certain deviations (penyimpangan) from the army's basic norms which had resulted in 
the urgent need for therapy (terapi).86 The main external factor which had caused 
deviations, according to the paper, was the shortage of budgetary allocations to the 
defence field. Before describing the budgetary problem, however, the paper 
emphasised the significance of the current security situation to back up Edi's claim for
83 Revisi Program Lima Tahun Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1989-1993, Dephankam, 1992, pp.7-8. This 
document was also a revision of ABRI's strategic design following the above ABRI seminar and the 
tightening budgetary allocation for ABRI's operational tasks, though it did not significantly affect budgets 
for sospol and territorial operations, which consisted of less than one percent in the total annual budget.
84 Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Penegakan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back to Basics), TNI-AD, 
Mabes ABRI, 1993. Hereafter called the Edi Paper.
85 The previous moral-improvement campaign was more inclined to emphasise historical values, especially 
the importance of Sapta Marga, rather than the problem-solving approach employed by the Edi Paper. For 
example, a Seskoad educational document at that time was devoted entirely to the reiteration of Sapta 
Marga as a guide for army officers to behave in efficient, effective, and moral ways; rather than dealing 
with the problems. See Naskah Departmen Tentang Kode Etik TNI-ABRI untuk Kursus Reguler Staf Umum 
dan Komando TNI-AD (No:52-07-Bl-F1301), Seskoad, 1991. The Edi Paper therefore illustrated a quite 
unusual approach.
86 The Edi Paper, p.4. Deviations were said to be caused both by environmental and internal factors.
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a budget increase. The Edi paper argued that:
The global change in recent years effectively ended international antagonism between 
Eastern and Western blocs..., but it certainly raised an international campaign 
coloured by issues such as democracy, human rights and environmental 
preservation.... No country, including Indonesia, can avoid being influenced by this 
international campaign... and its domestic reflection can actually be seen in our 
current process of transition from a traditional-agrarian society to a modem- 
industrial one, which is accompanied by changes in the social system and order.... 
To mention an example, the widening socioeconomic gap has an obvious impact on 
politics in this heterogeneous society.87
The emphasis on current political vulnerability was followed by a call for the 
balanced allocation of the national budget between prosperity and security aspects. 
The paper argued:
The annually increasing national budget is not accompanied by an increase in the 
defence budget, rather the allocation for the Hankam sector is declining.... This has 
always caused a perception gap—regarding prosperity and security—between 
technocrats and military circles.... It is often not recognised that development 
throughout the New Order was due to ABRI's successful maintenance of national 
security.... Some non-ABRI circles instead take security as a given thing without 
recognising the big contribution ABRI has made.... If the defence budget continues to 
decline, it will surely affect the security aspect which cannot be separated from 
prosperity in national development..., leading to an inequilibrium (ketidakseimbangan) 
between prosperity and security.88
The paper emphasised several political challenges. It argued that although Pancasila 
ideology had been disseminated in society, issues of democratisation and political 
change were emerging every year, as were the issues of the socioeconomic gap and 
related rioting. Under these conditions, the paper concluded, people could be 
manipulated politically in ways that would lead to security problems.89
The declining budgetary allocation was also identified as the main obstacle to 
improving ABRI's professionalism. It was argued that, over the previous ten years, the 
insufficient budget had had a negative impact on various programs, notably the 
maintenance of military bases, educational quality, military exercises, and the 
maintenance of weapons.90 These difficulties had resulted in a shift in values relating 
to kejuangan (struggle) in today’s society.
In the past, becoming a soldier was considered prestigious among the youth 
population. Now, however, people's willingness to join the army has declined. For 
example, among nearly 900 students who entered Akabri, those who had 45 points 
or higher in the NEM (Real Score of the Final Examination) were less than 10%, 
while the majority had points between 30 and 39. Moreover, according to a survey, 
60% of them choose the army merely to find a job, and most are those who could
87 Ibid., p .ll.
88 Ibid., pp.11-12. The defence-security budget had declined as follows: 14.8% (1974/75); 11.3% (1979/80); 
11.1% (1984/85); 7.4% (1989/90); and 6.6% (1992/93).
89 Ibid., p.13.
90 Ibid., p.14.
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If the declining budgetary allocation was coupled with the declining SDM in 
the army, it could result in a serious threat to ABRI's institutional integrity. The Edi 
Paper saw such conditions as the cause of certain deviations. The following five 
deviations were discussed.
First, illegal behaviour was apparent—for instance, going to prohibited places, 
breaking traffic rules, and even conducting criminal activities.92 Second, the 
perceptional gap between old and current generations regarding the understanding of 
kejuangan was also suggested as a case of deviation. The paper warned of the current 
tendency to assess kejuangan as identical with kepejuangan (warriorship) during the 
revolutionary war; this was not true because kejuangan consisted of "love" and "spirit 
of sacrifice" for the nation, and were thus eternal as long as Indonesia existed.93 Third, 
it was admitted that the problem of low salaries had motivated soldiers to find extra 
jobs even during office-hours.94 In this tight, the paper criticised a tendency for those in 
positions of authority (atasan) to be reluctant to discipline deviations by their staff 
(bawahannya), which was clearly in conflict with the army’s slogan that asserted: "there 
is no soldier who is wrong, but if there is, it is officers who have responsibility for what 
is done by their staff."95 These deviations, the paper claimed, had been assessed by 
several reports and evaluations, as well as in forum discussions and daily 
conversations, proving the decline of professionalism as a central problem of the 
army.96 Fourth, related to the third case, the paper mentioned a tendency for officers 
to dislike being posted to combat units and to positions outside of Java, because of 
their expectations that non-combat and Java postings could provide more
91 Ibid., p.14. NEM (Nilai Ebatanas [evaluasi belajar tahap akhir nasional] Mu mi) is an integrated 
examination for high school students who want to go to university. Sipenmaru is the abbreviation of 
Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru. According to an Akabri document, one requirement since 1993 to 
apply for Akabri was the attainment of at least 35 points in the NEM, so on paper, applicants with 30 
points are no longer able to apply. See Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata RI (1972-1993), Buku II, Mako 
Akabri, 1993, p.95. The declining quality of Akabri students is also discussed in kristiadi (forthcoming) 
which instead emphasises the growing alternative job opportunities rather than the declining value of 
kejuangan in society. Some also argue that the declining quality is due to the patronage factors in 
recruitment, especially for the children of ABRI officers. Bribe-giving is also mentioned
92 The Edi Paper, p .l7. The paper did not mention these prohibited places, but according to a previous 
document, they included night clubs, public steambaths, and other places which might harm the image of 
ABRI. See Instruksi Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (No: INS/03/IX/1986) Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Pola Hidup Sederhana di Lingkungan ABRI, Mabes ABRI 1986, pp.39-40. This document, 
compiled under Moerdani's leadership, also imposed strict regulations on their interaction with society.
93 The Edi Paper, pp.24-25. This claim revealed that the project of the third army seminar in 1972 was still 
incomplete. According to Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, former Deputy Commander of Seskoad (1976-78) 
and author of the 1972 seminar document, the intent of the seminar had virtually failed and dwifungsi 
already had become dwiporsi (dual portion), meaning merely seeking a wider role in politics without virtue. 
Interview, 30 July 1996.
94 Ibid., p.18.
95 Ibid., pp.21-23.
96 Ibid., p.24.
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opportunities for material well-being (kesejahteraan).97 One suggested reason was again 
the low level of salaries. The fact that salaries were hardly sufficient to cover basic 
needs had brought about a deterioration in military discipline and work ethic, which in 
turn further undermined professionalism.98 Finally, the paper implied the negative 
impact of a politically oriented career system by suggesting that "the declining spirit of 
kejuangan is often caused by the reality of uncertainty in career paths."99
In conducting "therapy," the back-to-basics campaign put the priority on 
improving "kepemimpinan" (leadership) and "manajemen" (management) capacities in 
the organisational mechanism. For example, given the difficulty in increasing the 
soldiers’ welfare budget, better management of Primkopad (Primer Koperasi AD: the 
army's cooperative association) was suggested, while at the same time, leaders should 
punish erring soldiers in strict ways. It was also hoped that the defence budget would 
be increased in a proportional way with the rise of the national budget.100 These two 
concepts of leadership and management were also intended to overcome some 
shortcomings resulting from the 1984 reorganisation.101
In this way, the back-to-basics movement seemed to be an attempt to 
overcome problems which arose in part from reduced budgetary allocations. It directly 
pointed out major problems in all three levels of civil-military relations, i.e. the 
environment surrounding ABRI, civil-military interactions, and internal military affairs. 
In other words, the paper identified the trouble in the environment (national budget 
allocation) as the prime source of this snowballing problem which disturbed both civil- 
military interactions (deviations/declining prestige) and internal military matters 
(delayed professionalisation). Since the deviations affected civil-military interactions, 
they could easily spill over to the controversial issue of dwifungsi legitimacy.
Gen (ret) Moerdani, for example, understood back-to-basics as meaning a 
move to give higher priority to the defence function above ABRI's sociopolitical role,
97 Ibid., p.27.
98 Ibid., p.28.
99 Ibid., p.34. As seen in the previous chapter, the process of de-Moerdani-sation created concern among 
many serving officers about their career uncertainty. Edi's assessment might reflect this reality. Lt-Gen (ret) 
Soebijakto expected that such distortion in promotion practice would only be normalised after Soeharto 
(Interview, 8 January 1997).
100 The Edi Paper, pp.38-42.
101 The Edi Paper explained some problems which emerged from Moerdani's reorganisation package. Among 
others, the elimination of Kowilhan reduced the effectiveness of the army's line-structure; dissolving of 
infantry brigades caused major problems in maintaining infantry battalions in Korems due to lack of 
training and readiness; the structure, capacity and tasks of all army organisations were too uniform 
(diseragamkan), especially in territorial commands, due to the failure to consider demographic, geographic 
and social factors, thus making it difficult for many organisations to conduct their tasks well (p.20). After 9 
years of Moerdani's reorganisation, Edi revealed technical problems, apart from concerns about the job 
reductions we discussed earlier. The uniformity of the Kodams could also be found in the fact that their 
hankam-sospol conduct was designed to be based on the Pangab's directions and, again at least on paper, 
some flexibility was only given in the case of combat, logistic and education policies. See, for the official 
tasks of Kodam, Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedure Tentara Nasional Indonesia 
Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) (KEP:08/X/92), Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.102-104.
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such as occupying bupati posts.102 Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman insisted that the movement 
was to go back to the real intention of kekaryaan, which meant abandoning the current 
dictatorial style.103 Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto saw the issue more critically. "Back-to- 
basics is intended to return to the ideal of 1945 values which are represented by Sapta 
Marga, but it still could be interpreted in various ways, as some people say it is back- 
to-barracks. It is in part the responsibility of Edi who provided such an unclear 
concept."104 More fundamentally, Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, the father of dwifungsi, 
insisted that: "I totally agree with Edi's back-to-basics idea that ABRI should return to 
the basics of the struggle-soldier (tentara pejuang) who is totally a tool of nation, not of 
a certain group."105
However, in the eyes of serving officers who participated in formulating the 
back-to-basics project, it had no direct link with dwifungsi. Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo for 
example argued: "it was a micro-managerial problem, and the movement was to re­
functionalise each part of the organisation to play its designed role, which had been 
undermined by a tendency within ABRI to avoid risk and responsibility. So it is 
basically self-evaluation to enhance professionalism, which has no link with civil- 
military relations."106 Another intellectual officer, Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, 
who also contributed to the concept building of back-to-basics, endorsed a concern 
reflected in the paper which was shared by a majority in the ABRI circle. "There is a 
huge salary gap between ABRI and civilian sectors, which inevitably raises a question 
in the minds of soldiers—'being professional and loyal to the nation for what?'"107 This 
general of Akabri's 1973 Class argued that this psychological problem contributed to 
the erosion of the semangat kejuangan (struggle spirit) among ABRI members.
102 Interview, 4 March 1997.
103 Interview, 4 July 1996.
104 Interview, 8 January 1997.
105 Written Interview with Gen (ret) Nasution, 4 January 1997.
106 Interview, 30 September 1996. Widjojo was an Advisor to the Pangab, Feisal Tanjung, in Political and 
Security Fields (Sahli Pangab bidang Polkam). Earlier, he had produced an article which was selected as 
the best working paper in the Sesko ABRI Regular Course XVIII 1991/1992. Sesko ABRI is the Joint Staff 
Command College, which is open for officers who have graduated from an appropriate service Staff and 
Command College (for example, Seskoad for army officers) and have a good record in their duties. Widjojo's 
working paper discussed various impacts of internal problems in conducting dwifungsi, as we discuss 
below. See Agus Widjojo, "Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Personil ABRI Sejalan Dengan Upaya Peningkatan 
Kaulitas Sumber Daya Manusia," Widya Dharma (Majalah Sesko ABRI), No.18, 1992, pp.47-89. Widjojo 
(Class 1970) is a son of Brig-Gen Sutojo, who was one of six generals killed in the abortive coup of 30 
September 1965.
107 Interview with Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to Pangab 
(Waasrenum Pangab), 24 January 1997. Wirahadikusumah—who was the Korem Commander in Denpasar, 
Bali, before his current post—was a member of the same Akabri class as Bambang Yudhoyono. This first 
Harvard MPA holder in ABRI is a nephew of the former vice president Umar Wirahadikusumah who 
commanded the Jakarta region during the coup in 1965. That Gens Sutojo and Umar were key players in the 
formation of the New Order army and their relatives were now involved in its reform project illustrated the 
ongoing generational change within the New Order. The two Aguses were transferred at the same time in 
January 1998. The former became Assistant to General Planning for Pangab (Asrenum Pangab) and the 
latter inherited Widjojo's previous position of Sahli Pangab Bidang Polkam and was promoted to Maj-Gen.
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As seen in the above paper, the concern was not basically directed to the 
limited allocation of the national budget in itself, but to its growth rate which did not 
match the increasing national budget. This point was very important in facing a 
possible question that ABRI was only concerned with its self-interest. Edi himself later, 
as Menhankam, insisted that this was not the case, maintaining that "we have to 
develop professionalism with a very limited budget, because we know that the largest 
portion must be used for the improvement of the people's prosperity."108 Clearly the 
limitation of the budget itself was not the central issue. On the contrary it matched 
ABRI's nationalist/heroic self-perception of mengorbankan diri bagi bangsa (sacrificing 
self for the nation). Instead, the concerns expressed regarding this issue at that time 
focussed on the relative gaps between: security and prosperity in national policy; the 
increase in the defence budget allocation compared to other sectors; the salaries of 
officers and those of middle-class civilians. In this regard, although the budget shortage 
itself had already been mentioned since the early days, as seen most recently at the 
1991 ABRI Seminar, Edi’s claim in his paper provided a new dimension to this old 
theme.
Assessing these features, there are several implications of the back-to-basics 
program for our analysis of ABRI's dwifungsi management during this time. First was 
its impact on the dwifungsi debate in society. As mentioned by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 
back-to-basics was no doubt primarily an exercise to rejuvenate the army's 
organisational life and thus not directly concerned with civil-military relations in the 
eyes of program promoters. Despite this, the back-to-basics program easily merged 
with the debate in political society over dwifungsi excesses, as we discussed in the 
previous chapter which, according to Edi, was manipulated by certain groups to 
express their political interests. This indicated that the dwifungsi discourse in political 
communication had already reached the point where ABRI could not maintain a 
hegemonic interpretation of its self-role perception.
Second, negative connotations involved in the Edi Paper regarding national 
policy revealed that the back-to-basics promoters were concerned about the declining 
institutional integrity of the army resulting from Soeharto's state administration which 
had reduced the defence-security budget. Such a perception was inherited by Edi's 
successor, Wismoyo, as KSAD, who not only energetically proceeded with Edi's back- 
to-basics program but was also said to be active in protecting the army's own financial 
sources through business activities, and thus distancing himself from the Palace— 
despite his earlier image as a "palace general."109 The back-to-basics idea, therefore,
108 Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.
109 The Editors (1995:104-105) assessed that Wismoyo was eager to protect army business interests against 
the encroachment of Presidential crony Bob Hasan in order to show that he was not a puppet of Soeharto. 
However, soon after Hartono replaced Wismoyo as KSAD in 1995, he scrapped Wismoyo's plan to restrict 
entrance to Seskoad to the holders of college degree (Si) in order to improve officer quality. This move was 
seen as a setback to the back-to-basics trend. Interview with a general-ranking army officer, October 1998.
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coincided with the reality that the army's institutional interests were not necessarily 
synchronised with Soeharto's political interests. Together with the budget issue, the 
problem of political promotion within ABRI—as mentioned in the Edi Paper—also 
reflected the army’s concern about Soeharto's disregard of its corporate interests.
In sum, there were at least two unintended political consequences of the back- 
to-basics program. One was the boosting of critical space given to the dwifungsi debate 
in public political discussion. The other was the awakening of the army's 
organisational concerns about Soeharto's policy stance. In other words, if the project 
was to tackle ABRI's internal problems and to promote professionalism, discipline and 
SDM, it also had to pay the dual cost of opening up social pressure on dwifungsi and 
objecting to some of Soeharto’s policies.
Seskoad Officers' Search for Dwifungsi1 *s New Paradigm
In parallel with the back-to-basics movement, there was the initiative of 
Seskoad-linked officers to support the Edi project, as if to revive the reputation of 
Seskoad as the dapur pemikiran (idea-kitchen) of ABRI in the early period of the New 
Order.110 The re-emergence of Seskoad indicated that ABRI, especially the army, was 
searching for a new format for its role in the changing society. A year after the Rapim 
ABRI 1992 which promoted the issue of back-to-basics, Seskoad introduced a program 
to promote leadership capacity among officers. As seen above, the need for leadership 
(kepemimpinan) skill was one of the conclusions in the Edi Paper, and Seskoad's 
educational curriculum supported this orientation. In 1993, it produced the first 
material which warned of the declining discipline among the officer corps by insisting 
that officers should not be "salon officers" (perwira-perwira salon) who only enjoyed 
having parties and ceremonies.111 The document called for "authoritative leadership" at 
all command levels to uphold strong discipline, because without it the military 
organisation would simply become an "armed gang." Such authoritative leadership was 
described as necessary within ABRI, especially in conducting its hankam role. On the 
other hand, in implementing its sospol role, the paper insisted that officers had to 
improve "democratic leadership" in order to accommodate the people's political 
aspirations.112 Although ABRI's emphasis on leadership was not new, it was the first 
time for it to be introduced as an internal education program for the officers.
Disregarding the simple question of how a body organised along authoritarian
110 As seen earlier, Seskoad was the institute which held major army seminars in the 1960s and 1970s to
formulate core political doctrines of the military.
111 SeeNaskah Departmen Tentang Kepemimpinan ABRI Untuk Kursus Regular Staf Umum dan Komando 
TNI-AD (No.52-07-Bl-F1201), Seskoad, 1993, p.21. The paper also noted that officers often failed to show 
their respect for higher-ranking officers by dropping "siap" (yes sir) in conversation at meetings.
112 This description of authoritarian and democratic leadership is from ibid., pp.7-8.
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lines could democratically lead others, these arguments distinguished between the two 
functions in the dwifungsi doctrine. This dichotomous approach was soon revised by 
Mabes ABRI which also produced a document on ABRI's leadership in 1993. This 
Mabes ABRI version argued that the dwifungsi leadership—without the distinction 
between hankam and sospol aspects—would be greatly needed in the era of 
globalisation in order to defend Indonesian values from the influx of individualistic 
foreign concepts such as human rights.113
Seskoad took further initiatives to promote its internal program along with 
Edi's back-to-basics. The Study Forum was newly established within Seskoad under 
the leadership of Maj-Gen Herman Musakabe, DanSeskoad, with full support from 
Edi (Menhankam) and Wismoyo (KSAD). On the occasion of the 42nd anniversary of 
Seskoad in 1993, the Forum published a collection of working papers written by noted 
intellectual officers. The book was entitled "Challenges of Development: Dynamic 
Thoughts of Seskoad."114 In his introductory note, Edi stressed that this work should 
begin a new tradition of Seskoad to improve the intellectual quality of the officer 
corps, while Wismoyo claimed that the book proved Seskoad’s constant role as the 
conceptual centre of the army. In fact, the articles ranged from internal problems of 
ABRI to international relations, and all were written by active officers. We only focus 
on the ABRI issues here, but before looking at each article, it is worth examining the 
ideas of Agus Widjojo who was not only involved in Edi’s back-to-basics movement 
but was also recruited by the Study Forum as the sole source of intellectual input from 
outside Seskoad. Among both active and retired officers, it was widely understood 
that Widjojo’s contribution in developing the two programs was critical.
Widjojo published a working paper in Sesko ABRI in 1992, which was—as 
mentioned earlier—selected as the best paper in the annual regular course. In his 
analysis of national trends, he pointed out that young people aged 25-35, who had no 
experience of serious political conflict in the nation, would dominate the population by 
the year 2000; inevitably they would not understand the background of ABRI's 
political commitment.115 Because these young people, especially in the urban areas, 
would receive a higher level of education than now, he continued, it was 
demographically predictable that more people would become critical and outspoken
113 See Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa 
Mendatang, Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.52. Pangab Try Sutrisno explained that this 64-page document was the 
latest reference for ABRI officers to improve professionalism of dwifungsi in order to take the leadership in 
guarding Indonesia from foreign ideologies.
114 See Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1992-1993, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian 
Seskoad, 1993. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had just come back from Harvard University in 1992 and 
joined Seskoad's teaching staff with lieutenant-colonel rank, was the Secretary of the Forum. In producing 
this book, the Forum selected several key contributors, all from Seskoad, except one who had been posted to 
Kodam III/Siliwangi as Assistant for Operations to Kasdam. That was Agus Widjojo (Col) whom Agus 
Wirahadikusumah evaluated as the best intellectual officer among the Akabri generation officers. Interview 
with Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, 2 October 1996.
115 See Agus Widjojo, op.cit., p.55.
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about the role of ABRI. For him, this trend was coupled with the change in political 
culture from the current traditional-paternalist one to a more modem-rational one. In 
facing these challenges, he argued that ABRI needed to abandon its conservative 
military culture, represented by such features as: lack of respect for pluralism and 
difference of opinion; tendency to see society as monolithic like the military; lack of 
tolerance to different ideas within the military, which had made officers unfamiliar 
with the persuasive approach in politics.116 He argued that these aspects did not suit 
modem political culture—which was open, rational, argumentative, and dynamic— 
and the current officers' general lack of curiosity to read books had encouraged such a
gaP-
Regarding dwifungsi, Widjojo mentioned Juwono Sudarsono's view—which 
was usually welcomed by other officers—that saw "ABRI as the only institution 
capable of creating nation-wide concepts and interests; therefore dwifungsi should not 
be challenged." According to Widjojo, Juwono's view was too static and failed to 
consider current social changes which had seen the establishment of many social 
institutions capable of managing fields which had been dominated by ABRI over the 
last 25 years since the second army seminar in 1966.117 In his view, there were various 
factors which would influence ABRI's dwifungsi. Among external factors, he identified: 
the perceptional change in society regarding ABRI; the rise of the educated middle 
class; the growing complexity of the modem nation; the erosion of the paternalistic 
society due to modernisation; and problems and challenges posed by economic 
development. On the other hand, the internal factor he mentioned was the increasing 
professionalism within ABRI. This was quite contrary to the mainstream interpretation 
that professionalism would not influence dwifungsi. Instead, he saw the possibility of 
perceptional change within the professional circle (kalangan ABRI profesional), which 
would influence dwifungsi and the role of ABRI in general.118 On the conduct of 
dwifungsi, Widjojo warned of the growing tendency of dogmatisation in implementing 
dwifungsi. "Ideology [of dwifungsi] has to be adjustable to the times, and guided by the 
rational, open, and discussable methods rather than dogmatic indoctrination."119
Widjojo then analysed various shortcomings in ABRI's organisational and 
personnel policies. He pointed out the uncertain career system which was also one 
argument in the Edi Paper. The need to establish a predictable career system, which 
was not affected by the 'external' factors such as politics and patronage, was strongly 
emphasised. He said this was important to encourage officers' work motivation, rank- 
prestige, and self-confidence, as well as to prevent both indifference (masa bodoh) and
116 Ibid., p.56.
117 Ibid., p.65. Above quotation of Juwono is provided without the source.
118 Ibid., p.66.
119 Ibid., p.71.
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the seeking of short-cuts.120 As discussed in the previous chapter, the uncertainty in 
the career system at that time was largely due to Soeharto's political manipulation of 
ABRI in making ABRI amenable in the midst of his conflict with Menhankam Gen (ret) 
Benny Moerdani. Widjojo also made a pragmatic suggestion aimed at improving the 
quality of personnel. "We should be brave enough to decide the priority between the 
two functions in dwifungsi, because ABRI does not have enough time to produce 
personnel who are competent in both functions simultaneously."121 ABRI's priority was 
no doubt the defence role, not sospol. Such a progressive suggestion was followed by 
his argument calling for the transformation of officers’ values from traditional to 
rational ones in order to improve ABRI's SDM, and—as argued in the Edi Paper—the 
acquisition of leadership and management skills.122
Widjojo's paper had two significant implications. First, it revealed that there 
was no single assessment within ABRI regarding the linkage between dwifungsi and 
professionalism, and the latter was now legitimately used as a foundation to express 
criticism of the current situation within ABRI. In explaining the need for 
professionalism which had already been recognised in ABRI, one could describe what 
should be corrected, and this in effect opened the space to legitimately raise concerns 
about the current system. Perhaps without using the umbrella of professionalism and 
SDM, Widjojo might have been taking a risk in describing ABRI as paternalistic, 
irrational, dogmatic, uncertain, and therefore less capable of performing two functions 
at the same time. As we saw above, the concept of professionalism had been widely 
used to expand the scope of dwifungsi legitimation since the mid-1980s, but Widjojo's 
paper illustrated that it could also be used by ABRI officers to question the current 
conduct of dwifungsi. However, a question which still remained was: how much 
support could be expected for Widjojo's line of thinking? According to a general­
ranking officer close to him, "we are still a minority within ABRI; the majority is not 
even willing to communicate with civilian intellectuals because they do not want to feel 
inferior."123 However, in ABRI as a whole, this was not to deny the potential support 
of the silent majority of lower-ranking officers who were naturally concerned about 
uncertain career paths.
Second, the fact that he was employed both in the back-to-basics and the 
Seskoad project also revealed that Widjojo's ideas and stances were at least welcomed 
by certain groups within the military leadership in conducting internal reform 
programs. Widjojo's ideas were basically reflected in the Edi Paper, though some of the 
more drastic elements were hardly visible. As we will see below, his contribution was 
also apparent in the Seskoad project, although his critical perspective was balanced by
120 Ibid., p.85.
121 Ibid., p.85.
122 Ibid., p.88.
123 Confidential interview, January 1997.
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the outward-looking approach provided by Lt-Col Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—a 
close friend of Widjojo.
Looking back to the Seskoad book, three articles are relevant here. The one 
written by Let-Col Hern Sukmadi discussed the challenges facing ABRTs ethics.124 
Hern argued that ABRTs current organisational culture was not yet fully based on the 
Sapta Marga principle. According to him, largely due to the influx of business values 
within ABRI, the military ethic was in serious danger of being replaced by a commercial 
ethic among ABRI officers.125 Hern elaborated further on the problem of military ethics 
by arguing that the formation of the DKM (Military Honour Council) in the wake of the 
Dili affair in November 1991 highlighted ABRTs lack of proper ethics. However, he 
asserted that the cause of the incident was not entirely on the ABRI side.126 As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this assessment reflected a general concern within 
the officer corps about Soeharto's disregard of military voices.
Hem's paper was followed by Lt-Col Agus Wirahadikusumah who argued 
about the professionalism of ABRI from a critical perspective.127 Quoting Edi's 
previous speech on back-to-basics, Agus called for its urgent implementation, due to 
the shared concern that the level of professionalism was declining. As if to reinforce 
the Edi Paper, he noted: the perceptional gap between the two generations regarding 
the understanding of kejuangan; the growing deviations from ABRTs standard norms; 
the lack of financial support to improve the quality of professionalism; and the rapid 
economic growth which had a negative influence on ABRI in that it tended to erode the 
discipline of military officers. Like Hem, Agus also regarded the Dili affair as an 
example of lack of professionalism in conducting security operations, but again, he 
believed that the blame could not be solely attributed to ABRI.128 For Hem and Agus, 
the Dili affair contributed a significant momentum to the professionalism campaign 
within ABRI, while at the same time causing concern that ABRTs corporate interest 
was not properly protected by the national leaders when they faced international 
pressure.
In terms of Soeharto-ABRI relations, therefore, the Dili incident provided a 
significant momentum for young officers in Seskoad—who had studied the army’s 
'long-term' strategic plans—to discuss the problems of the state leadership whose 
interests did not resonate with those of ABRI. In the military campaign for 
professionalisation, these officers developed an intra-military communication space to
124 Heru Sukmadi was a 1974 graduate of Akabri and a member of the teaching staff of Seskoad at that time. 
He was then posted as Edi's advisor (Staf Ahli Menhankam).
125 See Bambang Heru Sukmadi (Letkol), "Tantangan Etika Militer ABRI Dalam Era Pembangunan," in 
Tantangan..., pp.34-35.
126 Ibid., p.35. We will further examine the impact of the Dili affair and the DKM on the subsequent civil- 
military relations in the next chapter.
127 Agus Wirahadikusumah (Letkol), "Kejuangan dan Profesionalisme Prajurit TNI AD: Suatu Tinjauan dan 
Analisis Kritikal," in Tantangan..., pp.43-71.
128 Ibid., p.54.
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discuss such perceptions within the officer corps. In this sense, the concept of 
professionalism, which was first used to legitimise dzvifungsi practice for post­
revolutionary officers, but was later used to express problems of ABRI's 
intemal/extemal policy orientations, now provided officers with a lens to identify the 
gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's private interests.
Agus' article was followed by a reprint of Bambang Yudhoyono's writing on 
professionalism. It is difficult to find any recent Seskoad paper on professionalism 
which does not quote Bambang's paper, first circulated within Seskoad in 1990.129 
Unlike the previous two articles, Bambang's argument was largely centred on prospects 
and hopes rather than problems. As he identified ABRI's central concern today as the 
actualisation of professionalism in facing the complex challenges of social change, his 
argument was all-encompassing in nature, insisting on the prospective role of the 
professionalised ABRI in the next decades. This aspect seemed to be the major factor 
which made his writing so popular within ABRI whose legitimate place in society had 
been in question since the keterbukaan movement.
In starting his argument, Bambang rejected the views of Guy Pauker, Ulf 
Sundhaussen, Harold Maynard and Harold Crouch which he labelled as the liberal 
presumption of civilian supremacy over the military. In understanding the legitimacy of 
ABRI's sociopolitical role, he insisted that western notions were not suitable. His 
concept of military professionalism was distinguished from the western approach 
which tended to limit the utility of a profession to a certain field. He argued that in the 
case of ABRI, the Law No.2 in 1988—which claimed that ABRI should be professional 
in military affairs with the spirit of Sapta Marga—embodied the essence of ABRI's 
professionalism. "With dzvifungsi," he argued, "ABRI is expected to have two 
dimensions of professionalism, i.e. hankam and sospol fields. Therefore, all ABRI 
officers have to be professional in conducting their tasks in regard to defence and 
social-politics."130 This approach was different from that of Agus Widjojo who reacted 
to such an interpretation by saying that: "I personally do not believe that 
professionalism can be adopted in ABRI's sociopolitical role.”131
Bambang also saw the issue of democratisation as the major challenge to 
Indonesia. The world-wide wave of democratisation, according to Bambang, would
129 Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Letkol), "Profesionalisme Perwira ABRI Masa Kini dan Masa Depan," in 
Tantangan..., pp.91-149.
130 Ibid., p.101-102. He suggested six points which comprised the characteristics of ABRI's professionalism: 
high moral quality based on ABRI's codes of ethics; expertise in hankam and sospol; being leaders and 
managers with a sense of justice; having deep insights, awareness and responsibility in national life; a 
strong spirit of solidarity and compactness; solidarity with people in national life. As we have seen earlier, 
these slogans were not new in ABRI's thinking. Interestingly, Bambang integrated them all under his 
conception of professionalism in a new way.
131 Interviews with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996. A serving general-ranking officer also 
asserted that "ABRI can never be professional since it plays politics." Confidential interview, January 
1997.
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have a negative impact on Indonesian society—which was still in transition—because 
of the possibility that radical political ideas from abroad could easily gain popular 
support in domestic society.132 Quoting foreign media which placed Indonesia's 
country risk on the same ranking with China, mainly due to the uncertainty of national 
leadership succession, he insisted on the importance of ABRI's continuing role in 
providing maximum security and order in society to maintain investors' confidence.133 
Moreover, Bambang supported an opinion of Harold Maynard which noted ABRI as 
the only institution in Indonesia which was capable of handling security, stability, and 
development in an effective way—despite his earlier comment on western-biased 
studies. In discussing how ABRI should fulfil these "hopes of society," the concept of 
professionalisation again played a key role. It was argued that ABRI officers were 
expected to be professional as patriots, experts, leaders, managers, and thinkers.134
Among these professional capacities, Bambang emphasised leadership and 
management. In order to improve the quality of SDM in Indonesia, according to him, it 
was important to promote discipline, efficiency, productivity and the work-ethic in 
society, and it was in these areas that ABRI's social leadership would be needed. 
Regarding management, he said this ability was crucial in peace time. "With good 
management, we are not only able to utilise limited resources effectively and efficiently 
but also to arrange organisations, weapons, facilities, and exercises in optimal 
ways." 135 In sum, Bambang claimed that leadership and management were the key 
capacities of ABRI's professionalism, and it was in this context that he concluded that 
professionalisation would promote ABRI's role in society rather than becoming a 
pemadam kehakaran (fire brigade) .136 Bambang's catch-all conception of professionalism, 
therefore, provided a military discourse to counter any attempt in society to diminish 
the utility of dwifungsi in response to the perceived threat of social change.
The new concepts recently established in the dwifungsi language by Seskoad 
officers—namely, professionalism, SDM, discipline and leadership—were in fact 
reflected in ABRI's subsequent policies. For example, F-ABRI, according to Maj-Gen 
Hari Sabamo, now focused on SDM and national discipline issues after the keterbukaan
132 Ibid., pp.108-109.
133 Ibid., p.120.
134 Ibid., p.125. Bambang with Agus Wirahadikusumah also wrote another chapter in Tantangan 
Pembangunan, which focused on international politics concerning the Non-Block movement and the role of 
Indonesia in it. This highly academic writing gave the impression that they themselves embodied the "officer 
as thinker," which Bambang mentioned here.
135 Ibid., pp.135-136.
136 Ibid., p.147. As seen in the previous chapter, the term pemadam kebakaran has been used by critics to 
describe ABRI's role in reality as a mere watchdog of stability, despite its proclaimed role as the dynamisor 
of development. In this context, the term is used to criticise ABRI’s shortcoming in implementing dwifungsi. 
However, the term is also used to criticise ABRI's day-to-day involvement in non-military sectors. In this 
context, critics insist that ABRI's prime role should be like a fire extinguisher, which is only needed in an 
emergency situation.
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campaign in the early 1990s.137 So too in territorial operations, the internal magazine of 
as Kodam Jaya—then under the command of Maj-Gen Wiranto—asserted that the 
National Discipline Movement reflected ABRI's role as ing ngarsa sung tuladha in 
carrying out dzvifungsi's second function.138 Above all, Bambang's contribution was 
crucial in the making of this theory which integrated perceived needs in ABRI and 
society—such as SDM, discipline, and professionalism—and linked them with the 
viability of dwifungsi. Though there were subtle differences between Agus Widjojo's 
and Bambang's focuses, the latter's catch-all paradigm was soon adopted as the de 
facto official interpretation of dzvifungsi.
The Forum's first Tantangan project enabled Seskoad to institutionalise the 
series in the following years. Up to 1996, the Tantangan series was conducted every 
year, although the documents were only circulated within ABRI from the second 
edition in 1994. In the 1994 edition, which mainly focused on the strategic issues of 
Hankamneg, the Forum took a different approach by inviting civilian intellectuals for 
the five-day discussion.139 The aim was to promote communication between Seskoad 
and civilian intellectuals, which would strengthen the image of Seskoad as the leading 
idea-maker in civil-military relations.
The Forum strongly linked dwifungsi to the presidential succession. On the 
assumption that President Soeharto would remain in power, the Forum said: "by the 
year 2003, ABRI will still behave as it does today. But if succession takes place [in 
1998], ABRI—at least for the following five years—will lead domestic politics. Then if 
the political situation in 2003 is satisfactory, ABRI will review its kekaryaan role, which 
is distinguished from the sospol role of dwifungsi. Despite the possible reduction of 
kekaryaan, the quality of ABRI's sospol role will be improved as Seskoad’s new 
admission policy—which limits candidates to those who hold university degrees—will 
be implemented after 1997."140
These assessments were important in two ways. First the succession problem
137 Interview with Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997. Hari then became the 
Head of F-ABRI in September 1997, was given the task of leading F-ABRI in the March MPR session in 
1998.
138 See Gema Jayakarta (Media Komunikasi Kodam Jay a/Jakarta), edisi VI, December 1995, p.37. The role of 
ABRI was generally interpreted to be tut wuri handayani during this period, but ABRI saw some programs 
like GDN gave dwifungsi a chance to perform the role of ing ngarsa sung tuladha. Consult Chapter 2 for 
these Javanese concepts.
139 This year's Study Forum members were different from the previous year. However, noted officers 
included Col Rizal Nurdin—who later became Kasdam I/Bukit Barisan and Pangdam in the same Kodam in 
the 1997 July reshuffle—and Lt-Col Syarifudin Tippe who was the best graduate (lulusan terbaik) in the 
Seskoad 1989-90 class and became the Coordinator of Pangab's Personal Staff (Korspri Pangab) under 
Feisal Tanjung. The 1994 edition is Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1993-1994, Edisi 
Kedua, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1994. The articles included issues regarding: Local 
Development and AMD; Implementation of Security Approach; Revitalisation of Nationalism; Orsospol and 
Pancasila Democracy; The Role of Religion as the Unifying Doctrine; and The Relevance of Family 
Principles in Socioeconomic Transformation.
14^  Ibid., pp.231-233. As mentioned above, however, this admission policy was reversed by Hartono when 
he became KSAD in 1995.
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was discussed internally within ABRI and it was perceived as the major turning point 
for ABRI's political management. Here, Seskoad indicated ABRI's possible claim to 
lead the nation after the Soeharto regime. Given the fact that this book was circulated 
within ABRI, it seemed understood that ABRI was preparing for the succession, even if 
this was usually denied in official public comments. Second, Seskoad's distinction 
between dwifungsi and kekaryaan implied that in the post-Soeharto politics—where 
ABRI would lack a strong military leader who could claim his dominant role as the 
national-crisis solver and ABRI would merely become 'one among equals' in the 
political arena—a plausible policy taken by ABRI would be the reduction of kekaryaan 
which was no longer regarded as the essence of dwifungsi in the eyes of the Seskoad 
circle.141 The Seskoad assessment in the second Tantangan project provided some 
important insights concerning dwifungsi in the regime transformation.
In contrast to previous editions, the third edition in 1995 focused on the 
economy, particularly the role of ABRI in developing cooperative associations 
(koperasi).142 This theme also provided new ideas on dwifungsi. As suggested in the Edi 
Paper, koperasi management was seen as one way to overcome the problem of declining 
budgetary allocations for ABRI. However, in the Seskoad thinking, the koperasi 
development was now regarded as an expression of ABRI's increasing role in the 
economic field and it was manifested as the actualisation of the dynamising role 
embodied in the dwifungsi concept. Seskoad insisted that Primkopad, whose 
management had gradually become more professional, effective, and efficient, could 
contribute to the development of other koperasi in ABRI and the KB A, as well as in 
non-ABRI organisations at the local level. By doing so, ABRI's koperasi could strengthen 
the nation-wide small business groups, and would help consolidate the national 
economy in facing the challenge of a free-trade global economy.143 Moreover, it would 
also help prevent exploitation of resources and opportunities by big business groups at 
the expense of small business, which could cause political instability.144 In this way, 
Seskoad's recent initiative to establish new strategic concepts now covered ABRI’s 
dynamising role in the economy, and—in the eyes of Seskoad—it added another virtue 
for dwifungsi in the face of criticism that ABRI disregarded the interests of the people. 
Despite a general feeling that the free-trade economy required international 
competitiveness and would force ABRI to take a back seat in the economic field,
141 We will further analyse the details of kekaryaan discourse in Chapter 6.
142 Tantangan Pembangunan III— Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1994-1995: Strategi Pembangunan Koperasi 
dalam Menghadapi Era Perdagangan Bebas pada Awal Abad ke-21, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 
1995. The promotion of koperasi was a major national policy since 1993.
143 See Imam Maksudi (Kol), "Peran ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sosial Politik Dalam Mempercepat Kemajuan 
Usaha Koperasi," in ibid., pp.239-265. These claims were also aimed at improving ABRI's image in society 
which viewed ABRI as an agent of big business. As seen in the previous chapter, Menhankam Edi Sudradjat 
publicly warned of the danger of becoming a tool of the rich in 1996, reflecting a concern of the third 
Tantangan project.
144 Tantangan Pembangunan III..., pp.266-268.
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Seskoad provided a counter-assessment.145
Finally, the fourth edition of Tantangan series in 1996 focused on the 
democratisation issues—including the role of ABRL146 Seskoad attempted to 
systematise ABRI’s views on democratic prospects in preparing for the formulation of 
GBHN 1998. In the 1996 edition, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, DanSeskoad, first discussed 
the problems of national disharmony.147 Arifin called on the government to be more 
clean and ready to accept criticism from any direction, in order to prepare for the era 
of keterbukaan-democracy.148 He emphasised how globalisation would bring to the 
surface the problem of the current socioeconomic gap between the rich and poor, and 
how it could threaten national cohesion. From this security perspective, Arifin 
anticipated the increase of the number of mass riots and insisted on the need for 
preparing civilian militia (Rakyat Terlatih—Ratih) to support the task of the Police in 
maintaining security and order.149 The Seskoad Commander believed this was 
important to make society understood that 'security and order' were not a matter of 
the preservation of ABRI's dzvifungsi but a very essential common good in society.150 At 
the same time, civilian leaders in the government, he demanded, also needed to 
establish consistent measures for the lessening of the economic gap, without prioritising 
their factional interests in the government.
The article by the DanSeskoad was followed by that of another Major
145 In the light of free-trade economy, there is also a view which emphasises the increasing role of the Police 
(not the army) because of the sophistication of criminal economic activities, such as money-laundering, bank 
corruption, and drug dealing. The former National Police Chief (1991-1993) said that "today, the Police and 
BPK (Supreme Auditorial Board) can hardly check these activities, and they are the real threat for the 
rational economic planning, especially in facing globalisation. Therefore, the Police is now expanding its 
function to create the Cyber-Police." Interview with Police Gen (ret) Kunarto, Deputy Head of BPK, 23 
January 1997.
146 Tantangan Pembangunan— Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996 (Edisi ke-IV): Semangat 
Mempedomani Pancasila dan UUD 1945 Dalam Setiap Gerak dan Langkah Menjamin Adanya Harmonisasi 
Pembangunan Politik Pada Pelita VII, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1996. This edition was the 
result of a seminar held by the Study Forum in May 1996.
147 Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan (AMN 65) also played an important role in the LIPI project we discussed in the 
previous chapter. As mentioned earlier, the LIPI project consisted of two studies—one on dzvifungsi and the 
other on the electoral system—and Arifin was a key ABRI informant who provided input regarding the 
electoral system. His proposals, which opposed the single-seat district system, can be found in Arifin 
Tarigan (Mayjen), "Kajian Tentang Sistem Pemilu," Yudhagama, No.50, Vol.17, July 1996, pp.14-33. We will 
discuss this issue later in Chapter 6. In the July 1997 reshuffle, he was replaced by Brig-Gen Affandi, 
Deputy Commander of Seskoad, and became a member of F-ABRI. In June 1998, he became the Chairman of 
W anhankamnas.
148 See Arifin Tarigan, "Visi Tentang Globalisasi dan Perubahan pada Aspek Poleksosbud Serta 
Pengaruhnya pada Ketahanan Nasional," in Tantangan Pembangunan— Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995- 
1996..., p.49.
149 Ibid., p.53.
150 In November 1998, under the Habibie government, ABRI decided to formulate Ratih in order to 
strengthen security maintenance in preparing for the general election in June 1999. An assistant of Gen 
Wiranto (ABRI Commander) insisted that—apart from the said purpose—civilian participation in security 
maintenance was important to socialise the value of security in the public and, in turn, alleviate social 
criticism of dzvifungsi (interview with a general-ranking officer, October 1998). Seskoad's study in 1996 is 
reflected here.
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General, Tayo Tarmadi, Pangdam m/Siliwangi.151 His argument was highly conceptual 
but supported ABRI's slogan of "memberdayakan masyarakat" (empowering society) as 
dzvifungsi's major aim in future political development. At first, he distinguished 
between super- and infra-structures, insisting on the need for empowering the latter for 
the creation of a viable political system. The dichotomy of superstructure and 
infrastructure can roughly be equated with: the state and society; government and 
people; or the executive and legislative bodies. It was argued that since the early 
1990s, Indonesia had faced political issues such as keterbukaan, democratisation, 
human rights and civil society which were all new for the political system. The new 
trends were accompanied by limited social participation and bureaucratic dominance 
in the political system. It was against this background that the civil society issue 
emerged, involving the promotion of the bargaining position of society vis-a-vis the 
state and government.152 Although he pointed to the potential danger of a weak 
superstructure and a too-strong infrastructure, he insisted on the need for empowering 
the infrastructure, considering the current situation. In the future dzvifungsi should be 
aimed to encourage this process, he concluded. The super- and infrastructures were 
further conceptualised by Lt-Col Ade Djamhuri, Chief of Information in Kodam III, 
who emphasised the importance of improving mutual communication between the two 
structures in order to maintain harmony and equilibrium in their interactions.153
Overall, Arifin provided Seskoad's assessment regarding the political threats 
in the coming decades, whereas both Tayo and Ade attempted to formulate a new 
framework for assessing current political distortions by employing the state-society 
approach.154 The Tantangan project—which Seskoad hoped would rejuvenate its 
prestige as a dapur pemikiran as envisaged by Edi and Wismoyo in the first edition— 
was successful in the sense that it institutionalised the army’s internal discussion about 
future political problems and dzvifungsi's response to them. As seen in the previous 
chapter, the ABRI leadership under Feisal and Hartono had become dogmatic in its 
responses to the growing social criticism during this period, but Seskoad’s Study 
Forum, which consisted of a small intellectual circle, seemed to envisage the practical 
need for adjusting dzvifungsi in the changing society without resorting to the dogmatism
151 Tayo Tarmadi, "Pembangunan Politik, Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Masa Depan Pembangunan," in 
Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996..., pp.57-70. In the July 1997 reshuffle, 
Tayo (Akabri 71)—like Arifin—was transferred to F-ABRI.
152 Ibid., pp.62-66.
153 See Ade Djamhuri (Letkol), "Komunikasi Politik Antar Infra dan Suprastruktur Politik untuk 
Memelihara Stabilitas Keamanan yang Mantap dan Dinamis," in Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika 
Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996..., pp.199-227. Ade, who worked under Tayo's Siliwangi Command, is an 
Akabri classmate of Bambang Yudhoyono and is a holder of an MA from UI.
154 Before the state-society approach, ABRI writings tended to employ a systems approach which blurred 
the aspect of power relations in real politics. According to Brig-Gen (ret) Soedibyo, a senior researcher at 
Rudini's LPSI, early writings of New Order ABRI were strongly influenced by Karl Deutsch, who had 
contributed to the development of the systems approach in political science and international relations 
since the early 1960s. Interview, 22 July 1996.
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adopted by the ABRI leadership. The Army Seminar at Seskoad in 1996—which was 
held amidst the deepening of government intervention in Megawati's PDI—further 
reflected such postures shared among these officers who were involved in the designing 
of ABRI's 'long-term' political interests.
The 1996 Army Seminar: Designing Dwifungsi for Democratisation
For ABRI, the 1996 Army Seminar was significant in two ways. First, it was 
the first army seminar totally managed by the academy-generation officers to prepare 
for the army's inputs to a GBHN. Menhankam Edi Sudradjat, Pangab Feisal Tanjung, 
and KSAD Flartono were all AMN graduates whereas the seminar's working 
committees were largely led by Akabri graduates, or the New Order-generation officers 
who entered the academy after the army took power under the New Order.155 Second, 
as retired General Soemitro put it, "this seminar, like it or not, needed to calculate a 
possible scenario of presidential succession and this factor might influence ABRI's 
medium-term political stance, provided that ABRI already knows its role will change 
positively after Soeharto."156 Though the succession issue was still uncertain at that 
time, Soemitro's assessment was plausible in the sense that the seminar was primarily 
intended to formulate ABRI's medium-term political vision which would be included in 
the 1998 GBHN. Thus it was not strange for the 'professional' military group to 
anticipate the national leadership change, take into account its impact and determine 
ABRI's place in relation to other political forces. We now examine the result of the 
army seminar—which was the final one in the New Order—and the ways in which 
such aspects were reflected in it.
The seminar was held on June 18-19, on the theme "Perspectives on the 
Construction and Development of the Political Arena for the Seventh Five-Year 
Development Plan."157 The seminar produced three documents which would become 
the army's inputs to the subsequent ABRI Seminar in September and to the GBHN
155 AMN graduates were those who finished the 3-year course at the military academy (AMN) during 
1961-1968. In 1969, the course was extended to 4 years and AMN was renamed as Akabri. Thus, Akabri 
graduates were those who entered the academy after the army became the dominant power in 1966 and 
graduated after 1970. In our discussion, I often call them the New Order generation officers, or third- 
generation officers. The second-generation officers are AMN graduates who entered the academy during the 
Sukarno period, and followed the 1945 Generation.
156 Interview with Gen (ret) Soemitro, 23 July 1996.
157 The seminar's Steering Team was headed by Brig-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono, Kasdam Jaya; the 
Discussion Team was led by Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to 
Pangab (Waasrenum Pangab). The material preparation was under the responsibility of Maj-Gen Adang 
Ruchiatna, Dan Pusterad (Commander of Army Territorial Centre) whose leadership in East Timor as 
Pangdam IX/Udayana had boosted his reputation within ABRI as a professional territorial manager. All 
of them worked under the Chief Organiser, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan. Bambang and Agus were also the 
moderators of seminar discussions which had four speakers; Rudini, Juwono Sudarsono, Sayidiman, and 
Gen (ret) Awaludin Djamin.
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1998-2003. The first document, the core paper, contained the army's political 
guidelines for the period 1998-2003, while the second described the major differences 
with the GBHN 1993, and the last explained the background of formulating the army 
thinking presented in the first document.158 The central statement was that ABRI 
should play the role of improving the communication between political superstructure 
and infrastructure—a framework of reference adopted by Seskoad's internal 
discussion which we discussed above. It was assessed that, in order to respond to the 
complex challenge of globalisation, the improvement of communication between the 
two sides—which could be equated with state and society, or government and 
people—would be crucial as a way to avoid mutual misunderstanding and 
antagonism. ABRI thus does not seem to have identified with the state or government 
but saw itself as standing between state and society. Based on this core assumption, 
the seminar raised three issues: problems currently existing on both sides; the need to 
encourage the role of the masyarakat menengah (middle society), a concept newly 
introduced to define the group of people situated between political elites and political 
mass; and ABRI’s role. We examine them one by one.
The political superstructure—which could be viewed as a euphemism for the 
government—was criticised in various ways. The seminar evaluated the state 
apparatus as inconsistent in policies, lacking discipline, corrupted, feudalistic, egoistic 
and nepotistic.159 Moreover, the documents criticised the intervention of the executive 
branch in the problems of the infrastructure and, in order to empower the latter, called 
on the former to reduce its dominance through open-democratic communication.160 In 
this light, the seminar stated that the recent governmental interventions in Golkar and 
the two political parties had been too explicit, suggesting that it use opaque methods 
(jangan terlalu transparen)—if it really had to (terpaksa) intervene—in order to avoid 
cultivating negative social feelings.161
Criticism was also directed at the Department of Information (Deppen).
158 The three documents were: Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII 
(Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; Bahan Perbandingan 
GBHN 1993 Dengan Konsep GBHN 1998 Bidang Politik (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 
1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; and Suplemen Substansi Materi Dalam Perspektif Pembangunan dan 
Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, 
Mabes ABRI, 1996. Each document was also presented in summary version, thus there were six documents 
in all. They were brought to the ABRI Seminar in September to finally formulate the thinking of ABRI as a 
whole.
159 See Perspektif..., pp.50-52; Suplemen..., p.38. The summary version of Perspktif also referred to a 
tendency of power arrogance (arogansi kekuasan) in the superstructure, which resulted in the erosion of 
trust in national leaders. Interestingly, this point was not mentioned in the complete version of Perspektif, 
implying that the summary version (Narasi) was not a mere summary of the full text.
160 Perspektif..., p.18.
161 Suplemen..., p .ll. As seen in the previous chapter, there was a government-engineered PDI conference in 
Medan—which dismissed Megawati as the party chairperson—one day after this army seminar. 
Considering the timing, the seminar seemed to express the concern about the negative political impact of the 
government's attempt to overthrow Megawati.
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Mentioning the banning of three magazines in 1994, the seminar claimed that "because 
the current SIUPP system was handled by one organisation, it established the 
dominance of that organisation, and such a condition has diminished objectivity." 
Thus it was recommended that an impartial institution handle press cases.162 
Regarding the press, the seminar also asserted that because the bureaucracy had given 
"bland information" (komunikasi dingin) to the press, journalists were motivated to 
expose "off-the-record" comments; thus the government was criticised here rather than 
the press.163 Needless to say, the initial target of criticism was Harmoko who—as the 
Minister of Information—had withdrawn the printing permits of the three magazines, 
but the claim also confirmed the existence of dissatisfaction within ABRI concerning 
the handling of the 1994 event which was originally caused by the conflict between 
ABRI and Habibie regarding the procurement of German warships, as we discussed in 
the previous chapter. That such an assessment was officially adopted in the seminar 
documents was a significant sign that the army's concept-makers viewed critically the 
distortions caused by some of Soeharto's political decisions.
Moreover, regarding the growing international pressures on Indonesia over the 
issues of democratisation, human rights, and the East Timor problems, the seminar 
acknowledged that there was a gap between the ideal and practice; in other words, 
between the ideal of an active-independent foreign policy and the practical national 
interest. Using the case of the Dili incident, the seminar questioned the attitude of the 
government which bent the ideal for practical reasons, especially in order to obtain 
foreign economic investment and aid.164 ABRI's dissatisfaction with the government 
handling of the Dili case was formally expressed in this way. It also implied that many 
officers believed that ABRI had been humiliated by the Dili solution—in which ten 
soldiers were sentenced—and it was the government, or more precisely Soeharto, who 
had encouraged the process.
Finally, the seminar claimed that it was mainly due to the expanding number 
of civil servants that the problems of corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and 
arrogance of power never seemed to disappear both at the national and local levels.165 
As the number increased, their salaries decreased, and their work incentives and 
professionalism declined, the seminar insisted. In this regard, it was strongly suggested 
that the government adopt a "zero growth" policy, and that it should promote quality
162 Ibid., p.28.
163 This reference is from the Narasi version of Perspektif, p.16.
164 Suplemen..., pp.14-15.
165 Ibid., pp.36-40. It was claimed that among 4.5 million civil servants, nearly 2 million were teachers who 
belonged to educational institutions controlled by the Department of Education and Culture (Depdikbud). 
According to official statistics, the number of civil servants was 3.9 million in 1994 and 4 million in 1995. 
See Statistik Indonesia 1995, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1996, p.67. The seminar claimed 4.5 million in 1996 but the 
official data for 1995 was just published in September 1996; thus the official account of 1996 could not be 
checked at the time of the seminar.
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through training and education.166 This suggestion again touched on an aspect of 
Soeharto's political management since the early days of the New Order. As many 
previous studies have shown, Soeharto has controlled political participation channels 
and ensured Golkar's victory in general elections by forcing civil servants to join the 
Golkar-affiliated Korpri (civil servants' corporative) under the slogan of monoloyalitas 
(mono-loyalty). Therefore, the increasing number of civil servants was partly a by­
product of this corporatist interest-representation mechanism. The seminar's 
suggestion implied that the army now saw the risks of maintaining this system as 
outweighing benefits. It was a signal which hinted at a demand for the revision of the 
New Order political framework.
Linked with this, the seminar pointed out that the political representation 
system—namely legislative and electoral mechanisms—was not properly functioning, 
causing several problems in the political infrastructure. Two tendencies were 
mentioned here. On the one hand, the DPR was seen by society as incapable of 
representing the aspirations of the people in law making.167 On the other hand, the rise 
of NGOs and new social groups such as KIPP and PUDI was explained as a reflection 
of social dissatisfaction with the current representation system which was seen as 
having existed for the sake of political parties rather than for the people.168 The poor 
reputation of political parties was criticised as the cause of people seeking extra­
system channels to present their political aspirations. Given this assessment, it was 
argued that the vital task of ABRI would be to empower these components within the 
formal political infrastructure in order to absorb the complex demands of society in 
facing the global phenomena of democratisation and keterbukaan.
The army seminar therefore attempted to locate the primary role of ABRI as 
the dynamiser to facilitate the interaction between the political superstructure and 
infrastructure. Here, a new concept of masyarakat menengah was introduced. It was 
defined as "the group of people who have influential roles in society and give advice to 
policy-makers; for example, high-ranking bureaucrats, big business circles, the 
industrial world, bankers, leaders in various interest groups, and consultants."169 They 
were expected to have the ability to analyse government policies and support national 
development from the bottom as opinion-makers in society and as the bridge between 
the Elite Politik (political elites) and Masyarakat Bawah (lower or mass society) whose 
mutual communication was not always good.170 It was suggested that in order to
166 Perspektif..., p.42; Suplemen..., p.40. KIPP—the Independent Election Monitoring Group—was 
established in March 1996 by former Tempo editor, Goenawan Mohammed, to watch out for possible 
manipulation of electoral procedures by government officials in the coming general elections in 1997. PUDI 
was a newly formed unofficial political party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a vocal Muslim 
parliamentarian who was expelled from parliament.
167 Suplemen..., p.8.
168 Perspektif..., pp .ll, 20.
169 Suplemen..., p.4.
170 Ibid., pp.4-5. It is not clear whether the middle society is identical to the middle-class in the seminar
109
Chapter 3
promote democracy, the Masyarakat Menengah could play a bridging role, and ABRI's 
sociopolitical role was defined as to encourage the formation of such a "middle- 
society." Therefore, dwifungsi's dynamising role would be highlighted here.171 The 
seminar argued that this was the point which was not mentioned in GBHN 1993 but 
should be adopted in GBHN 1998. It was suggested that "it [GBHN 1998] needs to 
present ABRI's new policy of promoting its sociopolitical function in order to realise 
democratic society and middle-class society (masyarakat klas menengah) which will 
play active and constructive roles in political development."172
In sum, the army seminar in 1996 clarified ABRI's dwifungsi design with three 
conceptual pillars: ABRI would bridge two structures in politics; ABRI as dynamiser 
supports the rise of the "middle-society;" and ABRI would promote its sociopolitical 
function.
Having examined the seminar results, we can detect ABRI's critical stance to 
the political conduct of the current government, although it was expressed in very 
conceptual terms. However, the seminar also revealed the gap in civil-military 
discourse during this period. At least the following three aspects were apparent. First, 
military and civilian perceptions differed in defining the components of the political 
infrastructure, especially the place of Golkar. Golkar was defined in the ABRI view as 
the major player in the infrastructure but it was widely seen in society as a tool of the 
state, therefore a part of the superstructure. In this regard, the seminar's slogan of 
"empowering the infrastructure" could be interpreted by critical civilians as ABRI's 
attempt to empower a tool of the state—making the slogan tautological. For them, the 
same logic applied to the position of ABRI itself.
Second, some of the political phenomena such as NGOs, KIPP and PUDI were 
recognised in the seminar as a consequence of the malfunctioning infrastructure. 
However, it could be argued—perhaps more convincingly—that these phenomena 
arose in response to problems in the state authority, or superstructure, thus 
undermining ABRI’s unilateral blaming of the political infrastructure.173
documents. From the above context, it may be vaguely described as a group of people in the middle and upper 
classes who have influential roles in political society.
171 Ibid., pp.5-6.
172 Bahan..., p.l, 11. Here, the term middle-class was used, instead of middle society, thus indicating that 
ABRI supports both middle-class and middle-society.
173 According to a telephone poll conducted by Kompas, nearly 50 percent of 928 "middle-class" respondents 
in Jakarta supported the group. See "Hasil 'Polling' Mengenai KIPP: Sekitar 50 Persen Mendukung,” Kompas, 
27 March 1996. On the other hand, ABRI's territorial staff produced its report on KIPP, suggesting that it 
was unconstitutional but hard to ban because of the possible attack from foreign countries which would 
brand Indonesia's election as unjust. The report instead ordered the territorial apparatus to carefully 
observe KIPP's activities and report them to ABRI Headquarters. See Staf Teritorial ABRI, Tinjauan 
Teritorial, No. Triwulan II, 1996/1997, pp.10-11. One of the NGOs, PRD, openly declared anti- 
"superstructure" slogans: abolition of dwifungsi and the five political laws of 1985 (Siaran Pers PRD, 
No.40/c/Sta/PRD/VII/1996). PUDI in its greeting card for the Islamic holiday in 1997, listed its agenda: 
boycott the election in 1997; boycott nominating Soeharto for the next President; prepare for the new order 
after Soeharto in 1998. Sri Bintang was soon arrested on the charge of insulting the President.
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Finally, in searching for a legitimate conceptual place for dwifungsi in the 
growing demands for political openness, ABRI found it unavoidable to refer to 
democratisation and, in effect, attempted to incorporate the middle-class/society in 
its doctrinal scope. Though it was possible for ABRI to claim that dwifungsi would 
encourage the rising middle-class, the fact that ABRI's security preoccupation had 
always been aimed at compressing the interests of the middle-class—for example, free 
press and free speech—further confirmed the existing gap between concept and 
practice, leading to public scepticism about ABRI's language of political discourse.
Turning back to ABRI’s dwifungsi interpretation, we can see that the 1996 
army seminar determined to locate ABRI in the middle of the state and society. This 
might be the answer to our earlier question about the extent to which ABRI 
synchronised its corporate interests with Soeharto’s political blueprint. The seminar 
leaders’ criticism of the Soeharto-led government's projects showed that although ABRI 
was hardly independent from Soeharto, who was after all its Supreme Commander, 
this did not mean that there was no independent thinking in ABRI concerning its 
corporate interests.
Apart from this, we could also conclude that the seminar completed its 
formulation of a new conceptual link between dwifungsi and democratisation. A 
notable feature of the new interpretation adopted in the seminar was its dichotomous 
structural perspective. This could not be seen in the previous arguments based on 
stability-alarmism, the uncoupling of kekaryaan from dwifungsi, professionalism, 
discipline, and SDM, which were all oriented toward policy perspectives. Now ABRI 
invented an interpretation to bring all these perspectives into a total picture of political 
reform in the New Order, with the resulting emphasis of dwifungsi's dynamising role. In 
doing so, the use of the dual-structure in depicting the country's political system was 
quite effective. Employing vague terms—infrastructure and superstructure—helped 
ABRI both to argue about the need for broader political participation and criticise the 
misconduct of the government. For ABRI, these postures could be justified in the name 
of promoting mutual communication which was believed to be needed in the era of 
globalisation. It was in this framework that the seminar decided to criticise Harmoko's 
SIUPP management, the overstreched bureaucracy, the rubber-stamping DPR, nation­
wide corruption and the arrogance of governmental power. In the eyes of the army's 
concept makers, it was hoped that these claims would counter ABRI’s popular image 
as the alat mati pemerintah (dead tool of the government).
As if reflecting the new approach adopted by the seminar, ABRI's internet 
homepage (ABRI-NET) circulated an article written by Lt-Col Herman Ibrahim, the 
head of the information section in the Siliwangi Division, with the title "Empowering 
Society Through the Implementation of Dwifungsi.”174 The article endorsed what we
174 Herman Ibrahim, "Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Melalui Implementasi Dwifungsi ABRI yang Antisipatif
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discussed above, insisting that dwifungsi would be the bridge between government 
policies and social demands. Having emphasised this consensus, however, he argued 
that ABRI should push the government not to side too much with big capitalists. By- 
mentioning the example of the Marcos regime in the Philippines which he saw had 
collapsed due to corruption and hypocrisy, the article insisted that ABRI officers 
should learn from such history, thus indirectly identifying Soeharto with Marcos. 
Moreover, regarding the increasing mass riots (including one at Situbondo) in 1996- 
1997, he asserted that "the optimisation of the role of legislative bodies is significant 
both in order to restrain mass movements and anarchic situations such as the July 27 
incident and the Situbondo riot, so that ABRI is not always made the fire brigade."175
Herman's assessment was to some extent shared by other Seskoad-linked 
officers. It was directly argued that "the current dwifungsi under Pak Harto (Soeharto) 
is not independent, compared with the Bung Kamo (Sukarno) era, but after this regime, 
dwifungsi will become more autonomous and based on UUD45."176 All this illustrated 
that dwifungsi's new slogan, "empowering the political infrastructure," was at least 
perceived by some ABRI officers as a way to make dwifungsi practice more 
independent under the current regime which had widely been described in society as 
the Soeharto empire.
Conclusion
We can now summarise the development of ABRI's dwifungsi interpretation 
since 1966. Our arguments in this chapter showed that there were broadly six stages 
until 1997. First, between 1966 and 1969, ABRI endeavoured to consolidate its basic 
doctrinal design for the launching of the New Order regime, led by Gen Soeharto. The 
primary goal of doctrinal formulation was the management of political stability and 
the standardisation of modes of political involvement. Pro-Sukamo and PKI-affiliated 
elements within ABRI were purged, the new TUC was formulated, kekaryaan was 
intensified, and ABRI seats in the parliament were secured. Building on its historical 
legitimacy arising from its role in the national revolution, ABRI's political domination 
was explained as the need to restore the political order destroyed by the coup attempt
dan Sesuai dengan Tuntutan Zaman," ABRI-Net, available http: chttp://www.abri.mil.id/index5/>, 1997.
175 Emphasis added. It is still hard to judge whether he is just warning of such a possibility or describing 
the current reality. However, since he uses the term "always," we could assess that his warning includes the 
latter too. Also the phrase "ABRI is not always made..." seems to have a connotation that ABRI was 
"pushed" to be the fire brigade, implying a perception within ABRI that the failure of the government's 
political management had forced ABRI to take costly actions. The term fire brigade here indicated a less- 
independent security tool of the government, a role which ABRI had rejected. Brig-Gen Agus 
Wirahadikusumah, who was involved in the maintenance of ABRI-Net, evaluated Herman's article as one 
of the best writings on dwifungsi he had recently read (Interview, 24 January 1997).
176 Confidential interview with a general-ranking officer, January 1997.
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in 1965 and its stability programs promised future economic well-being.
Second, after experiencing the first election in 1971, ABRI faced growing 
criticism of kekaryaan in society. Although "1945 values" as the ideal of dzuifungsi were 
symbolically asserted at the third army seminar in 1972 to emphasise the continuity of 
dzuifungsi's values, the Doctrine of Sociopolitical Operations (Doktrin Operasi Sosial 
Politik) in 1977 officially moved on to deal with the negative image of kekaryaan by 
placing KBA in the front line of the kekaryaan policy. This aimed to emphasise indirect 
intervention measures in order to counterbalance the growing criticism of dzuifungsi. 
Also through the debate with outspoken retired officers, ABRI seemingly established 
the conceptual distinction between dzuifungsi and kekaryaan at the end of 1970s, as 
officially adopted in the 1978 kekaryaan doctrine.
Third, after 1980, following the critical debate in previous years, ABRI started 
to re-emphasis its unity with the people, under the doctrine of Kemanunggalan ABRI- 
Rakyat, while at the same time it completed the legalisation of dzuifungsi in the Law 
No.20/1982. Then the first comprehensive guidebook was prepared to systematically 
explain the various legitimacy bases of dzuifungsi—namely historical, philosophical, 
legal, cultural, geostrategic, and national defence. The diffusion of legitimacy 
arguments was expected to counter any type of dzuifungsi criticism.
The above process could be assessed as the construction phase. After this, 
ABRI seemed to enter the adjustment phase. First, in the mid-1980s, ABRI faced a 
major structural change, both in terms of personnel and organisation. Regeneration of 
the officer corps inevitably led to the loss of dzuifungsi's historical legitimacy, thus 
raising the question of dz u i f ungs i 's future relevance, while the 
reorganisation/rationalisation of ABRI required the explanation of its new institutional 
orientation. To meet these two demands, the professionalism movement was launched 
and it was soon built into the concept of dzuifungsi as a means of strengthening 
legitimacy. A widely proliferated interpretation argued that ABRI would be a 
professional organisation in order to effectively conduct the missions expected by 
society. The key was that these missions included the sociopolitical aspect. The 
concept of professionalism was infused in the dzuifungsi language in order to claim that 
with professionalism, ABRI could better manage dzuifungsi—an interpretation which 
uncoupled dzuifungsi from historical legitimation.
Second, after the successful inclusion of professionalism in official dzuifungsi 
interpretation, ABRI found that social policies themselves could be the source of 
dzuifungsi legitimation, as seen in the cases of the national discipline movement and 
SDM improvement. Although such ideas were based on an assumption that ABRI had 
ability to strengthen discipline and SDM, they involved an interesting development in 
terms of dzuifungsi's goals and means. The New Order ABRI—since the early days— 
had insisted that political stability and national development were the goals and 
rationales of dzuifungsi. With this logic, ABRI's involvement in social policies was
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stressed as the means to achieve these goals and to legitimise the virtue of dwifungsi. 
Now, we saw a new tendency in that the means itself was transformed to be the 
source of dwifungsi legitimation. This assessment was formalised in the doctrine of 
Hankamneg 1991. It however reflected the erosion of dwifungsi's original scheme for 
justification.
Finally, in the early 1990s, a group within ABRI started an internal revision 
program under the code name of back-to-basics. This implied that ABRI's institutional 
interests were not necessarily identical with the recent political projects of Soeharto. 
Our examination of ABRI's internal documents concretely confirmed this point which 
was previously only known through the personal comments of officers. Furthermore, 
the New Order-generation officers began to be posted to the leadership positions 
within ABRI, and it was they who needed to establish a viable interpretation of 
dwifungsi legitimation in response to the incremental demands for political 
liberalisation. Such a threat perception wTas reflected in the series of Seskoad studies 
which produced some of the fundamentals of the new interpretation applied in the 
1996 army seminar. In the eyes of army intellectuals, the dwifungsi interpretation was 
now reshaped to incorporate a theory of political change toward democratisation. It 
was a fact that since the early days ABRI had insisted on dwifungsi's support for 
’democracy,' but it took more than three decades for ABRI to formally locate dwifungsi 
in a perceived scenario of 'democratisation.'
It should, however, be noted that the doctrinal reinterpretation of dwifungsi in 
the face of growing social pressures for political democratisation was the product of 
army concept-makers, especially those who had been associated with the education 
sector within ABRI. Their perspective did not necessarily lead ABRI's political role 
since it was, to large extent, controlled by the President via his loyalist officers in the 
political, combat and territorial sectors. Nevertheless, the ways in which ABRI's 
doctrinal managers had attempted to adapt the dwifungsi legitimacy to the changing 
social-political environment should be clarified from the historical perspective in order 
to understand why ABRI—as an institution—thought dwifungsi, or military 
involvement in non-military affairs, was eternally relevant in Indonesia. We have 
examined how various sources of legitimation had been invented and mobilised in 
order to establish a network of dwifungsi legitimacy for the countering of criticism from 
any direction. The internal adaptation of dwifungsi doctrine—which had fortified 
ABRI’s role-belief under the New Order—however showed how it had become a 
laborious everyday effort to seek the rationale of dwifungsi even 30 years after its 
launching.
**********
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Chapter 4
Confronting a New Political Paradigm: 
Human Rights Accountability
In the last two chapters, we have discussed the politics of the evolving 
dzvifungsi debate and ABRI's internal adaptation of dwifungsi doctrines. We argued 
how the eroding Soeharto-ABRI cohesion since the end of 1980s had provided a space 
for open public criticism of dwifungsi and how ABRI's concept-makers had responded 
by adjusting their interpretation of dwifungsi legitimacy. Now our focus is shifted to 
the policy-institutional aspects of the changing civil-military relations by examining the 
issue of ABRI’s human-rights abuses. In what ways had the military's internal security 
operations been conducted during the late New Order? How had social forces and 
new institutional arrangements attempted to regulate military behaviour? How had 
ABRI responded to these challenges? Since dwifungsi's core legitimation is the 
maintenance of political stability, the issue of repression is easily seen as an excess of 
dwifungsi which most directly undermines the credibility of ABRI's role in the regime. In 
what ways had ABRI’s human-rights abuses shaped the direction of dwifungsi debate 
and how had the military officers perceived human-rights issues under the Soeharto 
polity? Examining these questions are the aims of this chapter.
We first investigate the issue of the shooting of civilians and the way in which 
the so-called "security approach" was debated both in society and ABRI. Second, we 
look at the major institutional development related to human rights—i.e. the 
establishment of Komnas HAM—and analyse its impact on ABRI's political stance. 
Third, some human rights projects introduced within ABRI are examined in order to 
assess the way in which ABRI had coped with the new political paradigm and the 
extent to which such pressure was diffused in the military's organisational thinking. 
Throughout the chapter, we attempt to clarify how ABRI's internal security policies 
had been challenged in the late New Order by the growing demand for political 
democratisation, and how ABRI's defensive postures were adopted. In the next 
chapter, however, we turn to the offensive side of ABRI's response to the problem.
Shooting Civilians and the Security Approach
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The shooting of civilians constitutes the first major focus of this chapter for the 
following reasons. First, such shooting not only represents ABRI's "military face" in the 
most visible way but also directly reinforces ABRI's social image as a force supporting 
the status quo, despite its attempt to present itself as a democratic dynamiser. 
Second, this issue falls into an area where the demarcation between dzvifungsi's security 
and political functions are hardly distinguishable. ABRI is inclined to say that such 
shooting has nothing to do with dzuifungsi, since it is a security problem, but civilians 
bring up the issue of dzuifungsi to criticise ABRI’s harsh conduct. For ABRI, it is the 
main area where the practice of dzvifungsi's first function (hankam) is criticised. Third, 
compared with ABRI's policies such as kekaryaan and support for Golkar, which have 
long been debated since the early New Order period, the civilian-shooting issue has 
recently entered into popular debate about so-called "security vs. prosperity" 
approaches, particularly since the late 1980s. Given these issues, we attempt to clarify 
the development of ABRI's response to the problem of shooting civilians, and the ways 
in which the issue constituted a civil-military struggle in the light of political 
democratisation. Based on this assessment, this section first looks at the genesis of the 
security approach debate, and then at four cases of the shooting—namely Lampung 
(1989), Dili (1991), Haur Koneng (1993) and Nipah (1993)—which took place before 
the launching of Komnas HAM in 1993.
Since the early days of the New Order, social criticism of excessive security 
conduct had of course existed. Before the keterbukaan movement, however, social 
demands for investigation and accountability were generally repressed. As seen in 
Chapter 2, there was no official investigation into the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, 
in which many believed that hundreds of Muslim demonstrators were shot to death by 
security forces although the official estimate was only dozens. The demand for 
investigations of military shooting of civilians did not become an established theme for 
open public discussion until the late 1980s, thanks largely to ABRI's efforts to 
suppress the rise of this sensitive issue and the unwillingness of high-ranking officers to 
participate in such a public debate.1 As we have seen earlier, the emergence of 
keterbukaan and the accompanying dzuifungsi debate significantly contributed to the 
opening up of previous taboo issues linked with ABRI. In particular, Soeharto's 
decision to scrap Kopkamtib in 1988 encouraged society to legitimately debate ABRI's 
repressive measures—including its shooting of civilians—in the public sphere.
Kopkamtib was officially dismantled by the Presidential Instruction (Kepres) 
No.29/1988 issued on 5 September and actually implemented in November. The 
Instruction did not make clear why the organisation was abolished at this particular
1 For example, Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani argued that the recent escalation of debate on the "ABRI problem" 
was encouraged by the tendency of current officers to speak too much. He said, during his period as Pangab 
and Menhankam, ABRI was not interested in responding to each criticism. Interview, 4 March 1997.
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time but only stated vaguely that "there was a necessity to maintain national stability 
in a proper way to reflect the level of social development."2 The former Kopkamtib 
Commander, Gen (ret) Soemitro, interpreted the Kepres' vague explanation as an 
attempt by Soeharto to remove an unnecessary political apparatus in the face of 
growing demands to speed up economic growth—which in effect diminished the long­
time priority given to security—and to open up the political system.3 From a political 
perspective, however, it was widely believed that the liquidation of Kopkamtib was 
primarily intended to diminish the power of General Benny Moerdani who had 
dominated the body since 1983. As seen earlier, the abolition of Kopkamtib was also 
viewed as an attempt by the Presidential Palace to counter ABRPs growing 
disenchantment with Soeharto, which was revealed when F-ABRI’s Maj-Gen Ibrahim 
Saleh openly disagreed with the nomination of Golkar Chairman, Sudharmono, as vice- 
president at the MPR session in March 1988.4
In facing mixed reactions from society which welcomed the decision but also 
doubted its impact due to its replacement with the new security agency, Bakorstanas, 
Soeharto emphasised that it was time to replace the security approach with the 
"prosperity approach" (pendekatan kesejahteraan) in the country's political life.5
Kopkamtib was originally established by Soeharto to restore security and order 
immediately after the coup attempt in September 1965, but the mission was soon 
expanded by a Presidential Decision in December to include the restoration of the 
authority and integrity of the government through military and non-military operations. 
Then in 1969, having crushed the PKI, Soeharto broadened the definition of 
Kopkamtib's task "to surmount other extreme and subversive activities in order to 
safeguard Pancasila and UUD45."6 It was through Kopkamtib that the regime arrested 
and detained those which it considered as "subversives" such as students, journalists, 
Muslim leaders, and even dissident military officers. According to Gen (ret) Daryatmo, 
former Chief of Staff for Karyawan Affairs (Kaskar) in 1970s and later the Speaker of 
the DPR, "the name of Kopkamtib had terrified society; the people became feverish 
even just hearing the name."7 The dissolution of this military agency inevitably raised a
2 See presidential consideration "c" (menimbang c) in Keputusan President Republik Indonesia No.29 Tahun 
1988 Tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional.
3 See "Sumitro: Gagasan Untuk Hapus Kopkamtib Sudah Lama," Kompas, 13 September 1989.
4 Also a few days before the Golkar Congress in October 1988, Kopkamtib had announced that a head of a 
Golkar branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting 
Sudharmono's management of Golkar. This ideological project of ABRI is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
5 "Prosperity, Bukan Security," Tempo, 19 November 1988. Bakorstanas relies on the civilian and military 
regular staffs in Kodams, BAKIN and BAIS, and is nominally a civilian advisory body to the President. 
However, its operational chain of command is linked with the army’s territorial system and each Kodam 
Commander heads Bakorstanas' regional body (Bakorstanasda). Thus, the disbanding of Kopkamtib in 
effect reinforced the power of the ten Kodam Commanders.
6 "Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.19/1969," articles 1-2. Based on the expanded role, 
Kopkamtib conducted covert action in sociopolitical fields.
7 "Fungsi Kopkamtib Sebaiknya Ditentukan oleh Pendirinya," Suara Pembaruan, 21 March 1989.
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question of ABRTs future political stance, and Soeharto's remark about the security- 
prosperity 'dichotomy' provided momentum to intensify public debate on this issue.8
In the ABRI newspaper, Lt-Col Syarwan Hamid wrote a lengthy article in 1989 
in which he argued that ABRTs sociopolitical role was not oriented to the use of force 
but to persuasion, emphasising the image that ABRI's stance was in line with 
Soeharto’s recent rejection of the security approach.9 However, the message was 
received with scepticism by society as it appeared only a week after military 
operations which revealed ABRI's continuing harsh handling of security problems.
In the so-called Lampung incident, ABRI troops attacked an alleged militant 
Islamic sect and killed 27 civilians, according to the official account. The operation 
was conducted by Col Hendropriyono, the Commander of Korem 043 in Lampung, 
South Sumatra, against a group called Mujahidin Fisabilillah on 7 January 1989. 
Hendropriyono commented that "they screamed 'Allah is great’ and it was really 
painful for me as a Muslim, so we also called 'Allah is great' during the operation"10 
This comment conjured up the image of sectarian Islam as a threat to national stability, 
and seemed intended to justify ABRI's attack which killed unarmed villagers. Since the 
incident happened a few months after the formal liquidation of Kopkamtib in 
November, the military leadership under Moerdani (Menhankam) and Try Sutrisno 
(Pangab) may have been creating an impression that Islamic extremism might re-emerge 
with the end of Kopkamtib. However, Soeharto attempted to mollify this concern by 
insisting that "the activity of a small group should not harm the name of Islam in which 
a large number of Indonesians believe."* 11 It soon became clear that the core of the 
problem was the government's transmigration policy and land disputes, especially 
from November 1988 when the local government started to bum the houses of villagers 
who had ignored an agreement with the government to move off the land. By January 
1989, almost a thousand houses had been burnt or tom down to make way for a 
government plan to use the land for a development project.12 Despite the outburst of
8 As if to emphasise the reduced reliance on the security approach, Soeharto then decided to abolish East 
Timor's status as a "special territory" and open up the region for foreign visitors while providing easier 
access to Indonesians in January 1989.
9 "TNI-AD Dengan Fungsi Sospolnya Tak Mengenal Pendekatan Kekerasan," Angkatan Bersenjata, 13 
January 1989.
10 "Sebuah Letupan di Lampung Tengah," Tempo, 18 February 1989.
11 Ibid..
12 See "Islam's Hidden Warriors," FEER, 23 February 1989; "Lampung villagers’ Home Burnt," Tapol, 
February 1989. It was said that the actual death toll was more than a hundred. Similar cases emerged in 
other areas, for example in Central Java where the government-World Bank project to construct the Kedung 
Ombo dam was launched in January 1989. In the process, peasants were forced to move. It was said that 
Korem and BAKIN threatened to put ex-prisoner's (ET) stamps on the residential cards (KTP) of those who 
resisted and even to carry out extra-judicial killing in the night. See ELSAM, Revealing Tortures by Public 
Officers, Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996, pp.89-97. The background of these incidents in recent years was the 
increasing demands for land to further accelerate economic development projects, which coincided with (1) 
the lack of legal system to clarify land possession, (2) inadequate compensation for the local people asked to 
move, and (3) the authority's forceful (rather than persuasive) approach to the local people.
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student demonstrations against the military shooting in Lampung, the government 
showed no intension to further investigate the case.
Two years later, however, another shooting incident occurred. Dili, the capital 
of East Timor, attracted international attention on 12 November 1991 when ABRI 
troops opened fire on two thousands marchers who were commemorating the killing of 
a pro-independence activist. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ABRI officers in general 
claimed that the troops fired because the mob attacked soldiers brutally. Initially ABRI 
announced that the death toll was nineteen. Facing international pressure, however, 
Soeharto quickly decided to establish the National Commission of Inquiry (KPN) on 18 
November, which later concluded that at least 50 people were killed, reversing ABRI's 
official account. Then, Soeharto—as ABRI's Supreme Commander—dismissed two 
officers, Brig-Gen Warouw (Commander of East Timor Operations: Pangkolakops) 
and Maj-Gen Sintong Panjaitan (Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana), neither of 
whom were directly involved in the shooting but were considered responsible for the 
incident taking place within their areas of command. Soeharto also ordered KSAD Edi 
Sudradjat to form the Military Honour Council (DKM) and appointed Maj-Gen Feisal 
Tanjung (DanSeskoad) to investigate ABRI members who had been involved in the 
massacre.13 The DKM finally dismissed nineteen officers from their posts. Among ten 
officers prosecuted and convicted by military courts, the longest sentence was eighteen 
months for firing into a crowd.
It was the first time in the New Order period that general-ranking officers were 
held responsible for the shooting of civilians and also one of the rare cases where 
soldiers were court-martialled. This experience of the DKM caused dissatisfaction 
among military officers but also encouraged political society to question ABRI's 
repressive behaviour by referring to Soeharto’s remarks about the security approach. 
Gen (ret) Rudini, for example, called on ABRI to follow Soeharto's appeal to end the 
security approach, as it was no longer the right time to use Kopkamtib methods.14
13 Warouw and Panjaitan were both close to Benny Moerdani, and the former—a Menadonese 
Protestant—was said to have conducted a disciplinary campaign, including the charging of over 300 ABRI 
personnel since he took office in December 1989. For their background, see "Dunia Menuding Kita Berdua," 
Tempo, 4 January 1992. This "clean up" campaign was said to be opposed by local Mafia with military 
links (called ninja), and by Lt-Col Prabowo Subianto—Soeharto's son-in-law—who had served for some 
time in East Timor. See The Editors (1992:98-99). Many believed that Prabowo had established a strong tie 
with ninja especially after he was rescued by a gang led by a man called Hercules when kidnapped by pro­
independent guerrillas (Fretilin) in the mountains. For the conflict between the Moerdani and Prabowo 
groups in the Dili incident, see, for example, Feith (1992:70). It is also suggested that the order to shoot 
demonstrators was certainly not from the sacked two generals in East Timor, but possibly from an officer 
with the rank of lieutenant colonel in Jakarta. For this account, see Shiraishi (1995:119). It has, therefore, 
been suspected that the shooting order came from Prabowo himself in order to discredit Warouw and to 
speed up the elimination of Moerdani-linked officers from ABRI's top positions. Prabowo's close friend, 
Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, was the commander of Kopassus' Intelligence Unit in East Timor at that time—a unit in 
charge of conducting covert operations outside the Kodam's command hierarchy.
14 See "Cara-Cara Kopkamtib Sudah Tidak Zamannya," Tempo, 28 December 1991.
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The lesson of the Dili affair and the consequent establishment of the DKM was 
critical for ABRI. News of the shooting of civilians had spread quickly around the 
world, regardless of its accuracy, and this increased pressure on ABRI's handling of 
internal security. At the same time, the DKM opened up political space to demand 
further inquiry into military shootings and to criticise ABRI's military activities. It was 
Kapuspen Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid who quickly sensed the 'debate trend' in society 
which identified the security approach as a fundamental cause of problems. In another 
long newspaper article, he insisted that there was a gap between civilians and ABRI 
over their understanding of the security approach concept—as the former saw it as 
something which should decline while the latter regarded it as a 'must' in securing the 
process of development. Syarwan asserted that the problem did not he with the 
military but with mass behaviour which forced ABRI to use repressive methods.15 
Syarwan's explanation clearly clouded his earlier assertion in January 1989—which 
emphasised ABRI's declining use of the security approach—but it seemed to be a 
common assessment within ABRI at that time. However, a few months later, or nearly 
a year after the Dili incident, a military shooting of civilians again provided hot 
news—this time on the island of Java—because of the two events: Haur Koneng in July 
and the Nipah dam in September 1993. Furthermore, the murder of woman labour 
activist, Marsinah, in May highlighted systematic torture conducted by ABRI members 
and became a symbol of human rights abuse. These incidents significantly influenced 
the direction of civil-military interactions regarding ABRI's human rights violations.
Four people, including a 12-year boy, in a small (15-member) religious 
community, known as Haur Koneng (Yellow Bamboo) in West Java, were shot and 
killed on 29 July when troops—a joint force of more than 100 police and army 
personnel—attacked their meeting place in a village in the district of Majalengka. The 
police announcement claimed that troops had fired when the group's leader, Abdul 
Manan, and his followers tried to resist arrest, following an incident on the previous 
day in which a local police chief was stabbed and killed. The police accused the group 
of promoting a "deviant sect" (aliran sesat) which had posed a threat to security, and 
justified the shooting as a necessary step to maintain order. However, the legal aid 
institute (LBH) in Bandung independently investigated the case and claimed that the 
group was not an extreme sect but that the incident resulted from a land dispute 
between the village head and the group. The LBH accused ABRI of the excessive use of 
force against a tiny religious group and asked the government to appoint another KPN, 
like in the case of Dili.16 In response to public pressure, the police started its
15 Syarwan Hamid, "Pendekatan Keamanan Dalam Proses Pembangunan Bangsa," Suara Pembaruan, 2 June 
1993.
16 See "Setelah Mereka Belajar dari Peristiwa Dili," Tempo, 16 October 1993. It was revealed that the 
angered village head, due to the land dispute with the group, reported to the local security apparatus that 
the group was a deviant sect which would threaten the government. ABRI's raid occurred after receiving 
this report. Tempo also reported that, having noted the process of establishing the KPN in the Dili incident,
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investigation but the central government rejected the demand to establish a KPN and 
no ABRI members were charged, while it was the surviving group members who were 
sentenced to jail.
This incident again invited an intense debate on the security approach which 
soon escalated into a debate about dwifungsi as a political system. Soon after the 
incident, Soeharto warned that "ABRI should wisely apply the security approach when 
the national life is not in crisis," implying that the approach had not been exercised 
wisely in the recent past.17 The next week, however, Menhankam Edi Sudradjat 
seemed to be responding to the President when he insisted on the continuing need for 
the security approach in the process of national development.18 Rudini, on the other 
hand, referred to the incident and insisted on the need for gradually reducing the 
weight of the security approach in the face of the democratic movement, arguing that 
otherwise it would be difficult for ABRI to overcome the growing criticism of 
dwifungsi.19 Here, the conceptual issue of the security approach was linked to the 
legitimacy of dwifungsi, and for Rudini, the security approach was no longer merely a 
policy issue but a matter of the total system of dwifungsi. Following Rudini, Edi— 
replying to a question at the DPR’s Commission I about the Haur Koneng incident— 
argued that the security approach should be adjusted but it could never be removed 
because it was essential for national stability. In fact, he said, ABRI troops had tried a 
persuasive approach at first in the case of Haur Koneng but it had failed so they then 
employed the security approach.20 Similarly, vice-president Try Sutrisno claimed that 
many people had started to argue about the irrelevance of security approach in 
promoting democratisation, but he insisted that without it national prosperity would 
be devastated.21 Try's explanation was rebutted by Gen (ret) Soemitro who insisted 
that the security approach was unnecessary today and ABRI should go "back to 
normal" if it wanted to maintain dwifungsi legitimacy.22 The different views on the 
security approach and dwifungsi among retired officers and their increasing role in 
public political discourse finally made the ABRI leadership invite them to Cilangkap to 
discuss the issue on 27 September. Coincidently, this was just two days after another
people started to demand reopening investigation of the Tanjung Priok case in 1984, in which many Muslim 
demonstrators were shot by soldiers under the command of Try Sutrisno (Pangdam Jaya). This was clearly 
an institutional impact of the KPN-DKM in 1991, which gave political society a weapon to publicly 
pressure ABRI and the government concerning excessive military operations.
17 "Presiden: Kita Harus Pandai Menerapkan Pendekatan Hankam," Suara Pembaruan, 3 August 1993. Here, 
he emphasised the need for reviewing the functional relations among ABRI commands, governmental bodies, 
and social sectors. This comment too reflected the Haur Koneng incident in which ABRI only relied on the 
report by the village head and then conducted an repressive operation.
18 "Menhankam: Pendekatan Keamanan Tetap Diperlukan," Suara Karya, 11 August 1993.
19 "Rudini: Pendekatan Keamanan Harus Dilakukan Proporsional," Kedaulatan Rakyat, 5 September 1993.
20 "Menhankam di Depan Komisi I DPR: Pendekatan Keamanan Berubah Menurut Waktu," Merdeka, 10 
September 1993.
21 '"Mau Tenteram, Tertib Dulu...' Wapres: Pendekatan Keamanan Komitmen Nasional," Jawa Pos, 17 
September 1993.
22 "Fungsi Polisi Sebagai Penegak Hukum, Perlu Dikedepankan," Kompas, 24 September 1993.
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military shooting of civilians, known as the Nipah case which we will examine next. As 
seen in Chapter 2, Soeharto on this occasion emphasised the danger of having different 
views on dwifungsi among retirees because it could invite social instability.23
In the middle of this debate over ABRI's security handling, the news of a new 
military shooting was aired on 25 September, this time in a village in Sampang on 
Madura island, East Java, where troops opened fire on villagers who had refused to 
move from their lands to make way for the Nipah dam. As a result, four people were 
killed, and three were wounded. Student activists across Java immediately called for a 
new KPN while the legal aid institute (LBH) in Surabaya conducted an independent 
inquiry which rejected ABRI's claim that civilians were armed and the shooting was 
unavoidable to protect the security of soldiers.24 Under pressure, the Brawijaya 
Command started its own investigation, interrogating those who opened fire and 
calling some twenty soldiers to the Kodam Headquarters. It finally decided to transfer 
four officers, and later in May 1996 a military court sentenced four soldiers—who 
actually did the shooting—to prison terms of up to 28 months.25 Contrary to Haur 
Koneng, Pangab Feisal Tanjung admitted that the handling of the problem by ABRI 
troops was wrong and not professional. Similarly, a Madurese officer and Lemhannas
23 Nine retired officers were invited, including Soemitro, Moerdani, Rudini, Sayidiman and Moerdiono. 
State Secretariat Moerdiono, in his paper, insisted on ABRI's need—in conducting dwifungsi—for 
understanding the fact that society was not based on "instruction/order," as was ABRI, but on "rights." He 
warned about ABRI's attitude in handling social problems. Moreover, he claimed that ABRI's concept of 
rakyat was very general and abstract; it needed to respect the diverse characteristics of the rakyat, and 
avoid a monolithic attitude toward rakyat in the field. These claims were directed at the recent security 
approach problems. See Moerdiono, "Bagaimana Mengaktualisasikan Dwifungsi ABRI Dalam Zaman Yang 
Berubah Cepat: Misi, Kebijakan, Strategi, Tolok Ukur," paper presented at Sarasehan Sesepuh ABRI, 
Mabes ABRI, Jakarta, 27 September 1993, p.8. Menko Polkam Soesilo Soedarman in his comment concerning 
the meeting revealed that the security approach was a hot topic in society and there was new input about 
this, though the details could not be disclosed because the meeting was not open to the public. He further 
said that active and retired sectors in ABRI should consolidate their opinions. "ABRI dan Pumawirawan 
Harus Terus Konsolidasi," Kompas, 28 September 1993. However, Edi Sudradjat denied the gap between the 
two sides. "Tak Persoalkan Makna Dwifungsi: Menhankam Jelaskan Lagi Pertemuan Sembilan Jenderal," 
Jawa Pos, 30 September 1993.
24 See "Ny'on Odik, Lalu Robohlah Mereka," Tempo, 9 October 1993 and "Priok, Sampang, Apa Lagi," 
Tempo, 16 October 1993. The LBH reported that one soldier on the previous day threatened the protesting 
villagers by saying that "if you don't give up, you will see many people die tomorrow" ("Harga Satu Nywa 
dan Sepuluh Waduk," Tempo, 16 October 1993). ELSAM also stressed that the troops were prepared to 
shoot the demonstrators (ELSAM, op.cit., p.85). Virtually all leading kiai (Muslim religious leaders) in 
Madura signed petitions to Soeharto, demanding a full inquiry and prosecution of responsible soldiers, 
which was backed by the East Java branch of NU. It seemed obvious that ignoring the demand would 
further harm ABRI-Islam relations which were said to have become closer after Feisal—a devout Muslim 
general—was installed as Pangab in May. Especially the East Java Military Command (Kodam 
V/Brawijaya) was one of the traditionally influential commands and so lingering confrontation with 
leaders of Muslim communities would not support Feisal's image of the desirable ABRI-Islam relationship.
25 Those who were transferred were the commanders of Koramil Banyuates (subdistrict of Sampang), 
Kodim Sampang, Sampang police, and the chief of the Banyuates police. In addition to the four, at least six 
others in the subdistrict military command were reported to have been transferred. See "Setelah Pertemuan 
dengan Jenderal Tanjung," Tempo, 23 October 1993. Because the question of impartiality of the Kodam's 
investigation still remained, and the official reasons of transferring four officers were not the killing of 
civilians, many still claimed the need to establish KPN. See "Perlu atau Tidak Dibentuk Tim Pencari Fakta?" 
Forum Keadilan, 11 November 1993. However, it seemed obvious that they took responsibility for the event.
122
Chapter 4
Governor, Maj-Gen Hartono, emphasised his good relationship with the local 
communities in East Java during his term as Pangdam Brawijaya and commented that 
the security apparatus made mistakes in the case of Nipah.26
Though the response of ABRI was not satisfactory in the eyes of democratic 
advocates, ABRI's approach was changing. At least the following three aspects became 
apparent in the events of 1993. First, the fact that the KPN and the DKM had been 
formed in the case of Dili seemed to offer a new tool to the civilian sector in pressuring 
ABRI over its policy accountability. In both cases, legal aid institutes, student activists, 
and Muslim leaders demanded further inquiry into the incidents by establishing a KPN 
and a DKM, and the ABRI leadership—which rejected the demand in the case of Haur 
Koneng—was now forced to respond. ABRI established its investigation team which 
consequently had to show some results in order to cool down the protest seeking the 
appointment of KPN-DKM. Finally some officers were transferred and four soldiers 
were court-marshalled in the case of Nipah. This by no means eliminated military 
abuses in the field but it certainly established a new political rule which impelled ABRI 
to demonstrate its policy accountability to the public in the aftermath of shootings. As 
we will see later, it was significant that routinisation of this ABRI-public interaction 
finally pushed the military leadership to officially introduce a standard reference on 
human rights.
Second, the use of the term 'security approach'—popularised by Soeharto when 
he disbanded Kopkamtib—was taken up by grassroots political movements as a tool 
with which to criticise ABRI. During the previous ten years, it had been rare to see 
obvious anti-dwifungsi slogans in street politics, especially after the introduction of the 
campus-normalisation policy in 1978 which had marginalised student political 
movements.27 After a decade, student activists—who recognised that anti-dwifungsi 
campaigns were easily labelled by ABRI as 'subversion' and 'anti-Pancasila,' thus the 
target of repression—began to echo Soeharto's use of the term 'security approach' in a 
way that allowed them to effectively express anti-ABRI slogans without giving ABRI 
an excuse to crack down on the protests.28 This development illustrated how the term
26 For Feisal's comment, see "Pangab: Aparat Keamanan Terbukti Salah," Suara Merdeka, 15 October 1993. 
Hartono’s interview is in "Karena Tak Paham Orang Madura," Tempo, 16 October 1993. Also an 
intellectual police officer, Anton Tabah, referred to the Nipah incident as a very expensive lesson for ABRI 
because not only the relevance of the security approach was questioned in society, but also the human 
rights issue was highlighted and ABRI's lack of professionalism was revealed. In the cases of Tanjung 
Priok, Lampung, Dili and Nipah, he saw the source of problem as almost the same, i.e. ABRI's handling of 
crowds, and suggested the need to improve professionalism to defend ABRI’s credibility. See Anton Tabah, 
"Profesionalisasi ABRI," Republika, 6 October 1993.
27 The policy was called NKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus—Normalisation of Campus Life) and 
banned political activity on university campus. As Tempo argued in 1989, student movements after the 
introduction of NKK seemed to avoid raising issue such as dwifungsi in order to prevent ABRI's dogmatic 
responses. See "Aksi Mahasiswa: Dengan Isu Lokal Membentuk Opini Nasional," Tempo, 22 April 1989.
28 For example, in the demonstration by FAMI (Forum Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia: The Action Forum for 
Indonesian Students) at the DPR on 14 December 1993 where twenty-one students were arrested for 
"insulting the President" (under the Dutch criminal code 134), the students' demand was to meet Wahono, the
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"security approach" was used by grass-roots political sectors as a way of mobilising 
anti-ABRI forces from the bottom. Unlike dwifungsi, which ABRI had claimed as a part 
of Pancasila values and which therefore could not be criticised without running the risk 
of being accused as anti-Pancasila, the security approach—as a policy problem—could 
be criticised, at least on the surface, without inviting ABRI’s traditional strategy of 
labelling the critics as "anti-national" and so on. The events in 1993 suggested that 
bringing the "security approach" to the front line of mass protests could provide more 
leeway for critical movements than direct criticism of dwifungsi, even when the target 
of the criticism was in fact the same.
Third, apart from street politics, debate about the security approach expanded 
the elite discourse on dwifungsi, by strengthening the basis of the critical approach to 
the interpretation of dwifungsi. Between the two 1993 incidents of ABRI's firing on 
civilians that we examined above, a political seminar was held at CIDES in September, 
which was attended by former Interior Minister, Rudini, and prominent intellectuals. 
One of the main themes of discussion was about the security approach. It was Rudini 
who started the argument by insisting that the security approach today was seen in 
society as an obstacle to democratic development with the result that its relaxation 
was strongly demanded.29 Rudini s view was welcomed but further explanation was 
demanded by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent political scientist at LIPI and CIDES. 
She replied to Rudini by arguing that the major question today was how the security 
approach should be replaced with a more suitable one. She sceptically asked whether 
the correction would be possible without changing the entire political system, because 
any reform by ABRI—which monopolised power—could easily fail if the rules of the 
game themselves were untouched.30 Rudini responded that: "it is true that the 
reorganisation (perombakan) of the security approach is needed—meaning that the 
security approach should be restricted both at the national and the local levels. 
Nationally, it has already been done by abolishing Kopkamtib, but at the lower levels, 
we need to formulate rules and also reorganise ABRI members' mental attitudes and
Speaker of the DPR, to protest to him about the security approach. Regarding the arrest, Maj-Gen 
Hendropriyono (Commander of Kodam Jaya) commented that in the recent case of the anti-SDSB (state 
lottery) demonstration, ABRI was quiet because they did not break the law, but this time, FAMI exceeded 
the limit. The F-ABRI Head, Abu Hartono, also explained that talking about the security approach was no 
problem but their speech at the lobby room in the DPR was beyond a tolerance. See "Demo di Luar Koridor," 
Tempo, 25 December 1993. However, according to Aspinall (1995:38), it was only when the students began 
to abuse the military that they were immediately attacked. For the detailed process of developing student 
movements during this period, see YLBHI, Catatan Keadaan Hak Asasi Manusia 1994, YLBHI, 1995, pp.67-81. 
There were more than fifteen large-scale student demonstrations in 1994 alone.
29 Rudini, "Peran ABRI Dalam Pengembangan Kehidupan Demokrasi," paper presented at Seri Dialog 
Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994, CIDES, Jakarta, 4 September 1993, p.6.
30 See the seminar paper, Dialog Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994: 2 Aspek Pertahanan dan Keamanan dalam 
Pengembangan Demokrasi, Seri Dialog Pembangunan, CIDES, 1993, p.28. Dewi became the Presidential 
advisor for foreign policy under the Habibie government.
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behaviour, because they still use the old approach, pendekatan kecurigaan (suspicion 
approach)."31
In facing the visible rise of the "security approach" issue in open political 
debate, ABRI intellectuals attempted to combat the possible escalation of the critical 
atmosphere. It was Lukman Saksono, Feisal’s civilian adviser, who insisted on the 
need for having a clear understanding of the security approach. According to him, the 
security approach could only be attributed to ABRI's first role (hankam) and should 
never be seen as a part of the sospol function. It was the prosperity approach which 
had directed ABRI's role as kekuatan sospol, thus its sociopolitical involvement was not 
repressive.32 However, Soeharto himself further encouraged the debate about the 
security approach. On ABRI's anniversary in 1993, he reemphasised his previous 
stance that ABRI should not always adopt military means in handling threats and 
challenges.33
As the security approach issue spread, prominent officers—notably Try, 
Syarwan, and Edi in the above examples—put emphasis on the need for continuous 
utilisation of this approach. While critics tended to see the security approach in terms 
of the democratisation process, these officers were inclined to insist on the need to 
maintain stability and order. While critics warned about current security handling in 
the tight of dwifungsi legitimacy, ABRI leaders rejected the idea of linking the two. 
Lukman's initiative to 'free' ABRI's sospol role from the controversy about the security 
approach was an interpretative attempt to delink dwifungsi from the security 
approach for the sake of the former—a logic adopted in facing criticism of kekaryaan in 
the late 1970s, as seen in the previous chapter.34
Moreover, the spread of criticism of the security approach—which was one 
form of expressing resentment toward ABRI's shooting of civilians—provided some 
new dilemmas for ABRI's dwifungsi management. First, the "anti-security approach" 
slogans in the streets could not be branded by ABRI as anti-Pancasila, in contrast to 
anti-dwifungsi slogans. Only when more fundamental causes were identified, for 
example when the President was insulted, could ABRI move to smash such protests. 
Secondly, the security-approach criticism could easily mobilise street demonstrations, 
and thus caused problems for ABRI in two ways. On the one hand, if ABRI responded 
in a repressive way, this could simply accelerate the vicious circle of the security 
approach. On the other hand, the popular mobilisation against the security approach 
could critically erode the basis of ABRI's self-image as "people's military," providing a
31 Ibid., p.37.
32 See Lukman Saksono, "ABRI Profesional dan Profesionalisme ABRI," Angkatan Bersenjata, 5 October 
1993.
33 See, for example, "Amanat Presiden Pada Peringatan Hari ABRI ke-48: Jangan Selalu Pakai Cara Militer," 
Media Indonesia, 6 October 1993.
34 However, this time, the attempt was partly counter-productive since it in effect allowed critics to say that 
it was therefore the hankam aspect which caused the problem for dwifungsi. This contradicted ABRI's long- 
established claim that the hankam role had no problem in the conduct of dwifungsi.
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space within ABRI and society to further question the cohesiveness of ABRTs identity. 
ABRTs frequent rejection of the description of its role as a 'fire brigade' also reflected 
such an identity problem generated by the security approach. Third, but most 
obviously, the ABRI leadership was concerned that any downgrading of the security 
approach might not only undermine ABRTs capacity to maintain political stability but 
also directly influence ABRI's political power in practice; since de-emphasising the 
security approach would allow non-ABRI actors to play a relatively bigger role in 
handling political problems, and also give more opportunities for the civil society to 
raise the issue of ABRI's policy failures. After all, it was these dilemmas which became 
apparent in this initial stage of the debate about the security approach—i.e. from the 
disbanding of Kopkamtib to the series of shootings which happened during the early 
years of the keterbukaan period. In the next section, we will discuss further cases of 
shooting which coincided with the launching of Komnas HAM—a governmental body 
established by Soeharto in June which fully started its activities in December 1993. 
Komnas HAM provided a significant momentum in ABRI's response to the issue of 
firing on civilians.
Dialogue with Komnas HAM
The establishment of Komnas HAM was the first attempt in the New Order 
polity to set up an internal mechanism to promote human rights accountability, 
reflecting the growing criticism of repression in recent years as Indonesia became more 
open to the international media. The Commission was deliberately modelled on the 
KPN established to investigate the Dili shooting. It was widely acknowledged that the 
vast international pressure after the Dili incident was the primarv factor pushing 
Soeharto to set up the Commission.35 Since then, Komnas HAM has become ABRI's 
major counterpart in dealing with controversial security operations. Although the 
Commission's power was limited to investigation and advocacy, which invited some 
sceptical opinions concerning its efficacy, its relatively easy access to the Pangab and 
other high-ranking officers highlighted its significant role compared with non-official 
human rights organisations such as LBH.36 A few months after the appointment of its 
members, the Commission produced a report which refuted ABRI's account of the 
Marsinah case, claiming that those who were arrested on suspicion of involvement in
35 Human Rights Watch/Asia (1994:126) also sees the ongoing ABRI-Soeharto antagonism as another 
factor which encouraged Soeharto to create a tool to publicise other military abuses that would be used to 
his political benefit.
3  ^Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 31 March 1997. For example, 
Komnas HAM's contacts during 1995 included Pangab, DP A, Kodam Jaya, Menko Polkam, Department of 
Labour, and Kapolri. For details, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Laporan Tahunan 1995, 
Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1995, Chapter 7.
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Marsinah's murder had been tortured by security officers and suggesting the high 
possibility that "other parties" had murdered Marsinah.37 Also in 1994, Komnas HAM 
was engaged in high-profile activities when it denounced the violation of human rights 
in the Medan riot in April and in the banning of three magazines in June.38 Coupled 
with these expressions of concern, which were highly publicised in the media, the 
Commission started to investigate cases involving the shooting of civilians since 
January 1995. We will look at two cases below: Liquisa (January 1995) and Timika 
(May 1995).
When it was announced that military troops killed six people in Liquisa, East 
Timor, on 12 January 1995, ABRI's security approach once again attracted wide public 
attention. ABRI claimed that those who had been shot were anti-integration Fretilin 
guerrillas involved in what ABRI called the "security disturbance movement" (GPK). 
Moreover, it was claimed that of the six, two were killed in the exchange of gunfire 
with ABRI troops and four were shot to death when they tried to escape after being 
captured. However, since it became apparent that no soldier was injured in the alleged 
fire contact and those who were killed were actually unarmed, domestic and 
international concerns about ABRI's possible misconduct were expressed. In response,
37 See "Keterangan Ketua Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia" (Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 2 April 1994), in 
Saafroedin Bahar, Hak Asasi Manusia: Analisis Komnas HAM dan Jajaran Hankam/ABRI, Jakarta: Pustaka 
Sinar Harapan, 1996. Marsinah, a woman labour activist, was killed in May 1993 during a dispute at a 
factory in East Java. When the nine people originally convicted of murdering Marsinah were released by 
the High Court in May 1995, Komnas HAM requested ABRI to establish a DKM to investigate ABRI 
members suspected to be involved in the incident. The East Java Police Chief, Maj-Gen Roesmanhadi, 
rejected the Commission's request but promised to reopen its own investigation, and ABRI Headquarters 
also formed an inquiry team. However, neither of them could provide new evidence and they finally 
announced the closure of the investigation in February 1996. See Republika's special reports: "Marsinah, 
Sampai Kapan Riwayatmu Jadi Misteri;" "Tenten Masduki, Ketua Divisi Perburuhan YBHI: Akan Ada 
Pihak Yang Tercoreng;" "Clementino Dos Reis Amaral, Anggota Komnas HAM: Mungkin Mereka Tidak 
Berani Mengungkap," all in the 12 February 1996 edition.
38 In the Medan case, an estimated 15-20,000 workers took to the streets in Medan, North Sumatra, 
demanding higher wages. This large-scale demonstration, which was led by the independent labour union, 
SBSI (Indonesian Welfare Trade Union), turned into an anti-Chinese riot on 14 April, resulting in the death 
of a Chinese businessman. ABRI crushed the riot and arrested hundreds of workers and Muchtar 
Pakpahan, Chairman of SBSI, who was accused of instigating the riot. However, as SBSI claimed, and was 
widely believed, the labour demonstration was manipulated by local preman (gang members) who were said 
to have been instructed by the local military command to provoke riots to give an opportunity for ABRI to 
crackdown. Muchtar himself stressed that it was SBSI which planned the demonstration but the riot was 
instigated by the preman (Reuters, 24 April 1994; Financial Times, 17 May 1994). Preman were also said to 
have been used in the June demonstration against the banning of magazines, which was also smashed by the 
security apparatus. According to Buyung Nasution, one of those who led the June demonstration, this tactic 
went back to the Malari affair in 1974 in which he—as a legal activist—recognised some of these gangsters 
paid by the military (Interview, 14 March 1997). In 1994, when the June riot broke out, Yorrys Raweyai 
was the head of Pemuda Pancasila's Jakarta branch and declared his active support for Operasi Bersih 
1994 (cleaning up operations targeted against those who might disturb public security) conducted by Maj- 
Gen Hendropriyono, Pangdam Jaya. See his article, "Meningkatkan Kewaspadaan," Pancasila Abadi, 
January-February 1994. Hendropriyono himself, in his regular three-monthly meeting with PP, also asked 
for the support of PP in conducting Kodam Jaya's security maintenance projects. "Pangdam Jaya: Kekuatan 
Pengamanan Berada di Fihak Rakyat Lemah," Pancasila Abadi, December 1993. The riot in Jakarta on 27 
July 1996 was also allegedly conducted according to this established procedure. In the free speech forum 
held by Megawati's PDI, some faces of the PP, including Yorrys’, were recognised.
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ABRI decided to form its own fact-finding team and started its investigation on 7 
February, while Komnas HAM also entered East Timor for the inquiry. A few days 
before the report of the ABRI team was published, State Secretary Moerdiono 
mentioned that Feisal Tanjung had reported to the President that the actions of several 
soldiers had breached legal procedures, resulting in the death of six villagers in East 
Timor.39 However, Feisal changed his explanation soon after he received the field 
report. He insisted that all the victims were shot during fire contact with security 
troops and were obviously members of the GPK.40 He did not deny misconduct at the 
lowest command level but defended the circumstances of ABRI’s security operation. 
When the result of ABRI's investigation team was announced on 24 February, four 
days after Feisal's comment, it became clear that at least some soldiers had deviated 
from the proper military procedure in handling the case and, based on the findings, 
ABRI determined to start another investigation led by the 36-member Officer's Honour 
Council (DKP).41 It was against this background that the conclusion of the Komnas 
HAM team attracted wide public attention. Komnas HAM claimed that the six victims 
were ordinary citizens with no GPK links, and they were possibly tortured before being 
shot.42 Komnas HAM's findings were surprisingly tough given its official position, and 
openly challenged investigations carried out by Mabes ABRI.
Since then, until the announcement of DKP findings in April, pressure on 
ABRI's security policy was further intensified. On the same day as Komnas HAM's 
press release, 50 academics and students in Jakarta signed a letter urging ABRI to drop 
its security approach in dealing with East Timor and demanding the appointment of 
an alternative inquiry team in place of the DKP, directly under the President, to secure 
the independence of the investigation. Similarly, LBH, which fully supported the 
Komnas HAM report, further demanded an inquiry based on the Komnas HAM 
findings, calling for the establishment of a KPN as in the case of Dili43 The scope of 
criticism then escalated when a Muslim organisation, HMI, also called on ABRI to
39 Pangab Feisal Tanjung, according to Moerdiono, explained that immediate measures would be taken 
based on military regulations, including the possibility of a court martial. See "Soldiers Said Out of Line in 
East Timor Killings," Jakarta Post, 12 February 1995; and "DKM untuk Liquisa," Gatra, 18 February 1995.
40 "Penjelasan Pangab: Tindakan ABRI Sudah Tepat," liras, 9 March 1995. He then defended the conduct of 
Kodim Liquisa which had dispatched a 30-soldier team to conduct the operation on 12 January.
41 For details, see "Tim Pencari Fakta Mabes ABRI Temukan Penyimpangan Prosedure Operasi Militer," 
Kompas, 25 February 1995. The DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira), according to Kapuspen Syarwan 
Hamid, was functionally the same as the DKM appointed in the Dili case. He also asserted that "it is a 
problem if ABRI is always put into a comer by the human rights concerns; who can guarantee the security 
of social life there?" "Kapuspen ABRI Tentang Kasus Liquisa: Lumrah Kalau Terjadi Perbedaan Hasil 
Temuan Tim ABRI dan Komnas HAM," Kompas, 23 February 1995.
42 The team also insisted that ABRI should reduce its presence in East Timor for the solution of the East 
Timor problem. See "Wawancara TIM Komnas HAM: Temuan Kami Bisa Berbeda dengan ABRI," Tiras, 9 
March 1995. Komnas HAM's inquiry result was announced on 1 March. See "Keterangan Pres Tentang 
Peristiwa Liquisa, Timtim Pada Tanggal 12 Januari 1995," Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 1 March 1995, 
appended in Saafroedin Bahar, op.cit., pp.146-148.
43 Reuters, 2 March 1995; "Kasad: Tak Ada Prajurit Salah, yang Salah Perwiranya," Republika, 10 March 
1995.
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establish a DKM to investigate cases in Aceh, demanding that Syarwan Hamid—a 
devout Muslim officer newly appointed as Assospol Kassospol—institutionalise the 
fact-finding system whenever Muslims became the victim of ABRI's shootings.44 These 
demands clearly caused ABRI to worry about establishing a DKM or DKP in East 
Timor, because not only would they uncover ABRI's misconduct in the field but also 
provide two other spillover effects. On the one hand, social pressure to open other 
DKMs would increase, and on the other hand, Muslim communities would legitimately 
claim that they were not equally treated with Christians who were the majority in East 
Timor. For the ABRI leadership at that time, which included senior devout Muslim 
officers, the second effect might be as serious as the first which was more a general 
threat to ABRI as an institution. Moreover, the international community also called for 
a further inquiry into the incident. Attempts were made to bring the issue to the United 
Nations' General Assembly and to the "All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue," which 
a UN-led meeting on 9 January—three days before the Liquisa killing—between Foreign 
Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal had agreed to hold in Austria in June 1995.45
Amidst these pressures, ABRI's second inquiry—the DKP’s investigation—was 
completed and its findings announced on 3 April. As if to follow Komnas HAM’s 
report, the DKP admitted that there had been a few procedural mistakes in the 
conduct of troops sent from Kodim Wiradharma. Thus two soldiers would be sent to 
the military court.46 This was the official closure of the Liquisa investigation. However, 
from the perspective of developing civil-military communications, it was during this 
dialogue between societal sectors and the military during the previous months that 
ABRI demonstrated a set of techniques to turn criticism aside. Facing enormous 
criticism from society, the ABRI leadership responded as follows. First, confronting
44 See "Pangab: Stabilitas Keamanan Bukan Untuk Pertahankan Kekuasaan," Kompas, 3 April 1995. This 
call was made at the national alumni meeting of the HMI (Islamic Student Association) held on 2 April. In 
fact, unlike the case of East Timor where international attention was high since its annexation, ABRI's 
heavy security operations against Aceh's rebel movements were rarely publicised. ABRI in 1989 decided to 
declare Aceh as a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer—DOM) in order to intensify the 
security operations against the separatist movements. Under that status, everyday human-rights abuses had 
been made by the security forces.
45 The dialogue was the first official meeting between pro-integration and pro-independence East Timorese 
groups (the latter were the overseas activists—including some Fretilin leaders) since the annexation of East 
Timor. It was held on 3 June and, as anticipated, ABRI’s over-presence in the region became a central issue. 
Following the dialogue, the 52th UN General Assembly considered a written report on the East Timor issue, 
describing the heavy-handed security pressure of ABRI, including the use of ninja groups to terrify society. 
For details, see The United Nations Secretariat, "East Timor," working paper prepared by the Secretariat 
for the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/AC.109/2026,22 June 1995, pp.2-20.
46 "DKP Laporkan Hasil Penyelidikan Kasus Liquisa: Dua Orang Diserahkan ke POM ABRI," Republika, 4 
April 1995. Marzuki said that "it showed the DKP result was to endorse Komnas HAM's conclusion." 
"Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo," Forum Keadilan, 27 April 1995. The two soldiers were First 
Lieutenant Jeremias Kasse—a former intelligence officer of the Kodim 1638/Liquisa—who had led the 
operation in the incident, and Private First Class Rusdin Maumere. Kasse was sentenced to four years and 
six months in jail and dismissed from the military service, while Maumere received four years jail at the end 
of June 1995 (Reuters, 21 June 1995).
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student activists who demonstrated on the Liquisa case, Feisal revived an old theme 
when he warned that the recent student movement should not be exploited by "other 
parties" for their benefit.47 This assessment about the emerging student movement 
illustrated ABRI's increasingly hard stance towards keterbukaan and was expressed 
repeatedly during the next two years. Second, ABRI was concerned about the 
escalating criticism of the security approach and its anti-ABRI posture. Menhankam 
Edi Sudradjat regretted that the current political debate was coloured by the Western 
notion of civilian supremacy over the military, which implied the abolition of dwifungsi 
and the security approach.48 It was a warning from Edi that criticism of the security 
approach could now be interpreted as criticism of dwifungsi which, from his 
perspective, was also criticism of Pancasila. Third, together with these general views 
on politics, Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, Pangdam IX/Udayana, who was responsible 
for the East Timor area, asserted that there was nothing wrong with his soldiers 
because the victims were celula (cells in towns, meaning the invisible supporters of 
GPK). Moreover, explaining how ABRI had disagreed with the plan to open up East 
Timor in the early 1990, this general—who had a reputation as a strict professional 
soldier—declared that the quickest way to solve East Timor's problems was simply to 
increase the number of ABRI personnel in the region. He was in effect challenging 
Komnas HAM's suggestion.49 ABRI's vague definition of GPK was not something new, 
but it was after Komnas HAM’s report that ABRI started to refer to the activities of 
celula and clandestine members, who were allegedly hiding in towns and hard to 
identify. This interpretation replaced ABRI's original explanation that the Liquisa 
victims were armed GPK guerrillas.50
In sum, three approaches could be seen in ABRI's response to the growing 
pressure for policy accountability, which was effectively legitimised by Komnas 
HAM's findings. Student movements were now openly described as possibly
47 "Pangab: Keterlibatan Mahasiswa di Bidang Politik Akhir-akhir Ini Disinyalir Menggelisahkan," 
Kompas, 29 March 1995.
48 "Evaluasi Dwifungsi Diintensifkan," Republika, 25 February 1995.
49 See his interview, "Kalau Dianggap Salah, Saya Siap, Silakan Tindak," Forum Keadilan, 16 March 1995. 
Also in the lower command, Korem Wiradharma, its commander Col Kiki Syahnakri asserted that his 
soldiers were "200 percent correct" during the operation, based on the military procedures. "Melacak Enam 
Nyawa di Liquica," Forum Keadilan, 16 March 1995. Although the definition of military procedure was not 
given in these interviews, Adang—who later became Commander of the Army Territorial Centre: 
Danpusterad—explained it in the light of the ideal function of ABRI's territorial system which was: (1) to 
have high ability to detect local trends negative to national development; and (2) to bring analysis and 
information quickly to the upper commands (Written interview with Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, 
Danpusterad, 18 December 1996). From this perspective, it seemed normal for him and Kiki to assert that his 
command line had no problem in the case of Liquisa. Whether it was related or not, Kiki was transferred in 
the month after the announcement of the DKP findings. Adang was succeeded by Maj-Gen Abdul Rivai in 
September, three months after the military court held heard charges against two of his soldiers.
50 The new Army Chief Gen Hartono, who was in charge of conducting the DKP, explained that clandestine 
members were more dangerous than GPK because they had two faces and could live anywhere, not only in 
East Timor but also in other major cities. See "Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo," Forum Keadilan, 
27 April 1995.
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manipulated by "other parties;" criticism of the security approach was treated as 
criticising diuifungsi; and the emphasis was shifted from the visible GPK to less 
discernible clandestine actors in identifying the threat target. These arguments were 
reflected in the opinions of ABRI leaders in regard to subsequent events. Towards 
students, ABRI reiterated the existence of a third party in facing Ujung Pandang 
demonstrations in April 1996, while PRD-SMID movements during 1996 were similarly 
branded as being manipulated by PKI-sympathisers, as we examined in Chapter 2.51 
About criticism of dwifungsi, the dogmatic response of ABRI leaders was evident. For 
example, in an air force seminar in May 1996, Maj-Gen Tamlicha Ali, Assistant of 
General Planning for Pangab, asserted that the current criticism of the "dwifungsi- 
security approach" was used by certain groups to discredit ABRI and could lead to 
national instability. Also the army seminar in June 1996 insisted that some people still 
questioned dwifungsi, wished to end it and tried to change Pancasila democracy. 
Furthermore, in a private seminar held at Surabaya in November 1996, Gen Hartono 
warned about the influx of liberal thoughts into Indonesia—due to the globalisation— 
and labelled the current negative social view of ABRI's political role as based on a 
different framework of thinking, which was easily translated as anti-Pancasila in the 
ABRI language.52 Finally, regarding the threat of clandestine rebels, Hartono further 
tried to disseminate alarm by insisting that they were using the government's facilities 
for their underground activities.53 Three days later, as if to show the proof, the 
controversial mystic-psychic Permadi—who was alleged to have made blasphemous 
remarks about Prophet Muhammad—was actually labelled as a clandestine activist by 
a top-ranking army general.54
51 Student demonstrations in Ujung Pandang (the capital of South Sulawesi) were originally protests 
against a government decision to increase public bus fares. They developed into a large-scale protest with 
thousands of demonstrators, including mini-bus drivers, who finally clashed with the security apparatus. 
Among them, hundreds were wounded and six were killed, according to the student side, while the military 
insisted that the death toll was three. ABRI interpreted the incident as having manipulated by the 
unidentified "agents of chaos." Later, after the 27 July 1996 incident, ABRI identified the PRD—with its 
student wing, SMID—as the mastermind of Ujung Pandang riot.
52 Tamlicha Ali's assessment is found in Mayjen TNI Tamlicha Ali, "Prasaran Asrenum Pangab Pada Pra 
Seminar Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII," paper 
presented at Pra Seminar TNI Angkatan Udara Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang 
Hankam Pada Pelita VII, Mabes ABRI, TNI-AU, 29-30 May 1996, p.9. The dwifungsi assessment in the 
1996 army seminar is cited from Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik..., p.74. For 
Hartono's remarks at the Surabaya seminar, entitled "The Role and Position of ABRI in National Political 
Life," see Hartono (Jenderal TNI), "Peran dan Posisi ABRI dalam Format Politik Nasional," in Selamat 
Ginting, et.al., eds., ABRI dan Demokrasi, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZEN, 1997, p.4. We will 
further discuss ABRI’s hardline mind-set in the next chapter.
53 Hartono's remarks about clandestine activists were delivered at the launching ceremony of ABRI's AMD 
program for 1995/96 on 7 April. He added that: "we have received reports about their existence and we are 
working together with related government agencies to combat the group which threatens stability." See 
Reuters, 11 April 1995; "Rapat Paripuma ABRI AMD XV Dibuka: Kopassus Diminta Ikuti Perkembangan 
Politik," Media Indonesia, 8 April 1995. He made the same warning at Akabri two days later when he 
attended a ceremony to install the new governor {Antara, 5 April 1995).
54 The accusation against Permadi was made by Lt-Gen Soeyono, Kasum (Chief of General Affairs), who 
accused Permadi of conducting clandestine activities behind his soothsayer’s cloak. "He is a dangerous
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Although it was not the sole factor, the political function of Komnas HAM—i.e. 
to permit criticism from within and provide legitimate political space for social sectors 
to express criticism—was very important for assessing the process by which ABRI's 
dogmatic response had developed in the mid-1990s. Moreover, Komnas HAM's 
international link, especially with the United Nations, also seemed to make a 
contribution to the increase in international pressure, thanks largely to the widening of 
access to information via Komnas HAM.55 Such external pressure then provided a 
direct input to Soeharto's decision-making, on the one hand, and also feedback to 
domestic society for legitimatising its critical approach toward ABRI’s lack of policy 
accountability, on the other hand. The Liquisa case showed that this structural flow 
was now in formation.
We now look at another case of political contention between ABRI and Komnas 
HAM. The Timika shooting on 31 May 1995 provided some important insights in 
regard to the civil-military struggle. Komnas HAM received complaints from 5 
prominent NGOs concerning recent human rights abuses in the area of Timika, Irian 
Jaya, and called on Komnas HAM to investigate the case. The NGOs’ request was 
based on the investigation conducted in cooperation with Bishop Munninghoff of the 
provincial capital, Jayapura, who had read a report published the previous April by 
the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), which exposed a series of human 
rights violations by the security apparatus during the period from June 1994 to 
February 1995 56 After the 31 May incident in a village of Hoya in Timika, he compiled 
a Catholic Church report at the end of August, which endorsed ACFOA's earlier 
findings, described the 31 May killing, and urged Komnas HAM to conduct an 
independent inquiry.57 According to the Church report, which was made public on 29 
August, soldiers from the 572th Trikora battalion came into a Protestant Church in 
Hoya and started to shoot the people there when they prayed, including the minister 
of the Church, without any warning. Eleven civilians, among them 5-6 years old
clandestine member using tactics that could endanger the stability and security of the nation, and have clear 
targets—these are ABRI, the President, Golkar, and Islam," Soeyono added. See "Permadi Engaged in 
Clandestine Activities: ABRI," Jakarta Post, 11 April 1995.
55 For Komnas HAM's international activities, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, op.cit, chapter 4.
56 ACFOA is the coordinating body for some 100 Australian NGOs. Its April document is entitled, Trouble 
at Freeport: Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport-MacMoRan Mine in Irian Jaya, 
Indonesia and Indonesian Military Repression, June 1994 - February 1995, Canberra: ACFOA, April 1995. 
This 11-page report listed the names of 22 civilians killed by ABRI during the six months (p.10).
57 The Catholic Church’s August report is entitled, "Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian 
Jaya, Indonesia: A Report by the Catholic Church of Jayapura," Onl ine,  available http: 
<http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/bishop-irian-jaya.html>. The report (Section 4, Executive 
Summary) stated that the people had been interrogated and tortured by the security apparatus for allegedly 
giving food and other supplies to the anti-Indonesian rebels, or OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka: Free 
Papua Organisation), sometimes in containers owned by the Freeport copper mine and at the security post of 
this US-based giant company. This report was brought to the Indonesian Bishops Conference to disclose the 
fear in Timika to the wider public.
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children, were killed.58 Having received the report from NGOs, Komnas HAM started 
its investigation, led by Marzuki Darusman, and the Army Headquarters also sent its 
team to Timika to obtain further information.
The ABRI leadership reacted to this Church report in various ways. A few days 
before the report became public, Kapuspen Brig-Gen Suwamo Adiwijoyo insisted that 
the cooperation between ABRI and the Freeport was there to develop society, not to 
intimidate the local people, and he warned of certain overseas groups who tried to 
discredit ABRI, the government as well as the nation—thus this kind of report had to 
be treated with vigilance.59 Maj-Gen I Ketut Wirdhana, Pangdam VTII/Trikora, accused 
the Bishop of distorting the facts, denied that the May incident had taken place, and 
asserted that the happening was just a military operation against GPK members of the 
OPM, while KSAD Gen Hartono said that the Church needed to show proof about the 
allegations in its report, and reiterated that the event of 31 May was merely an 
exchange of fire between the security apparatus and the GPK. To push further, 
Hartono applied his clandestine theory, saying that: "the GPK in both East Timor and 
Irian Jaya is almost the same, thus it is clandestine groups which are more dangerous 
and need to be watched."60 However, these assertive postures were soon neutralised 
by other officers who showed a more accommodative stance in facing the popular 
criticism. Kasum Lt-Gen Soeyono, on 17 September, stated that ABRI would form a 
DKM at the Kodam level in order to solve the Timika case, and two days later, this 
was endorsed by Menhankam Edi Sudradjat at the Commission I of DPR.61 Pangab 
Gen Feisal Tanjung then announced that he had received a report from the army team 
sent to Timika, which indicated some procedural and legal deviations by ABRI 
members in the Timika incident. He asked Hartono to take legal action against those 
who had made mistakes.62
It was the next day that Komnas HAM released its Timika investigation 
results. Based on information provided by 40 witness and 14 sources, the statement of 
Komnas HAM concluded that from October 1994 to June 1995, there were 6 patterns
58 For details, see Report 1 in ibid..
59 "Komnas HAM Kirim Tim ke Timika, Kapuspen: Tak Benar ABRI Lakukan Pelanggaran," )aiva Pos, 21 
August, 1995.
60 For Wirdhana's comment, see "Laporan dari Timika," Gatra, 2 September 1995. He also said in a magazine 
interview that the Church report relied on wrong informants. "Pangdam Trikora, Mayjen I Ketuk 
Wirdhana: "Saya Akui, Penembakan Untuk GPK Memang Ada,"" Forum Keadilan, 11 September 1995. 
Hartono's remarks are from "KSAD: Langkah ABRI di Timika Tak Salahi Aturan," Republika, 31 August 
1995. In facing these reactions, Bishop Munninghoff cynically commented that "for them [ABRI], I am one 
who discredits the name of ABRI, and maybe they think I am also the OPM. But as a Bishop, I had to report 
this problem of human rights." See "Kasus Timika: Laporan Uskup, Komnas HAM, dan ABRI," Forum 
Keadilan, 11 September 1995.
61 For Soeyono’s comment, see "Komnas Sambut Upaya ABRI Bentuk DKM Kodam Trikora," Kompas, 18 
September 1995. At the DPR meeting, a youth group in Irian Jaya demanded that Edi not form the DKM at 
the Kodam level but at the Mabes ABRI level. See "Menhankam Soal Timika: Di Sana Memang Ada GPK," 
Republika, 20 September 1995.
62 "Pangab Tentang Kasus Timika: Ada Pelanggaran Prosedur," Kompas, 21 September 1995.
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of clear human rights violations inflicted by elements of ABRI—namely indiscriminate 
killings, torture and inhuman treatment, unlawful arrest, disappearances, excessive 
surveillance, and destruction of property.63 As a result of these activities, the 
statement continued, 16 citizens were murdered and 4 people were missing. Regarding 
Freeport, it reported that since ABRI's operations in the area were to control GPK and 
protect the mining enterprise which had been identified as a vital project by the 
government, Freeport had an automatic responsibility to participate in solving the 
problem. Given this assessment, Komnas HAM called on ABRI to investigate these 
events and to take disciplinary measures and legal action against those involved in 
human rights violations.64 This statement largely endorsed the Church report on ABRI's 
human rights violations, but since there was no clear explanation about the linkage 
between Freeport and human rights abuses and also because the Commission's 
recommendations were general in nature, the report created the impression that the 
investigation was not enough.
In response, Hartono soon announced that ABRI would not establish a DKP. 
When asked why a DKP was formed in the case of Liquisa and not this time, Hartono 
answered: "we had concluded that the level of deviation [from the military procedure] 
and the scale of the incident was not as big as the Liquisa case, thus there is no need 
for a DKP."65 Hartono—who had just promoted Brig-Gen Dunidja (Deputy 
Commander of Army Territorial Centre) to replace Maj-Gen I Ketut as Pangdam 
Trikora earlier in the month—seemed to have full confidence to apparently overrule the 
remarks made by Soeyono and Edi a few days earlier. It was against this background 
that a public statement was released by the five NGOs which originally brought the 
case to Komnas HAM the previous August66 The group of NGOs announced that 
Komnas HAM's conclusions were indeed worthy of respect and support, but there 
were still many things which needed to be done by the Commission, including the 
investigation of Freeport and further pressure for a DKP 67
63 See Paragraphs 1 and 2 in Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, "Keterangan Pers Hasil Pemantauan 
dan Penyelidikan Atas Lima Peristiwa di Kecamatan Timika dan Satu Peristiwa di Desa Hoea, Irian Jaya, 
Dalam Masa Antara Oktober 1994 - Juni 1995," Jakarta, 22 September 1995, attached as Appendix 5 in 
Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, Laporan Tahunan 1995, Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1996.
64 These points are from Paragraphs 4, 5, and 10 in ibid.. For the press conference, see "Temuan Komnas 
HAM Soal Kasus Timika: ABRI Lakukan Enam Pelanggaran HAM, 16 Tewas dan Empat Hilang," Suara 
Merdeka, 23 September 1995.
65 "KSAD: Tidak Perlu Bentuk DKP," Kompas, 23 September 1995.
66 They were the Institute for Social Research and Development (LPPS: Lembaga Penelitian dan 
Pembangunan Sosial), the International NGO Forum for Indonesian Development (INFID), ELSAM, YLBHI, 
and the Indonesian Environmental Network (WALHI: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia). Their 
statement was entitled, "Response to the Results of Komnas HAM's Report on the Human Rights Violations 
in Timika, Subdistrict of Fak-Fak, Irian Jaya," signed on 27 September 1995 in Jakarta. The full text is 
available on internet at <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp>.
67 The statement especially insisted that: Freeport surely knew of these violations of human rights and 
allowed its facilities to be used by ABRI, so Komnas HAM should take a firm stand on Freeport's 
involvement in these events; there was an urgent need for Komnas HAM to push for the formation of DKP at 
Mabes ABRI as the authoritative body to handle the matters that occurred in Kodam Trikora.
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From the perspective of the political process, rather than the standpoint of 
human rights, the NGOs' demands seemed to have twofold implications for Komnas 
HAM. On the one hand, the demand was clearly an expression of dissatisfaction in 
the grass-roots community with Komnas HAM's ambivalent stance which largely 
resulted from its nature as a governmental instrument. However, on the other hand, 
having assertive constituents was an obvious advantage for the Commission's 
bargaining power in dealing with ABRI since the Commission's designed role—as a 
built-in regime mechanism—was to legitimately convey selected social pressures to 
ABRI. In fact, from the viewpoint of ABRI, claims made by NGOs and Komnas HAM 
were both the same in terms of attacking ABRI's misuse of power and arbitrary killing 
of civilians, and Komnas HAM's endorsement of the Church report, which ABRI had 
already rejected, in effect provided a legitimate space for these NGOs to play an 
assertive role in revealing ABRI's lack of policy accountability. Marzuki Darusman 
himself regarded the NGO's growing assertiveness as a positive sign for necessary 
political restructuring. He argued that: "the NGOs are virtually taking over the function 
of political parties, which is to mobilise social movements from the bottom, so they 
play a significant role for national integration," dismissing ABRI's frequent claim that 
NGOs could be a destabilising factor.68
It was a few days later that Maj-Gen Dunidja announced a compromise 
measure to finalise the Timika case. He repeated Hartono's earlier remarks that ABRI 
would not form a DKP, thus rejecting the NGOs’ demand, but stated that his Trikora 
Command would instead establish an investigation team to bring the responsible 
soldiers to a military tribunal which would be formed in January the following year.69 
On 28 October, four soldiers were arrested and Kodam Trikora formed the Timika 
Case Resolution Team to prepare for the military court. At the end of January 1996, 
these four soldiers were sentenced at the court. Second Lieutenant Mardjaka—who 
was mentioned in the Bishop's report as ordering his soldiers to shoot a Protestant 
minister even after he had raised his hands—was sentenced to 16 months jail for 
intentional disobedience and giving false information to his superiors, which damaged 
the image of ABRI and the nation. The other three who had actually shot civilians 
received 2-3 years jail for making "procedural mistakes" leading to human rights 
abuses.70 The Timika affair was virtually closed by this event.
68 Interviews, 27 March 1997; 31 March 1997. A prominent sociologist and democratic activist, Arief 
Budiman, says that there are informal contracts between Komnas HAM and NGOs. "If the Commission 
[members], as a state institution, can not work in the formal way, they may pass operations to the NGOs." 
"Human What?," Inside Indonesia, No.46, March 1996, p.7.
69 "Pangdam Trikora: Kasus Timika Akan Dituntaskan Secara Hukum," Suara Pembaruan, 4 October 1995.
70 See "Three Soldiers Tried for Killing," Jakarta Post, 30 January 1996; Reuters, 15 February 1996. Needless 
to say, NGOs claimed that the term "procedural mistake" was too vague. Also, due to the frequent 
disciplinary measures taken against ABRI members in recent years, the relevance of the existing military 
law was more often discussed even within ABRI. One of the military law experts in ABRI, retired Brig-Gen 
Amiroeddin Sjarif who served as the head of the Army Legal Service (Dinas Hukum TNI-AD) for three 
years from 1980, insists that ABRI’s existing disciplinary laws (hukum disiplin militer) are unsuitable in
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Throughout the Liquisa and Timika cases, the ABRI-Komnas HAM interaction 
was the focus of attention. From ABRTs perspective, the institutionalisation of the 
Komnas HAM mechanism was a new challenge to its political control, since ABRTs 
lack of policy accountability was more openly and legitimately disclosed in the 
domestic and international arenas. Needless to say, Komnas HAM’s modest role of 
questioning ABRTs procedural errors did not prevent the error itself, but the 
sociopolitical cost of being labelled as "salah" (mistaken) was undoubtedly boosted in 
the era of Komnas HAM. For ABRI, ignoring Komnas HAM would only risk its social 
credibility. It is this respect that Komnas HAM acquired bargaining power vis-a-vis 
ABRI and expected to gain ABRTs cooperation in the long-run. Marzuki Darusman 
argued that: "if they [ABRI] really assess their own 'ethics and interests,' they may 
cooperate with us. Ethically, ABRI puts the highest value on being integrated with the 
people; thus respecting human rights is a legitimate claim even within ABRI circles. At 
the same time, it is also ABRTs political interest to prevent a decline in its popularity 
in society."71
Although these ethics and interests are matters of principle, we could also note 
the practical-operational interests. For ABRI, Komnas HAM’s stance was more 
acceptable than the claim usually made by grass-roots activists, whom ABRI perceived 
as always confrontative. Contrary to Komnas HAM’s approach to ABRTs human 
rights problem, the former editor of the banned Tempo and the chairman of KIPP 
argued that: "no consideration can stand before the fact that the people are killed by 
ABRI, and in order to stop this, we must consolidate grass-root forces, challenge the 
power, and fight for justice."72 If Komnas HAM’s approach could be assessed as the 
elite-persuasive one, Goenawan's—and many NGOs'—approach represented the 
grass-roots-confrontative one. For ABRI, the case of Timika showed that there was an 
practical interest—together with the above principled commitment—in preserving 
Komnas HAM and cohabiting with it. As an effect of this, ABRTs internal promotion 
of its human rights program proceeded after the Timika case, and Komnas HAM's 
involvement was apparent in some stages of that. It challenged the security approach 
as ABRI-mind and expanded ABRTs internal communication space for discussing 
issues regarding human rights abuses. We now examine this process and its 
implications below.
Formulating Human Rights Assessment within ABRI
current social conditions and also do not meet the standard of a modem legal system, as seen in the example 
of their unclear explanations about deviations [from discipline]. See Amiroeddin Sjarif, Hukum Disiplin 
Militer Indonesia, Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1996, pp.9-11.
71 Interview, 27 March 1997.
72 Interview with Goenawan Mohammad, 5 December 1996.
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First of all, Maj-Gen Dunidja (the Trikora Commander) prepared a guidebook 
on human rights protection after the arrest of four soldiers and the formation of the 
Timika Case Resolution Team. This was the first time for the New Order ABRI to 
attempt to codify human rights violations, based on the UN standard, and explain 
ways to avoid such violations.73 The guidebook first stated that ABRI soldiers had to 
respect the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibited acts of punishment 
without legal process. Thus ordering subordinates (bawahan) to commit human rights 
violations would be punished with a penalty equal to, or heavier than, the penalty 
given to the subordinate who conducted the order.74 The guidebook explained that "if 
it is hard for the field soldiers to report the violation to their immediate superior 
(atasan langsung), for example in the case that he is also involved in the abuse, they 
must report to the next-highest authority or directly to either Kodam Police or Kodam 
Legal Service (Kumdam); and once it is received, the receiver has to report it to the 
higher authority in the command structure."75 About murder, rape, torture and the use 
of excessive force, the instruction clearly said that they were crimes, and even if GPK 
members were captured, they had the rights to appeal to a court based on the existing 
laws. Moreover, torturing to obtain confessions or information was a legal violation, 
and such a confession could not be used for the prosecution of a suspected person at 
the court. Furthermore, the book insisted that military interest, national security and 
other reasons could not justify acts of torture.76
Clearly the book was a response to the Timika incident, as torture and murder 
were present in this case, but it was also notable that: (1) ABRI’s customary dogmatic 
emphasis of national security and the GPK threat was downgraded in this matter; and 
(2) ABRI employed the UN standard of human rights which ABRI had long been 
reluctant to accept, claiming that the Pancasila society, based on the keluarga 
philosophy, had its own mode of respect for human rights. The above two points 
implied that ABRI's traditional political language—which was coloured by 
particularism and cultural relativism—was virtually abandoned in the face of the 
practical need for introducing an internal reform program aimed at raising the conduct 
of soldiers to international standards. Perhaps having sensed these new features in the 
guidebook, Komnas HAM—in its letter to Pangab Feisal Tanjung— praised Kodam 
Trikora for providing a positive sign for future cooperation between ABRI and Komnas
73 The guidebook is Petunjuk (Direktif) Pangdam VIII/Trikora Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia (No. 
SKEP/96/XII/1995), Markas Komando Daerah Militer VIII/Trikora, 1995. An English extract of this 
21-page document is in Inside Indonesia, No.46, March 1996, pp.6-7.
74 Petunjuk..., pp.4-5.
75 Ibid., pp.5-6. Soldiers in the field are also instructed in the book to ask for an explanation from a 
commander who has issued the order, and if there is a possibility of human rights abuses, they are expected 
to show disagreement with it (p.7).
76 Ibid., pp.11-12. Soldiers were also instructed not to violate individual rights such as freedoms of thought, 
expression, and association.
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HAM in protecting human rights, and also called on the Pangab to use the book as a 
standard reference for all ABRI members in the archipelago.77
Coupled with this project targeted to the field-operation level, human rights 
became one of the central topics for ABRI's internal studies at the higher level, and 
contributed to the expansion of the scope for debating dwifungsi within ABRI. It was a 
few days after the release of the Church report on Timika that ABRI held a major 
national seminar to celebrate its contribution to national development. The seminar 
was held at Sesko ABRI and its two-day discussion focused on the management of 
ABRI's fundamental values for the next 25 years.78 Within this context, the human 
rights issue was discussed as a trend in the era of globalisation. The seminar concluded 
that, like the call for democratisation, the growing demand for improving human rights 
was an unavoidable consequence of globalisation, thanks to the prevailing notion of 
international solidarity, forcing many authoritarian governments to shift their 
policies.79 Unusually, the seminar provided no cultural arguments to counter this 
apparent global trend towards respect for human rights.
Contrary to these two events—the human rights guidebook and the seminar— 
which illustrated ABRI's institutional effort to cope with the new political paradigm, 
there was also an attempt to defend ABRI's traditional thinking based on a 
particularistic world view. At a seminar held the next year by the air force 
headquarters to formulate ABRI’s defence policy for the government's next 5-years 
development plan, the human rights issue was labelled as a significant obstacle. The 
seminar asserted that: "the human rights problem became a popular global issue 
because of the Western nations which attempted to bring up the issue in order to 
pressure other countries. However, human rights cannot be implemented in the same 
way because each country has its own national interest and culture."80 In this light, the 
seminar also concluded that the NGOs—as pressure groups for human rights and 
democratisation—where obstacles in Indonesia's strategic environment.81 While some 
officers accepted the need to respond to global concepts of human rights, others clearly 
saw them as a threat to ABRI’s security management.
77 Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, "Petunjuk Pangdam VIII/Trikora tentang Hak Asasi 
Manusia," N o.95/TU A /III/96,11 March 1996. This is a letter from Ali Said, Chairman of Komnas HAM, 
to Pangab Feisal Tanjung.
78 The seminar paper was entitled, Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa Dalam Rangka Menyukseskan 
Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua, Makalah Hasil Seminar, Bandung, Seskoabri, 6-8 September 
1995.
79 Ibid., pp.42-43.
80 Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII (Naskah Awal Pra Seminar), 
Mabes TNI-AU, April 1996, p.24. This air force seminar was parallel with the army seminar of 1996 which 
we examined in Chapter 3. The former discussed defence issues while the latter identified political issues. 
Both results were brought to the ABRI seminar in September to finally formulate ABRI’s input to the GBHN 
1998.
81 Ibid., p.33.
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However, it should be noted that this traditional thinking now openly faced 
criticism within ABRI. At the 1996 ABRI seminar held in September, the view to assess 
new societal forces and new global values as threats was strongly challenged by the 
seminar participants. Among them, retired Lt-Gen Hasnan Habib argued that human 
rights were not a weapon of the Western nations, but universal interests of all human 
beings. Mentioning the example of the 1992 Non-Block Movement Meeting in Jakarta, 
Hasnan claimed that Indonesia had already confirmed the "Jakarta message" of the 
meeting which stipulated the universal validity of human rights and thus negated the 
cultural particularism applied by some current officers.82
Furthermore, in November, a two-day seminar was again held at Sesko ABRI 
about ABRI's sociopolitical role and human rights. We have already examined the 
former subject in Chapter 2. For the human rights aspect, the discussion was led by 
some prominent figures, including Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman and Marzuki Darusman.83 
Marzuki warned against ABRI’s deepening suspicion of NGOs and argued that they 
represented new public aspirations resulting from New Order economic development.84 
About current human rights practice, he claimed that it was still limited to policy 
adjustments and proposed that it was necessary to be diffused as a national moral 
concept, insisting on the need for introducing an MPR decision to secure the nation's 
enduring commitment to universal human rights.85 On the other hand, Sayidiman 
defended the traditional views. He thought there was certainly foreign intervention in 
domestic affairs and cited the human rights problem as an example. For him, 
activating Pancasila philosophy was the most urgent task in order to reject such 
foreign pressure because human rights values were already built into Pancasila. Thus, 
he continued, domestic liberal groups who were influenced by foreign thoughts would 
have no opportunity if Pancasila were truly implemented.86 At the same time, he 
attributed the growing NGO activities to the impact of Western-value penetration, and 
again proposed that activating Pancasila philosophy was the key for ABRI to 
overcome the threat87
In this way, the conflicting interpretations on human rights could be seen in 
ABRI's internal discussions, which indicated that the process of change was in process.
82 Hasnan Habib, "Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII (Tanggapan)," paper prepared 
for Seminar ABRI, "Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Nasional Pada Pelita VII," Mabes 
ABRI, 3 September 1996, p.3.
83 Presentations were also made by Edi Sudjana, Head of the Human Rights and Environment Department at 
CIDES, Indria Samego of LIPI, and Professor Muladi, a law professor at the University of Diponegoro.
84 Marzuki Darusman, "Konsepsi Peningkatan Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi Pancasila," paper 
presented at Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 
November 1996, p.3.
85 Ibid., p.4. Italic added.
86 Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi di Indonesia," paper presented at 
Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 November 1996,
pp.1-2.
87 Interview, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, former Lemhannas Governor, 5 December 1996.
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Whatever the assessment, ABRI's attempts to bring human rights issues into the 
process of organisational learning illustrated a new phenomenon in the era of 
Kopkamtib-free politics, the reemergence of student demonstrations, assertive NGOs, 
and Komnas HAM. ABRI's human rights discussion was its response to the new 
political paradigm since the late 1980s. It did not simply add another topic to the 
conceptual debate within ABRI but also provided both a source of critical thinking in 
the developing dzvifungsi debate in society and a larger place within ABRI for those 
officers who had endeavoured to formulate viable visions of dwifungsi conduct in the 
era of keterbukaan.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the case of ABRI's adaptation to the new political 
paradigm (i.e. human rights accountability) in conducting internal security operations. 
Since this field exemplified the overlapping of dwifungsi's first and second functions, 
we expected our investigation to clarify an important part of ABRI's political thinking 
and its application. Our discussion started from the analysis of the shooting of 
civilians. We attempted to elucidate the way in which the events have affected the 
debate over ABRI's security approach which emerged in conjunction with the 
elimination of the extra-judicial security body, Kopkamtib. Then we argued that, 
reflecting the keterbukaan movement and the revival of the student movement, the 
security approach debate became a major theme in the opposition’s demand for policy 
accountability on ABRI's part. This criticism seemed to become relatively entrenched in 
the New Order civil-military discourse, since—unlike direct criticism of dwifungsi—it 
alone could hardly be interpreted by ABRI as attacking Pancasila and UUD45. The 
Dili incident at the end of 1991 also provided new institutional tools, namely KPN 
and DKM, for the critics of ABRI. We also focused on the role and impact of Komnas 
HAM as the first legitimate mechanism within the regime which checked ABRI's 
excessive use of force. As seen in the case of Timika, Komnas HAM virtually became a 
bridge between ABRI and the NGOs which first revealed the series of civilian killings. 
Though ABRI's recognition of 'procedural errors’ was not satisfactory in the eyes of 
NGOs which gave high priority to human rights values, it could also be concluded— 
from the perspective of the political process—that Komnas HAM's endorsement of the 
NGO/Church report eventually made grass-root voices accepted as legitimate pressure 
within the regime's political process. As we examined, ABRI also had rational reasons 
to cohabit with Komnas HAM, thus showing that some degree of policy accountability 
had become a standard procedure for ABRI, in contrast to the 1970s and 80s. As if to 
prove this, ABRI demonstrated its willingness to adopt human rights values within its 
organisational practice, as seen in the creation of its first human rights manual for field
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soldiers—based on the UN standard—and a series of internal seminars, focusing on 
the promotion of human rights.
These processes all indicated that ABRI's traditional framework for internal 
security conduct had started to erode and be subjected to some institutional 
restrictions—again in comparison with the pre-keterbukaan period. This development 
was promoted through various steps—namely the spread of the security approach 
debate, the adoption of DKM/DKP as a new measure to handle ABRI's human rights 
abuses, and the legitimate role of Komnas HAM in challenging ABRI’s earlier one-sided 
explanations about military shooting of civilians. All contributed to the diminishing 
military control over civil-military communication in the era of keterbukaan.
What should be noted, however, was that ABRI's perception of the human 
rights issue was linked in the minds of officers to the issue of globalisation. ABRI's 
traditional approach thus identified that it had been pushed by environmental 
pressures rather than by an awareness of its own misconduct in the field arising from 
the excessive security approach. This subjective view was interesting not so much 
because it could affect ABRI’s behaviour but because it allowed ABRI to seek a 
rationale which could revive its autonomous posture, when ABRI felt the necessity to 
defend itself. The concept of "foreign-value penetration" was, in fact, interpreted as the 
influx of liberal thinking which was then easily stamped as anti-Pancasila ideas veiled 
by human rights and NGOs.
It was in this context that we can assess ABRI's dual use of globalisation 
language. On the one hand, as discussed in this chapter, the term was employed to 
present ABRI's accommodative posture in the coming decades; saying that the security 
approach and human rights assessment were being revised in the era of globalisation. 
On the other hand, the term provided a weapon for ABRI to attack domestic critics, by 
arguing that globalisation allowed the inflow of negative foreign-values destructive to 
national stability, and then identifying certain groups promoting these values. It was 
notable that this cognitive structure seemed to run in tandem with the growing civilian 
use of globalisation terminology—which clearly backed activities of Komnas HAM, 
students, NGOs, and critical intellectuals—to question ABRI's paternalistic political 
control and traditional security approach in dealing with societal demands for wider 
political participation. Therefore, although we have seen ABRI’s accommodation to the 
new political paradigm, its traditional approach should not be ignored for our 
understanding of ABRI's response to democratic demands during the late New Order 
period. The purpose of the next chapter is to investigate the development of such 
hardline military thinking—their ideological projects and political reflexivity—aimed at 
repressing the demand for political democratisation.
**********
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The Hardline Military Ideology in the 
Age of Globalism: The Development 
of the Kewaspadaan  Mind-Set
This chapter discusses ABRI's ideological adaptation in the face of growing 
democratic pressures during the late Soeharto era.1 As discussed in the previous 
chapters, political society in the age of keterbukaan insisted on the need for improving 
human rights accountability, eliminating ABRI's praetorian political intervention, and— 
more generally—broadening space for political participation. It is in this process that 
the mass media and political figures introduced such concepts as globalisation 
(globalisasi) and civil society (masyarakat madani) into New Order political discourse to 
support these demands as inevitable historical and global trends that cannot be 
reversed.2 Backed by the concept of globalism, democracy advocates both within the 
regime and in society stepped up pressure for the elimination of authoritarian practices 
long adopted by Soeharto and ABRI.
In Chapter 4, we investigated how ABRI defensively accommodated such 
pressures for human rights accountability. This chapter, on the other hand, examines 
ABRI’s counter-offensive against these democratic challenges by reshaping its 
ideological framework in a way that identified them as a national "threat”—a 
legitimate target of security operations. The concept of globalisasi has played a decisive 
role in this ideological reformulation aiming to rationalise a hardline military approach 
to democratic movements. Our empirical question, therefore, is the how and why of 
such developments. We seek the answers in the contexts of both Soeharto-ABRI 
relations during the final decade of the New Order regime and the institutional inertia 
of ABRI's ideological reproduction since the beginning of the regime.
1 For a more extensive version of the argument of this chapter, see Honna (1999).
2 Although it is hard to trace exactly when the popular usage of these terms started in Indonesia, we can 
suspect that, as elsewhere, these concepts were widely used after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the 
Soviet Union during 1988-1991. One of the earliest discussions in Indonesia can be found in late 1990. A 
leading evening newspaper demanded ABRI's adjustment of its role in facing globalisation. See "Tugas ABRI 
dan Era Globalisasi," Suara Pembaruan, 5 October 1990. ABRI, in its own newspaper, reacted to this by 
insisting that the role played by ABRI to safeguard the national ideology was crucial to prevent national 
disintegration as happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. See "Dalam Era Globalisasi, Ideologi 
Tetap Diperlukan," Angkatan Bersenjata, 12 November, 1990.
142
Chapter 5
We first look at ABRI's organisational attempts to standardise its ideological 
format within the military and society during the decade since the late 1970s. The next 
section focuses on ABRI's internal efforts since the late 1980s to adjust the established 
framework of hardline military thinking to the changing environment—such as the 
collapse of Soviet Union and the rise of social pressure for regime opening. We argue 
that such ideological reshaping was coloured by the shift in Soeharto-ABRI relations— 
from antagonistic under Moerdani's ABRI leadership to amenable under the Feisal- 
Hartono leadership—in the early 1990s. The way in which the reshaped ideological 
setting was translated into actual political programs during the final years of the 
Soeharto government is also examined. The range of politico-ideological dissent that 
emerged in this process is investigated next, followed by my attempt at categorising 
three different mind-sets among the military officers which reflected the diversification 
of military thinking during the final years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, 
the significance of both political and institutional factors in evolving New Order 
military ideology is argued.
Tarpadnas and the Ideological Setting of Military Kewaspadaan
As seen earlier, ABRI's dwifungsi, which was officially adopted at the beginning 
of the New Order, claimed a "permanent" role in the defence and sociopolitical fields. 
We showed in Chapter 3 that this permanency was a notable characteristic of the 
officers' role belief derived from developmentalist ideology. However, this ideological 
framework needed frequent reproduction to justify continuing military control of 
politics as stability was not yet fully achieved. The military thus claimed that it had 
the ability to maintain stability, but at the same time needed to say that it had not 
achieved complete stability. To this end, since the launching of the regime, continuous 
efforts were made to construct an image of instability. After 1978 this was formally 
programed and routinised within ABRI on the initiative of Lemhannas. This high-level 
military educational institute established a program, the so-called National Vigilance 
Refresher Course (Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional—Tarpadnas), for the 
indoctrination of both officers and civilians about "potential" political threats to 
national stability. According to Lemhannas, this vigilance (kewaspadaan) indoctrination 
program was almost completed by February 1988.3 Assessing the content and 
development of this program during the period of 1978-1988 is helpful to clarify 
ABRI’s standard threat image before the keterbukaan period.
3 "Surat Keputusan Gubemur Lemhannas No: SKEP/07/II/1988, Tanggal 24-2-1988, Tentang Penggunaan 
Buku Materi Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional dan Kegiatan Semacamnya,” in Materi Balatkom, Jakarta: 
Lemhannas, Mabes ABRI, 1988.
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Tarpadnas was a joint project of Lemhannas and Kopkamtib and was open to 
ABRI members and staff of other Departments.4 It was not coincidental that the 
program started in June 1978, following the regime crackdown on the 1977-1978 
student movement opposing Soeharto's presidential re-election.5 One document 
prepared for the Tarpadnas 1979 asserted that the "New Left" had taken over 
communist activities after the banning of the PKI in 1966, through the medium of 
students and intellectuals. The development of the New Left in the campuses had 
encouraged the extreme left which used labour and land disputes to attract supporters 
and had also infiltrated various mass organisations and government institutions.6 
Regarding the extreme right, or Islamic fundamentalism, the document claimed that it 
had become fanatic and militant because they had no attractive propaganda to 
expand their organisation except by using religious means.7
From another angle, the Tarpadnas course in 1980 claimed that, in order to 
alleviate the latent danger of these extremes, it was very necessary to reduce the 
increasing economic gap between the rich minority and the poor majority, and to 
minimise government manipulation of power and authority—thus admitting the 
regime's and ABRI's own failures as a factor encouraging extremism.8 However, in 
response to the government policy to gradually release PKI political prisoners, 
Lemhannas warned that about 105 of them were still "diehards" who were unwilling to 
drop communist ideology, including the authors, Pramudya Ananta Toer and Rivai 
Apin. Therefore, the paper concluded, ABRI should not relax its kewaspadaan against 
them.9 This alarmism was encouraged by the notion of "organisation without
4 The program was launched following a leadership change within the military in June 1978. Lemhannas 
had been headed by Lt-Gen Sayidiman who was widely believed to be critical of Soeharto's inner-circle 
officers who had dominated ABRI's intelligence sector, such as Admiral R. Sudomo, Gen Yoga Sugomo and 
Maj-Gen Benny Moerdani. In the 1978 reshuffle, which placed General Mohammad Yusuf as the new ABRI 
Commander, Sudomo became Kopkamtib Commander while he held concurrently the post of Deputy 
Commander of ABRI. Yoga, the Head of BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordination Board) who was directly 
responsible to the President, was posted as the Chief of Kopkamtib in October without losing his BAKIN 
position. Similarly Moerdani held the posts of Assistant for Intelligence in the Defence Ministry, Head of 
the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat) in the Defence Ministry, Assistant for Intelligence at 
Kopkamtib and, since 1978, Deputy Head of BAKIN. Soon after the implementation of Tarpadnas, 
Sayidiman was transferred to an ambassadorship (Japan) in October 1978. The new governor of 
Lemhannas was Lt-Gen Sutopo Juwono, former Head of BAKIN. Thus, the Tarpadnas project reflected the 
ongoing dominance of the intelligence sector within ABRI.
5 On nation-wide student demonstrations, see The Editors (1978:151-182).
6 Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1979, pp.23-27. 
The definition of New Left was not provided in this document, but it should be noted that, as Anderson 
argues, people who had been with the Left before the New Order were rarely university-educated 
(Anderson 1998:290). Thus, perhaps ABRI identified the increasing role of universities as a new 
development for the Left.
7 Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya, p.26.
8 Pengamanan Ideologi Pancasila Terhadap Pengaruh Ideologi-Ideologi Besar di Dunia, Jakarta: Lemhannas, 
Dephankam, 1980, n.p..
9 Perkembangan Bahaya Laten Ex-Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1980, 
pp.23-24. This document was also part of the Tarpadnas material. There is, however, no explanation of 
how "105" people could be a threat to national security.
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organisation" (organisasi tak terhentuk). The construction of a network of cell members 
without formal organisation, Lemhannas insisted, had been the strategy of PKI 
supporters under the New Order. They had tried to undermine national unity based on 
the Pancasila ideology by attempting to infiltrate the "floating-mass" and looking for 
opportunities among labour, agrarian, student, women's, legal, and cultural movements 
which had emerged in the process of national development (pembangunan).10 Such 
kewaspadaan thinking, which saw the latent danger of communist resurgence in the 
changing society, reflected the legacy of military mind-sets cultivated during the 1966-7 
elimination of PKI. They were formally standardised for officer indoctrination during 
the first few years of the Tarpadnas program.
In 1985, the indoctrination target was expanded to include lower-level 
governmental bodies and official organisations such as the National Journalists 
Association (PWI), National Youth Committee (KNPI), Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Kadin), and so on. At the regional level, Kopkamtib officers (Laksuswil) 
conducted the program for the members of the regional branches of the above 
organisations and also for provincial parliamentarians. Moreover, at the lower level, 
Kopkamtib officers (Laksusda), in cooperation with Korems, coordinated meetings of 
Tarpadnas alumni to maintain the kewaspadaan indoctrination for those who had 
previously joined it.* 11 The stretching of this indoctrination program into society was 
instructed in August 1984 by General Benny Moerdani who became Pangab and 
Kopkamtib Commander in March 1983.12 As Soeharto's right-hand man and as the 
New Order intelligence czar, Moerdani endeavoured to expand the military's 
ideological surveillance in society for the further fortification of New Order political 
control.13 Moerdani's program was implemented by Maj-Gen Soebijakto—another 
intelligence officer and a close aide to Moerdani—who was installed as the Lemhannas 
Governor two months after Moerdani's promotion to Pangab.14 The kewaspadaan 
project, which was first intended to standardise the military’s (and the government's) 
threat perception regarding national stability, was now transformed into ABRI's 
security-intelligence project aiming to control political ideas in society. This move
10 Taktik-Taktik Komunisme, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1981, pp.1-2, 5. The concept of the floating- 
mass was introduced in the early New Order period. It required that the mass of the people should express 
their political preferences only in general elections held every five years, so that their daily activities could 
be spent fully on economic development. The major advocate of this theory was Maj-Gen Ali Moertopo. See 
Ali Moertopo (1973).
11 For details, see Pengarahan Aster Kasum ABR1 Pada Rakorter ABRI Tahun 1985 Tanggal 1 Agustus 1985 
Tentang Kebijaksanaan Pembinaan Teritorial, Jakarta: Staf Teritorial, Mabes ABRI, 1985, pp.25-32.
12 "Surat Telegram Pangkopkamtib No:STR. 61/Kopkam/1984 Tanggal 18 Agustus 1984 Tentang 
Pelaksanaan Tarpadnas dan Kegiatan Semacamnya."
13 About Moerdani's intelligence power, see The Editors (1984:149-152).
14 Significantly, Soebijakto was a former military attache to Moscow (1977) and regarded as a "communist 
expert" within ABRI.
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resonated perfectly with the Soeharto regime's program to enforce all social 
organisations to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophical foundation.15
The kewaspadaan formula, however, provided some interesting insights into the 
mode of development of New Order military ideology. First, regime concepts, such as 
pembangunan and floating-mass, had been presented since 1966 as the antithesis of the 
communist-influenced Old Order led by President Sukarno. However, they were now 
perceived as sources of vulnerability which would provide the basis for underground 
extremist activities. This assessment reflected the process in which ABRI's original 
scheme of threat theory had been broadened to cover the "consequences" of 
pembangunan after the first decade of the New Order. ABRI's long-term political 
involvement had been rationalised by a developmentalist ideology which insisted on 
the military's role in safeguarding the ultimate national goal (i.e. pembangunan). The 
established kewaspadaan doctrine—which now saw pembangunan as a source of 
threat—enhanced the ideological rationale for military domination.
Second, ABRI's internal study of the latent communist danger (Bahaya Laten 
Komunisme—Balatkom) revealed an interesting contradiction in approach. In a 
February 1988 document which was formulated by Maj-Gen Soebijakto as a standard 
material for the subsequent Tarpadnas, the history, thought, and activities of the PKI 
were described in detail with the conclusion that Marxist ideology—whether it was 
implemented by communist or other groups—was destructive to Pancasila society. 
However, this 100-page paper at the same time rejected liberal capitalism by using the 
neo-Marxist perspective on capitalism and the world-system to argue that capitalism 
had made the rich richer and the poor poorer because the rich were the owners of 
capital. The paper asserted that the recent rise of multi-national corporations also 
resulted in the accumulation of capital in industrial countries and this had 
strengthened the structural dependency of the poor countries.16 Logically, there was no 
conflict between concern about communism and concern about capitalism, since both 
could undermine the ideological basis of Pancasila.17 But what should be noted is that 
Balatkom was juxtaposed with neo-Marxist language in the perception of Lemhannas 
officers who had developed the kewaspadaan ideology. Soebijakto—the communist 
expert—seemed to know the utility of Marxist ideas.
15 Soeharto had proposed this plan in his Independence Day speech in August 1982 and the legislation was 
formally adopted in 1985. This was widely perceived as Soeharto's attempt to undermine the influence of 
political Islam. A month after Moerdani's instruction above, violent riots broke out in Tanjung Priok, North 
Jakarta, where hundreds of angered Muslims were killed by security forces. This event encouraged a 
growing perception among Muslim groups that Gen Moerdani, a Catholic, had been aiming to de-Islamise 
Indonesia. Regarding this series of developments, see, for example, Bresnan (1993:218-244).
16 Materi Balatkom, pp.3-5.
17 As Weinstein's vivid study illustrated in 1976, one shared world-view among political elites since the 
time of the Revolution was the fear of dependence on the capitalist countries—as an expression of 
imperialism. Thus the officers’ suspicion of capitalism was not new. See Weinstein (1976).
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All the Lemhannas papers examined above implied that in order to construct 
this Pancasila dialectic, both communism and capitalism-liberalism were "needed" as 
the thesis and antithesis. ABRI's standard assessment can be found in the following 
comment.
When we adopted our political system, there were two mainstreams in the world, 
i.e. Western democracy based on individualism and the Communist regime based on 
class. However, they were not suitable for Indonesia where the sense of 
"togetherness" (kebersamaan) in society transcended both individual and class 
[interests]. This was the foundation of our Pancasila democratic system.18
This perception was held by both ABRI officers and the state administrators, and it 
was against this background that, with or without a real threat, Balatkom gradually 
became a built-in ritual of hypemationalism which upheld Pancasila as the absolute 
value.19 In the history of New Order anti-communist thinking, this was a major 
development, as the ritualisation no longer needed "real" threats—since the 
maintenance of the ritual itself became the end of organisational activity—and enabled 
ABRI to adopt Balatkom as a weapon against any societal element branded as "anti- 
Pancasila."20
It was, however, notable that the completion of Lemhannas’ Balatkom study 
was soon followed by Soeharto’s decision to abolish Kopkamtib in September 1988. In 
terms of military ideology, the loss of Kopkamtib was unlikely to undermine ABRI's 
established Balatkom thinking which had already become a standard aspect of 
Lemhannas courses. The Tarpadnas project was also preserved in post-Kopkamtib 
civil-military relations. Nevertheless, in the political context, the disbanding of 
Kopkamtib and the completion of Balatkom had significant reflections in the growing 
inner-regime contestation. As seen in Chapter 2, it was widely believed that the
18 Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Minister of Defence and Security, February 19, 1997.
19 Maj-Gen Soebijakto, Lemhannas Governor, at the opening of Tarpadnas meeting in 1988, explained that 
the PKI had revolted three times, so a fourth attempt might be possible. But he said it was difficult to detect. 
See "Mewaspadai yang Keempat," Tempo, 5 November 1988. Such a threat assessment was far from 
professional but well represented the ritualised nature of this kewaspadaan campaign. For a similar account 
which stresses the ritualisation of the anti-communist campaign, see Goodfellow (1995). It should also be 
noted that the three revolts start with the famous 1926-27 uprising against the Dutch colonial government. 
This suggests that the New Order (and ABRI) sub-consciously identify themselves as a late reincarnation of 
Dutch colonial rule. For an account which suggests this point, see Anderson (1983:492-493).
20 As if to maintain the ritual, Pangab Try Sutrisno, again at Lemhannas, explained that Balatkom's present 
target was "non-formal" social groups which were supposed to have links with PKI sympathisers. "Inti 
Amanat Pangab: Waspadai Kegiatan-Kegiatan Politik Praktis dan Kelompok Non Formal," Mimbar 
Kekaryaan ABRI, Edisi 213, September 1988, pp-7, 63. Regarding the developing anti-communism campaign, 
Goodfellow sees four historical phases. The first three were between 1965 and 1971, namely the physical 
annihilation of the PKI, the consolidation of army dominance in central politics, and the use of the campaign 
as a weapon of coercion against any individual or group which objected to the New Order. The fourth 
phase was from the late 1980s when the campaign was mainly utilised as a means of suppressing popular 
political expression by NGOs and students. See Goodfellow (1995:1-15). Our focus is, however, on how the 
military has reshaped its ideological framework to legitimise the transformation of the campaign from one 
target to another.
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liquidation of Kopkamtib was primarily intended to diminish the power of Moerdani 
who was unhappy with Soeharto's choice of Lt-Gen (ret) Sudharmono as vice 
president for 1988-1993. Moerdani was eased out of the Pangabship by Soeharto and 
transferred to the Department of Defence as Minister just before the presidential (and 
vice-presidential) elections at the MPR in March 1988. The growing disenchantment of 
Moerdani's officers with the President was evident when Brig-Gen Ibrahim Saleh of F- 
ABRI interrupted a session in the MPR by openly objecting to the nomination of 
Sudharmono as vice president. ABRI's unhappiness was expressed in other places too.
Gen Try Sutrisno, a close ally of Moerdani, who had replaced the latter as 
Pangab, spoke to his officers just after the MPR session:
This time, the atmosphere [of the MPR] was different from the past cases. There 
was a tendency of a certain group to force its wishes in such a way as to endanger 
Pancasila democracy. We have to watch out for this. Recalling the MPR session 
which just finished, we are almost ready to conclude that ABRI's sociopolitical 
activities for securing the purity and consistency of Pancasila and the Constitution 
will be significantly difficult in tire future.21
In July, Sutrisno again expressed his opinion at a meeting of officers who were to be 
posted to non-military positions. This time, he stressed that:
Indonesia should have a healthy and dynamic Pancasila democracy in which we 
can nominate more than two candidates for the vice presidency and vote to decide 
on one of them at the MPR. This is important to improve the professionalism of all 
sociopolitical forces.22
These two statements by the new ABRI Commander indicated the objection of the 
ABRI leadership toward Soeharto's selection of Sudharmono. These statements were 
also rare cases of the ABRI Commander openly showing his dissatisfaction with 
Soeharto's political projects. It was also the first time that ABRI accepted the idea of 
competition for the vice presidency and implicitly for the presidency. Resonating with 
such frustration among the ABRI leadership, the established kewaspadaan approach— 
armed with the Balatkom doctrine—was mobilised against Sudharmono who may 
have still intended to seek re-election as chairperson of Golkar at its 1988 Congress.
Kopkamtib was mobilised to identify 'communist penetration' in the 
Sudharmono-led Golkar. During the period between the March MPR session and the 
Golkar Election in October, an intensive campaign was conducted to discredit 
Sudharmono by alleging his involvement in the activities of communist organisations in 
the late 1940s, presumably reflecting Moerdani's roll-back strategy against Soeharto
21 Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Upacara Penutupan Susyawan ABRI Angkatan ke-XIV di 
Bandung Tanggal 14 March 1988," Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI, Edisi 208, April 1988, p.47.
22 Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Acara Pertemuan Dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI 
Eslon-1 di Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988," Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.44.
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and Sudharmono.23 Soeharto’s September decision to abolish Kopkamtib was made 
under these circumstances. From the perspective of ABRI's kewaspadaan development, 
these events showed how the intra-military program of ideological standardisation 
had been transformed into a tool of security surveillance in society and was finally 
developed into ABRI's weapon to challenge Soeharto's political blueprint. It was ironic 
that the project, which was intended to secure the stability of Soeharto’s regime based 
on Pancasila conformity, unintendedly turned into a military means to undermine 
inner-elite cohesion and threaten Soeharto. The evolving kewaspadaan doctrine during 
the decade up to 1988 strongly reflected the pre-eminence of the intelligence sector 
within ABRI which had long been dominated by Moerdani. It was remarkable, in this 
sense, that the completion of the Balatkom project was accompanied by the decline of 
Moerdani s power.
However, the fall of Moerdani did not mark the end of the kewaspadaan 
ideology within ABRI. It was ABRI's institutional inertia that had sustained ritualised 
kewaspadaan thinking by seeking new targets since the late 1980s. The New Order 
military had needed to struggle continuously to maintain the legitimacy of its 
permanent political involvement as derived from the developmentalist ideology—as if 
pumping the heart to keep sending blood into the body of the living dinosaur. It was in 
this context that the growing democratic movements and their frequent use of the 
globalisation concept attracted the eyes of ABRI's doctrine managers.
The Hardline Military Thinking on Globalisation
Globalisation was a concept originally popularised by the media and 
democratic movements in their attempts to question the legitimacy of military control 
of politics and to expand democratic space in the country's political discourse. This 
new weapon for advocates of democratisation—including students, legal activists, 
NGOs, and elite critics consisting of retired generals and civilian politicians—had 
asserted that regime opening, or keterbukaan, was an irresistible global demand as it 
was no longer relevant for ABRI to emphasise the threat of communism after the fall of 
the USSR and the dissolution of the Communist Bloc commencing in 1988. ABRI's
23 A few days before the Golkar Congress in October, Kopkamtib announced that a head of a Golkar 
branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting Sudharmono's 
management of Golkar. This Balatkom campaign was also encouraged in April by retired Lt-Gen Sarwo 
Edhie Wibowo who announced his resignation from the DPR/MPR in protest against what he believed 
were ex-PKI figures in key governmental posts. Sarwo's action was widely seen as an attempt to label 
Sudharmono as communist. Then, for the rest of the year, the latent danger campaign was conducted under 
the name of bersih diri (clean-self) and bersih lingkungan (clean-environment) to look for those in the 
government who (and whose family) had any link with past PKI activities. Sudharmono finally decided not 
to run for the Golkar chairmanship. For details of this extraordinary campaign, see "The Latent Danger of 
the PKI," Tapol Bulletin 87 (June 1988); "The 'Clean-Self and 'Clean-Environment' Witch-Hunt," Tapol 
Bulletin 90 (December 1988); and Goodfellow (1995:15-28).
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established kewaspadaan doctrine faced an unprecedented challenge as its principal 
resource for ideological reproduction was cut off. However, as seen below, ABRI's 
ritualised practice invented an "opportunity" in this new social trend to reassert the 
supremacy of kewaspadaan thinking and expand the political territory in which ABRI 
could enjoy relative freedom in projecting this ritual into its actual political program. 
This dynamic had nothing to do with the ongoing Soeharto-ABRI friction but reflected 
ABRI's corporate interest in preserving its dominant political power rationalised by its 
long-standing role beliefs. Institutional inertia was, therefore, at work in driving the 
transformation of ABRI's kewaspadaan doctrine into a tool of popular repression since 
the late 1980s. However, it was the changing Soeharto-ABRI relations that had 
characterised the "style" of the doctrinal application. We will look at these two 
spiralling developments and how the globalisation discourse provided ABRI with a 
critical opportunity to synchronise its old ideological structure with the new social 
discursive trend in such a way as to strengthen ABRI’s hardline approach to popular 
democratic movements.
To assess this indication in the early stage of the keterbukaan movement in 
society, ABRI's strategic paper in 1988 is helpful. ABRI's basic strategic planning 
consisted of three pillars, i.e. long-term (25 years), medium-term (5 years), and short­
term (annual) assessments. The Defence Department headed by Moerdani formulated 
the annual strategic assessment in 1988 which was full of kewaspadaan concerns. It 
stated, among other things, that for the next few years in the 1990s, when international 
communication would become easier and wider, special vigilance would be needed in 
response to the infiltration of foreign values into Indonesia—especially communism 
and liberalism—which might threaten the values of Pancasila and UUD45, and these 
alien values would penetrate in places where excessive economic development had 
caused a widening of the social gap between the rich and the poor.24 Therefore, the 
internal security threat in the early 1990s, the document concluded, would be in the 
form of "new-style communism" (komunisme gaya baru—KGB) infiltrated into the 
government and society. And kewaspadaan would be urgently required to monitor the 
activities of: (1) social organisations which in the past had shown hesitation in 
accepting Pancasila as the sole principle for all social organisations, and later accepted 
it in a doubtful way; (2) the fourth-generation communist group which based its tactics 
on the new-style communism, that is, no longer using physical means but constitutional 
methods, intellectual activities, government administration, and other means in order 
to "depoliticise ABRI;" (3) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional 
ways—such as instigating mass riots—to further their political interests based on 
racial and separatist motivations; and (4) a certain group of people (pihak tertentu) 
who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread
24 Analisa Lingkungan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1988-1989, Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal, 
Perencanaan Umum dan Penganggaran, Dephankam, 1988; pp.126-127.
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through academic forums, discussions and seminars as well as via the mass media.25 In 
order to counter these "dangers threatening Pancasila, UUD45, national integration 
and development," this short-term strategic study advocated the vital need to uphold 
the kewaspadaan level with the aim of eliminating any idea in society which might 
contradict Pancasila and the national interest.26 Though the term "globalisation" was 
not yet used, the paper emphasised deepening international relations as the key factor 
which would activate these threats.
ABRI's intermediate-term strategy for 1989-1993 paid special attention to 
security management during the 1992 election and the presidential election at the 
general session of the MPR in 1993. The policy guideline for the territorial apparatus 
stated that there were certain groups which tried to stir up emotional issues in society, 
such as land disputes, and encouraged demonstrations and riots oriented toward 
racial-religious issues in order to achieve their political interests linked with the general 
elections and the presidential election.27 In response to these threats, the territorial 
commands were instructed to sustain the kewaspadaan effort, scrutinise the activities of 
former political prisoners, manage political conditions for the election and the MPR 
session, neutralise the negative impact of economic development and new advanced 
technology, and combat any effort by certain groups to manipulate religion for political 
interests.28 This guidance showed that the concept of "vigilance against certain groups" 
was not only a tool of ideological indoctrination but a core part of ABRI's territorial 
operations in practice.
ABRI's security conduct during the election and handling of the MPR, however, 
gave legitimacy to demands in society to relax the tight security practices of previous 
years.29 ABRI responded on the 28th anniversary of the failed 'communist' coup of 
1965 (G30S/PKI) in September 1993, when Lemhannas published a thick document 
about kewaspadaan and Balatkom under the instruction of Lemhannas Governor, Maj- 
Gen Hartono.30 One of Hartono's contributions to ABRI’s kewaspadaan discourse was 
his view that communist tactics were no longer the monopoly of communists but had
25 Ibid., pp.128-130. The second point here showed how ABRI had perceived the criticism of dwifungsi as 
an attempt to depoliticise ABRI, which could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and anti-national integration; 
thus, in short, possible subjects of security operations. Also reflecting the third point, the government and 
ABRI decided to place on Aceh in 1989 the status of Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer— 
DOM) in order to intensify the security operations against the separatist movements. The other two areas 
which also had this status were Irian Jay a and East Timor.
26 Ibid., p.166. Emphasis added.
27 Pokok-Pokok Kebijaksanaan Pembinaan Teritorial Tahun 1989-1993 [No: Kep/04/VII/1990], Jakarta: 
Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp. 10-11.
28 Ibid., pp .20-23.
29 We discuss the events in the 1993 MPR in the next section.
30 The document is Sekitar Padnas, Bahaya Latent & Tapol G.30.S./PK1, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 
1993. Hartono had been appointed to this position since February 1993. As discussed in Chapter 2, he was 
an ICMI-linked officer and his promotion was widely seen as Soeharto's tactical shift from the military to 
Islam in ensuring his political power base. This move resonated with Soeharto's alienation of Moerdani- 
linked officers.
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now been "borrowed and adapted" by "certain groups for certain political interests."31 
By distinguishing the method from the ideology, Hartono argued that non-communists 
also utilised communist methods in their attempts to topple the government. Needless 
to say, this interpretation was quite useful when condemning popular political 
movements in which it was hopeless for ABRI to try to find a scent of communist 
ideology. Also, since the term "certain group" was open-ended, any political trouble­
maker in the eyes of ABRI could be brought into this category if necessary. To support 
this approach, the document developed an argument which can be summarised as 
follows.
It first countered the idea claiming that the communist threat was an illusion 
after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
document explained that, with the closing of the Cold War, the world entered an era of 
globalisation and free flow of information which had a great impact on Indonesia's 
development because the boundary7 between the domestic and international systems 
was rapidly becoming meaningless. This phenomenon brought a new spectrum of 
threats in every fields of national life. In politics, globalism encouraged the penetration 
of capitalism, liberal thought and other foreign ideologies which contradicted the 
Pancasila philosophy and jeopardised the Indonesian defence system based on the 
Total People's Defence (Hankamrata).32 In the economic field, the free market economy 
had an impact on Indonesia's Pancasila economy based on kemitraan (partnership), 
while in religious life, globalisation facilitated the influx of foreign values which would 
meet with a negative reaction from religious groups. The document thus concluded that 
these threats would damage social harmony and national resilience (Ketahanan 
Nasional).33 It was against these perceived challenges that the kewaspadaan campaign 
had to be conducted and, significantly, Lemhannas repeatedly emphasised the 
campaign's synchronisation with Ketahanan Nasional as the total defence policy. This 
was the invention of ABRI which thought that the umbrella of Ketahanan Nasional— 
an indisputable national concept—could be useful to rejuvenate the ritual of Balatkom 
and kewaspadaan which was, to a large extent, a historical legacy. By attaching the 
kewaspadaan project to Ketahanan Nasional, ABRI found an interpretative technique to 
resist its declining historical legitimacy after the 28 years of regime stability.
Hartono, who was promoted to Kassospol with the rank of lieutenant general 
in January 1994, again wrote his views on the national threat in a more systematic way 
in a Lemhannas journal.34 This time, he stressed the threat from capitalism-liberalism
31 Ibid., p.III. Emphasis added. As a logical consequence, Hartono insisted that such a new trend became the 
target of kewaspadaan in the ideological, political, economic, sociocultural, and defence fields.
32 Despite such a worry about capitalism in the early 1990s, it was a reality that the regime had invited 
massive foreign investment by Western capitalists since the mid-1960s.
33 Above explanations are from ibid., pp.V, 1-10.
34 R. Hartono (Letjen TNI), "Pengaruh Perkembangan IPTEK Terhadap Aktualisasi Pengabdian Generasi 
Penerus ABRI," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, No.60, 1994, pp.43-56. As seen in the next section, Hartono's 
appointment to this position—which commands ABRI's political policies—reflected the rise in fortunes of
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which accompanied globalism, rather than his previous emphasis on communism. For 
Hartono, the rapid development of science and technology (IPTEK) in the era of 
globalisation greatly influenced the ideological-political-economic-sociocultural- 
military (ipoleksosbudmil) areas of national life so it was the task of "professional" 
ABRI officers to anticipate its negative influences. The idea that the global change was 
a threat to the nation was underlined. He argued that:
... the bipolar international system under the Cold War had ended and been 
replaced by a tendency to form a uni-polar system under Western capitalism- 
liberalism. [As a result], the global economy speeded up the penetration of foreign 
culture through advanced information/communication technology and made 
Westerners think that their cultural values were universal. They then started to push 
other countries over the issues of human rights and environmental protection.35
Hartono's assessments were not unique and were widely shared by the state 
administrators. However, as seen in the Lemhannas document on national vigilance, 
this shared perception effectively opened discursive space for ABRI to assert the need 
for strengthening ideological-political control under the flag of "latent danger." 
Hartono’s promotion to the position of Army Chief of Staff in February 1995 
facilitated ABRI's inclination to adopt this approach in political practice. The 
foundation of this should be sought in the context of the changing Soeharto-ABRI 
relations since the 1988 MPR session which was, as discussed earlier, coloured by 
ABRI's overt frustration with Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice president.
Transformation of Soeharto-ABRI Relations
The lingering antagonism between Soeharto and the ABRI leadership had been 
reflected in events such as the dissolution of Kopkamtib and the creation of ICMI. For 
Soeharto, both would work to undermine the influence of Moerdani-linked officers and 
make sure that ABRI was fully under his control. These attempts were accompanied by 
his move to limit the conducts of dwifungsi led by the current ABRI leaders, as implied 
in his tut zuuri handayani instruction in November 1990. Soeharto's handling of the Dili 
shooting was also understood as part of this political struggle.36 Moreover, as seen 
earlier, the vast international pressure after the Dili killing became the primary factor 
pushing Soeharto to set up Komnas HAM in December 1993, which was also seen as
Muslim officers typified by the promotion of Gen Feisal Tanjung who had replaced Try Sutrisno as ABRI 
Commander in March 1993.
35 Ibid., pp.43-45.
36 As discussed in Chapter 4, both the sacked generals—Brig-Gen Warouw and Maj-Gen Sintong 
Panjaitan—were thought to be Moerdani's men, and it has been suspected that Lt-Col Prabowo, who had a 
special access to the President and was helping the purge of Moerdani-linked officers, engineered the 
incident in Dili to encourage the process.
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an attempt by Soeharto to create a tool to help him publicise military problems that 
would be used to his political benefit.
The military leadership under Moerdani and Try Sutrisno was not silent. In the 
June 1992 general election, ABRI adopted a "neutral" attitude toward Golkar and also 
"tolerated" retired officers who supported the PDI. It was ABRI's reminder to Soeharto 
that the established New Order political system could not be maintained without 
ABRI's active support. ABRI's response was highlighted in the vice-presidential 
election at the MPR session in March 1993. As seen previously, Moerdani's aide, Lt- 
Gen Harsudiono Hartas (Kassospol), announced ABRI's nomination of the Pangab, 
Try Sutrisno, as the next vice president. This was a high-profile challenge to 
Soeharto—who is said to have favoured Habibie. In the finale of this Soeharto-ABRI 
antagonism, officers such as Moerdani, Sutrisno and Hartas were all removed from the 
military structure.
This 1993 event was a turning point in Soeharto-ABRI relations. From 
Soeharto's perspective, it was urgent to reconstruct the military so that it would be 
amenable to him. Dismantling the legacy of Moerdani's ABRI and recruiting loyalist 
officers were the two major goals. Soeharto’s political survival rested largely on how he 
could transform ABRI within the next five years before the 1998 presidential election. 
Whether he wanted to stay in office or not, establishing an amenable military was 
necessary for a smooth succession scenario. A structural impediment faced by 
Soeharto to this end was the generation gap. As a remnant of the revolutionary 
generation, Soeharto seemed to have been less capable of judging loyalist officers of the 
new generation—except for his military aides. Inevitably, Soeharto started to accept 
the advice of reliable circles in selecting officers who would occupy strategic positions. 
The role of his family, including Habibie whom Soeharto had known since Habibie was 
a child, became increasingly apparent in military promotion practices.37 It was against 
this background that Prabowo's rise toward the top military position at the time of the 
1998 MPR was widely perceived as inevitable, although it deviated from the standard 
promotion procedures.38
37 Apart from Feisal Tanjung, Wismoyo Arismunandar who replaced Edi Sudradjat as Army Chief in May 
1993 was a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife. In February 1995, Wismoyo was replaced by Hartono who 
had been close to Prabowo and Siti Hardijanti Rukmanan, or Mbak Tutut, Soeharto's eldest daughter.
38 Such a trend was already apparent in December 1995 when Prabowo was promoted as Commander of 
Kopassus and became a brigadier general. According to the codified promotion standard, it normally takes 
20-25 years after graduation from the military academy to reach the rank of colonel and a minimum of 23 
years to become a one-star general. Buku Petunjuk Dasar Tentang Pembinaan Prajurit ABRI 
[Kep/06/X/1991], Mabes ABRI, 1991, pp.81, 96. Prabowo, who was a graduate of Akabri in 1974 was 
clearly deviating from the norm. One retired officer put it as follows. "Prabowo has a toll-road ticket— 
meaning he can bypass the jam of waiting officers. We are concerned about the impact of his case on lower- 
ranking soldiers. ... I am not surprised if young soldiers dream of Prabowo and gradually disregard the 
moral disciplines they have believed until today." Confidential interview, August 1996. Such concerns are 
reflected in the comment by a serving two-star general who insisted th a t"... today's ABRI faces declining 
independence from the President, and ABRI can never be professional under the current situation" 
(interview, September 1996).
154
Chapter 5
The ABRI leadership under Feisal Tanjung, who replaced Edi Sudradjat in 
May 1993, further adapted itself to the direction of Soeharto's shifting political 
preference, as indicated by two events: Golkar civilianisation and ICMI-sation in 
October 1993; and liquidation of BAIS in January 1994. The end of BAIS further 
encouraged the dismantling of the personal network of Moerdani, while at the same 
time it diminished the organisational basis of autonomous military power that could 
evolve beyond Soeharto's control.39
Through these processes, the transformation of ABRI's high command in the 
post-Moerdani period was conducted. Soeharto's urgent need to reconstruct the 
President-ABRI relations on a new basis, and his search for loyalist officers to this 
end, were increasingly mediated by Habibie and Feisal and also by Prabowo. When 
Hartono was promoted to Army Chief of Staff in February 1995, it was seen as being 
on the initiative of the latter.40 The renewed ABRI leadership led by Feisal and 
Hartono was pro-ICMI and amenable to the First Family. It was this military 
leadership that Soeharto relied on to prepare for the smooth conduct of both the 1997 
general election—which was expected to face a serious opposition movement centred 
on Megawati—and the 1998 presidential election which was required to avoid repeats 
of 1988/1993 happenings, i.e. Ibrahim Saleh's interruption in the MPR and Harsudiono 
Hartas' early nomination of the vice president.
Against this political background, the new ABRI leadership was inclined to 
seek a rationale to legitimise political repression against the widening popular criticism 
of the Soeharto regime and the growing societal demands for democratic keterbukaan. 
Here, relying on the routinised kewaspadaan approach which was institutionalised by 
the previous ABRI leadership was not bizarre as it had been regarded as a legitimate
39 Admiral (ret) Sudomo, who was Moerdani's old ally and was still in Soeharto's inner circle, explained 
the scrapping of BAIS as a necessary step because it had deviated from its original task as seen in its 
manipulation of sociopolitical organisations. See "Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi," Kom pas, January 18, 
1994. Perhaps, the deviation here only meant activities which were perceived as not reflecting Soeharto's 
vision. In this light, the PDI Congress which elected Megawati Sukarnoputri, a daughter of Sukarno whom 
Soeharto overthrew, as the new chairperson in December 1993 was interesting. Moerdani's trusted man in 
BAIS, Brig-Gen Agum Gumelar (Director of Internal Affairs' Section in BAIS and later Kopassus 
Commander), was one of the army officers handling the case. ABRI issued permission to the PDI to hold the 
Congress in Jakarta which was almost certain to elect Megawati—a popular opposition figure—as the 
chairperson. The liquidation of BAIS was just after this event, and Gumelar (Kopassus Commander) was 
also sidelined to the post of Chief of Staff of the North Sumatra Division in September 1994. This was 
commonly seen as reflecting Soeharto's unhappiness with Gumelar's role in the PDI issue. However, 
according to an officer who has known Gumelar well, Gumelar told him: "how was it possible for me to act 
without Soeharto's order?" Soeharto, at that time, told Gumelar to settle the PDFs leadership problem, so he 
interpreted Megawati's elevation as acceptable. It was then Prabowo who informed the President that the 
operation was unfavourable, and Soeharto decided to sideline him (personal communication, 1998). Agum's 
successor as Kopassus Commander was Brig-Gen Soebagyo Hari Siswoyo, whose promotion was also said 
to be recommended by Col Prabowo (Deputy Commander of Kopassus at that time). This promotion was 
seen as a part of Prabowo's factional consolidation within ABRI.
40 Both Hartono and Prabowo established a political think-tank, Centre for Policy and Development 
Studies (CPDS) in 1995, which had a strong Muslim and anti-Moerdani orientation. As mentioned earlier, 
Hartono also cultivated a very close relationship with Tutut.
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practice within the military. Perhaps it was perceived as a painful task, since ABRI's 
social trust would undoubtedly fall. But the new military leaders found a hope; their 
kewaspadaan approach might appeal to Muslims if it used the Islamic cause—as 
Soeharto did in the mid-1960s when the army mobilised Muslim masses to eliminate 
PKI supporters under the flag of jihad.41
Kewaspadaan Political Programs during the Final Years
The Feisal-Hartono leadership therefore adapted the established mode of 
kewaspadaan doctrine. As discussed earlier, the negative impact of pembangunan—as 
providing an opportunity for communist resurgence—was already a part of the 
standard interpretation of Balatkom. Under the new military leadership, the content 
was frequently adjusted to cultivate Islamic sympathy. The problem of the widening 
social-economic gap, which was also raised by democratic advocates as critique of 
New Order developmentalism, was instead emphasised to focus on Chinese- 
Indonesians. Reference to the gap was often code for appealing to Islamic sentiments 
against rich Chinese. Although the use of the simple dichotomy between the rich- 
Christian-minority-Chinese and the poor-Muslim-majority-pnhwwz could be dangerous 
by stirring up ethnic disharmony, the political usefulness of this approach was still 
considerable. If this approach was coupled with hardline thinking on globalisation, as 
officially formulated by Lemhannas under Hartono, the missing link between the 
Islamic cause and support for the regime could be found in the eyes of ABRI's doctrine 
promoters. Gen Hartono's close associate, Brig-Gen Farid Zainuddin, for example, 
wrote in a Lemhannas journal as follows:
The West is always antagonistic to Islam. This is not unrelated to the recent 
international campaign for political liberalisation [by the West]... which has also 
been promoted in Indonesia as the revival of Islam becomes apparent.... It is 
globalisation that facilitates this [campaign]. It [globalisation] also strengthens the 
international network of non-pribumi business which has dominated the Indonesian 
economy since the beginning [of the New Order].42
This threat perception adopts the concept of globalisation to emphasise the "Chinese 
problem" in economic life. It is expected to promote Islamic "nationalism" and 
demonstrate ABRI's sympathy to it. Then, it opens space to argue that the democratic 
movement—which is allegedly manipulated by Western anti-Islamism—should be 
treated with suspicion by Muslims.
41 See, for example, Robinson (1996:127,140) and Cribb (1990).
42 Brig-Gen Farid Zainuddin, "Reaktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI Dalam Rangka Memantapkan 
Kemandirian Bangsa," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, No.63, 1995, p.109. Non-pribumi refers to ethnic 
Chinese Indonesians. Zainuddin was Hartono's assistant for political-security affairs, and then promoted 
as the Head of BIA in August 1997.
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The military leadership also strove to invent a new logic to link evolving 
democratic pressure from society to the need for upholding the Balatkom campaign. 
The opportunity arrived in July 1995, when Soeharto decided to release some G30S- 
related political prisoners, including Soebandrio, Omar Dhani and Soetarto.43 The 
release of former political prisoners had been strongly demanded by the Komnas HAM 
from a human rights perspective. When Minister of Justice, Oetojo Oesman, announced 
Soeharto's plan to give amnesties to these figures, ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung— 
who had claimed before that there were still more than 300 PKI supporters in society— 
responded by showing his discontent and insisted that this issue had to be handled 
carefully and would take time.44 At the same time, the military leadership reintroduced 
the latent danger theory to combat the opinion in society that ABRI’s vigilance was no 
longer relevant in the current stable situation. Maj-Gen Syarwan Hamid—who had 
been promoted to Assistant of Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol (Assospol 
Kassospol) in March—stated that:
... communism has in fact become bankrupt, but its "teaching" is still alive today. 
For example, when we listen to the music, ABRI does not see the singer but listens to 
the song, and tries to recognise whether or not the melody comes from the old song 
even though the musical instrument is different from the past."45
Having insisted that the communist song could be played on new instruments, 
Syarwan asserted that current political issues such as keterbukaan and human rights 
provided excellent opportunities for singing the song.
As seen above, the detachment of the "method" from the "ideology" of 
communism seemed to have become an established interpretation of Balatkom, and the 
concept of globalisation had greatly helped ABRI in developing this technique of 
discursive manipulation. ABRI's effort to link the foreign threat to domestic political 
instability was nothing new, as it had been repeated since the beginning of the New 
Order 46 What could be seen in mid-1995, however, was the renewal of its method and 
target. Now, in the age of the post-Soviet world order, the alleged "outside threat" 
shifted from the communist doctrines to communist-type activities via the penetration 
of universal values, not communist values. The target of repression was no longer 
limited to communist supporters, but was expanded to the popular movements 
conducting anti-regime activities, by identifying them as similar to the communist ones.
43 Soebandrio was former deputy prime minister and Omar Dhani was former Air Force Commander, while 
Soetarto was a police intelligence officer during the Sukarno era. None of the three were PKI members.
44 "Silang Pandangan Mengampuni PKI," Gatra, 22 July 1995. However, there was no explanation of how 
300 people could threaten national stability.
45 See Syarwan’s interview in "Dengar Lagu, Bukan Orangnya," Gatra, 22 July 1995. Emphasis added.
4  ^For example, soon after the launching of the New Order, a BAKIN-sponsored weekly, Chas, conducted a 
campaign to link the Wall Street Journal—which had published a series of articles on military corruption— 
and the Soviet KGB as the "outside threat" to Indonesia's domestic stability. Then the remnants of the PKI 
were regarded as the hypothetical domestic agent of the threat. I am indebted to Professor Ben Anderson in 
making this point.
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The political operationalisation of this technique soon became apparent. In late 
1995, political society was occupied with the issue of "formless [communist] 
organisation" (Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk, or OTB), raised by ABRI's Chief of General 
Staff (Kasum), Lt-Gen Soeyono, who pointed his finger at 15 government critics as 
OTB figures. He publicly explained that there were two groups of communists—one 
consisted of former PKI supporters and the other consisted of those who had been 
influenced by the first group and now tried to discredit the government by using the 
issues of human rights, democratisation and environmental protection.47 Furthermore, 
Soeyono insisted that the PKI had used "agitation and propaganda" (agitprop) in the 
past, which were now used by these figures to criticise the government, and therefore 
they were identified as OTB. In our analysis of the developing kewaspadaan-Balatkom 
discourse, Soeyono's interpretation seemed to be the ultimate model which opened the 
way for ABRI to claim that virtually any demonstration against government policy 
used communist methods. Linking the OTB issue and the alleged impact of 
globalisation, his theory attacked both the Internet and NGOs, asserting that current 
indications of communist emergence were almost the same as in 1965, except that the 
method was different as they could infiltrate via the Internet.48 Regarding the NGOs, 
which—as seen in Chapter 4—had already become important political actors in 
lobbying the government and international society to blame ABRI's frequent human 
rights abuses, he warned that "we now know their colour and will scrutinise them to 
reveal many of their grey activities," insisting on the possible link between the 
transnational human rights movement and the latent danger of communist 
infiltration 49
47 See "ABRI Names Faces Behind Incidents," Jakarta Post, 17 October 1995 and "Letjen TNI Soeyono: Cara- 
Cara PKI Sudah Dilakukan Terang-Terangan," Forum Keadilan, 23 October 1995. Soeyono was a former 
Presidential adjutant. The alleged fifteen critics consisted of: five academics (George Adicondro, Arief 
Budiman, Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono, Lie Sing Tew—all had links with the Christian University of Satya 
Wacana); a labour activist (Mochtar Pakpahan); an anti-regime novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who 
received the Roman Magsaysay Award in 1995; a vocal Muslim parliamentarian who was kicked out 
parliament (Sri Bintang Pamungkas); human-right lawyers (Mulyana Kusumah and H.J.C. Princen); a former 
Minister during the Sukarno period and long time political prisoner (Oei Tjoe Tat); a Chinese student living 
in Canada and active in internet (Paul Salim); a hugely popular public speaker and supporter of Megawati 
(Permadi); a retired general purged after 1965 for his links with Moscow and his leftist past (Soehario 
Padmodiwirio), and an undergraduate student (Petrus Hariyanto). Many of them were prominent 
democratic-reform advocates, and those who had conducted popular political activities outside the regime 
were now easily labelled as potential threats to the regime stability by utilising the OTB concept.
48 Ibid.. ABRI’s concern about the Internet—which was beyond the state's control of information—led to 
the establishment of a special Internet unit in ABRI headquarters. This was announced a few days after 
Soeyono's OTB statement on 16 October. See "Perangi Info Sampah ABRI Masuk Internet," Republika, 20 
October 1995. On the political impact of the Internet "revolution,” see Hill and Sen (1997). It was thought 
that the main objective of this unit was the collection of information about anti-government activities and— 
as described by an officer involved in this project—"counter-information" on the Internet (interview, 
October 1996).
49 Quotations are from his above interview in Forum Keadilan (23 October 1995). This view was supported 
by Syarwan Hamid who insisted that Liem Soei Liong, an activist of Amnesty International in London and 
general secretary of Tapol magazine, was an OTB figure who had tremendous influence on all NGOs in 
Indonesia. According to Syarwan, ABRI had already identified 13 NGOs which exploited the issues of
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The OTB concept was carried further by other officers who followed the 
Soeyono-Syarwan approach. Maj-Gen Yusuf Kartanegara, the Commander of the 
Central Java Kodam, announced that five ex-PKI figures in Purwokerto had attempted 
to gather forces to plot the establishment of negara Islam (Islamic state), while Colonel 
Mat Ishak, Korem Commander in Padang, Central Sumatra, asserted that a recent riot 
in Jambi had been didalangi (manipulated) by former PKI members, and Maj-Gen Imam 
Utomo, East Java Kodam Commander, rode on the wave by stating that a recent riot 
in his command area, which targeted the house of a local parliamentarian, was 
possibly led by OTB members. He also claimed that East Java was a "storehouse" 
(gudang) of OTB. Similarly in the West Java Kodam, its Commander, Maj-Gen Tayo 
Tarmadi, warned that OTB figures had benefited from the current economic gap in 
society and penetrated into religious organisations to conduct dangerous activities.50 
None of the three Kodam Commanders in Java provided any explanation about the 
dubious link between Marxist atheism and religious fanaticism. But they publicly 
adopted this new version of old regime language, which now included the globalisation 
concept as a tool to strengthen military pressure on democratic advocates. In effect, 
many of the major issues of the civil-society movement—such as human rights, 
democracy, NGOs, labour-land rights, and economic injustice—were incorporated in 
the scope of kewaspadaan-Balatkom discourse under the FeisaTHartono ABRI 
leadership.
Several critics responded to ABRI's ghost-hunting by arguing that it was merely 
a repetition of old language in order to promote ABRI's political bargaining power vis- 
a-vis the emerging democratic forces.51 Also it was interesting to note that the former
human rights and democratisation. See his interview in "Assospol ABRI Syarwan Hamid: PKI Kini Sedang 
Bermetamorfosa,” Forum Keadilan, 6 November 1995. The prominence of NGOs in the late New Order 
politics reflected the growing wave of labour strikes that started about 1990. These strikes had been 
supported and encouraged by many human rights NGOs. Details are analysed, for example, in Hadiz (1993). 
ABRI's hostility to these NGOs might be enhanced by the fact that military personnel were often hired by 
enterprises as their security guard, i.e. strikebreakers. See Lambert's (1993) study about this issue.
50 All comments are from "Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," Forum Keadilan, 6 November 1995.
51 Many critics also saw that the campaign had political goals. A human rights activist, H.J.C. Princen 
argued that the campaign was ABRI's effort to emasculate government critics before the 1997 general 
elections, while Paul Salim, an Internet commentator, saw that the government—which had been relying on 
repressive measures—needed the campaign to legitimately insist that stability was endangered. Both 
Princen and Salim were included in Soeyono's list of 15 OTB members, as seen above. For their responses to 
the campaign, see "Curiga Lima Belas Dalam OTB," Forum Keadilan, 6 November 1995. In January 1996, as if 
to sustain the campaign, the ICMI-sponsored newspaper, Republika, published an article (5 January 1996) 
which indicated that many children of ex-PKI figures had a tendency to vote for the PDI in elections. This 
obviously aimed to discredit the PDI—particularly Megawati. The growing pressure on the grass-roots 
movement was soon rebutted by a group of 16 NGOs which published "A Joint Statement on the New Order 
Culture of Violent Approach Toward Indonesian Citizens," (English) in May 1996. The statement strongly 
condemned Soeyono and Syarwan Hamid for their OTB labelling of NGOs, and insisted that NGOs' 
activities were based on the constitution.
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vice president Sudharmono, who had earlier been the target of rumours branding him 
as communist, responded negatively to the OTB campaign, by warning against 
"instantly labelling certain people as OTB or having an 'unclean [family] environment' 
(tidak bersih lingkungan)." The Minister of the Environment, Sarwono Kusumatmadja, a 
reformist Minister, similarly showed his unhappiness by saying that the campaign was 
reminiscent of the 1970s.52 The father of the Tarpadnas project, Lt-Gen (ret) 
Soebijakto, also asserted in 1997 that: "today's ABRI insists on the latent danger of 
PKI, or formless [communist] organisations (OTB), and always claims that there is a 
PKI-ghost behind democratic movements. But they are nonsense, there is no threat 
from the PKI any more."53 As widely believed, the campaign might have been 
motivated by practical political calculations relating to the coming general election in 
1997. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of ABRI's institutional routine of 
kewaspadaan maintenance, the OTB campaign in 1995 seemed to be the final step to 
"free" its doctrinal utility from the bounds of history.
In facing these criticisms, the military leadership responded in two ways. First, 
it reiterated the established interpretation of Balatkom. Lt-Gen Moetojib, who had 
replaced Hartono as Lemhannas Governor, wrote in his house journal that the current 
issues of democratisation, human rights and keterbukaan had all been strongly 
influenced from abroad, and encouraged the formation of critical public opinion— 
including criticism of ABRI’s political role—which in effect threatened national 
stability.54 Here, without referring to Balatkom, civil-society concepts were all 
automatically regarded as impediments to stability and the object of kewaspadaan. 
ABRI’s interpretative consolidation was also suggested by the territorial staff section in 
ABRI headquarters. In its regular report internally circulated in early 1996, the OTB 
issue became a special focus of attention 55 After describing the chronological events 
leading to the emergence of public debate over the OTB in the previous year, the report 
claimed that OTB members believed in the communist technique as the most effective 
tool. The alleged technique referred to the "theory of contradiction" [szc] encouraging 
conflict between groups, for instance between the rich and the poor, between religious 
groups, between ABRI and labourers, and between old and young people. By using
52 The comments of Sudharmono and Sarwono are from "Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," Forum 
Keadilan, 6 November 1995. Komnas HAM—a 'government' body to monitor human rights abuses—also 
complained at a meeting with the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam) 
Soesilo Sudarman and Lt-Gen Soeyono, and warned of the baseless argument developed in the OTB polemic. 
"Komnas HAM Minta Klarifikasi Soal OTB Pada Menko Polkam,” Kompas, 26 October 1995.
53 Interview, 8 January 1997. Soebijakto's rejection of OTB seemed to be derived largely from his 
antipathy—strongly shared by former Moerdani allies—to Soeharto and the new ABRI leadership.
54 Moetojib (Letjen TNI), "Stabilitas Nasional Sebagai Landasan Kokoh Bagi Pembangunan Politik dan 
Ekonomi," Telstra, No.38, January-February 1996, p.10. Since March 1996, Moetojib served as the head of 
BAKIN until replaced by Lt-Gen (ret) Zein A. Maulani in September 1998.
55 Staf Teritorial ABRI, Tinjauan Teritorial, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, No. Triwulan I 1996/1997. Tinjauan 
Teritorial is the quarterly report of ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section (Ster ABRI).
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this, the report continued, these OTB elements created antagonistic conditions and 
conflicts of interests in society, which would lead to rioting and political instability.56
Coupled with these attempts by ABRI to consolidate the established 
interpretation, the second response to criticism was a search for evidence—or the 
construction of the reality of Balatkom in the current situation. First, academics 
became the target. In October 1995, Brig-Gen Djoko Subroto, Chief of Staff of the 
Central Java Kodam, announced that the Kodam's investigation found proof that three 
academics in the Christian University of Satya Wacana had been involved in 
communist activities in the distant past. Asked about possible action to be taken 
against these three, Djoko suggested that the University Rector had the power to act, 
thus placing the case beyond ABRI's direct responsibility.57 The pressure on campus 
politics continued as Lt-Gen Soeyono in November warned that he could bring a 
military tank to any university if necessary, even without a formal request to come.58 
His threat was a response to the growing number of student demonstrations in recent 
years. This high-profile warning to students was followed in December by the arrest of 
Petrus Hariyanto, a prominent student activist and Secretary General of SMID 
(Students in Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia) who was included in Soeyono's list 
of 15 OTB figures and was suspected of leading a recent petition movement to the 
Dutch Embassy.
Second, together with the academic sector, NGO activists became the target of 
ABRI's effort to bring Balatkom into reality. In May 1996, a book published in 
December the previous year was banned by a Supreme Court decision. The title of the 
book was "Bayang-Bayang PKI," or Shadows of the PKI, which was edited by Stanly, a 
young political activist. The banning was suggested at first by the Publications 
Investigation Team of Bakorstanas which concluded in March 1996 that, despite the 
stated purpose of the book as a general reference for young people about G30S/PKI, 
the content was full of historical distortions, attempting to discredit ABRI and the 
national leadership.59 As seen in the report's conclusion, ABRI labelled this book as
56 Above references are from ibid., p.3. Theory of contradictions is Mao’s contribution to modem political 
language.
57 See "Kodam IV Teliti Dugaan Tiga Dosen UKSW Sebagai Eks PKI," Suara Merdeka, 26 October 26 1995. 
The three faculty members were Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono and Lie Sing Tew. They faced this accusation in 
October 1994 when the faculty conducted a 'democratic' strike against the dismissal of Dr Anef Budiman— 
a sociologist and long-term New Order critic—who had protested against the unclear process in selecting 
the University's new rector. The allegations against the three re-emerged in the military's attempt to seek 
evidence for Soeyono's OTB approach.
58 "Saya Bisa Bawa Tank ke Kampus," Kompas, 28 November 28 1995.
59 The assessment by Bakorstanas is in Staf Teritorial ABRI, op.cit., pp.5-12, with the title, "Hasil 
Penelitian Tim Karya Tulis Bakorstanas Terhadap Buku 'Bayang-Bayang PKI.’" The report demanded that 
the Supreme Court immediately ban the book, and also asked ABRI's territorial apparatus to watch out 
(mewaspadai) for the circulation of this book in society. In branding the book as a "historical distortion," 
Bakorstanas pointed to some remarks in interviews with old political figures conducted by the project team 
of this book. For example, Manai Sophiaan, former Secretary General of the pro-Sukamo Indonesian 
Nationalist Party (PNI), recalled the situation in 1965, and insisted that Soeharto surely knew about the 
coup attempt because one of the plotters, Colonel Latief, was an old friend of Soeharto and let him know the
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extremely dangerous if read by younger people who had never experienced the 
G30S/PKI incident. After this, ABRI's surveillance of NGOs via the territorial 
apparatus from Kodam to Koramil was tightened. As seen in Chapter 2, it was in the 
midst of such tension between NGOs and ABRI that Megawati's PDI was toppled and 
a physical clash between the two sides triggered a large riot on July 27th in 1996, 
followed by ABRI's purge of NGO activists, especially targeting the People's 
Democratic Party (PRD)—a student NGO which had recently declared itself to be a 
political party.
To effectively conduct this campaign and sustain the high pressure on the anti­
regime political movement for the smooth implementation of the general election in 
May 1997, what was crucially needed for the Feisal-Hartono leadership was solidarity 
within ABRI in its interpretation about the PRD and the support of the Islamic sector. 
The former goal was, for example, evident in the report produced by ABRI spokesman, 
Brig-Gen Amir Syarifuddin, for the elite green beret unit—Kostrad—whose role was 
significant in successfully conducting any political-security project by ABRI.60 He 
insisted that it was after the liquidation of Kopkamtib that the communists saw the 
opportunity to revive their activities in society and the PRD was the final product. 
According to him, the PRD should be seen as a communist group because: (1) its 
manifesto was clearly anti-Pancasila, and its behaviour resembled the PKI's attempted 
coup in Madiun in 1948; (2) its organisation was formed in the communist way, by 
gathering many labour, peasant, artist, student, intellectual organisations, which were 
often led by ex-PKI figures; and (3) its tactics were nothing more than communist- 
oriented because they organised labour-agrarian strikes and mass demonstrations in 
Irian Jaya, West Kalimantan, Ujung Pandang, Bogor, Surabaya, Solo, and Semarang 
during 1996 with posters demanding "remove divifungsi." Following the established 
kewaspadaan doctrine, anti-divifungsi was dogmatically identified as an expression of 
communist language. Syarifuddin's clarification was circulated to the territorial 
commands throughout the archipelago, which were instructed to tighten regional
plan a day before it happened. See Stanly, ed., Bayang-Bayang PKI, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 
1995, p.90. In his auto-biography, Soeharto himself admits that Latief came to see him, but there is no 
description about the talk between the two (Soeharto 1989:118). This work also discussed a survey 
conducted by the team of Institut Studi Arus Informasi (the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of 
Information)—a research and publishing house established by Goenawan Mohamad, editor of Tempo 
which was banned by the government in 1994—in Jakarta. Among 100 respondents (not randomly selected 
as many of them were students), more than 70 percent disagreed with the government policy of broadcasting 
its semi-official G30S/PKI film every year, showing that the Balatkom program was rejected by those who 
were bom in the 1970s. These points might be one of the reasons which made Bakorstanas decide to ban the 
book.
60 See Amir Syarifuddin (Brigjen: Kapuspen), "Mewaspadai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di 
Indonesia," Darma Putra, No.37,1996, pp.24-29. Darma Putra is Kostrad’s internal media.
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security surveillance in anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of 
the ultra-left PRD.61
On the other hand, the latter goal was the mobilisation of Islamic support for 
PRD-bashing as a warning against still-active "atheist" communism. This "theory of 
contradiction" applied by ABRI was expected to work under the current military 
leadership which had included top-ranking officers with strong Muslim backgrounds. 
Among them, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid seemed to be the most active in conducting this 
operation.62 The "contradiction theory" adopted by Cilangkap was aimed at shifting 
the nature of the political event from an authoritarian crackdown of the popular 
movement to the Islamic struggle against the communist remnants.
In this way, the "Crush PRD-Mega" campaign, which was carried out by Feisal’s 
ABRI, heavily relied on the kewaspadaan approach established under the previous 
military empire of Gen Moerdani—with fine adjustments of threat definition and target 
population for counter-mobilisation. Although the colour of the two leaderships was 
very different, and each was antagonistic to the other, the institutional inertia was at 
work in rationalising ham-fisted and praetorian military intervention in politics.
Such continuity was significantly rooted in the developmentalist ideology of the 
New Order military which viewed economic modernisation as the indisputable 
national interest and the military's "permanent" political commitment as an effective 
measure to ensure the preconditions to achieve that end. This ideology necessitated the 
invention of discursive techniques to produce "national" threats which required ABRI 
to provide its "professional service" to eliminate them. Routinisation of this ideological
61 Staf Teritorial ABRI, Tinjauan Teritorial (No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997): 11-19.
62 A week before the July 27 riot, Syarwan had a meeting with 61 pro-government youth organisations, 
including many Islam-oriented ones such as MDI (Majelis Dakwah Indonesia) and Pemuda Muslim 
Indonesia, urging them to watch out for OTB activities and condemning the free-speech forum held by 
Megawati's wing of the PDI as illegal. These organisations publicly announced their support for ABRI to 
take action against the PRD and PDI-Mega. See "Kassospol ABRI: ABRI Minta PDI Hentikan Mimbar 
Bebas," Kompas, 21 July 1996. Also on July 30, Syarwan held a meeting with a delegation of Islamic youth 
groups, such as Pemuda Ansor, AMII (Angaktan Muda Islam Indonesia), and Pemuda Tarbiyah. On the next 
day, they declared their willingness to fight against communism and condemned the PRD as a dangerous 
element which instigated the riot. More Muslim organisations, such as Pemuda Muhammadiyah, HMI 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), and the government-sponsored MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) also 
released statements endorsing ABRI's red-purge campaign after the riot. For details, see "Terlalu Naif, 
Kalau Anggap ABRI Jadikan PRD Sebagai Kambing Hitam," Kompas, 1 August 1996; "Pemyataan Bersama 
dan Trauma Ormas Islam," Forum Keadilan, 26 August 1996. Furthermore, on August 6, Syarwan had a 3- 
hour talk with the key figures in the PPP regarding the July 27 riot. This was his first meeting with a 
political party after the riot, indicating the heavy weight put on Muslim organisations in mobilising 
support for ABRI's PRD-bashing. The Head of PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, expressed his full backing for 
ABRI's effort. "Syarwan: Kita Sudah Ingatkan Tetapi Dituduh Mengada-ada," Suara Pembaruan, 7 August 
1996. Finally on August 11, more than 10,000 people from major pro-government mass organisations 
gathered in Jakarta to release an official declaration of support for the government and urged ABRI to ban 
the PRD as communist. Syarwan-led ABRI delegates at the meeting insisted that the declaration was 
spontaneous and not requested by ABRI, but emphasised the danger of the communist PRD and the need for 
promoting close cooperation between ABRI and Islam. "Apel Kebulatan Tekad Dukung Orde Baru," Suara 
Pembaruan, 12 August 1996, and personal communication with an anonymous journalist who attended the 
meeting, August 1996.
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activity was the role of Lemhannas, and both Soebijakto and Hartono—two very 
different figures—similarly made contributions to this organisational task. The former 
completed the standard material for Balatkom and also propagated the concept of 
fourth-generation communism, while the latter invented a theory which made the 
popular democratic movement as "legitimate” object of the kewaspadaan approach, by 
infusing the idea of globalisation—which was interpreted as the primary source of 
ideological deviation in society—into its doctrinal scope. This theory "freed" ABRI to 
identify the movement as inspired by communism although it did not present 
communist ideology, because the penetration of foreign values in the era of 
globalisation allegedly allowed the entry of the ideology in various forms. This thinking 
opened a space for arguing that once the movement displayed methods resembling 
those of the communists, it could be identified as communist, and thus a legitimate 
target for military operations to ensure political stability for economic development. In 
repressing the PRD, this legitimation was applied. These ideas were, of course, viewed 
in society as a tendency toward dogmatisation in ABRI's response to growing 
democratic demands. For the military leadership under Feisal and Hartono, however, 
the effort could be justified as consistent with ABRI's long-run institutional activity to 
reproduce the legitimacy of developmentalist ideology, which had faced a serious 
challenge since the loss of USSR—the principal source of Balatkom legitimation.
The Loss of Military Cohesion and the Rise of Dissent
Whether or not the adapted kewaspadaan approach in the mid-1990s reflected 
ideological cohesion among the officer corps was, however, a different question. As 
discussed earlier, the transformation of Soeharto-ABRI relations after the fall of 
Moerdani produced issues which could accentuate cleavages within the military—for 
instance, the question of ABRI's autonomy vis-ä-vis Soeharto, the rise of Prabowo, 
links to ICMI, the mobilisation of Islamic issues in conducting military policies, and 
dogmatisation of the military response to popular movements. Although the 
reproduction of kewaspadaan ideology was a corporate interest of the military as a 
whole, this did not mean that implementation measures were unquestioned and 
always welcomed by the officer corps at large. The development of intra-military 
cleavages which were centred on these issues contributed to the rise of reform-minded 
officers who were concerned about the direction of the Feisal-Hartono leadership. 
Since any military organisation respects discipline and command, as a part of 
professionalism, it is difficult to find public statements by serving officers about 
internal problems—which would no doubt put their careers at risk. But their voices 
were somehow represented by retired generals who had became increasingly critical in 
the public arena as they perceived the military leadership failing to eliminate the
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sources of unhappiness. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, such developments during the 
final years of the Soeharto polity facilitated the perception that reshaping the role of 
the military in political life—including President-ABRI relations, Golkar-ABRI 
relations, and more generally society-ABRI relations—was crucial to prevent ABRI's 
further loss of social trust.
In private, a serving brigadier general at Cilangkap argued that: "many of us are 
concerned about today's political role of ABRI which is being used only to support Pak 
Harto (Soeharto). Who will pay the price of being unpopular among the rakyat 
(people)? It is the next generation officers who will inherit the leadership in the near 
future."63 In intra-military communication, however, expressing internal criticism 
openly risks officers' careers, thus the wording was cautious. Even so, several concerns 
could be identified in officers' internal writings.64
For example, in mid-1995, Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, in his graduation thesis at 
Lemhannas, wrote that ABRI's support for Golkar should be reviewed to make ABRI 
more neutral in dealing with all political forces.65 The problem of personnel 
management was also discussed. Syarwan's assistant, Maj-Gen Suwamo Adiwijoyo 
(Assospol Kassospol) expressed a concern about the growing uncertainty about tours- 
of-duty, especially at the top level of the army. "After getting a new position, a general 
needs at least one year to settle into the position and should not be replaced in a 
haphazard way at least during the 5-year cycle of one ABRI Commander." He believed
63 Confidential interview, December 1996.
64 I am indebted to a retired officer who suggested to me the importance of understanding kromo in officers' 
writings, as a technique to read "read words" behind the established formality. Kromo, or krama, is the 
Javanese language form characterised by politeness, officiality and formality which was used by priyayis 
(indigenous civil servants) during the colonial period. Opposite to krama is ngoko which represents 
informality, proximity, and emotionality used in the daily social life. Anderson describes krama as like a 
mask whereas ngoko is like the heart. See Anderson (1990:131-132). Apart from cultural habit, there seem to 
be two practical factors which push serving officers to be highly formalistic in publishing their articles in 
ABRI journals. First, journals like Ketahanan Nasional of Lemhannas and Yudhagama of the Army 
Headquarters are the arenas for many officers to demonstrate their level of mental discipline and 
ideological conformity designed by the military education program, which have a say in determining 
promotion. Second, it is clearly mentioned in these journals that editors reserve the right to edit submitted 
papers without obtaining the permission of the authors in order to "meet the purpose of the journal"—which 
is no doubt indoctrination. Considering these, prospective intellectual officers who are given the 
opportunity to present their opinions there immediately judge the limit of acceptance—which fluctuates 
along with the civil-military relations of the time—and determine the balance between "mask” and "heart," 
or the way to infuse the latter into the former.
65 Mayjen Hari Sabamo, Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020, Jakarta: 
Kertas Karya Perorangan [Taskap] Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun 1995, Lemhannas, 1995, p.71. The 
summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but the above reference 
to Golkar could not be seen here, indicating that he perceived it was not following ABRI's krama. 
Interestingly, Hari's concern for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when—as seen in Chapter 2—Feisal was 
preparing to back Golkar and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral. Although it 
was extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, limited space for individual thinking 
made it possible to produce an internal communication arguing the negative impact of policies adopted by 
the military leadership. Hari was replaced by Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol in March 1995 and 
joined the Lemhannas course. After the course, he moved to be deputy head of F-ABRI, then became the head 
of F-ABRI, and, under the Habibie government, he got the post of deputy chairman of DPR/MPR.
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that this ideal had been distorted by non-objective ways of deciding on promotion 
which had contributed to the accumulation of dissatisfaction among ordinary officers. 
Suwamo stressed that the job criteria should be codified more clearly and personnel 
data should be computerised in order to avoid subjective promotions.66 The fact that 
Suwamo had a strong Islamic orientation indicated that the concern did not arise from 
the cleavage along religious lines, but between officers close to the Presidential Palace 
and those who were not.67 Finally, the army seminar of 1996 should be noted. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the seminar—which was held a day before the Soeharto- 
engineered Medan Congress of PDI in June 1996—criticised the state apparatus in 
general as inconsistent in policies, lacking discipline, corrupted, feudalistic, egoistic 
and nepotistic. Seskoad-linked army intellectuals also questioned the intervention of 
the executive branch in the problems of the political infrastructure—such as 
sociopolitical organisations—and called on the former to reduce its dominance through 
open-democratic communication. In this tight, the seminar stated that the recent 
governmental interventions in Golkar and political parties had been too overt. One of 
the seminar participants described these statements as "an expression of concern 
among future-looking officers."68
These suggestions provided at the final army seminar under the Soeharto polity 
were, however, soon buried in the subsequent repressive approach taken by the 
government and the army to eliminate the popular Megawati force from the formal 
political arena in tine with Soeharto's political blueprint for his succession in 1998. 
Among those who were involved in the Seskoad seminar, such behaviour—which 
ignored concerns expressed in the seminar papers—was perceived as undermining 
ABRI's long-term corporate interests.69 Revisionist views within the military were 
further strengthened during the next two years until Soeharto's last day on 21 May in 
1998. Disenchanted officers were motivated to be 'reformists' either by: (1) their 
deepening concern about the eroding credibility of the military in society; or (2) their 
power struggle with rival officers placed in Soeharto's patrimonial structure—or both.70
66 Mayjen Suwarno Adiwidjoyo, "Pemandu Bakat Kepemimpinan Perwira TNI-AD Yang Handal di Era 
Globalisasi," Yudhagama, No.59, July 1996, p.61. He was later replaced by Maj-Gen Budi Harsono after 
serving 8 months as Assospol Kassospol. After the fall of Soeharto, the retired Suwamo joined the party 
executive of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional—National Mandate Party), headed by Dr Amien Rais, a 
popular Muslim opposition leader.
67 An interesting remark was made by Feisal Tanjung in August 1998 when he said that during his term as 
ABRI Commander, no one—even himself, a four-star general—could freely visit the Kopassus sites 
controlled by Prabowo, a major general. See "Feisal: Saya Tidak Terlibat Kasus Penculikan Para Aktivis," 
Media Indonesia, 25 July 1998. This showed how ABRI's command structure had been distorted by 
Soeharto's special preference given to his son-in-law.
68 Interview with a brigadier general, October 1996.
69 For example at Seskoad, which studies ABRI's long-term political strategy, an instructor (colonel) said 
that the Kassospol today did not represent ABRI's institutional interests as he was preoccupied with the 
political game (personal communication, October 1996).
70 For convenience, I use the term "reformists" to refer to the officers who were concerned about the 
direction of the military leadership at that time. However, their views were not necessarily synchronised 
with the reform visions of civilian democratic activists, especially for officers who were preoccupied with
166
Chapter 5
World View, Domestic Threat Perceptions and the Perceived Role of ABRI 
in the Age of Globalism
It is not surprising that the friction within the military, perceived distortions in 
Soeharto-ABRI relations, and the escalating social criticism of ABRI all contributed to 
the erosion of ideological projects led by the Feisal-Hartono leadership. Let us examine 
this point and assess the diffusion of ABRI’s ideological orientation in the late New 
Order. The applied kewaspadaan doctrine since the early 1990s mainly consisted of 
three components—i.e. the world view, the domestic threat, and the military’s role 
perception—and they were linked in a way to construct a discursive technique for 
neutralising democratic pressures. We summarise the structure of this hardline 
approach first, and then look at two other approaches developed within the military.
In the eyes of democratic activists who had tried to promote civil society in the 
country's everyday politics, the globalisation concept was one of the weapons to 
legitimately claim the need for regime opening after the collapse of the Cold War 
environment and the 30 years of New Order authoritarianism. However, ABRI's 
hardline approach found an opportunity in this concept to expand the category of 
"political enemy" to include elements not covered in their traditional framework of 
threat assessment. As the issue of democratisation had constantly forced ABRI to take 
a defensive posture in political society, the reshaping of threat targets allowed the 
military leadership to re-assert itself and tighten its social surveillance policy.
The adaptation of Balatkom language and the kewaspadaan ideological project 
were aimed to maintain discursive political power through which ABRI had dominated 
since the mid-1960s. We examined the way in which the Balatkom campaign 
developed to neutralise new political phenomena—such as democratisation and 
human rights—by assuming that globalisation encouraged the influx of dangerous ideas 
from abroad. In the advanced form of this campaign, not only the international 
environment but problems in government too were utilised in order to expand the 
sphere of kewaspadaan. Now, the widening socioeconomic gap, government corruption, 
religious disharmony, industrial disputes, and the decline of society's trust in ABRI 
were all emphasised as the "opportunity" to invite dangerous communist activities— 
rather than as problems in themselves. The OTB approach taken by the hardliners 
implied that those who might raise such issues could become campaign targets, and 
their possible conduct of demonstrations could be interpreted as agitprop which was
the second type of reform motivation. Although the boundary between the first and second types was not 
clear, as both are significantly overlapping, the distinction should not be ignored because it was reflected in 
the officers' different attitudes toward social demands for political reformasi (reform) under the Habibie 
government.
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identified as the method of communism. In this framework of assessment, proving a 
person's communist ideology was no longer necessary. This separation of method and 
ideology was necessary for the hardliners to reshape the discourse on the communist 
threat—which was a legacy of 1965—in the face of growing democratic pressure and a 
widening critical base.
This process resonated perfectly with the self-image of current military officers 
who believed that their political mission was oriented by professional military 
concerns. As seen earlier, Hartono insisted that anticipating, preventing and—if 
necessary—suppressing the negative impact of foreign-value infiltration were the task 
of "professional" officers.71 It was against this background that ABRI's search for 
"pihak tertentu" (certain parties) could provide the operational guidance for territorial 
commands to mobilise the entire technology of their profession to combat the invisible 
threat target. Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin argued that:
ABRI's commitment to the defence of national unity based on Pancasila and the 
Constitution is to be actualised through the preventive strategy (strategi penangkal) 
which employs the methods of early detection and deterrence. They are to 
encompass all individuals in this country as our informants. [I]n terms of norms and 
policy, such a system is well established, though it is not yet perfect at the 
operational level/2
The established norm of strategi penangkal had allowed the territorial apparatus to 
conduct intelligence operations which targeted students and activists as "informants" 
to identify invisible or latent subversives.73 The strategy exemplified how professional 
officers transferred their military techniques and knowledge to the conduct of political 
missions, although it was accompanied by the risk of public criticism when imperfect 
operations led to illegal activities, such as abduction and disappearance of citizens.74
71 It should, however, be noted that many of the elite officers had been trained in the US, receiving benefits 
from foreign ideas.
72 Written interview with Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Chief of Staff of Kodam java, 23 December 1996. 
Sjafrie was then promoted to the Commander of Kodam Jaya in September 1997, but was transferred to the 
less-influential post of Assistant of Territorial Affairs to the ABRI Commander in June 1998, probably to 
take responsibility of the May 13-15 riots in Jakarta in which the new Pangab, Gen Wiranto, in August 
1998, admitted the involvement of military elements. It was however commonly suspected that the riots were 
indeed engineered by the key army officers around Prabowo, including Sjafrie himself. See, for example, 
"Teka-Teki Jenderal Sjafrie," Tajuk, 1-3 September 1998.
73 About the practice of the on-campus intelligence activities, see Human Rights Watch (1998b: Chapter 9). 
The idea that "the people" consists entirely of "informants"—i.e. people who give information about the 
others—comes straight out of the occupation of East Timor where kidnappings, executions and tortures 
were commonplace. These East Timor practices seeped into Indonesia in the 1990s.
74 The Kopassus Commander, Maj-Gen Prabowo, was promoted to the Kostrad Command with three-star 
rank, just after the presidential re-election of Soeharto—with Habibie's promotion to vice-president—at the 
MPR's general session in March 1998. In conducting security operations to 'prevent instability' at this MPR 
event, Prabowo and his aides in Kopassus, since February 1998, conducted abductions of student activists 
who had staged anti-Soeharto demonstrations. Most of them were Megawati supporters and PRD activists. 
Under the Habibie government, which was formed on 21 May, Gen Wiranto ordered an investigation and 
Prabowo admitted in front of the Officers' Honour Council (DKP)—held in August—his involvement in the 
abduction of nine activists who had already been released. The DKP discharged Prabowo from the military
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Furthermore, in legitimising the search for Balatkom and invisible subversives, 
reformulation of ABRI's world-view was decisive. The ideology of kewaspadaan now 
targeted global change in its perceptual scope and identified it as a source of domestic 
instability after the fall of the Communist Second World. This broad paradigm, 
however, provided only a very vague definition of how the foreign penetration would 
take root domestically and who would be the principal sponsors. A space for arbitrary 
interpretation existed here, providing a license for the hardliners to flexibly label their 
own political enemies as national security threats. The ideological fortification of 
kewaspadaan via this approach reflected the desire to control the pace and degree of 
political change. Moreover, the military’s frequent call for Islamic solidarity could be 
the tactical measure to blur the conflict between regime preservation and social 
demands for democratic opening. The human-rights activist, Marzuki Darusman, 
recognised that: "the bahaya (hazard) campaign is an attempt to slow down the speed 
of keterbukaan, and it is not really bahaya for the right, left and others, but bahaya for 
the change itself. They [ABRI and government] cannot say that they do not want the 
change, thus they use the bahaya language to protect themselves from the change."75 It is 
in this context that we may conclude that these political orientations constituted the 
core aspect of kewaspadaan doctrine applied by military hardliners during the late 
Soeharto era.
Among ABRI circles, however, less dogmatic approaches to the link between 
global change and domestic threat were also developed, with resulting differences in 
the perceived role of ABRI. There is a set of views which emphasises the emergence of 
political threats resulting from globalisation and insists on the need for ABRI to 
expand its scope of political control. However, Balatkom connotations were not built 
into this discourse. Maj-Gen Budi Harsono, for example, explained that:
[T]he gap between the OKB (orang kaya baru: the new rich) and the OMB (orang 
miskin baru: the new poor) in big cities is becoming serious. The OMB are far poorer 
than the people in the village.... and globalisation encourages this phenomenon.
organisation. However, there are still many who are missing, at least 14 as reported, and Sjafrie's 
involvement was also suspected. See, for details, "Melilah-Milah Komando Penculikan," Tajuk, 1-3 
September 1998. Kopassus had received professional military training from the US and Australia. Even 
after the official ban in 1992—due to the Dili incident—more than twenty instances of US training had been 
reported, the latest one conducted just before the 1998 MPR. The training was said to have specialised in 
torture, disappearance, urban combat techniques, psychological warfare, and night raids on civilian 
homes—all sugar-coated by the term "counter-terrorism." For details, see "U.S. Aids Killers in Indonesia," 
Sacramento Bee, 29 March 1998 and "Jakarta Opposition Leader Decries U.S. Role in Troop Training," 
Chicago Tribune, 25 March 1998. More details are described in Naim (1999). It is easy to suspect that such 
training contributed to the professionalisation of disappearance and abduction.
75 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chair of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.
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ABRI needs to carefully watch out for this tendency and promote professionalism u 
order to overcome such an impact of globalisation/ 6
Another intellectual officer, Col Syarifudin Tippe, also saw the new challenge in the 
global and domestic political arena, and described ABRI's increasing role as a 
democratiser. He wrote:
Globalisation... facilitates the linkage between democratisation in foreign countries 
and the demands for political opening (keterbukaan) in our society. One obvious 
dimension [of this phenomenon] is the increase in accusations against the military's 
dominant role. This happens everywhere in the world, including Indonesia. Coupled 
with the wave of democratisation, demands for improving human rights and civil 
rights in politics have become stronger. All these demands ask ABRI to share power 
with other [non-ABRI] parties... and to play the demokratisator (democratiser) role.77
Absorbing social demands, rather than rejecting them, and transforming ABRI 
into a democratising force are Tippe's answer to the question of the political impact of 
globalisation. But democracy here, in the common ABRI language, is a democracy 
based on Pancasila—the state ideology of anti-liberalism. ABRI's alleged responsibility 
as the promoter of democracy, therefore, does not necessarily reduce its role in politics. 
It is in this context that the ideas presented by Budi Harsono and Syarifudin Tippe 
can be assessed as having the same orientation, that is the perception that ABRI 
should play a more active role in facing the globalisation problems. Their emphasis 
was slightly different from the hardline approach which employed the distorted world 
view to assert the resurgence of the old threat—communism—in order to rationalise the 
military repression of popular movements. This second type of approach, which does 
not use dogmatism but still conforms with ABRI's traditional paternalistic self-image, 
can be categorised as the moderate school of thought.78
Among ABRI circles, however, there was also another set of views which 
basically put weight on the declining social space for ABRI to carry out its political 
role. The view that the nature of the threat is changing in a way which reduces the role
76 Interview, 31 January 1997. Maj-Gen Budi Harsono was Assospol Kassospol at that time, serving the 
hardline Syarwan Hamid. He was replaced by Maj-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono in July 1997 and posted to F- 
ABRI. Bambang's entry to ABRI's sociopolitical section might reflect a willingness of Gen Wiranto—who 
had replaced Hartono as Army Chief in June 1997, after the general election—to consolidate his power base 
with reform-minded intellectual officers against the hardline group around Prabowo.
77 Syarifudin Tippe, Peran Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Meningkatkan Kualitas Pengamalan Wazvasan 
Kebangsaan di Tengah Kecenderungan "Global Paradox" (Narasi), Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 
Orasi Ilmiah Pada Ulang Tahun Seskoad Ke-44, 25 May 1995, p.6. Tippe, at that time, served Gen Feisal 
Tanjung as Personal Staff Coordinator for the ABRI Commander, and was also a devout Muslim. As if 
reflecting the anti-Moerdani posture of many ICMI-linked officers, this Feisal follower (graduate of Akabri 
in 1975) criticised the old intelligence policy in the 1980s which compelled officers to obtain permission 
before writing in the mass media, which he thought had killed the officers' intellectual creativity. See his 
interview in "Syarifudin Tippe: Banyak Perwira yang Pinter," Forum Keadilan, 3 July 1995.
78 This is by no mean to attribute the idea to the individual officer and judge his entire political views based 
on the category. Rather, the classification is intended to systematically assess the existing perceptions 
within ABRI. Thus, it is not a problem if one expresses different opinions on different occasions.
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of the military is presented, for example, by Maj-Gen (ret) Maulani who argues as 
follows.
In the past, until the 1980s, the threat was dominated by ideological conflicts, 
physical insurgencies, and political party conflicts.... Reflecting these, ABRI's 
management of stability was oriented by political and military approaches. 
However, the current threat is coloured by the economic gap between the rich and 
poor and social injustice as represented by land disputes. It is globalisation which 
has brought these issues to the surface. In order to respond to these threats to 
stability, ABRI's previous politico-military approaches are useless. What is required 
is the improvement of distributive economic policy and a strong judicial system to 
implement consistent and impartial decisions, which result in a reduced role for 
ABRI and broader participation of social sectors.79
A similar view was provided by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo who emphasised the multi­
dimensional impact of globalisation and insisted on the need for a rational division of 
labour, arguing that:
[T]he current wave of globalisation pushes social values in one [universal] 
direction... and Indonesia is not an exception. This invites the question of the 
military's place in a modem society.... ABRI should not believe that it can solve all 
problems. That would be counter-productive. Rather, non-ABRI sectors should be 
empowered and, in this process, the political centre will move to the Interior 
Ministry [from ABRI], while security matters, especially in the big cities like Jakarta, 
should be handled by the Police. Thus, ABRI has to change its way of thinking... but 
the problem now is: who wants to lose the power? Still there are many 
conservatives within ABRI.80
These two ideas link the nature of the threat and the role of ABRI to societal change. 
Their emphases differ as Maulani sees the main threat shifting from politics to 
economics, while Widjojo insists on the convergence of global values. They, however, 
similarly minimise the need to defend the country from globalisation and also recognise 
the necessity of decreasing the role of the army in facing global-domestic pressures for 
change. In the triple interaction between world view, domestic threat, and ABRI’s role 
perception, these ideas seem to constitute a progressive approach which emerged 
during the late New Order period.
The growing diffusion of ideological orientation among officers was, in this 
way, reflected in their different perceptions about ABRI's future prospects. The first 
approach—the hardliner doctrine—was, to a large extent, the product of Soeharto’s 
political interests, involving the transformation of military leadership from the 
Moerdani-Try line to the more amenable Feisal-Hartono line in order to secure his
79 Interview with Maj-Gen (ret) Zein Maulani, Adviser for Military Affairs for B.J. Habibie, Minister of 
Research and Technology, 28 November 1996. Maulani became Chief of Staff of the Vice-Presidential Office 
when Habibie was elected as vice president in March 1998, and, in September, was appointed as the head 
of BAKIN—a body directly responsible to President Habibie. His claim for the lesser role of ABRI may 
reflect his support for the civilian Habibie.
80 Interview, 15 January 1997. Widjojo was Feisal's adviser for political and security affairs at that time. 
The term "conservatives" here may be identical to hardliners.
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political succession in 1998. As discussed above, the two leaderships were mutually 
antagonistic, but in the formulation of counter-democracy discourse under Feisal's 
ABRI, which was aimed at supporting Soeharto's political goals, the established 
framework of kezvaspadaan thinking during the Moerdani period greatly contributed, 
although its application mode was not the same. This ideological orientation during the 
Feisal period, however, had been eroded within the officer corps, as its policy 
projection was accompanied by the dual risk of damaging social trust in ABRI and 
demoralising organisational life of the military—notably nepotistic and politicised 
personnel transfers. However, this does not mean that ABRI's kewaspadaan mind-set 
has been abandoned. Since the developmentalist ideology still predominates ABRI's 
organisational thinking, its desire for permanent-everyday involvement in the political 
area is preserved, and it provides an institutional incentive for the officers to rely on 
the kewaspadaan approach when they feel the necessity of legitimising such political 
involvement.
**********
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C hapter 6
The Structure of Dwifungsi Discourse: 
Approaches, Arenas and Non-Debate
Our investigations of ABRI's adaptation in the late New Order polity have 
focused on: the political reflections of the developing dwifungsi debate; dwifungsis 
doctrinal foundation and its interpretative change within the military; civil-military 
struggle over the human rights problem; and ABRI's ideological reshaping in facing 
democratic pressure. We have argued that since the late 1980s, criticism of ABRI in 
open political debate became increasingly common, and in response, ABRI adjusted its 
interpretation of its political doctrines to defend their continuing legitimacy. At the 
same time, development of civilian institutions in the age of globalism shrank the 
political space in which ABRI could freely conduct internal security operations. In 
facing such challenges, ABRI responded in two contradictory ways—accommodation 
and dogmatisation: the former was represented by adopting human-rights values in 
organisational thinking, while the latter could be seen in the new hardline ideology 
encompassing the identification of globalisation as a source of national threat. ABRI's 
responses to democratic challenges, in this way, could not be described in a simple 
linear continuum of change and continuity. In some areas, where reform-minded 
intellectual officers could take initiatives, such as doctrinal development, coping with 
new social demands became the major goal, while in other areas, such as combat and 
territorial sectors, the military relied more on its traditional mind-set and behaviour, as 
if resisting political change.
ABRI's mixed responses to democratic pressures during the late New Order era, 
however, did not imply that there were officers who wished to end dwifungsi. As seen 
before, dwifungsi constituted the core organisational identity of the New Order military 
and was thus a primary corporate interest which had to be preserved in the eyes of 
serving officers. Regardless of the hardliner-softliner distinction within ABRI in its 
response to democratic demands, ABRI—as an institution—has endeavoured to 
maintain the legitimacy of its involvement in non-military fields as programmed by its 
doctrine of political activism. From the perspective of democracy advocates in society, 
this effort by ABRI needed to be undermined in order to expand the political space 
free from military intervention. The New Order civil-military debate on dwifungsi,
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therefore, represented a struggle for legitimising and delegitimising dwifungsi. This 
chapter examines the structure and patterns of this contest in the late Soeharto regime. 
How have the critics developed counter-discourses in order to undermine military 
thinking? How has ABRI developed theories to counter them? In what ways was the 
dwifungsi dialectic structured and what was not debated? From these perspectives, 
this chapter deals with the thematic analysis of dwifungsi discourse involving both 
critics and ABRI. Our attempt is to analyse the contextual characteristics of this 
political communication which should be clarified not only to see the eroding military 
hegemony in national political discourse but also to understand the inherent gaps in 
political perception between the military and democratic advocates in promoting 
regime transition after the fall of Soeharto.
We first discuss several counter-discursive approaches developed by "insider" 
critics to delegitimise the permanency of dwifungsi. Second, ABRI's response to these 
and its efforts to develop standard theories to counter the critical discourse will be 
examined. Third, two particular arenas of the discourse—i.e. ABRI's appointed seats 
in the parliament and its backing for Golkar—will be investigated as they represented 
the most established patterns of ABRI's involvement in the formal political process (i.e. 
legislative process). We will see the increasing diversification of opinions within the 
military on these issues and discuss how ABRI's modes of involvement reflected its 
organisational vulnerability to the changing society. Finally, assessing the structure of 
current dwifungsi discourse, we will focus on one theme—dwifungsi's first function, i.e. 
defence—which was not embraced in the discursive scope. Problems of this will be 
investigated.
Approaches of Delegitimation
In the early stages of keterbukaan, ABRI Commander Gen Try Sutrisno explained 
his understanding of the concept.
Recent development of keterbukaan may boost demands for further openness but it is 
natural given the rising educational level in society. Demanding more openness is an 
indication of our successful political development.... [B]ut it does not mean that we 
can express anything we want. For example, pornography and national secrets 
cannot be published freely since they are prohibited by laws.*
The reform-minded police officer, Brig-Gen Roekmini, recalling her activities as a 
keterbukaan promoter in the DPR, argued at a private seminar in 1993:
Why did I and my friends in F-ABRI promote the keterbukaan?... At that time, an 
open debate was hardly accepted in the DPR. You may not believe it but there was
1 Try Sutrisno, "ABRI dan Keterbukaan Politik," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, No.51, 1989, p.55.
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an atmosphere which did not allow politicians to raise tough questions with 
Cabinet members. This had to be broken to promote dialogue in the DPR, and we 
tried to do so by disseminating the idea of keterbukaan.2
As discussed in Chapter 2, the keterbukaan movement opened the window for 
legitimately expressing the problems of dwifungsi in the public sphere, although for the 
campaign promoters, like Roekmini, the movement was originally intended to activate 
the function of the DPR. Indeed, the Roekmini speech, as quoted above, invited a 
comment from the seminar coordinator, Shobirin Nadj, who insisted that "if ABRI truly 
wishes to promote democracy, it has to accept the natural result, that is the reduction 
of the military's political role. For the last 25 years, the people have talked in many 
ways but the conclusion is always the problem of military domination. Why could we 
not widen political participation? The thing is whether or not ABRI is ready to reduce 
its role."3 Try Sutrisno's attempt to adopt a tolerant posture towards the growing 
demand for more open politics was, in this way, finally interpreted by critics as an 
opportunity to legitimately castigate ABRI—as such criticism could not be categorised 
as exposing a "national secret."
The New Order’s experiment of keterbukaan generated a debate on the need to 
reduce ABRI's political presence, but approaches differed as to how this could be 
done. Students and activists conducted street demonstrations against ABRI's security 
approach and dwifungsi excesses, while outspoken intellectuals (both civilian and 
retired officers) criticised ABRI’s conduct. Active officers usually expressed their 
concerns either by endorsing the moderate criticism emerging in society' or by insisting 
on the need for adjustment in the new sociopolitical circumstance. As seen above, 
ABRI's human rights abuses, repression of student-labour demonstrations, support for 
Golkar, and personnel changes all provided opportunities to air critical opinions about 
ABRI’s dwifungsi orientation. Slogans such as: 'ABRI should go back to the spirit of 
UUD45 and Sapta Marga;' 'ABRI should stand above all groups;' or 'dwifungsi should 
utilise persuasive rather than repressive-security approaches' became almost ritualistic 
in public protests.
ABRI has also been confronted by less-publicised "everyday modes of criticism" 
after the keterbukaan movement began.4 This criticism is posed by people who are
2 Roekmini's speech at the seminar, "Democracy and Problems of National Integration," held at the Institute 
for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), Jakarta, 21 September 1993. 
Quoted from Laporan Seminar: Demokrasi dan Masalah Integrasi Nasional, CESDA-LP3ES, 1993, pp.6-7.
3 Citations are from ibid., pp.13-14. Shobirin Nadj is a researcher at LP3ES.
4 In the analytical framework of this chapter, everyday modes of criticism is an operational concept to 
distinguish the nature of criticism which we examine here from criticisms based on particular 'events' of the 
time. The concept is taken from the classic study of Scott and Kerkvliet (1986) which developed the notion 
of "everyday forms of resistance" in suggesting the need for assessing various types of hidden peasant 
opposition to the state, which were usually ignored or disregarded in the traditional conceptions of 
peasant revolt and rebellion. Although the subject of analysis is different, the concept of 'everyday form' 
provides a significant analytical perspective in assessing various modes of dwifungsi criticism which we 
tend to ignore by only following well-publicised big political events.
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regarded by ABRI as sympathisers (or insiders) and who constantly exchange ideas 
with those in military circles. One of the features of this communication is that it— 
regardless of events—emphasises the declining legitimacy of dwifungsi in the changing 
sociopolitical structure. Unlike its response to event-oriented criticism, ABRI officers 
express more varied opinions in this context, probably because they feel relieved from 
the immediate task of presenting a unified answer. For the study of political 
communication under an authoritarian regime in which open critical debate is usually 
restricted, finding topics which invite divergent opinions from military circles is crucial 
for assessing the changing pattern of regime discourse/counter-discourse. In the case of 
ABRI, the legitimacy question is the topic under discussion here.
The counter-discourse conducted by sympathetic 'insider' critics of dwifungsi 
legitimacy can be divided into three broad types. The first is the most modest 
approach which does not directly criticise dwifungsi but merely emphasises the way in 
which social change throws up challenges that tend to undermine the legitimacy of 
current dwifungsi conduct. The second approach goes further by challenging the current 
interpretation of dwifungsi itself and standard justifications for ABRI's political role. 
Finally, the third approach is one which does not explicitly oppose dwifungsi but acts 
as a 'messenger' by conveying negative public perceptions of dwifungsi. These three 
approaches in fact often overlap but all aim to support the counter-discourse on 
dwifungsi legitimacy. Each approach has its own strengths which need to be 
delineated in order to illustrate the entire structure of dwifungsi discourse.
Implicit Criticism
The first approach highlights the implications of social change without 
explicitly questioning dwifungsi. For example, in 1993, Lemhannas published in one of 
its house journals a lengthy article written by a retired colonel, Saafroedin Bahar. His 
key concept was the rising middle-class. The article argues that the role of middle-class 
people has become more and more important. Even though they accept military 
involvement in politics as a matter of fact, they are getting sick of ABRI's heavy- 
handed repression of human rights and democratisation.5 He argues that although 
dwifungsi is legally protected, middle-class people now strongly question its legitimacy 
because they are alienated by younger-generation officers who also come from middle- 
class backgrounds but enjoy special political privileges derived from dwifungsi. By 
discussing the long-term social change that has produced the middle class and the 
new-generation ABRI, Saafroedin provides a strong argument to counter ABRI’s 
standard claim that minor adjustments to 'implementation' provide a way of
5 See Saafroedin Bahar, "ABRI dan Proses Demokratisasi: Pengalaman, Prospek dan Strateginya," Persepsi, 
Edisi Khusus, 20 May 1993, pp.71-112. Bahar has served as an official of the State Secretariat since 1989, 
and from 1995 also works as a Komnas HAM member.
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maintaining the dzvifungsi legitimacy. Whatever the implementation, Saafroedin's logic 
insists that the rise of the middle class and a new generation in ABRI officers 
undermines the legitimacy of dwifungsi. The major weakness of this argument, however, 
is its difficulty in identifying the political orientations of the middle class whose 
commitment to political reform is not necessarily strong.6
Another example is an article by Juwono Sudarsono who emphasised the 
changing nature of national problems which inevitably reduce space for ABRI to play 
its current role. In the Army Headquarters' periodical, he described the following 
points in 1994, before he was installed as Lemhannas' vice-governor. His approach 
was to 'criticise by praising’ ABRI, arguing that: "25 years of ABRI's political role in the 
New Order have helped national development but the success now raises many 
questions about its role in the future." He insisted that: "because of national 
development and rapid population increase, social problems are now mainly 
concerned with land and labour issues, as seen in the fact that these issues dominate 
more than 70 percent of problems brought to the parliaments during 1984-1994." 
Juwono stressed that these problems could not be solved by dwifungsi. It was, 
therefore, ironic to see that ABRI's success would require it to reduce its involvement in 
sociopolitical areas.7 Juwono also asserted that dwifungsi was doomed to lose its 
legitimacy as the managerial ability of civilians become acknowledged.8 As seen in the 
approaches adopted by Saafroedin and Sudarsono, the everyday mode of dwifungsi 
criticism constitutes one stratum in the current discourse on dwifungsi with its focus on 
the changing environment, challenging ABRI's claim for the 'permanent' legitimacy of 
dwifungsi.
6 Scholarly debates on the role of the middle class under the New Order have been popular since 1984 when 
a social science journal, Prisma, published a special issue in its February 2nd edition. Crouch (1984:5) then 
compared Southeast Asian countries and generalised that if the number of middle class was too small, it 
could neither be an effective pressure group nor a supporting base for the state. In 1986, Monash University 
held a symposium on this topic (Tanter and Young 1990). Here, Lev (1990:48) saw that the notion of 
'private' had emerged within the middle class and thus they were likely to raise the issues of political 
access, social equality and control over state power. Liddle (1990:50-51) argued that they were rather 
responsive to state paternalism and could easily be included in the corporatist network of the government. 
Budiman (1990:134-136) underlined the state's effort to keep 'disorganising' civil society led by the middle 
class. Most recently, Robison (1996:85, 98) endorsed Liddle's position and insisted that the middle class 
was rather conservative in political reform due to their economic benefits in preserving authoritarianism. 
These pessimistic opinions seem to be dominant in the study of the Indonesian middle class, and is shared by 
the domestic society in general, as reflected in the title of a book, Kelas Menengah Digugat [Middle-Class 
Accused] (Jakarta: Fikahati Aneska, 1993), published a year after the 'middle-class' revolution in Thailand 
in 1992. However, it is not to deny their deepening dissatisfaction with the New Order's "implementation" 
of authoritarianism as seen in many opinion tolls conducted by the media (see, for example, footnote 173 in 
Chapter 3). The increasing possession of private telephones in the middle-class layer, for example, seems to 
have made it much easier to survey public opinion immediately after any political event—which could not 
be done before due to the lack of sampling numbers.
7 Above explanations are from pp.34-35 and pp.37-39 in Juwono Sudarsono, "Peranan Sosial-Politik ABRI: 
Perkiraan ke Depan," Yudhagama, No.46, 31 October 1994, pp.33-39.
8 Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Vice-Governor of Lemhannas, 17 June 1996.
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Explicit Challenges
A second approach directly challenges ABRI's dwifungsi discourse although 
from a sympathetic position. This critical dialectic—which is also presented regardless 
of ’events'—can be found in the argument by Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib in his paper at 
a private seminar entitled "The Role and Position of ABRI in the National Political 
Format," held at Surabaya in November 1996, and attended by some powerful serving 
officers, including the Army Chief Gen Hartono and his security assistant, Maj-Gen 
Zacky Anwar Makarim.9 Hasnan first attacked ABRI's customary arguments which 
emphasised the need for kewaspadaan (vigilance) in facing globalisation and the influx 
of western-liberal democracy. He asserted that there was no country which could 
isolate itself from globalisation. As Indonesia participated in global economic 
competition, its political system also had to be in harmony with today's global wave of 
democratisation. Since many developing countries already had joined this wave, it was 
wrong to say that liberal democracy was Western democracy. Hasnan also rejected 
ABRI's paternalistic claim to lead the pace and degree of democratisation, as he 
stressed that "since the international system has become more and more 
interdependent, ABRI's role in the process of democratisation is no longer self- 
determined, because international actors significantly influence this process."10
He asserted that democracy required the abandonment of the dominant 
influence of the military, and ABRI—which was a non-democratic institution operating 
under command-and-order rather than consensus—could hardly play a political role in 
the democratic environment.* 11 Given this assessment, he warned that: "the world trend 
has shifted to respect for free trade, democracy and human rights." Thus, "if Indonesia 
wants to reject these three tendencies, its [international] reputation will change from 
being an 'influential player' in Southeast Asia to being the 'biggest patient' in the 
region." ABRI's standard interpretation of democratisation, which placed Indonesia in 
the spectrum of cultural particularism, was totally rejected in the argument of this 
intellectual retired officer. Hasnan then shifted his focus to dwifungsi itself.
First, in an attempt to 'decommodify' ABRI's interpretation of its 'glorious' role 
during the independence war, which was used as a historical basis for legitimising the 
perpetuation of dwifungsi, Hasnan claimed that dwifungsi was not a 'right' given by 
history. Rather it was merely a historical 'fact' that ABRI had fought for independence, 
but ABRI could not assert such a commitment as a monopoly of ABRI.12 Second, given 
the global change mentioned above, Hasnan insisted that it was time for ABRI to
9 Seminar papers were later published as a book, entitled "ABRI and Democracy." The following citations 
are from his chapter in it. Hasnan Habib, "ABRI dan Demokrasi Politik," in Selamat Ginting, et.al., eds., 
ABRI dan Demokrasi, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZAN, 1997, pp.15-48.
10 Above citations are from ibid., pp.16,19,21.
11 Ibid., pp.28-30.
12 Ibid., p.48.
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concentrate its role on its defence function, while social security and order should be 
handled by the Police and the civilian governmental apparatus (namely the Interior 
Department). This suggestion meant the virtual end of dwifungsi. In doing so, laws 
should be formulated to 'normalise' the functional boundary between the military and 
the Police, and to abolish Bakorstanas which he labelled as an extra-constitutional 
institution.13 He believed these normalisation processes should eventually lead to the 
appointment of a civilian defence minister.
Hasnan's arguments are not far from those of civilian democratic activists who 
similarly call for democratisation and criticise dwifungsi both in principle and 
implementation. As seen in the previous chapter, such civilian activists, however, are 
easily labelled as 'Westernised' or 'anti-Pancasila' by military hardliners who suddenly 
cut the channels of communication with them. As typically seen in the case of the 
argument above, the attempts of some retired officers' to produce counter-discourses 
on the dwifungsi legitimation must be seen as significant examples of the everyday 
mode of criticism. As respected retired officers, they could explicitly focus on ABRI’s 
declining legitimacy without giving ABRI an excuse to condemn their argument as non- 
Indonesian or subversive. It is in this context that criticisms made by Hasnan, Rudini 
and Maulani—to name a few—seem to have had an impact in de-hegemonising the 
ideological projects of dwifungsi.
Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution performed the same function in de-hegemonising 
dwifungsi discourse. ABRI’s ideological claim that dwifungsi is a historical 'right' was 
undermined when the former army leader and dwifungsi concept-maker presented an 
opposite argument. "As KSAD, I made the so-called Jalan Tengah (Middle-Way) 
speech in 1958 in order to declare the political position of the military and it later 
became the basis of the dwifungsi concept. However, today's dwifungsi is not what we 
[army leaders of the time] intended to create. Under the New Order, extra­
constitutional institutions—such as Kopkamtib and later Bakorstanas—have played 
the most influential role in politics, thus society believes this is the form of dwifungsi. 
This is not the dwifungsi I tried to develop before."14 In the structure of New Order 
civil-military discourse, ABRI's manipulation of historical interpretation for the 
maintenance of dwifungsi legitimacy seemed to face a fundamental obstacle as long as 
Nasution was considered as a primary source of army history. To the extent that he 
was regarded by ABRI as the father of dwifungsi, this not only confirmed a 'historical 
fact' but could also be used by critics to delegitimise ABRI's hegemonic interpretation 
of dwifungsi.
13 Ibid., pp.44-45. Emphasis added.
14 Written interview with Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, 4 January 1997. His 1958 speech declared that the army 
would neither become a direct political force like in Latin American states nor be a dead tool of the 
government as in the European states. See, for the speech and its background, Penders and Sundhaussen 
(1985:133-134).
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'Messenger' Approach
The third approach attempts to bring out criticisms emerging in society and 
then deliver these voices to ABRI. By adopting—whether explicitly or not—the role of 
'messenger' or 'carrier' of wider opinions in society, the critical civilian may avoid being 
labelled as Western-contaminated at best or anti-Pancasila at worst. As an example of 
this approach, LIPI's dwifungsi study should be examined here. As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, this was the result of LIPI's research project in the year 1996-1997, which 
had been commissioned by Soeharto in February 1995. The research was almost 
completed by the end of 1996, and following the seminar which disclosed its main 
conclusions to the public, LIPI produced a final report in March 1997.15 LIPI's research 
had two special aspects which made its report unique in comparison to preceding 
studies. First was the fact that it was commissioned by Soeharto, the Supreme 
Commander of ABRI, and second was its research method based on a wide range of 
interviews with national and local political leaders. It was the first time in New Order 
civil-military relations that civilians were given such wide official space to present 
civilian views on dwifungsi. As the messenger of these voices, LIPI emphasised its 
objectivity, neutrality and empiricism. This "apolitical" gesture was effective in limiting 
ABRI's dogmatic reaction to its critical conclusions. ABRI officers could disagree with 
them but it was difficult to openly accuse the research as "anti-nationalist." The 
following is the main argument of the LIPI report.
Indria Samego, the project coordinator, claimed that ABRI frequently explained 
the misconduct of its sociopolitical role as the responsibility of few individual soldiers 
(oknum). This had become ABRI’s way of avoiding further criticism. He argued that, if 
there are many such individuals who deviate from the rule, ABRI leaders should share 
society's view that ABRI’s entire sociopolitical role should be critically examined.16 As 
an example of a common viewpoint, Indria suggested that: "although ABRI keeps 
saying that it has never 'played with fire' [provoking social riots], it is hard for society 
to believe this because of its long-standing political intervention. In fact, many people 
believe that ABRI has contributed to the outbreak of riots in Ujung Pandang, the July 
27th Affair, Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo."17 For Indria, ABRI's role as a 
'fire brigade' is hardly unrelated to its structural involvement in politics, and he thinks 
that it has brought about a negative impact for ABRI itself; for instance, it has
15 According to a LIPI staff, the research result was first submitted to Moerdiono, Secretary of the State, at 
the end of 1996 but because the content was so critical, the report was stopped at the level of Sekneg (State 
Secretariat) for further consideration and it took several months before it was finally delivered to the hand 
of Soeharto. Moerdiono also told LIPI not to publicise the report before the President accepted it. See Indria 
Samego, "Penelitian Peran Sosial Politik ABRI," Studi Politik, LIPI, No.l, 1996, p.160. A book—based on a 
LIPI discussion of the report—was printed in March 1997. See Indria Samego, et.al., Peranan Sospol ABRI: 
Masalah dan Prospeknya, Jakarta: LIPI, March 1997.
16 Indria Samego, "Demokratisasi Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan Pendahuluan," in ibid., p.15.
17 Quotations are from ibid., pp.18-19. About these riots which broke out in 1996-1997, see Chapter 2.
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institutionalised repressive behaviour, curtailed military professionalism, weakened 
military discipline, and made an alliance between ABRI and particular social groups.18
Distortions of dwifungsi were further suggested in this report, as if evident in all 
fields of military engagement. The report criticised ABRI's ideological projects which 
easily identified those who had different opinions from ABRI/government, as 
subversive and communist.19 In the political field, the report stressed that ABRI's 
intervention had deepened social disharmony. This was seen in the case of the Medan 
Congress held by the Surjadi-PDI, which—as admitted by the PDI staff—was fully 
backed by ABRI in finance and support mobilisation. In the economic field, ABRI was 
portrayed as far from solving labour-land disputes, because it had always backed 
crony business, thus spreading ABRI's social image as a 'public enemy' (musuh rakyat). 
Furthermore, the report presented opinions of interviewees who criticised the poor 
financial condition of state enterprises led by ABRI and concluded that ABRI’s 
economic intervention was one reason why Indonesia was not ready to welcome the 
ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement (AFTA).20 From the perspective of ASEAN's regional 
security balance, it was also suggested that ABRI, like it or not, should be forced to 
stop focusing on the internal security problem in order to build up conventional 
defence capacity corresponding to the level of neighbouring countries, and which 
requires a review of the current ascendancy of army vis-a-vis other services.21
All these arguments were said to be reflecting the voices of civilian political 
figures at national and local levels with whom the project team had conducted 
interviews. To emphasise the nature of the report as a policy paper, some 
recommendations were made for the President. Among other things, LIPI suggested 
that ABRI's political role should be limited to participation in the legislative branch, 
preferably only in the MPR, in order to enhance ABRI's political disengagement, and 
this process should be completed by the general election of 2007. This, the authors 
claimed, was no more other than the realisation of ABRI's slogan declared at the 1995 
ABRI Anniversary: "what is good for the people is the best for ABRI."22 As seen in 
Chapter 2, this recommendation was widely questioned by ABRI officers. Most 
claimed that it was unrealistic and lacked a historical perspective. Such defensive 
reactions illustrated that the messenger approach could have a direct role in bringing
18 Ibid., p.27.
19 Riza Sihbudi, "Dampak Perubahan Lingkungan Domestik Terhadap Peran Sosial Politik ABRI,” in Indria 
Samego, et.al., op.cit., p.129. Needless to say, this criticism strongly reflected ABRI's OTB theory and its 
implementation in the PRD affair in July 1996.
20 Above points are from ibid., pp.128-131. ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
21 Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Lingkungan Intemasional, Demokratisasi dan Peranan Sosial Poltik ABRI," in 
Indria Samego, et.al., op.cit., p.165. Dewi became the Presidential advisor for foreign policy under the 
Habibie government.
22 See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "Masa Depan Peran Sospol ABRI," and Indria Samego, "Kesimpulan dan 
Rekomendasi Penelitian," both in Indria Samego, et.al., op.cit., pp.191,212,231.
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public voices into the discourse arena without inviting ABRI's dogmatic response, 
which was apparent whenever public protests raised the same criticism.
The three approaches above have their own strengths in the conveying the elite 
counter-discourse on dwifungsi. In the eyes of political activists situated outside the 
regime, these approaches adopted by elite insiders were not enough to dismantle the 
dwifungsi system. However, the utility of insider criticism, as seen above, was to open 
the communication channel with ABRI and develop a mutual discourse under the 
authoritarian polity. This function should not be ignored in assessing the development 
of dwifungsi thinking within the military. It is only in this elite discursive space that the 
military officers endeavoured to defend dwifungsi legitimation. For the study of a 
military's political thinking, investigation should target this arena. In our study of ABRI 
under the late New Order, insider criticism of dwifungsi was mainly via the three 
approaches we have examined above. Let us, then, examine the responses of ABRI 
officers to the critical discourse on dwifungsi.
Responses to Counter-Discourses
ABRI's discursive responses seemed to have three elements—labelling critics 
and criticism, perceiving problems and developing standard theories to defend 
dwifungsi legitimacy.
Classifying Criticism-Critics
At the most highest level, ABRI responded to criticism by first classifying and 
labelling critics and criticism in order to provide a conceptual lens for ABRI officers to 
interpret and rebut such criticism. At the beginning of the keterbukaan period in 1989, 
the Pangab, Gen Try Sutrisno, summarised three major lines of criticism directed at 
ABRI's dwifungsi.
In formal procedures, ABRI's role as a sociopolitical force no longer has a problem. 
But we should not close our eyes to the fact that in society there are still certain 
people who do not accept such a role of ABRI..., and they can be classified into 
three groups. The first group thinks that dwifungsi is only linked to the 45 
Generation, so it should decline when the generation changes. The second group 
believes that dwifungsi is ABRI’s domination of civilian posts, asserting that since 
civilians have become capable [of state management], these posts should be passed 
onto them. The third group claims that ABRI is willing to adopt militarism.23
23 Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Pada Pembukaan Sussospol 
ABRI Angkatan-1 1988/1989 di Sesko ABRI Bandung," Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI, Edisi 222, June 1989, 
pp.68-69.
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Later, in 1993, Try identified three sources of civilian response—two of which 
were critical while the third was supportive. The first group was made up of those 
who were influenced by liberal democratic ideas, and were mostly associated with the 
university campuses. They believed that the professional military should limit its role 
to the defence field. The second group accepted dwifungsi but hoped that kekaryaan 
would not close civilian career paths. The third group consisted of those who 
welcomed dwifungsi as an effort to establish the family state (negara kekeluargaan).24
General Try's statements hardly acknowledged that dwifungsi legitimacy was 
facing serious challenge and he apparently saw no need for ABRI to adjust its position. 
Critics were simply categorised into two groups. One group was identified as "liberal" 
and thus automatically labelled as "western" and unacceptable. The other group was 
accused of confusing dwifungsi and kekaryaan and therefore drawing wrong 
conclusions. For ABRI officers, these classifications were one way to respond to the 
counter-discourse on dwifungsi and were commonly used by officers to claim that 
critics were wrong and their criticisms based on misunderstanding.
Perceiving Dilemmas
Within ABRI, however, some officers acknowledged that they were facing a 
problem in response to the dwifungsi counter-discourse. Maj-Gen Abdul Rivai, for 
example, acknowledged in the Kostrad journal that dwifungsi gave rise to a structural 
dilemma. He pointed out that dwifungsi s first function—i.e. defence—was part of the 
state's security policy, but in performing its second function, ABRI was expected, like 
other sociopolitical organisations, to supervise governmental policy. He thought that if 
ABRI was preoccupied with performing its function as a part of governmental 
apparatus, it would risk dwifungsis second function, while at the same time its first 
function would not be implemented properly if ABRI was too busy performing the 
second function.25 Describing ABRI's position as dilemmatic itself implies that he 
perceived the current position as not holding a desirable balance between the first and 
second functions of dwifungsi He also understood that ABRI’s second function was to 
supervise governmental policy. As discussed previously, there was a growing concern 
within the officer corps about ABRI's loss of independent stance vis-a-vis Soeharto 
during that time. It is therefore plausible to see that Rivai's concern was directed at 
dwifungsis perceived inability to properly perform its second function, due to its 
preoccupation with the first function as a tool of the government.
24 Kepemimpinan ABRI Dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa Mendatang, 
Mabes ABRI, 1993, pp.52-53.
25 A. Rivai, "Aktualisasi Peran dan Sikap Mental Aparatur Pemerintah dalam Era Pembangunan," Darma 
Putra, Edisi Khusus, No.32, 1995, p.77. Rivai is a graduate of AMN's class 1965, who served as Pangdam 
IX/Udayana until the July 1997 reshuffle. He then became a member of F-ABRI at the DPR.
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We can see a similar theme in the writing of Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo. He 
suggested that ABRI's current role as pejuang (warrior) and prajurit (soldier) contained 
clear contradictions and dilemmas, especially in a situation where governmental 
policies did not meet the aspirations of the people.26 If ABRI behaved as a 
governmental tool, it would harm its spirit as pejuang, but if officers merely followed 
the demands of the public, this would risk a deterioration of ABRI's internal 
discipline.27 Hari believed this dilemma to be increasingly serious in the face of growing 
democratic demands, and urged that ABRI should re-evaluate the following questions 
to overcome this challenge. Was ABRI ready to give support to the emerging new 
groups in society which would result in the reduction of ABRI's role? Could ABRI 
really become a dynamiser in the process of democratisation, or did it still want to 
persist in its role as stabiliser even though other social forces were willing to play the 
dynamising role? Wasn't it true that the new-generation officers trained in internal 
security management tended to have a negative view of social change? And weren't 
they overacting in response to emerging social movements?28
The arguments of Rivai and Hari Sabamo indicate one direction of ABRI's 
internal discussion in the face of growing social demands for political openness. This 
expression of the dilemma was obviously not for public consumption but it implied 
that the current situation was not regarded satisfactory by some officers. The dilemma 
described above led to concern about either (1) ABRI's excessive responsiveness to 
social demands, which wrould incapacitate its functional role in the state apparatus, or 
(2) its identification with state activity vis-a-vis society, which would undermine not 
only ABRI's corporate identity as a people's army but also its everyday divifungsi 
rationale. Judging from Rivai's reference to the need for supervising the government and 
Hari's questions which are commonly asked by civilians, the two generals' concerns 
were focused on the latter, i.e. ABRI's dissociation form the rakyat. In other words, in 
response to the critical discourse on divifungsi, some serving ABRI leaders admitted the 
existence of a gap between ABRI’s proclaimed role as a promoter of social interests 
and its practical role as a tool of the government. This perception did not necessarily 
propel these officers into action, for example by resisting Soeharto's political blueprint, 
since—as in any social organisation—such a dynamic depends on other calculations in 
real politics. Rather, what is demonstrated in the above cases is one of the ways in 
which ABRI officers, who perceived the declining legitimacy of divifungsi, expressed 
their concerns through the medium of intra-military communications. Their assessment 
of the dilemma, however, did not seem to meet the criticisms launched by non-ABRI 
critics who saw the problem in ABRI's excessive use of force and arbitrary ideological
26 About the concepts of pejuang and prajurit, consult Chapter 3.
27 Hari Sabamo, "Tantangan Demokrasi dan Sikap ABRI," Yudhagama, No.46, October 1994, pp.19-20.
28 Ibid., p.21.
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operations, which could not be explained by the mere fact that the military was a tool 
of the government—a universal phenomenon.
Reformulating Theories
Another way of responding to the dzuifungsi counter-discourse is the reinvention 
of the logic to legitimise the relevance of dzuifungsi. Two theories are commonly 
employed to this end. One is 'culturalisin' and the other is 'developmentalism.'
In the former, it is interesting to note that a booklet written by Brig-Gen (ret) 
A.S.S. Tambunan, a prominent dzuifungsi theorist, was published in 1995 as an 
attempt to re-emphasise the legitimate foundations of dzuifungsi.29 Tambunan's work is 
comprehensive in the sense that several resources are mobilised in order to insist on the 
durability of dzuifungsi. However, regarding democratisation, his approach emphasises 
culture. He claims that democracy takes various forms in the world and the Indonesian 
way includes the dzuifungsi system. He therefore stresses the irrelevance of the civil- 
military dichotomy in promoting democracy in Indonesia and argues that Indonesian 
society recognises no functional boundary between military and civilian tasks. Thus 
ABRI should participate in any social activity in accordance with social needs. This 
interpretation is a response to the criticism which attempts to limit ABRI's non-military 
activity to the MPR and reduce ABRI's kekaryaan practice. The rationale for this, 
according to Tambunan, is the culture of familism (kekeluargaan) rooted in Indonesian 
society which respects mutual assistance and organic solidarity among all social 
components. This conception of society is asserted by Tambunan as a prime reason for 
rejecting the distinction between civilian and military affairs, with the resulting 
justification of ABRI's perpetual involvement in non-military sectors.30
Significantly, this ideology of civil-military fusion also helps ABRI to reject 
dzuifungsi criticism based on the social-change approach which emphasises the 
emergence of post-revolutionary generation officers and the rise in civilian competence. 
It is in this context that we can see ABRI’s increasingly strong rejection of civil-military 
dichotomy in the recent debate on dzuifungsi legitimacy, which is coloured by the 
growing demand for 'civilian empowerment.' This argument is not intended to replace 
ABRI's traditional emphasis of historical, stabilising and legal justifications. Rather, it
29 The booklet is A.S.S. Tambunan, Socio-Political Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces: An Effort to 
Outline the Issues, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995. The original text was written in 1980 but the 
publisher, in the Introduction to the book, stresses that it is still highly relevant in the contemporary context 
and it soon became a standard reference among ABRI intellectuals. In my conversations with ABRI officers, 
many—though not all—nominated the book as one of four writings they recommended civilians to read. The 
other three are Notosusanto (1984), Soebijono, et.al. (1992), and Said (1991). Since Tambunan's work was 
revised in 1995, we will look at this 'latest' work which discusses issues of dzuifungsi in democratisation.
30 Above citations are from Tambunan, op.cit., pp.31-34. However, it does not provide an answer to the 
counter-discourse which says civilians, in that case, should also take part in military organisations, such 
as occupying the post of Menhankam.
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reflects the relative shift of emphasis in defending dwifungsi against the counter­
discourse.31
For example, a prominent ABRI thinker, Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, 
declined to assess the Law No.20/1982 as a valid source of dwifungsi legitimacy 
because he considered it to be only a confirmation of dwifungsi and not its source. For 
him, Nugroho's argument in 1984 was also less relevant in today's society because it 
was strongly inclined to a historical explanation. In facing the demand for 
democratisation which is pushed by globalisation, Abdulkadir regards historical 
emphasis as backward thinking. For him, it is the cultural legitimacy of kekeluargaan 
which is the fundamental basis of dwifungsi.32 Indeed, as an ultimate rejection of the 
strict civil-military boundary applied in many western countries, one officer insisted 
that it was even a mistake to translate ABRI as the Armed Forces or the military in 
English.33
ABRI's cultural approach is essentially static and used against any criticism 
which insists on the need for ABRI—which composes only 0.25 percent of the total 
population—to hand over its political power to civilians under stable political 
conditions. As a built-in New Order regime discourse, dwifungsi has long been 
explained in the four-step logical flow based on culturalism: democracy has variations; 
Indonesia is based on kekeluargaan; democracy based on kekeluargaan asks all social 
member to participate in every field of national life with a result that the civil-military 
dichotomy is invalid; thus dwifungsi has eternal legitimacy. Tambunan's argument 
seems to be the simple reproduction of this logic.
However, this justification does not meet the argument which stresses declining 
dwifungsi legitimacy as a result of ABRI's constant repressive behaviour against 
political movements. Because of this limitation, although seeking a cultural source has 
seemingly become the central approach in ABRI's current dwifungsi discourse, there are 
other attempts to develop a more convincing explanation which can respond to the 
multi-dimensional criticism of today. The utility of cultural approach is suspect here. 
A reform-minded officer in ABRI Headquarters, for example, argues:
31 In the author's interviews with the serving officers, there was not one who did not mention this denial of 
civil-military dichotomy in explaining the place of dwifungsi in democratisation, though a variety of 
opinions were expressed regarding the strategy to manage the military commitment to the political process.
32 Interview with Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, 30 July 1996. Criticism of Nugroho's work in 1984 was 
also posed by the late Lt-Gen (ret) Simatupang, a prominent 45 Generation army intellectual, who saw 
Pejuang dan Prajurit as not paying attention to the reason why dwifungsi would not be geared towards 
militarism, but would encourage Pancasila democracy in the future. See T.B. Simatupang, "Renungan Atas 
Tempat dan Peranan TNI/ABRI," Teknologi & Strategi Militer, No.2, 1987, p.17. Abdulkadir's former 
student at AMN, the Defence Minister Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, also emphasised kekeluargaan culture as the 
strongest basis of dwifungsi existence (Written and oral interviews, 19 February 1997). In this line of 
thinking, there is also an argument stressing the need for academics to develop a social science theory of 
negara kekeluargaan as the basis of dwifungsi's legitimacy. See Achmad Roestandi, "Masa Depan Dwifungsi 
ABRI," Persepsi, No.l, 1990, pp.24-25.
33 Interview with First Admiral Joost Mugho, Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff in the Field of National 
Zone (Staf Ahli KASAL bidang Wilayah Nasional), 3 October 1996.
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There is a trick in the explanation that dwifungsi is a reflection of kekeluargaan 
because if it is true, we should have consultation and consensus [regarding 
dwifungsi policies]. The reality, however, is the rule of the king who thinks his 
legitimacy comes from his own cosmos rather than from consensus made with his 
followers.34
For these officers who believed that ABRI’s institutional interests had been distorted 
by Soeharto's private interests, the cultural approach was obviously not sufficient to 
respond in a practical way to the massive pressure posed by critics. One of the 
popular alternatives among younger generation officers was the approach emphasising 
different levels of development, rather than static, cultural and legal foundations.
As a counter to democratisation without dwifungsi, an Air Force intellectual, 
Vice Marshal Graito Usodo, provided the following theory:
Indonesia consists of four different social layers. They are stone-age, agrarian, 
industrial and information societies.... Inevitably ABRI's stance towards society has 
to be adjusted depending on the layer. For example, ABRI knows globalisation is 
good for the information society but distractive for the stone-age society in Irian 
Jaya. Under these circumstances, political change has to be managed by those who 
can represent the interests of all layers, and it is ABRI.... Dwifungsi maintains its 
legitimacy as ABRI fulfils this coordinating role.35
Similarly, Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, political adviser of ABRI Commander, argued that:
Memberdayakan sipil (empowering civilians) is the adopted posture of ABRI in the 
era of democratisation, but whether it reduces ABRI's role or not may depend on the 
quality of people's life. We still have huge gaps between eastern and western parts 
of the archipelago, and between cities and rural areas. In facing these horizontal and 
vertical gaps, I think dwifungsi should be tut wuri handayani in places where the 
development is satisfactory, such as Jakarta, but other approaches should be used 
where the development is insufficient.36
Contrary to the cultural approach which emphasises the inadequacy of 
democratic concepts as applied by many critics and seeks perpetuation of dwifungsi 
legitimacy in the regime ideology of kekeluargaan, the 'level-of-development' theory 
envisages political ramifications of economic change. It also tries to formulate an 
alternative justification for the military engagement in the civilian sector in the coming 
decades of rapid social mobility. Regarding previous forms of dwifungsi legitimation, 
Widjojo further explained, as follows:
How should ABRI develop the legitimacy of its sociopolitical role? A historical 
explanation is weak and cannot be insisted on in the future, the same as the 
constitutional justification which can be amended in the future. Culture? It also
34 Confidential interview, October 1996. Obviously this is an attack on Soeharto.
35 Interview with Vice Marshal Graito Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI Commander in the Field of Industrial 
Development (Staf Ahli Pangab bidang Inbang), 26 November 1996.
36 Interview, 15 January 1997.
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changes. In like manner, the legal basis is not strong since it can be revised. Now we 
need to develop a social legitimacy which totally relies on the needs of society.37
In contrast to the "culturalists” who seem less concerned with the developing 
counter-discourse and more inclined to interpret criticism as a misunderstanding or 
'false consciousness' of critics, the flexible level-of-development theory is more 
communicative and less deterministic in its response to criticism. It is largely a product 
of certain ABRI intellectuals who at least believe that rational discussion should be 
held with critics in order to halt the growing scepticism about the future utility of 
dwifungsi. As the information-communication technology dramatically develops and 
the media network expands in time and space around the world, there are natural 
concerns among military officers about ABRI's need for promoting dialogue with 
society in order to avoid being considered as a living dinosaur in the eyes of domestic 
and international communities.
However, this is not to argue that the pragmatic proponents of the flexible 
approach are ready to accept the critical discourse aiming at challenging the legitimacy 
of dwifungsi. An intellectual brigadier general, who supported the level-of-development 
approach, stressed that: "figures like Sri Bintang Pamunkas, Amien Rais and George 
Aditjondro are all popular, smart and have ideals. To defend dwifungsi's legitimacy 
from their arguments, we need to develop our communication skills in domestic and 
international societies to let people know that their ideals are too premature to be 
adopted in today's society."38 The level-of-development approach, which attempts to 
'rationally' counter the criticism linked with democratisation demands, discounts the 
static cultural approach, but also tends to distrust civilian institutions which ABRI 
thinks a priori are not capable of representing the diverse interests of the whole society. 
This perception is evident in the fact that ABRI's intellectual circles who stress the 
need for dwifungsi reforms simultaneously emphasise the inadequacy of civilian 
institutions. Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, for example, sometimes questions the loyalty of 
civilians to the nation, whereas Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah believes that the 
frequent intellectual arrogance of civilians has disturbed mutual communication 
between the civilian and the military 39 ABRI's distrust of civilians seems to be deeply 
entrenched, regardless of differences in approach that they take in defending the 
legitimacy of dwifungsi.
ABRI's distrust of civilians has not yet been a major theme in the debate over 
dwifungsi. However, some critics envisage this issue as a fundamental problem which 
curtails ABRI's rejuvenation of dwifungsi legitimacy. It was retired Lt-Gen Bambang 
Triantoro, the chairman of YKPK, who insisted that ABRI leaders should not talk as if
37 Interview, 15 January 1997.
38 Confidential interview, February 1997.
39 Interviews with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996; and Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, 24 
January 1997.
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challenges came from foreign cultures or new political and economic development, but 
should recognise that it was the aspiration of civilians which had challenged ABRI's 
dominant role. ABRI was inclined to forget this point due to its biased view of 
civilians, he asserted.40 Moreover, former Police Chief, General (ret) Kunarto, argued 
that: "comparing soldiers—who totally grow up within the military organisation—with 
civilians with college degrees, the latter actually know much more about politics and 
are far closer to the rakyat than soldiers. This is well reflected in ABRI's ignorance and 
distrust of civilian aspirations, as proved in the Megawati case in which ABRI 
overthrew a popular political leader."41
It is against this background that critics have frequently suggested the need for 
reviving civil-military dialogue even at the stage of cadet training, in order to alleviate 
mutual distrust between future military and civilian leaders.42 ABRI’s hesitation in 
accepting this idea is, of course, due to its concern for effective military schooling 
which needs an intensive initiation period for cadets. It is during this period that ABRI 
first indoctrinates ideologies of the regime, including dzvifungsi and kekeluargaan, to the 
succeeding generations. Therefore, any noise from society should be eliminated in order 
to secure ideological consistency among generations within ABRI. This concern was 
well reflected in ABRI's strategic manual which emphasised a fear that generational 
change could be manipulated by certain elements in society to undermine solidarity 
within ABRI.43 Thus, ABRI's current slogan to promote open communications with 
civilians can be clouded by its latent fear of eroding the military value-system. ABRI's 
perceived limits in encouraging mutual dialogue also indicate that ABRI has 
fundamentally seen rapid social mobility—resulting from economic development—as a 
threat to the maintenance of military ideology and dzvifungsi legitimacy.
The dzvifungsi counter-discourse we examined earlier provides criticisms from 
various perspectives focusing on international, social, and intra-ABRI problems. In 
response, ABRI has developed explanations—mainly through the two approaches 
discussed above—about the current relevance of dzvifungsi, as summarised in Table 6- 
1. Making a provisional conclusion from our examination in this section, we must note 
that most of these explanations are aimed at the interpretation (and reinterpretation)
40 Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang Triantoro, 16 December 1996.
41 Interview with Gen (ret) Kunarto, Vice-Chairman of BPK, 23 January 1997.
42 At Seskoad, formal communications with civilian intellectuals were closed down in 1969 and replaced 
by informal ones. At Akabri, there were formal opportunities to exchange political views with university 
students, but again they were abolished. For details, see "Komunikasi ABRI dengan Para Cendikiawan 
(Wawancara Khusus dengan Wakil Gubemur Lemhannas oleh Alex Dinuth)," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, 
No.51,1989, pp.57-58, 61. Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, Seskoad Commander, admitted that since the closure of 
communication, the gap between civilian and officers’ thinking had widened (Interview, 17 October 1996). 
In Akabri, the ABRI side noticed that the dialogue with university students was not productive because 
Akabri cadets were trained by doctrines while students had free minds (Interview with Maj-Gen Agus 
Widjojo, 30 September 1996). Today, Akabri cadets only have a few opportunities to exchange views with 
civilian students at the AMD-like village camp organised by Akabri once a year. About this camp, see 
"Marching to a Crossroad," FEER, 3 September 1992.
43 Telaahan Strategik Nasional 1983-1993 (Slide), Lemhannas, n.d., p.23.
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of social conditions rather than of dwifungsi itself. In other words, ABRI's major efforts 
in the current discourse on dwifungsi legitimacy are mainly focused on defining the 
direction of ongoing social change, as if to demonstrate the conditions for asserting 
that dwifungsi is still relevant under the given situation. That ABRI's essential focus in 
the discourse is on society—rather than dwifungsi—reflects the nature of current civil- 
military debate which is occupied with the argument about democratisation. As critics 
have continuously brought forward the issue of democratisation in emphasising the 
declining nature of dwifungsi legitimacy, ABRI is forced to counter the argument by 
showing alternative views on society which can explain the inapplicability of liberal 
democracy in the current social condition and the resulting need for maintaining the 
dwifungsi system. In doing so, ABRI has mobilised the cultural approach, which is 
based on particularism and which interprets society in a static way, bhirring the ongoing 
social change. At the same time, some elements within ABRI have employed a more 
pragmatic level-of-development approach, based on relativism, which claims that 
certain social sectors still need to receive pengabdian, or 'services,' through dwifungsi.u
Table 6-1: Major Patters of Communication in Cultural and Level-of-Development Approaches
Methods of Relegitimation
Sources of Delegitimation Cultural Approach
Global wave of democratisation 
brings universal values.
Regeneration removes ABRI's 
revolutionary legitimacy.
Middle-class civilians are tired 
of ABRI's dominant role.
Indonesia is based on Pancasila 
democracy with kekeluargaan 
values.
Indonesia is based on 
kekeluargaan which has no civil- 
military dichotomy.
ABRI is a part of negara 
kekeluargaan and represents 
interests of all family members, 
including the middle-class.
Level-of-Development Approach
Democratic needs depend on 
particular circumstances which 
vary according to place and time.
Compared with others, ABRI has 
ability to lead the nation and 
represent all interests in society.
ABRI supports middle-class 
people. They still wish ABRI to 
maintain stability which is 
needed for their economic 
activities.
44 Ramage (1995:124-130) already pointed out that ABRI's emphasis of Pancasila and its integralistic 
ideology became apparent in its effort to maintain dwifungsi legitimacy. Our examination of current 
officers' thinking suggests that ABRI has also found an approach less reliant on the culture-oriented 
integralism. As just discussed, this is a consequence of ABRI's growing need to strengthen its interpretation 
of the current social change process, and which cannot be carried out by a cultural explanation alone.
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ABRI is merely a 'tool of the 
government.'
ABRI always resorts to the 
security approach so is nothing 
more than a 'fire brigade.'
Traditionally, ABRI as hankam is 
a part of the government, but 
ABRI as sospol is a part of 
society. ABRI as a whole is 
always for the rakyat.
ABRI's sospol role is flexibly 
implemented depending on the 
needs in society.
The security approach is only a 
part of the hankam role required 
to defend Pancasila. ABRI is not a 
'fire brigade' because its sospol 
role provides many services.
Security and prosperity 
approaches are used in a 
balanced way, and depend on the 
situation. For example, in the near 
future, security should be mainly 
handled by the Police.
Arenas: Military Involvements in Legislatures
In their critical discourse aimed at delegitimising the permanency of dwifungsi, 
critical elites have often targeted particular policies of ABRI. However dwifungsi is 
interpreted, its 'policy' problems have been widely noted in political society.45 This fact 
has made many critics see the practical implementation of dwifungsi as the main 
obstacle to political development rather than the inadequacy of social-cultural 
conditions as alleged by ABRI.46 Since the keterbukaan movement began, several critical 
figures have insisted on the need for reforming the formal political mechanism by 
redesigning institutional settings. For these 'institutionalists,' civilian supremacy, 
human rights and democratisation are not obstructed by cultural incompatibility or 
inadequacy, but by structural defects in the current political system which can be 
solved, to a large extent, by renovating political institutions.
From this perspective, attention was given to ABRI's formal channels of 
political participation in the legislative branch; the arena of 'politics.' The first target 
was ABRI’s appointed members in legislatures both at the national and regional levels. 
The second was ABRI’s backing for Golkar during the elections in order to secure 
ABRI's influence in the legislative body. We examine discourses on these two issues 
below and see that they are not merely a technical issue of seat numbers or the 
principle of ABRI’s alleged neutrality in politics, but reveal ABRI’s institutional 
vulnerability in its long-established political involvement.
45 ABRI’s backing for Golkar during elections, and its policy of kekaryaan are notable cases raised by the 
civilian elites. In fact, despite ABRI’s long-time claim that kekaryaan had decreased, the 1987 Kekaryaan 
Seminar concluded that it would be imperative for ABRI to immediately increase its personnel in legislative, 
executive and judicial branches as well as in social sectors in order to prevent a vacuum after the 1987 
election. As the result, the total number of kekaryaan staff became 15,680 in the end of 1987, which was a 
slight increase from 14,819 in 1984. See "Hasil Seminar Susyawan ABRI Legislatif III Tentang Strategi 
Pembangunan Politik dalam Sistem Demokrasi Pancasila," Widya Dharma, No.9, 1987, pp.69-70; Try 
Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI pada Acara Pertemuan dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI Eselon-I di 
Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988," Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.41.
46 Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Vice-Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.
191
Chapter 6
F-ABRI and ABRI's Non-Participation in the Elections
In the mid-1990s, it was already standard for ABRI to argue that the 
strengthening of legislative bodies is crucial in promoting democratisation. Kassospol 
Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid presented this idea when he said that: "ABRI, in its political 
role, has a strong commitment to democratisation and what we do at first is to 
encourage political institutions, namely legislative institutions, to function in optimal 
ways."47 This commitment, however, would be doubted by critics if it were not 
followed by the actual reduction of ABRI's representation in legislative institutions. To 
achieve this, critics have supported LIPI's proposal to demilitarise the DPR in 2003. 
ABRI members would no longer be appointed to legislatures and they would be 
allowed to vote in elections.48
In the development of the debate concerning ABRI representatives in the 
national and regional parliaments, several retired officers in the 1990s argued in favour 
of a return to the 1955 situation. Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto argued that the National 
Consensus conflicted with UUD45 and criticised ABRI's arbitrary interpretation of the 
National Consensus to legitimise F-ABRI, which he thought was just a temporary rule 
made more than 30 years ago. This logic led him to conclude that "ABRI should 
participate in voting at elections and withdraw from its appointed seats in the DPR in 
order to correct the major distortion of dwifungsi both in principle and in practice."49 
Similarly, Brig-Gen (ret) Soedibyo also drew attention to F-ABRI’s lack of legitimacy 
because ABRI did not have a constituency to represent people's interests, and 
therefore, it should participate in elections if it wanted to be represented in the 
legislative process.50
The arguments of Soebijakto and Soedibyo to allow ABRI to restore its voting 
rights illustrate an unique case in the dwifungsi counter-discourse which criticises 
ABRI's participation in the formal political structure by encouraging the removal of a 
self-restriction. Gen (ret) Nasution, who actually experienced the 1955 elections, took 
this stance too. "Since the UUD45 guarantees the rights of all citizen to vote, it is better
47 See his interview in "ABRI Punya Komitmen Terhadap Demokrasi tapi Tidak Mau Dijadikan Hanya 
Sebagai Alat,” Sintesis, No.15, May-June 1996.
48 In the political history of Indonesia, the members of the military were permitted to vote in the first general 
elections in 1955. But this right was abolished in the second election conducted in 1971 under the Soeharto 
regime, following the so-called "National Consensus" that provided appointed seats for ABRI in parliament. 
The rationale for this at that time was to secure political stability, Pancasila and UUD45 in the 
parliamentary process, and it was widely claimed by officers as a quid pro quo for giving up their right to 
vote.
49 The references above are from an interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto, Chief Executive of Indonesian 
Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI), a think-tank headed by Gen (ret) Rudini. 8 January 1997. The 
principle he refers to here is ABRI's identity as the people's military. He believes that such an identity is 
distorted by taking over the legislative place which should be filled by political parties.
50 Interview, 22 July 1996. Soedibyo was also affiliated with LPSI.
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for ABRI to participate in elections as we experienced in 1955 with my IPKI (League of 
Upholders of Indonesian Freedom). Although this system was abolished by President 
Soekamo, I thought it was much better than having appointed seats in parliaments. If 
ABRI has to be 'appointed,' it has be limited to the MPR."51
The claims made by Soebijakto, Soedibyo and Nasution were basically aimed 
at overcoming perceived contradictions in ABRI's current political participation 
channels. In response to such an argument, ABRI's claim—which seems to have been 
shared by most active officers and many retired officers—was that, if ABRI 
participates in elections, it runs the risk of being split by the intervention of civilian 
political parties and, as seen during the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, 
a split within the military might risk the country's political stability.52 The fear of 
civilian intervention in the military sector not only poses a question to ABRI's rejection 
of the civil-military dichotomy, but also undermines the ’self-sacrifice’ argument long 
claimed by ABRI, which insists that ABRI gave up its right to vote in the elections in 
order to 'stand above all groups' and to play the role of 'national guardian.'
This point was raised by Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib who argued:
In democratic countries, soldiers can vote in elections. But in Indonesia, the National 
Consensus has prevented them from doing so. The time has come to review it. If 
there is still a concern within ABRI that participating in elections may split ABRI, as 
soldiers vote for different parties, it reveals that ABRI leaders do not trust their 
members and it proves the failure of current management within ABRI. [What are 
they scared about?] Isn't it Pak Harto who said communism was no longer active 
and all political parties accepted Pancasila...? I see ABRI’s appointed seats in the 
DPR as political discrimination.53
All these arguments suggest that ABRI's paternalistic political involvement in the 
legislature is a reflection of its institutional vulnerability rather than its proclaimed role 
as a national guardian. It also implies that ABRI still fears being influenced by civilian 
political forces, as in the 1950s, thus leading to an assessment that ABRI has failed to 
develop professionalism and internal cohesion. This critical discourse, therefore, 
uncovers ABRI’s hidden problems in civil-military relations.
51 Written interview with Gen (ret) Nasution, 4 January 1997. IPKI was a political party which nominated 
73 officer-candidates for the 1955 election. Officers affiliated with Petisi 50, such as Lt-Gen (ret) 
Mokoginta and Maj-Gen Azis Saleh, were Nasution's partners in establishing IPKI. When Soeharto 
instructed LIPI to conduct research on dwifungsi, Petisi 50 lobbied LIPI to make a proposal beyond the 
simple reduction of F-ABRI numbers. See Kelompok Kerja Petisi Limapuluh, Demokratisasi Politik: Pokok- 
Pokok Pikiran Untuk Perubahan dan Penyempurnaan Paket Per Undang-Undang tentang Kehidupan Politik 
Nasional, Seri Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa, No.9, May 1995, pp.41-43.
52 For example, interviews with Gen (ret) Rudini, 4 September 1996; Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 
1996; Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, 17 October 1996; Maj-Gen Budi Harsono, 31 January 1997.
53 See Hasnan Habib, op.cit., p.47. Ruslan Abdulgani, former chairman of Pancasila Propagation Board (BP- 
7)—the agency in charge of disseminating the state-ideology of Pancasila—also stressed that "ABRI should 
now participate in the election because there was no longer a threat to Pancasila. ABRI's ideological- 
political functions to safeguard Pancasila were already unnecessary (menguap). So the ABRI seats should 
be reduced or simply dismantled." Cited from Pakpahan (1994: 204).
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As seen in the legitimacy argument, ABRI's distrust of civilians is also apparent 
in this debate over F-ABRI and electoral participation. Hasnan insisted that: "I 
introduced this idea [relinquishing F-ABRI and allowing soldiers to participate in 
elections] to Lemhannas and Seskoad and they understood the logic, but they were 
really worried about the possibility of civilian political leaders conducting an anti- 
dzvifungsi movement in the legislative branch, especially people around Megawati."54 
The coupling of ’distrust’ and ’fear’ not only builds up ABRI's negative view of social 
evolution but also strengthens its determination to oppose attempts in society to erode 
ABRI’s institutional solidarity.
Another ABRI argument insists that the non-participation of soldiers in 
elections is an insurance against military repression. If ABRI members participate in the 
election, it is argued, they may be tempted to force people to vote for a certain party 
by using guns. Therefore, the appointment of ABRI members to the legislatures and 
their non-participation in elections are intended to avoid such a situation.55 The 
ultimate argument in this line of thinking further insists that if ABRI is not represented 
in the legislatures and is excluded from formal participation in the political process, it 
may be motivated to take over power directly. By being represented in the legislatures, 
on the other hand, ABRI feels that it is already participating in government affairs and 
is therefore less likely to feel the need to assert itself by carrying out a coup.56
Resorting to the danger of a military coup seems to be the most primitive 
approach in the current dwifungsi discourse that we have examined in this study, and 
contradicts ABRI’s official rejection of military coups in Indonesia. It has been 
repeatedly claimed by ABRI that although it had several opportunities to take over the 
government—as seen in the cases of Madium in 1948,17 October in 1952, Martial Law 
in 1958, and G30S/PKI in 1965—it did not do so because the military placed its 
primary interest in national development and prosperity rather than self-interest.57 
Most recently, Lt-Gen Prabowo, Kostrad Commander, declared that ABRI never had, 
and never would include the word 'coup' in its dictionary.58 In this way, the coup issue 
has been used, on the one hand, to assert that ABRI has no intention of dominating 
political life, but also on the other hand to threaten society by saying that a coup is
54 Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, 9 August 1996. Aberson Marel Sihaloho, a PDI politician in 
the Megawati-side, embodied the fear of ABRI. He stressed that Megawati wanted to implement Pancasila 
and UUD45 in a pure way, which would result in the liquidation of F-ABRI and dwifungsi because they 
were clearly in contradiction to UUD45. See his interview in Santoso (coordinator), M egawati 
Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah, Jakarta: ISAI, 1996, pp.141-143. Megawati herself vaguely 
explained in 1994 that dwifungsi became a problem if it deviated from the basics—i.e. the fact that it was 
only a 'fish' which could live in the 'water' (rakyat). See Megawati Soekarnoputri, Bendera Sudah Saya 
Kibarkanl: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Megawati Soekarnoputri, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994, pp.33-35.
55 Interviews with Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani, 4 March 1997; Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, 28 November 
1996.
56 See Chapter 2 for Soeharto's use of this argument in justifying the existence of F-ABRI.
57 See, for example, Dasar Hukum Dwifungsi dan Identitas ABRI, pp.11-12; Notosusanto (1984:215-216); 
and Tambunan (1995:41).
58 "Jangan Ada kudeta di Indonesia: Pesan Pak Nas Kepada Prabowo," Jawa Pos, 21 March 1998.
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possible if ABRI is not represented in the institutions of government. A similar dualism 
can be seen in the explanation of the non-participation of soldiers in elections. As 
described above, it was first argued that ABRI had sacrificed the voting rights of 
soldiers as 'compensation' for F-ABRI. This interpretation was then adjusted to argue 
that non-participation was intended to avoid the risk of intra-military disunity, which 
was exclusively ABRI's own responsibility. The logic was further developed to insist 
that there was a danger of ABRI dominating both guns and ballots, if it was permitted 
to participate in elections.59
In this way, although the problem of F-ABRI has generally been discussed in 
terms of New Order authoritarian practice which puts ABRI into parliament to control 
the legislative process, a close look at the current critical discourse on this issue 
highlights ABRI's vulnerability in its interaction with society. This means that ABRI has 
perceived its potentially weak institutional cohesion even after the three decades of 
military ascendancy in politics, by preserving a traditional fear of being fragmented. 
Needless to say, such a thesis is not acceptable to ABRI which has firmly stressed that 
the problem of F-ABRI is a matter of ABRI’s commitment to national development and 
stability. This may be true but the goal and performance of F-ABRI are not the focus of 
our discussion here. Rather we pay attention to the fact that the F-ABRI issue has a 
strong link with the problem of military non-participation in elections, and that the 
debate concerning the two issues provides a significant insight into ABRI's perceptions 
of self and society.
The Proper Size of F-ABRI
Apart from the principle of whether ABRI members should be appointed to 
legislatures, a second issue involved the number of seats. As seen in Chapter 2, many 
critics viewed the reduction of F-ABRI from 100 to 75 seats—which was announced in 
1995 and implemented in 1997—as an insignificant reduction in ABRI's accumulated 
political power. In countering such an argument, ABRI turned to the idea of tut zvuri 
handayani. For the military leadership, the F-ABRI reduction was a rare opportunity to 
propagate its commitment to visible reform of ABRI's political instruments, following 
the cases of Kopkamtib in 1988 and BAIS in 1994. Unlike these cases, which were 
replaced by new bodies (Bakorstanas and BIA), the reform of F-ABRI was a physical 
downsizing of a formal political channel, and thus provided a better chance for the 
military to claim that the F-ABRI reduction illustrated ABRI's reformist posture.
59 Judging from the logical resemblance, we may also think of one hypothesis in explaining ABRI's 
opposition to coups in Indonesia—i.e. the hidden message is that it is not ABRI's sense of national interests 
but its fear of internal splits that has deterred its takeover of the government in the alleged opportunities 
above.
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However, as seen below, intra-military debate on this issue revealed ABRI's perceived 
vulnerability in effectively managing the military's organisational life.
Since 1995, ABRI's official stance was that the number itself had no 
significance, provided that ABRI's seats were guaranteed in the legislative mechanism, 
meaning that LIPI's 'zero-option' was not acceptable. The Defence Minister Gen (ret) 
Edi Sudradjat stressed that: "although the number is flexible, it is impossible to cut all 
seats because—unlike ABRI governors and mayors who are selected by society—ABRI 
members are sent to the DPR as a part of military duties."60 This assessment, which 
was fully shared by many officers, reflected ABRI's attempt to defend its autonomous 
organisational activity (i.e. F-ABRI) from social pressure. From a strategic point of 
view, the F-ABRI circle also believed that 75 seats was the limit of tolerance. Maj-Gen 
Hari Sabamo insisted that: "F-ABRI of less than 75 is unacceptable because we will no 
longer be able to conduct effective parliamentary activities in all eleven committees in 
the DPR."61 In this sense, although the focus was different, both Edi and Hari had 
similar concerns about the effective functioning of ABRI's role in the parliament. In the 
late New Order, this was the standard argument within the military regarding the issue 
of the proper size of F-ABRI.
On the other hand, among the serving officers, some suggested that drastically 
cutting ABRI's parliamentary involvement would be needed to normalise the military's 
organisational life. This view was expressed in an article circulated in an internal 
military journal in 1994 which was soon widely read by intellectual officers. The writer 
was Brig-Gen Mulchis Anwar, an adviser of KSAD Gen Wismoyo Arismunandar.62 
Mulchis argued that the proper number of F-ABRI seats in the DPR was 30. The 
number of thirty came from the calculation that 27 members should represent each of 
Indonesia's 27 provinces plus 3 more who might work as fraction and parliamentary 
leaders—such as Head/Deputy Head of F-ABRI and the DPR Chairperson or Deputy 
Chairperson.63 Also at the regional levels, he continued, it was enough for six to seven 
ABRI members to be appointed at the DPRD I (provincial parliaments), and two to 
three at the DPRD II (regency parliaments).64 He stressed that a reduction would not 
only enhance the quality of F-ABRI but also solve the problem of the current tour-of- 
duty which had a tendency to disregard posts in parliament.65 To solve the problem,
60 Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.
61 Interview with Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997.
62 Mulchis Anwar (Brigjen), "Aktualisasi Dwifungsi ABRI Pada Era PJP II," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, 
No.61,1994, pp.39-49.1 am indebted to a Lemhannas staff who informed me of the existence of this article. 
Mulchis was then promoted to Maj-Gen and served as KSAD Hartono's assistant for personnel affairs and, 
in July 1997, became coordinator of expert staff for Pangab Feisal Tanjung.
63 Ibid., p.44.
64 Ibid., p.45.
65 In the current practice within ABRI, parliamentary positions are regarded as the end of one's career. 
Except positions such as F-ABRI head and deputy head, other officers only become "politicians-in-uniform," 
and their status is regarded as lower than those who have the same military rank but become Governors or 
Regents. For example, a major general who becomes governor after retirement is more prestigious than a
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he suggested cutting the number of F-ABRI and provision for officers who had served 
in DPRDs to return to military service as Danrem (Korem Commander) or Kasdam 
(Chief-of-Staff, Kodam), while ABRI personnel in the DPR must be given a chance for 
promotion to the position of Kasdam or Pangdam.66 For him, the drastic reduction of 
F-ABRI would help to revitalise ABRI's organisational life, especially the coordination 
between kekaryaan and military sectors.
The fact that the possibility of drastic F-ABRI reform had been discussed 
within ABRI before Soeharto's initiative in 1995 illustrated the lack of consensus within 
ABRI about the desirable number of F-ABRI. More significantly, however, it also 
revealed that some officers perceived tut zvuri handayani projects as not primarily 
responses to democratic pressure, but means to solve internal vulnerability—notably 
the disparity between political (kekaryaan) and professional sectors within the military. 
If ABRI's move to curtail its formal political participation channel is derived from 
internal military problems rather than external pressures, it shows us the relevance of 
Nordlinger's classic theory where he argues that a praetorian military's voluntary 
decision to disengage is the result of internal desire to restore the rationality of the 
military command hierarchy.67 Mulchis indicated that there was a concern within ABRI 
to look at the problem of F-ABRI in line with Nordlinger's thesis rather than merely in 
response to external political pressure.
We have begun our argument about F-ABRI by examining the debate over 
ABRI's proper channel for formal political participation, i.e. the DPR or MPR. We then 
focused on two related issues; the military abandoning its electoral rights and the 
implication of reduced F-ABRI seats. To strengthen our analysis, it is also important to 
pay attention to the link between ABRI's direct and indirect channels, such as its 
backing for Golkar.
Intra-Military Debate on Golkar
During the New Order, ABRI's engagement in Golkar basically had two modes, 
i.e. internal and external. The former was through retired officers who became Golkar 
candidates or were associated with social organisations under the control of either 
ABRI's Big Family (KBA) or Golkar’s Big Family (KBG).68 The latter was through
major general who serves as a DPR politician with his active-duty status. Mulchis saw this career pattem 
as a problem of diminishing work incentive for serving officers who are sent to parliaments, producing 
negative influences for the entire officer corps.
66 Ibid., p.46.
67 See Nordlinger (1977:145).
68 In establishing Golkar in 1969, mass organisations under the KBG were placed in seven Main 
Organisational Groups, or KINO (Kelompok Induk Organisasi). One of them was Ormas Hankam (Mass 
Organisations under Department of Defence and Security). KINO was dissolved after the 1971 election but 
since then, it has been understood that the Golkar Family has three streams—i.e. ABRI, Bureaucrats and 
Functional Groups. Technically, soldiers in service were not allowed to join the ABRI stream which was
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ABRI's measures to secure the victory of Golkar during elections. This includes: 
intelligence screening of electoral candidates which was conducted in a discriminatory 
way against opposition parties; Kodam 'guidance' given to the regional leaders of 
social organisations to mobilise Golkar votes; measures taken by territorial commands 
to disturb the electoral campaigns of PDI and PPP; and ABRI's intervention in the 
internal affairs of opposition parties to prevent the rise of popular leaders. These 
internal and external modes of engagement were aimed, on the one hand, at ensuring 
that ABRI's voice was heard in the legislative process—via the dominant party in the 
parliament—and on the other hand, at maintaining the virtual one-party system under 
the authoritarian polity which needed elections but did not need a parliament 
challenging government policies. However, ABRI's use of Golkar for its parliamentary 
engagement was accompanied by the risk of highlighting its abandonment of one of the 
principles of dzvifungsi—i.e. 'standing above all groups.'
In facing this dilemma, ABRI has developed various 'shock-absorbing' 
interpretations. For example, as seen in Chapter 2, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid's 
dichotomisation of ABRI's sospol-hankam functions and Gen Hartono's citizen- 
institution dichotomy were the most recent cases which stressed that ABRI’s backing 
for Golkar was justifiable and did not endanger its proclaimed neutrality in politics.69 
Undoubtedly, denial of the apparent contradiction between support for Golkar and 
insistence on neutrality was a mainstream interpretation within the late New Order 
ABRI. However, there was also internal debate wrhich attempted to counter this official 
interpretation. As we saw in the case of the F-ABRI debate above, in which Brig-Gen 
Mulchis Anwar insisted on the need to drastically reduce ABRI’s direct involvement in 
the DPR, there was also an argument stressing the need to limit ABRI's indirect 
engagement through Golkar. Such a view, of course, signified the obvious contradiction 
between ABRI's backing for Golkar in reality and the virtue of its doctrinal neutrality. 
We will see two examples below.
Lemhannas is the highest educational institute for all army officers who have 
successfully graduated from the military academy (AMN or Akabri), Seskoad, and 
Sesko ABRI, and who have good records in carrying out military duties. A graduation 
thesis is required to pass the Lemhannas study program, and it is interesting to note 
that one of the popular thesis topics since the early 1990s is about dwifungsi's future 
prospects. Among many writings which merely reiterate the official legitimation of 
dzvifungsi, there are some which try to touch on controversial issues and question 
current interpretations, including the ABRI-Golkar relationship. A thesis written by
under the control of Pangab. For the organisational development of Golkar, see DPP Golkar (1994:93-126) 
and Suryadinata (1989).
69 On the question of ABRI's siding with Golkar, there was also a criticism of the style of these two 
generals. For example, Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani argued that "Hartono's way [to approach Golkar] is too 
overt. ABRI's support for Golkar should not be done in such an open way" (Interview, 4 March 1997).
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Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, who entered Lemhannas in 1995 when replaced by Brig-Gen 
Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol, is an example.
For Maj-Gen Hari Sabamo, it is not necessary to continue ABRI's current heavy 
commitment to Golkar (i.e. indirect intervention) in the future if F-ABRI's role (direct 
intervention) is secured in the parliament. He insists that ABRI's cooperation with 
Golkar should be reviewed in order to enhance Golkar's independence and to make 
ABRI more neutral in dealing with all political forces. Although it is difficult to 
completely detach the two political institutions, he continues, ABRI's support for 
Golkar should be restricted to the level of strategic policy formulation and should not 
extend to field operations because this only damages ABRI’s position in society.70 
Interestingly, this concern of Hari's for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when Pangab 
Feisal Tanjung was preparing to back the Habibie-influenced Golkar leadership in the 
1997 election and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral—a 
comment which provoked public criticism, as seen in Chapter 2. Although it is 
extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, the limited space for 
individual thinking makes it still possible to produce an internal communication 
arguing the negative impact of ABRI-Golkar fusion on ABRI's neutrality doctrine, and 
therefore providing a premise in legitimising the presence of F-ABRI. Needless to say, 
Hari's reference to the strategic policy cooperation with Golkar included election of the 
President, while his concern for neutrality was directed at the general election. In 
theory, having the same policy with Golkar by no means undermines ABRI's autonomy 
and neutrality, whilst siding with Golkar during the election clearly deviates from the 
neutrality principle. In assessing ABRI's perceptions of self-autonomy and political 
neutrality, the above differences should not be ignored or confused.
Earlier, after the 1987 election when Golkar won 73 percent of the votes, 
Colonel Ishak Prawiradilaga, a Lemhannas officer, also raised a question about the 
future Golkar-ABRI alliance. He stressed that ABRI's role as a political force was to 
safeguard the equilibrium between Golkar and other political parties because a too- 
dominant Golkar would only distort Pancasila democracy. For Ishak, Golkar should 
not have won more than two-thirds of the total votes in the election.71 The problem 
which he believed was evident in the last election was the fragility of PPP and PDI, 
which somehow was inconsistent with the culture of Pancasila democracy. He thus 
concluded that ABRI, which stood above all groups, would have to intervene in
70 Above citations are from Hari Sabarno, Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif 
Indonesia 2020, Kertas Karya Perorangan (Taskap) Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun 1995, Lemhannas, 
1995, p.71. The summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but the 
above reference to Golkar can not be seen here, indicating that he perceived it as not following ABRI's 
official line. See Hari Sabamo, "Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 
2020," Majalah Ketahanan Nasional, No.63, 1995, pp.115-123.
71 The sentences above are from Ishak Prawiradilaga, "Peranan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Politik," Majalah 
Ketahanan Nasional, No.52,1990, p.59. Two-thirds of the total votes means 66 percent. This, therefore, is a 
direct criticism of Golkar, which got 73 percent in the previous election under Sudharmono.
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overcoming this problem, in order to secure fair play for all three contestants in the 
next election 72
The arguments made by Hari and Ishak warn against excessive siding with 
Golkar as it puts at risk dwifungsi s legitimacy based on the neutrality principle. 
However, we should also note a significant difference in emphasis between Hari and 
Ishak. The former puts weight on ABRI's non-commitment in the electoral process while 
the latter sees a need for ABRI to intervene in the process in order to strengthen the 
two opposition parties for the sake of promoting Pancasila democracy. This gap 
between the two provides an interesting aspect for our examination of dwifungsi 
discourse within the officer corps. It illustrates that even though officers use the same 
language, such as criticising ABRI's backing for Golkar and respect for the neutrality 
doctrine, the implications differ. One can stress the need to decrease commitment to 
the electoral process while the other may use the same terms to support such 
commitment.
Overall, we have examined some of the reformist debates within ABRI. 
Observers may understand them as a partial reflection of ABRI's growing internal 
inconsistency in the face of multi-dimensional pressures for political change, and also 
partly as a mirror of the political game at that time. However, from a different angle, it 
is also possible to see reformist thinking as a reflection of ABRI's growing sense that 
even without heavily relying on F-ABRI and Golkar—or ultimately without having deep 
involvement in the formal political structure—ABRI’s primary role of political 
surveillance can be maintained. Several indications back up this interpretation, as we 
will see below. How are the debates on formal political channels linked with informal 
political processes handled by ABRI?
Territorial Management as Non-Debate
Returning to the basic fact that dwifungsi is a military ideology which effectively 
removes the functional boundary between security and political operations, the 
developing counter-discourse on dwifungsi needed to incorporate ABRI's security 
perception into the scope of its criticism, if it was to fully control dwifungsi and modify 
ABRI's organisational mission in such a way as not to interfere with the process of 
'opening-up' the regime. As widely proposed in the literature of third world 
democratisation, the redesigning of security doctrine is critical in order to incorporate 
the military into the process of political liberalisation.73 For Indonesian democracy
/2 Citations from ibid., pp.61-62. These opinions also confirm the cleavage between ABRI, led by Moerdani 
and Try Sutrisno, and Sudharmono at that time.
73 See, for example, Stepan (1988:45-54); Pion-Berlin (1988), (1989a); and most recently, Desch (1996). We 
will examine this dynamics by comparing ABRI with other militaries in the next chapter.
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advocates, this process may also require bringing dwifungsi's security function into the 
public discourse and breaking into the sanctuary of ABRI’s territorial doctrine. 
Intellectual critics appreciate that the mere dismantling of dwifungsi in formal politics 
at the national level would not be sufficient to remove ABRI’s political influence, as 
ABRI would still be able to utilise security operations conducted by its territorial forces 
to control the political process.74 ABRI's territorial doctrine is still an area of "non­
debate." Here, we attempt to clarify its designed political functions in order to 
understand ABRI's routine political missions under its territorial doctrine.
In terms of organisation, the army's territorial doctrine involves four 
institutions—i.e. the Army Headquarters' Territorial Affairs Section (Sterad), the 
Kodams, the Army Centre of Territorial Affairs (Pusterad) and trans-territorial elite 
troops (Kostrad and Kopassus). First, at the central level, Sterad coordinates the basic 
territorial policies to be conducted by Kodams. A listing of the nine specified territorial 
roles shows a significant overlapping of security7 and political missions, since eight are 
overtly political tasks, as seen below.
• Design and formulate policies for territorial and sospol management.
• Organise and coordinate activities for territorial management and help develop 
education and exercises in territorial and sospol fields.
• Make technical policies for regional security management.
• Design and coordinate technical activities for the army and KBA to conduct 
sospol roles.
• Supervise staff for the procedural/conditional improvement of sospol 
management.
• Organise and coordinate activities for the management of doctrines, regulations 
and goals in territorial and sospol fields.
• Promote relationships with government departments which can be used for 
territorial and sospol management.
• Conduct analysis and evaluation of territorial and sospol management.
• Analyse trend and formulate proposals for matters related to above tasks.75
Based on this doctrinal setting which removes the demarcation between politics 
and defence in territorial management, officers have developed a perception that
74 Interviews with Kristiadi, Head of Political Department at CSIS, 25 March 1997; Marzuki Darusman, 
Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997. The security approach debate, discussed in Chapter 4, 
was a case of raising the problem of ABRI's security function during the late New Order era. However, the 
debate was limited to the level of policy rather than challenging the utility of territorial doctrine.
75 See Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat 
(TNI-AD), KEP/08/X/1992, Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.36-38. In a broader doctrinal design, the army's 
territorial operation is defined as one of four pillars—along with intelligence, combat and social order 
operations—constituting the System of Internal Security Operation (Pola Opskamdagri) which is one of 
two pillars—together with the System of Defence Operation (Pola Opshan)—in ABRI’s designed role as a 
'defence' force, not as a sospol force. Thirty years of ABRI's political involvement in the New Order polity 
resulted in the expansion and differentiation of cell defence doctrine (Hankamnas) which now has an 
enormous number of functional, coordinating and operational doctrines. In the mid-1990s, KSAD Gen 
Hartono finally felt the necessity to draw a clear map of this complicated network of doctrines, and 
instructed his staff to write a reference book, Kapita Selekta Sosial Politik ABRI (Mabes ABRI, 1994). See 
especially pp.185-191 for the above doctrines.
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military techniques and knowledge are transferable to the conduct of political 
missions.76 Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, the Commander of Pusterad, insisted that early 
detection and prevention is a key to strengthen the territorial management.77 Since 
territorial management involves political surveillance, this preventive strategy of early 
detection provides an example of how ABRI's professional military mind transfers 
military techniques to the conduct of political management. Among many operations 
based on this strategy at the Kodam level, the biggest is the handling of political 
stability during the general election and the MPR sessions. It is therefore worth noting 
how the preventive strategy of early detection is implemented in this context.
According to an internal newsletter owned by Kodam Jaya, territorial officers 
are given the heavy task of keeping watch over prominent individuals, religious 
leaders, and youth leaders who are not associated with KBA. They are instructed to 
approach these people and, by using techniques of surveillance and penetration, 
influence them to become partners of KBA or supporters of ABRI's sociopolitical 
mission 78 In this way, a strategy is devised to enable military activity to penetrate into 
any social field and detect the source of political disturbance. ABRI has been 
practising this mode of political involvement during national elections over the last 30 
years but this does not seem to have become a major topic in the recent elite debate on 
the relationship between dwifungsi and elections—a debate which is largely limited to 
such issues as ABRI's appointed seats in the parliament and its backing for Golkar.
The Kodam’s territorial activities are significantly supported by two elite trans­
territorial forces. Kopassus' everyday intelligence operations are designed to enable its 
agents to penetrate areas where the adversary force is apparent, in order to secretly 
'create' a situation useful for the subsequent conduct of a military operation 79 Covert 
operations are designed to 'create situations,' such as the manipulation of 
student/labour demonstrations to create circumstances allowing intervention by
76 See a reference made by Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin on the political use of strategi penangkal 
(preventive strategy) which treats all individuals in the country as ABRI's informants, as discussed in 
Chapter 5.
77 Written interview, 18 December 1996.
78 See "Peranan Koter Dalam Menyukseskan Pemilu 1997 dan Sidang Umum MPR 1998," Gema Jayakarta 
(Media Komunikasi Kodam Jaya/Jayakarta), October 1995, pp.33, 58. KBA is based on clear membership 
while Supporters of ABRI's Sociopolitical Missions (Pengemban Misi Sospol ABRI, or called PMS) is a 
concept to categorise the people who are—in the eyes of ABRI—cooperative to ABRI's sospol conduct. They 
include intellectuals, government officials, religious leaders, journalists, people in business circles and 
other informants and followers of ABRI in society. The recruitment of PMS is said to be made either by 
organisational units within ABRI or at the discretion of individual officers.
79 "Sejarah Singkat Korps Baret Merah Kopassus," Cahaya Chandraca, No.l, 1987, p.23. Cahaya Chandraca 
is Kopassus' internal newsletter. The most prominent example of this was the operation before the 
annexation of East Timor in December 1975 when red beret troops (at that time the name was 
Kopassandha) were giving training to Apodeti, a pro-integration party of Portuguese Timor, before the 
formal invasion by Kostrad and Kodam troops. For details, see McDonald (1980:189-215). Jenkins also 
suggested that Kopassandha had played a central role in the so-called 'mysterious killings' in the early 
1980s when 3,000-4,000 suspected criminals were killed in extrajudicial ways to curb a rising crime rate. 
See his "SAS Dares But Do We Win?," The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 July 1993.
202
Chapter 6
Kodam forces at a later stage.80 ABRTs internal security operations—including covert 
missions—have become more sophisticated over recent decades due to professional 
training and the development of information/military technology. However, in the 
current dzvifungsi debate, it is rare to see an argument aimed at establishing a 
transparent examination of this mode of political intervention. These practices of 
territorial management are inherited by succeeding generations of officers through 
military education and indoctrination, and are considered by them as 'national 
defence'—an untouchable military sanctuary.
As discussed above, the development of counter-discourse on dzvifungsi during 
the late New Order period reflected decline of ABRTs relative autonomy in society and 
the diminishing legitimacy of dzvifungsi ideology. However, on the other hand, ABRTs 
territorial management became more and more autonomous in establishing mechanisms 
of political surveillance. It is in this context that the absence of debate on territorial 
management has—in a paradoxical way—affected ABRTs response to the growing 
criticism of dzvifungsi. Based on the assessment that ABRI's core political role can be 
maintained solely by consolidating the territorial system, with or without the concept 
of dzvifungsi, a view is emerging within ABRI which envisages that the concept of 
dzvifungsi may possibly be scrapped as a way to alleviate the pressure on ABRI if 
social criticism reaches an unmanageable level. Rear Marshal Sunardi, for example, 
indicated this assessment by insisting that:
[W]e have noticed that dzvifungsi is not a proper concept, causing many troubles. 
Dzvifungsi has been, criticised as ABRI's lack of adaptability to the changing society, 
but it is just a criticism aimed at ABRI's sospol capability which is only a small part 
of ABRI. Sospol, or dzvifungsi, is only one of six capabilities ABRI possesses in 
conducting its expected role, along with intelligence, territorial, security, defence, 
and logistic capabilities. Therefore, dzvifungsi is not what we want to preserve, but 
what we want is the total defence role to serve the nation and state.... It is such a 
simple matter.81
Thus, Sunardi’s interpretation is aimed at de-emphasising the concept of 
dzvifungsi, which defines ABRI's role in terms of its defence and sociopolitical 
functions, by placing the latter as only one of ABRI’s six functions. This self­
dismantling of the dzvifungsi concept seems to make up a progressive interpretation 
which goes beyond merely re-interpreting dzvifungsi. However, this suggestion of 
irrelevance of the dzvifungsi concept becoming less relevant may be based on the 
assumption that elimination of the second function of dzvifungsi would not significantly 
limit ABRI's practical political role, since the diverse capabilities used by ABRI in 
conducting its defence function provide enough capacity to take measures to maintain
80 As seen previously, cases such as the Medan riot in 1994 and the 27th of July 1996 Affair in Jakarta are 
said to have involved Kopassus operations.
81 Interview with Rear Marshal Sunardi, Expert Staff for Minister of Defence and Security, 13 December
1996.
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its high level of political engagement. It is in this context that the function of non­
debate cannot be ignored if we wish to fully examine the officers' response to the 
criticism of dwifungsi.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the structure of dwifungsi discourse during the late 
New Order period. We have focused on three areas—legitimacy, political participation 
channels, and territorial management. We first discussed various critical attempts by 
elite circles which had developed several approaches to delegitimise the permanency of 
dw ifungsi. Our examination showed that they had contributed to the 
institutionalisation of dwifungsi criticism—a role which could hardly be accomplished 
by non-regime critics. This is the latent function of elite criticism that is usually seen as 
too moderate in the eyes of political activists who take a position to confront ABRI by 
demanding a total dismantling of dwifungsi. We suggested that different characteristics 
of moderate and progressive criticism did not undermine the pressure on ABRI. They 
should be understood as 'one goal, two necessary approaches.'
In the late New Order polity, ABRI, which only engaged in open communication 
with the 'moderate' side, responded to the elite counter-discourse broadly in a 
threefold way—by manipulating criticism, admitting dilemmas and reshaping the 
framework for re-legitimation. In Chapter 3, we discussed how ABRI had expanded 
the sources of legitimising dwifungsi, and in this chapter, our examination showed that 
ABRI also reinvented techniques to counter critical discourse by consolidating cultural 
and pragmatic frameworks of political thinking. However, we emphasised that ABRI 
continued to fear social mobility, which was thought to erode dwifungsi's social 
acceptability.
Such vulnerability was also apparent when we assessed ABRI’s political 
participation channels. We have argued that although ABRI has justified its 
parliamentary engagement via F-ABRI as a compensation for the surrender of its voting 
rights, its fear of recognising the natural rights of citizens is quite evident. Many 
officers can imagine how easily internal military cohesion could collapse once soldiers 
start to participate in elections—the most legitimate political activity in a modem 
nation-state. 'Desuperficialisation' of the F-ABRI debate also reveals a very fragile 
aspect of dwifungsi commitment as represented by the growing concern about the 
disparity between professional and political duties in the officers' military life. In 
tandem with this, we have seen the serving officers' own concerns about the declining 
neutrality of ABRI's role in the formal political structure, mainly due to its overt 
channelling of influence through Golkar. On the other hand, however, we underlined 
ABRI's growing conviction that it could control the political process without relying on
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formal political channels. We paid attention to the political tasks designed under 
ABRTs territorial management, and suggested that, despite lack of debate, these 
aspects of ABRTs political role had to be included in the scope of open discourse in 
order for civilian elites to comprehensively question dwifungsi's political engagement. 
All these aspects seemed to have constituted the structure of divifungsi discourse 
during the late New Order era.
**********
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Chapter 7
Comparative Implications: Doctrinal 
Change and Democratic Transition
We have seen ABRI's frequent claim that Indonesian civil-military relations are 
unique, as dwifungsi is deeply rooted in the nation's history and culture. It is implied 
that ABRI's political engagement should be understood as a commitment to the 
development of Pancasila democracy, and thus cannot be compared with the political 
roles played by military regimes in other developing countries. ABRI's claim may be 
partly true, but it still invites comparison with other Third World militaries which have 
developed doctrines to justify7 their political intervention, and the way in which these 
have been eroded in the face of democratic pressures.
Although culture and history produce particular patterns of civil-military 
relations in a society, they do not eliminate cross-national commonalities, due largely 
to similarities in the military's organisational environment and status in the modem 
nation-state. Thus, the development of dwifungsi may be further understood through 
comparing civil-military relations in the process of democratisation.
Our target parameter here is the military doctrine of political activism—how it 
has been shaped, reproduced, and finally revised as the military faces the political 
demand for democratisation. 1 From this perspective, we will primarily—but not 
exclusively—examine the cases of Latin America where militaries have developed a 
political doctrine, the so-called the National Security Doctrine (DSN: Doctrina de 
Seguridad Nacional). In all cases there, the militaries which had once governed 
experienced a retreat from politics with the reinstallation of civilian governments. In 
what ways has the DSN played a significant role in the processes of military 
intervention and withdrawal? And what are the lessons and implications for the 
dwifungsi-democratisation issue?
In order to answer these questions, the first four sections of this chapter 
examine the genesis and application of the DSN. Then, in the following three sections,
1 Among various cross-national comparative strategies, Riggs (1994) provides a useful framework which 
focuses on formal political concepts that are used homogeneously in different countries but implemented 
heterogeneously. Using the concept of presidentialism, his work systematically integrates the variants of 
presidential regimes and generalises the patterns of country-particular reflections. Our analysis in this 
chapter follows his methodological model.
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the general dynamics of military disengagement from politics and related theoretical 
problems are discussed. Finally, we will come back to the DSN and attempt to clarify 
some major aspects of crafting military doctrines to marginalise military influence and 
consolidate democratic transition. The implications for dwifungsi are also examined.
The Formulation of DSN
Many students of military regimes in Latin America have noted new features of 
military intervention in the mid 1960s. Especially in Brazil (1964), Peru (1968), Chile 
(1973) and Argentina (1976), 'new' military regimes were established not only to solve 
problems of short-term political instability, but also to achieve far-ranging projects of 
political, economic, social and cultural reform. These coups were no longer revolts by 
lower-ranking commanders but were decisions of military headquarters; they were the 
product of professional officers who had formulated the DSN in higher educational 
institutions within the military, for example at the Superior War College (ESG) in 
Brazil and the Centre for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in Peru. This doctrine linked 
internal security and economic development as the professional tasks of the military. 
Given the economic stagnation experienced since the 1950s, which showed the 
structural limitations of Latin America's domestic markets in making the transition 
from import-substitution industrialisation to self-sustained economic growth, these 
countries faced the rise of populist forces and radical politics as the masses were 
mobilised for wider political participation.2 The DSN was intended to counter these 
challenges and to set internal security as a precondition for further economic 
development, thus providing the necessary rationale for the military's political 
domination.
The genesis of this doctrine, its inclination to see security and development as a 
coherent whole, and the logic of legitimising military involvement in political life, are 
quite similar to ABRI's dwifungsi. It was the rise of the PKI and Soekamo's radical- 
populist policies which created political and economic concerns among army generals. 
Seskoad had conducted studies of economic development, collaborating with US- 
trained economists. In the Second Army Seminar in 1966, as we have seen in Chapter 
3, the army declared its commitment to internal security and economic development, 
and defined itself as the guardian of Pancasila and the dynamiser of national life. 
ABRI's self-perception of its role was soon formulated as the doctrine of dwifungsi.
Similarity can also be seen in the evolution of the two doctrines. The DSN was 
presented by Latin American military thinkers as a doctrine derived from the social 
sciences, especially from political science and geopolitics; this—it was thought—might
2 On the political and economic background of the DSN, see Calvo’s excellent summary (1979:69-72).
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make it scientific, technical, and therefore politically neutral.3 As seen previously, 
ABRI officers—especially the young generation—rationalised dwifungsi by employing a 
systems approach from political science, with its functionalist description of political 
order, presented, for example, by Huntington and Janowitz. Geopolitics and 
geostrategy were also emphasised in consolidating threat perceptions which led to the 
conclusion that the national environment had forced ABRI to accept internal security 
and economic development as inseparable goals, in turn legitimatising the military's 
political role in society.4 In both the DSN and dwifungsi, emphasis on objectivity in 
defining threat environments is an important means to internalise doctrinal legitimacy 
in both the military and society. This doctrinal arrangement shows a commonality in 
the ways that the military attempts to institutionalise its access to the political arena.
Pion-Berlin argues that DSN had three components: security/development, 
geopolitics, and counterinsurgency (CI).5 Cl developed in the late 1950s and early 
1960s in France and the US, respectively, in response to revolutionary warfare in 
Algeria and Vietnam. The French and American Cl theorists took the writings of Mao 
Tse Tung seriously, believing that revolutionary efforts were successful only where they 
cultivated popular support through a politically informed strategy that combined 
political, military, economic, societal and psychological aspets. The DSN’s operational 
design was greatly influenced by the French counter-revolutionary doctrine and the US 
civic mission program—practised, for example, in the Philippines—which involved 
psychological operations to 'win the hearts and minds of the people,' improve the 
popular image of the government, and gather information about subversive elements 
from local residents.6 It was in this context that internal security missions defined in 
the DSN encompassed military, political, social, economic, cultural and ideological 
defence as a coherent whole, creating the Latin American version of Ipoleksosbudmil. In 
its doctrinal formulation, Cl against Maoism was reinforced by Clausewitz's dictum 
that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." The fusion of Cl and 
Clausewitz contributed to the blurring of the boundary between military and non­
military aspects of national life.7
3 Ibid., p.73.
4 ABRI's geopolitical concept is exemplified in Wawasan Nusantara, and its geostrategy in Ketahanan 
Nasional. Both are explained as absolute values defining Indonesia's defence environment objectively. See, 
for example, ABRI's first Defence White Paper published in 1995 (Department of Defence and Security, The 
Policy of the State Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta: Department of Defence and 
Security, 1995, pp.12-15). Hereafer The White Paper. For the 'scientific' and 'technical' approach to 
Ketahanan Nasional, Lemhannas produced mathematical and socio-technological models, as seen in Bunga 
Rampai Ketahanan Nasional (Konsepsi & Teori), Himpunan Lemhannas, Jakarta: PT Ripres Utama, 1980, 
chapters 48, 49.
5 Pion-Berlin (1988:386).
6 Pion-Berlin puts equal weight on the influence of French and US armies in the formulation of DSN. Nunn 
(1995:6) argues, however, that the basic doctrinal model was French although encouraged by the US army.
7 Pion-Berlin (1988:386-387). Among dwifungsi theorists too, Clausewitz's famous aphorism has frequently 
been employed, for example in Notosusanto (1984:208). Here Clausewitz's thesis is similarly misinterpreted 
or manipulated. The DSN and dwifungsi advocates use the dictum to conclude that military and political
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In this way, the DSN's basic pillars—i.e. convergence of internal security and 
economic development, its geopolitical platform, and counterinsurgency—seem to be 
compatible with dwifungsi's components. Another issue is the self-image of Latin 
American armies before the formulation of the DSN. This is significant in assessing the 
ideological incentive to create such an all-encompassing military doctrine. Nunn’s 
study describes their self-images as centred on being creators, defenders and 
integrators of the nations.8 These are all familiar terms for the student of the 
Indonesian military. The officers in Brazil and Chile, however, further attempted to 
synchronise these self-images with constitutional legitimacy, by revising constitutions 
and legally assigning the military to protect the 'constitutional order' and serve as the 
'guarantor' of the constitution. Thus, the revised constitutions in Latin America in the 
1970s and 1980s generally acknowledged the military's legitimate political role and 
justified military participation at all levels of policy making and administration.9 
'Constitutionalisation' of the military's political mission and self-image was a 
necessary step to secure the implementation of the DSN and to diversify its basis of 
legitimacy. In Indonesia, where the constitution was not revised under the New Order, 
ABRI’s self-image as the defender of UUD 45 has not been given such constitutional 
status, but—as discussed in Chapter 3—dzuifungsi's political mission was formally 
legalised in 1982, providing an alternative legitimation in the eyes of ABRI officers.
ABRI's traditional claim that dwifungsi is uniquely Indonesian seems, therefore, 
to be superficial. ABRI shares significant similarities in doctrinal settings and 
legitimacy-building measures with many of the politically active militaries in Latin 
America. What, then, of the impact of doctrine? Doctrine has impact both internally 
and externally on the military. The main focus of discussion in scholarship on the Latin 
American military regarding the internal aspect has been on the impact of DSN on 
military professionalism; in regard to the external aspcet, the main concern has been 
the assessment of policy variants under the common doctrine. We will examine the two 
below.
The DSN and 'New' Professionalism
Alfred Stepan greatly contributed to the study of Latin American military 
politics by providing a controversial argument about the changing pattern of military 
professionalism after the formation of the DSN.10 His argument can be summarised as
matters cannot be distinguished, thus the military should have a say in politics. However, Clausewitz’s 
own intent was to argue that it is politics that controls the military, not the other way around.
8 Nunn (1992:113-150).
9 Loveman (1997:138-139). On the ideological premises for such constitutional settings, see also Pion-Berlin 
(1989b) which examines cases in Argentina and Peru.
10 Stepan (1973).
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follows. Samuel Huntington's classic conception of military professionalism presumes 
that the military's primary mission is the conduct of external warfare, thus its 
professionalisation inevitably leads to the specialisation of military skills in a way that 
is incompatible with any other significant social and political roles. Therefore, 
according to Huntington, professionalisation depoliticises the military. Stepan 
accepted this argument in part but developed the thesis that, in Latin America, where 
the primary mission of the military is internal warfare, the skill-specialisation of 
military officers is not limited to narrow military affairs but expands to the wider 
social, economic, and political spheres. Thus, when internal security is the military's 
chief concern, professionalisation politicises the military and encourages its role 
expansion. This is what he called 'new professionalism,' in contrast to Huntington's 
'old professionalism.' In his model, Stepan emphasised the role of DSN which requires 
economic development for the maintenance of internal security. He paid particular 
attention to the processes through which the doctrine had been studied and socialised 
in the ESG and CAEM since the 1950s, and concluded that such military schooling 
changed the professional orientation of the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries.11 By 
defining this new trend as the 'new professionalism of internal security and national 
development,' Stepan introduced a landmark concept in the literature on modem Latin 
American civil-military relations.12
Here, our comparative study should pay attention to the linkage of five factors: 
doctrine, internal security, economic development, professionalism and political 
activism. Stepan's assumptions flow as follows: a change in threat target (from external 
to internal) leads to the modification of doctrinal content (from conventional warfare to 
security-development fusion) [Step 1]; a change in doctrinal content alters the type of 
professionalism (from 'old' to 'new') [Step 2]; and a change in professional orientation 
shifts the military's role in society (from a moderator of the political game to the director 
of the political system) [Step 3]. Before examining how this thesis fits ABRI s case, it is 
worth looking at major critiques of Stepan.
First, the new professionalism thesis has been criticised from a historical 
perspective. McCann, for example, argues that: "if you study the Brazilian military role 
in politics from the perspective of the post-1964 political arena, Stepan's 'new 
professionalism' seems reasonable. If you approach it from a historical analysis of the 
military institution, it begins to lose its newness and the situation of the last fifteen 
years appears as the logical outcome of long-range evolution."13 McCann insists that
11 Above descriptions are from ibid., pp.48-62.
12 O'Donnell's influential book, published in the same year as Stepan’s article, endorsed the politicisation 
impact of professionalism by using the case of Argentina. He argued that enhanced military 
professionalisation had two effects: (1) raising the threshold of political turmoil that would result in 
systematic military intervention in politics; and (2) encouraging a far greater degree of political involvement 
by the military (O'Donnell 1973:166).
13 MacCann (1979:506-507).
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since the 1930s the Brazilian army has been committed to internal security to fulfil its 
historical responsibility as guardian of national unity and order.14 His argument 
supports Nunn's extensive historical study, published a year before Stepan's article. 
The criticism based on historical continuity seems to be understandable even in the 
eyes of non-Latin American experts, since Stepan's argument posits a historical break 
of the mid 1960s. Nunn asserts:
that the military profession exists in Brazil in a context different from that of some 
other parts of the Western world is no longer in doubt. That the profession now 
exists in Brazil in a different context than in that country's past is, however, 
questionable. The army has changed radically since 1870, but within the parameters 
of change, especially since 1920, the professional army has maintained its role as 
'defender of national honour.'15
What is unchanged since the early twenty century, according to Nunn, is that "the 
professional officer has a sense of responsibility toward the nation (ethnic aggregation) 
and the state (the political domain) and the society or community. When the state does 
not serve the interests of the national and societal totality, however, it is in danger of 
being opposed by the one who sees himself as truly representative. In Brazil it is the 
professional soldier who sees himself in this role."16 Arguments of McCann and Nunn, 
therefore, question the 'newness' of professionalism suggested by Stepan.
Secondly, from an institutional perspective, an objection was posed by Markoff 
and Baretta. Their detailed study suggests that Stepan exaggerates the role of the ESG. 
Long before the ESG was established, the army vainly attempted to govern Brazil. 
Also concerning the shift of the type of professionalism, they believe that the ESG had 
concerns for economic development and internal security from early days. They 
therefore conclude that "Stepan's new professionalism is actually old professionalism 
in the Brazilian context."17
For students of comparative civil-military relations, these criticisms, based on 
historical and institutional perspectives, and directed at Step 3 (see above)—i.e. the 
impact of professionalism on the military’s role in society—carry some conviction, as 
Stepan tends to dismiss the gradual historical process in which rival perspectives 
compete for predominance, a process natural in any institutional change.18 However, in 
terms of Stepan's broader argument, including Step 1 and Step 2, the critiques are less
14 Ibid., pp.519-520.
15 Nunn (1972:54). For a description of the historical development of professionalism in the Brazilian 
military, see also Nunn (1983).
16 Nunn (1972:47). Italic added.
17 See Markoff and Baretta (1985:179,182). They also support Nunn's study which emphasises continuity 
rather than change, insisting that one of the roots of the military activism of the 1920s throughout Latin 
America was the growing professionalism of the armed forces.
18 According to organisation theory, this coexistence of competing perspectives is due to the dynamism 
whereby, in the early stage of institutional transformation, the transaction cost of altering an entire system 
is so large that it demands a cushion by selectively introducing new values into the established system. See 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991:4).
211
Chapter 7
convincing. Both Nunn and McCann identify concerns within the military regarding 
internal security and economic development from the 1930s. They argue that both 
professionalism and messianic self-images resulted in "professional militarism" (Nunn). 
But these points do not deny Stepan's argument that internal security and economic 
development became the military's simultaneous 'professional missions' after the 
formation of the DSN.19 In other words, internal security and economic development 
were 'concerns' before the 1960s, but not yet defined as primary professional missions. 
As Stepan emphasises, it was the new doctrine in the mid 1960s which institutionally 
established and legitimised internal security as the primary mission of the already 
highly professionalised Brazilian military, and systematically linked economic 
development as a prerequisite for the attainment of internal security. Stepan's 
argument in Step 1 and Step 2, therefore, survives. It is not sufficient for his critics to 
reject his new professionalism argument by simply objecting to the final point, Step 3.20
Other scholars have applied Stepan's concept to third-world militarism 
elsewhere, including the Indonesian military. Casper, for example, describes the new 
professionalism as one of the sources of political activism in the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP). She suggests that: "the nation-building programs taught at the 
National Defence College and the Command and General Staff College brought 
institutional change within the AFP and it was clearly an important factor in 
explaining its willingness to intervene to put an end to the Marcos regime." Moreover, 
"in both Brazil and the Philippines, the military schools introduced or expanded 
nation-building and administration classes. This training led the officers to see 
themselves as equal to bureaucrats and politicians, whereas previously they had been 
willing to defer in nonmilitary areas."21 In terms of Step 3, this argument seems to fit 
the new professionalism since it shows that professional socialisation of domestic 
affairs leads to political activism. But it is not clear, first, whether economic 
development and internal security were built into the primary professional mission, or,
19 Markoff and Baretta (1985:186) admit that Brazilian officers in the 1930s often regarded internal 
security as an unprofessional mission.
2(1 Apart from these main points, McCann (1979:506) doubts the relevance of ’new' professionalism, since 
the 'old' one is not applicable to the pre-1960s Brazil. He says that "Stepan marshalled his data so adroitly 
that one nearly forgets to ask if the first premise is correct. Does Huntington's description of the 'old 
professionalism' apply to the Brazilian army?" However, this criticism is weak because Stepan never 
claimed that old professionalism fitted the Brazilian military. He uses Huntington's thesis in order to 
contrast it with his new idea derived from his examination of changing patterns in Brazil and Peru. If 
Stepan is to be criticised in terms of old professionalism, a point should be made, instead, about his 
'acceptance' of Huntington’s paradigm in building his theory. Stepan's concept of new professionalism is the 
anti-thesis of Huntington's professionalism but this undermines the coherence of a causal relationship 
between professionalism and politicisation, because Huntington does not envisage the possibility that 
'external' security concerns also facilitate military politicisation. Needless to say, the strategy of total 
warfare which mobilises all national resources for external defence frequently leads to military 
politicisation. Our Indonesian case is an excellent example. However, again, this is a criticism linked only 
to Step 3.
21 Casper (1991:197, 200, 206). However, as seen in Nunn's description above, it is more accurate to say 
that Brazilian officers inspired by the DSN see themselves 'above' politicians and bureaucrats.
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secondly, whether there was a visible 'change' in the schooling program. If the political 
activism merely resulted from the military's anxiety about the corrupt dictatorship and 
the inefficient state administration, and if its goal was to overthrow the national 
leader, and if the 'contextual' change in the education is not presented, the argument 
does not accurately fit Stepan's thesis. It is, rather, close to Nunn's argument—that 
professionalisation tends to lead to politicisation—which supports the classic studies 
of Finer and others.22
The core argument in Stepan's new professionalism, therefore, is not whether a 
professional military thinks internal security is a part of its task. As Stepan's critics 
have shown, such a concern certainly existed long before the mid 1960s. What makes 
Stepan's thesis interesting is the introduction of a new doctrine encompassing internal 
security and economic development as a coherent whole, with the resulting shift in the 
primary professional mission from a normal defence role—whether concerned with 
external defence or internal security—to that of state manager.23 If the military merely 
expands its role while receiving professional training, without change in professional 
orientation from one type to another, the case better fits one or other of the 
professionalisation-politicisation schemes presented by Huntington's critics for the 
analysis of Third World military intervention in politics.
To emphasise the significance of the role of the doctrine, Stepan interestingly 
mentioned the case of Indonesia, where Seskoad had formulated a development and 
security doctrine in the early 1960s that was later implemented under the New Order 
government.24 However, as examined in Chapter 3, Seskoad's emphasis on economic 
development and internal security was—unlike their Latin American counterparts—not 
derived from professional concerns. There was not even a single sentence in the official
22 The classic debate is as follows. Against Huntington (1957:84), who argues that "a highly professional 
officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority 
within the state," Finer (1962:25-27) argues that professionalism cultivates a high sense of nationalism 
among the officer corps that may encourage an interventionist orientation. Janowitz (1964:40-49) also 
insists that professionalisation promotes officers' administrative capacity with the result that skill 
differentiation between military and political management becomes blurred, in the eyes of officers, leading 
to the development of an interventionist military in the developing countries. Moreover, Abrahamsson 
(1972:17-18), from an organisational theory perspective, argues that professionalisation strengthens the 
military’s sense of corporate interests and may facilitate military intervention in politics once it is 
threatened by civilian politics. Sarkesian's (1984) vivid comparison of Huntington and Janowitz minimises 
their differences but stresses their complementary nature in many respects. Needless to say, it is impossible 
to deduce from the degree of professionalism an explanation for political commitment without assessing the 
country's political environment. However, understanding how the process of professionalisation influences 
the political orientation of the military itself is still a significant task in political science.
23 As if avoiding a claim of historical continuity, Stepan emphasises that the Latin American military came 
to redefine its mission primarily in terms of dealing with threats to internal security, especially after the 
defeat of the conventional army in Cuba by Castro's guerrilla force. Then, highly professionalised militaries 
in Brazil and Peru developed doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements, 
leading to a focusing of energies on the 'professionalisation' of their approach to internal security and 
national development. See Stepan (1973:50-51). These processes should be seen as a whole in order to 
defend Stepan's thesis from criticism based on the historical perspective.
24 Ibid., p.51, fn.5.
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document of the 1966 Second Army Seminar at Seskoad about the professional 
mission of ABRI in the coming decades. In the early New Order, both stability and 
economic development were certainly built into ABRI's Hankamrata doctrine, but then- 
link with professionalism was thin. This was understandable given the fact that 
politicisation of the officer corps came first and professionalisation followed, in the 
history of the Indonesian military. Thus, Step 3 in Stepan's thesis is not applicable in 
the case of ABRI. ABRI’s professionalisation of internal security and national 
development—which proceeded after ABRI had secured its dominant role in politics— 
only reinforced what was already there under the New Order. As we have discussed 
previously, professionalism is a key concept among the AMN-Akabri generation 
officers in referring to the better management of dzvifungsi, and it is in this context that 
the concept has been reinterpreted to incorporate the second, sociopolitical, mission of 
dwifungsi. Thus it cannot be said that the change in professional orientation politicised 
ABRI—the thesis argued by Stepan; rather, an already-politicised military promoted 
the idea of new professionalism in adaptive ways.25
Finally, in contrast to the Latin American military, which identifies itself in the 
first place as a professional institution and secondly as a political actor, ABRI—as 
expressed in the dwifungsi declaration—defines itself first as a freedom-fighter which 
has a right to participate in politics, and secondly as a force of professional soldiers. 
This difference again demonstrates that ABRI’s political commitment is not primarily 
derived from professional concern.
We have seen that ABRI and Latin American political militaries share many 
characteristics, such as components in their doctrines and professional education 
which focuses heavily on the value of political stability. Nevertheless, what Stepan 
sees as the 'new' dynamics, i.e. the way in which the change in professionalism 
politicises the military, does not fit ABRI's experience. What, then, of the interpretation 
of the doctrine, and what does the comparison imply?
Variants of DSN Interpretation
Scholarship on DSN acknowledges the variety of doctrinal interpretations 
among military regimes. First, in terms of the influence of geopolitics in doctrinal 
assessment, the case of Peru is often distinguished from Brazil, Argentina and Chile. 
Pion-Berlin points out that, relative to these three countries, the Peruvian military 
regime between 1968 and 1975 gave less weight to geopolitical theories in its rationale
25 MacFarling's study of dwifungsi argues that ABRI is an instructive example of new professionalism 
because "officers are members of a cohesive, well trained organisation that has focused its corporate 
energies on achieving and maintaining national stability" (1996:188). This view identifies a phenomenal 
similarity but does not pay attention to any causal relationship in Steps 1-3. If the military is simply 
professional and plays the role of national stabiliser, it rather fits Finer's old model.
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for the authoritarian national security state. Rather, DSN was modified by military 
thinkers associated with the reformist military regime to pay more attention to national 
development. Although the weighting is a matter of degree, the Peruvian style is often 
described as 'soft-line' in contrast to the geopolitical emphasis of the 'hard-line' 
approach seen in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.26
In the hard-line school, DSN advocates associated emerging 'subversive' 
activities (mainly but not exclusively communist) in the domestic arena with the 
geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers. They asserted that the repression of 
progressive social and political change was imperative to maintain national security. 
Within this broad paradigm, the geopolitical thinking said little about how the national 
security threat would take root domestically, nor who would be its principal sponsors. 
A space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, and the ambiguity was manipulated 
by an aggressive military that felt free to choose its own enemies. As Pion-Berlin 
suggests, this vagueness provided a licence for unbridled state power and 
militarisation of society.27 'Ideological subversion' then became the invented subject of 
military operations 28
ABRI's threat perception and dzvifungsi legitimation have shared a similar logic. 
Wawasan Nusantara, which is defined as an unalterable 'national' geopolitical 
doctrine, sees subversion as the main threat to security, which may be enlarged through 
foreign ideological penetration. The subversion takes the form of anti-Pancasila and 
anti-UUD 45 ideology, according to the Indonesian geopolitical theory. In defining 
subversive actors, ideologies and activities, this doctrinal vagueness has provided 
ABRI with interpretative power to label certain groups as subversive agents. As 
democratic pressure grew under the late New Order, this frequently became ABRI's 
dominant approach. Military concepts of KGB, OTB, GPK, and liberalism, for 
example, allowed ABRI to paint government critics as subversives, as seen in previous 
chapters. By doing so, ABRI created a 'buffer zone’ between the government and 
legitimate social demands, absorbing 'excessive' demands and transferring them to the 
area of non-politics—i.e. military operations. The ’flexible' geopolitical doctrine also 
produced a rationale for the military to conduct Ipoleksosbudmil missions to safeguard 
national sovereignty. Dzvifungsi was built into this formula as an embodiment of 
ABRI's commitment to national security and development.
26 Pion-Berlin (1989a:421-425). See also Atkins (1997:168-169). This does not mean that regime repression 
was 'soft' in Peru, but reflects a general feeling that geopolitics is a primary military concern while 
development is a social matter.
27 Pion-Berlin (1988:390).
28 In the countries of the Southern Cone, a dominant interpretation emerged in the 1970s which asserted that 
groups which failed to uphold 'Western Christian values' were the active, or unwitting, accomplices of 
subversive forces trying to undermine noncommunist regimes and attack the moral and spiritual foundations 
of the nation. For details, see Fitch (1993:23-24). Fitch's article provides an excellent description of the 
detailed process whereby foreign doctrines were introduced and localised in Latin America.
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Apart from geopolitics, the DSN’s economic-development aspect should be 
noted. The hard-line approach interpreted the link between security and development 
in terms of orthodox strategies of modernisation and the need to remove the political 
obstacles for economic growth. Typically, officers favoured closing channels to mass 
mobilisation that encouraged populist politics and 'unreasonable' labour demands.29 
However, in Peru reformist and radical officers developed an alternative 'soft-line' 
interpretation which stressed economic dependency, socio-economic inequality, and 
elite-dominated political systems as the principal causes of domestic insurgency. They 
also advocated socialist reform. The Peruvian experience made scholars aware of the 
breadth of possible interpretation of DSN. There, a professionalised and politically 
active military in the 1960s found that the principal threat to national security and 
development lay in exploitation by the oligarchy and its foreign accomplices, leading to 
the emergence of radical reformist military regime.30
Peru's left-wing variety of DSN not only illustrated the indigenisation of a 
common doctrine but also indicated that commitment to particular policies was 
extremely weak. Similarly our study of dwifungsi indicates that differences over the 
interpretation and actual policy implementation of the doctrine within particular 
militaries is hardly avoidable. In the case of the DSN, Fitch argues that the general 
acceptance of the DSN did not prevent serious internal splits over specific policies in 
Brazil.31 Also Stepan—who in 1973 emphasised the significant role played by Peru's 
CAEM in socialising the new professional doctrine—later revised his assessment, 
insisting that CAEM circles were actually not the core ruling group which implemented 
the radical reform project.32 It can be concluded that both dwifungsi and the DSN 
provide a coherent ideological lens through which military officers can look at the state 
of the nation, their expected missions, and how economic development is imperative 
for internal security, but it does not necessarily help unify the officer corps or cultivate 
consensus on policy implementation.
The DSN and Antipolitics
29 Ibid., p.23.
30 The regime was the revolutionary military government headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado 
between 1968 and 1975. Velasco's revolutionary projects involved land reform and nationalisation of 
enterprises in several industrial sectors. For successes and failures of the left-wing DSN projects under 
Velasco, see two continuous works—Lowenthal (1975) and McClintock and Lowenthal (1983). Becker 
(1982) stresses the rise of the 'new bourgeoisie' under the regime, although its structural dependence on the 
state prevented the emergence of liberal-democratic ideology among the new middle class.
31 Fitch (1986:29).
32 Stepan (1978:144-146) argues that none of key radical officers who initiated the reform project was a 
graduate of CAEM. All, however, had strong connections with the intelligence sector which had 
investigated several corruption cases linking local elites and foreign actors during the previous Belaünde 
administration. Philip (1980:427-429) suggests that CAEM graduates were instead prominent in the 
technocratic faction that supported reform from above, but opposed mass mobilisation in support of those 
reforms.
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Despite variations in interpretation and policy implementation, the military 
regimes under DSN influence shared a common structure of political control. A major 
attempt to generalise this commonality can be found in the work of Loveman and 
Davies, who insist that the basic paradigm of these regimes—'military antipolitics'— 
applies to both leftist and rightist variants.33 For them, the left-right gap was bridged 
by a common perception among professional officers who rejected the political 
process, seeing it as the source of underdevelopment, corruption and evil.
It [antipolitics] is antiliberal and anti-Marxist. It assumes repression of opposition, 
silencing or censoring of the media, and subordinating the labor movement to the 
objectives of the regime.... It does not willingly tolerate strikes by workers.... It 
places high priority on economic growth and is usually little concerned with income 
distribution except insofar as worker or white-collar discontent leads to protest and 
disorder.... It can use elections, pseudopolitical parties, and plebiscites in order to 
give a veneer of "democratic" legitimacy to authoritarian direction of the state and 
society.34
The Peruvian revolutionary project (1968-75) adopted mobilisational 
inclusionary strategies of economic modernisation but the left-wing military 
antipoliticians did not see themselves as being dedicated to class interests. 
Contaminated by DSN, officers found the principal enemies in the Peruvian landed 
oligarchy and allied US capitalists, but this was a reflection of their nationalism, not 
Marxism. In this context, the radical revolution took the form of authoritarian statism 
to command the direction of social empowerment. Here, antipolitics was adopted to 
maintain the supremacy of the state over society, and thus not different from right- 
wing regimes inspired by the DSN.
Antipolitical techniques also provided similarities. In Brazil, the military's 
political project involved the development of the industry of torture, aiming to 
eliminate 'subversives'—often by summary murder of suspects—in order to 'atomise' 
Brazilian society.35 Rabid anti-Marxism was also a feature of the military regimes of 
Chile and Uruguay, where terror became an official instrument to accomplish the 
'public' policy of social cleansing. The DSN-inspired Proceso government in Argentina 
(1976-83) also launched a notorious campaign of state terror against its internal 
threats—politicians and subversives. This 'dirty-war' left thousands dead as well as 
disappearances of 'subversives' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.36
Importantly, once DSN emerged as the dominant belief, military rulers in these 
countries concluded that security and development could only be achieved by a long-
33 Loveman and Davies (1989).
34 Ibid., p.12-13.
35 Zirker (1988:592) and Epstein (1984:39).
36 The Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared called the DSN "the doctrine behind the 
repression" in the country. See Pion-Berlin (1988:383). It is said that 8,960 people disappeared under the 
regime. In Brazil, 125 people disappeared while in Uruguay the number was 25 (Stepan 1988:70).
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term military regime, thus relieving them from insisting—in the traditional way—that 
intervention in politics was temporary or undesirable in principle. Under these 
circumstances, whatever their differences over economic management, the construction 
of an antipolitical environment was soon recognised as imperative to achieving security 
and development. As if to reflect their role perception as the national guardian, 
ambitious and aggressive military programs of political control were generally justified 
as 'defensive' missions to rescue their nations from the threat of subversion and 
chaos.37
These characteristics of the 'new professionalism of military antipolitics' 
(Loveman and Davies), commonly seen in the Latin American professional militarism, 
are nothing new for students of ABRI. As we have repeatedly discussed in previous 
chapters, ABRI's antipolitical officers during the Soeharto period were anti-liberal and 
anti-Marxist. They supported measures to censor the media. Intervention in labour 
affairs was a part of the mission of Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas. They retied primarily on 
the 'trickle-down' growth strategy, while concerns about the widening socio-economic 
gap in society were assessed in security terms. Pseudo-democratic institutions—such 
as elections, party-politics, parliaments and constitutionalism—were supported to 
give a 'democratic face' and legitimacy to the regime, but 'political society' had been 
subjected to intervention, quite frequently by using both formal and informal channels 
and direct and indirect measures. Extra-judicial killings of citizens, systematic 
torturing of suspected 'subversives,' and abduction of political activists—including 
teenager students—had been conducted in highly professional ways, often by ABRI's 
best-trained unit, Kopassus.38
However, for our comparative study, it is not enough merely to recognise these 
similarities in the external outcomes of military antipotitics. It is also necessary to see 
the pattern of perceptional development before and after the introduction of the DSN. 
Military intervention in politics surely existed in pre-DSN Latin America, but, as seen 
above, the engagement was essentially ad hoc 39 The military at that time often targeted 
internal threats in its combat operations, while concerns about economic 
underdevelopment also existed. If these two factors—internal security and economic 
development—were present both before and after the introduction of the DSN, why 
did the military seek its enduring involvement in politics only in the latter period? One 
answer lies in the nature of the DSN.
37 Loveman and Davies (1989:307).
38 As seen earlier, this unit has been trained by the US; training of Kopassus officers also took place in 
Australia.
39 More precisely, Latin American militaries, with few exceptions (e.g. Venezuela and Mexico), 
traditionally believed that they—as ’guardians' of national interests—had a legitimate short-term political 
role when these interests were threatened in crises where civilian institutions were weak, fragmented and 
ineffectual (Fitch 1993:21). See also Bacchus's (1985) work which analyses the ideological basis of this 
orthodox short-term intervention by the Brazilian army and the rise of disputes when it adopted a long­
term version after the Brazilian revolution in 1964.
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There was little fundamental change in the military's 'ways' of attacking internal 
subversive elements, namely by mobilising intelligence, paramilitary units and special 
anti-terrorist troops. What changed, however, after the DSN phenomenon was the 
military's 'definition' of these elements. The doctrine had systematically incorporated 
modernisation economics into the professional internal-security mind-set. The 
military's old 'concerns' about underdevelopment were now elaborated with the 
inclusion of the concepts of the open world economy and latecomer modernisation. 
Having packed these economic theories into its arsenal, the military reached two 
conclusions. First, successful implementation of development projects could not be 
achieved through traditional short-term access to the government. Secondly, 'catch-up' 
economic modernisation—which required low wages and disciplined labour to attract 
foreign investments (or to facilitate capital accumulation in the case of left-wing 
regimes)—needed strong state control over society. It was against this background that 
repressive antipolitics became the logical outcome of the military's commitment to 
these two ends. To secure the long-term military control of the government, regime 
critics had to be eliminated. To control society, 'politics'—which is uncertain and 
disturbs social harmony—had to be buried and replaced by 'administration' with a 
high discipline. Definitional expansion of 'subversion' (or more broadly deviance from 
state projects) had its roots here, aiming to justify the military's elimination and 
surveillance activities.40
Therefore, in answering the question above, it can be argued that, in terms of 
internal military dynamics, the prime mover in the transition between 'traditional' and 
'new' militaries was not the aspect of internal security but that of economic 
development. If the DSN had only carried concerns about internal security, neither 
permanent takeover of the government nor establishment of an antipolitical 
environment was crucial or justifiable. Many developing countries assign their soldiers 
to counterinsurgency missions without leading to military takeover of the government. 
It was the infusion of economic development thought (or ideology) into the 
professional doctrinal arena that gave birth to a military which sought perpetual 
involvement in politics and the adoption of antipohtics.41
These reflections on the doctrinal origin of antipolitics provide some 
hypotheses for our study of the Indonesian military. It seemed obvious that the New 
Order military desired to permanently involve itself in politics. It had said that there 
was no 'back-to-the-barracks' in ABRI’s dictionary. Its maximum concession was the
40 This assessment owns much to Giddens' inspiring work (1987) which describes how the development of 
administrative technology in the modern state changed the definition of social 'deviance' and adapted the 
modes of its surveillance and control. See especially chapters 7, 8, and 12.
41 We limit our argument here to the impact of doctrine on political activism of the military. Needless to say, 
however, political orientation cannot be explained solely by doctrine or ideology. Zagorski (1992:54,72- 
74) argues that the DSN provided a ready rationale to legitimise permanent military involvement. But he 
does not clarify what aspect of the DSN did this.
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adoption of the concept called tut zvuri handayani, which was said to be applied in the 
age of keterbukaan. Since the New Order was not a military regime in a strict sense, a 
simple comparison with hard-core militarism in Latin America should be avoided. 
However, it can be argued that ABRI's claim for permanent involvement in politics— 
and its antipolitical attitudes—was similarly derived from its built-in economic 
development ideology. When the retired 1945 generation officers say that ABRI should 
retreat from everyday intervention, their motive is not only to earn popularity in 
society but, to some extent, reflects their belief in the traditional role perception of 
ABRI. As in Latin America before DSN, the Indonesian military's core role perception 
was that of guardian, believing intervention was the result of civilian failure to protect 
national interests. Importantly, as was obvious in the Latin American case, this 
traditional perception itself did not necessarily oblige the military to permanently 
intervene in politics. It would at most lead the military to having a permanent veto 
power. As if following such traditionalism, Indonesia's retired generals have often 
claimed that if General Sudirman—the first army commander who led the 
revolutionary war—were still alive, he might oppose the current implementation of 
dzvifungsi A2
On the other hand, the AMN-Akabri generation's self-image was cultivated 
through education. In this process, traditional perceptions were surely inherited, but 
officers were also indoctrinated in the economic modernisation ideology. From our 
comparative perspective, this suggests the hypothesis that the socialisation of the 
post-1966 officers has had a major impact on the officers’ perceptions of the desirable 
level of military commitment in everyday political life. This level—we assume—is much 
higher than that of the traditional role-perception, because the development mission 
provides far more areas of military concern related to stability maintenance.43 Of 
course, not a small number of current officers may think that economics is too complex 
to be handled by soldiers. However, in assessing ABRI as an institution, this 
indoctrination process has no doubt encouraged the officer corps to regard everyday 
and permanent engagement in the non-military sector as legitimate.
In this regard, we may conclude that, although there is a generally accepted 
view that the introduction of professionalism has distinguished AMN-Akabri officers 
from the revolutionary generation, it is more precisely their professional commitment to 
modernisation ideology that has marked these younger generation officers. If we accept 
a claim by many officers that dzvifungsi has existed since the early days of the 
Republic, we can also argue that this 'old' dzvifungsi was already replaced by 'new' 
dzvifungsi. The new version under the New Order has favoured everyday involvement
42 Interview with Ali Sadikin, 30 July 1996; written interview with Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, 4 January 
1997.
43 The testing of this hypothesis would require relational analysis of educational programs and officers' 
perceptions. It could be conducted, for example, by observing quantitative-qualitative changes in education 
materials in Seskoad and matching them with content analysis of officers' writings.
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in all levels of politics to constantly provide the professional 'service' of stability 
maintenance for the realisation of long-term economic development—a national 
interest.' Some self-images derived from the old version, such as 'self-sacrifice,' and 
ABRI's role as 'defender' and 'integrator' of the nation, have backed up both internal 
legitimation of the new dwifungsi and external fortification of antipolitical projects.44
Our comparative doctrinal analysis implies that many of the dwifungsi-related 
phenomena are not unique to Indonesia. If so, what of the process and dynamics of 
doctrinal erosion in the face of the growth of democratic pressure? In many Latin 
American military regimes inspired by the DSN, political change in the 1980s led to 
military disengagement from politics and the resurgence of civilian government. 
Civilians have endeavoured to trim aggressive military doctrines in order to secure 
military subordination to democracy. Their aim has been to neutralise the implications 
of modernisation ideology from officers' professional military concerns, while not 
threatening their traditional loyalty to the nation. What is the problem of crafting 
military doctrine in this new way? What implications are there for Indonesia? In order 
to examine these questions, we need first to look at the general dynamics of the 
military extrication process and scholarly attempts to conceptualise civil-military 
relations in democratic transition. We will examine these issues of extrication in the 
next three sections—discussing approaches, analytical difficiencies, and political 
dilemmas—before returning to the questions raised above.
Extrication Problem I: Approaches
Beginning in 1979, South American military governments gradually relinquished 
power to civilians, for example in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil. Economic crisis 
had undermined the position of the ruling military, encouraging divisions within the 
military institution—always a key factor in motivating a military seizure of power— 
and provoking the overthrow of military government. Needler's timely study found 
common attitudes among the officer corps in some of these countries. Military 
presidents, who had come to power as institutional representatives of the military, 
were seen as using the armed forces to build a personal power base independent of the 
military institution and for self-interested purposes that the institution itself did not 
share 45 The increasing gap between the ideal of being the guardian of national interests
44 We will come back to this old-new distinction in the concluding chapter where we think about the 
direction of ABRI's internal reform in the post-Soeharto era.
45 Needier (1980:622). The most prominent cases were Ecuador's General Guillermo Rodiguez Lara, 
Argentina's General Levingston, and Bolivia's General Juan Pereda Asbün. The overthrow of Preda was 
plotted by what was called 'the generational group' within the military, a set of younger officers, academy 
trained, more professionally oriented, who were tired of the continual factionalism and political meddling 
of the top echelons of the officer corps (ibid, p.618).
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and the reality of being a tool of a self-interested and unpopular president made it 
possible for military officers to perceive the transfer to civilian government as an 
acceptable choice. This perception was encouraged by the deepening economic crisis 
which showed day after day the government's inability to defend the 'national interest.' 
As seen previously, similar attitudes can be found among Indonesia's military during 
the late New Order period.
Apart from the collapse of the president-military relationship, many studies of 
regime change also recognise internal military conflicts in the process of polity 
transition. Fitch's comparative study in 1986 emphasised that, for a decade prior to 
military extrication, a visible common feature among military regimes in Latin America 
had been the conflict between the faction in power and those who performed normal 
military functions.46 This assessment was reflected in O’Donnell and Schmitter's 
influential theoretical work, published in the same year. They argued that:
[A] factor encouraging a withdrawal from government concerns the agencies of 
repression. Whenever this 'instrument' is used protractedly and indiscriminately, 
and whatever the initial formal engagement of the military, the units specially 
responsible tend to develop an increasing autonomy and capacity to command 
resources. This exacerbates old rivalries between service branches and leads to 
skirmishes over jurisdictions and methods.... [Fjaced with the growth of security 
agencies, professionally minded officers may become willing to support a 
civilianization of authority which can deal effectively with such excesses.47
Emphasising the role of intra-miliary conflict—namely between the security unit's 
hardliners and moderate professionals—O'Donnell and Schmitter concluded that: 
"there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of important divisions 
within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage 
between hard-liners and soft-liners."48
This assessment sees the primary cause of democratic transition as a 
'contingent' result of a game among authoritarian agents. Transition, therefore, is 
random, uncertain, unplanned, unpredictable and shaped by their strategic choices. 
This view challenges structural explanations which have tried to find causes in the 
socio-economic and political structure—i.e. the lack of regime adaptability to the 
growing political, economic and international pressures on the authoritarian regime 49 
The new emphasis was on the action aspect rather than structure. Reflecting this 
tendency, current theories of military disengagement from politics involve a set of 
different approaches between action and structure. It seems reasonable to assert that 
the structural approach may not explain the direct trigger of military extrication,
46 Fitch (1986:34).
47 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:35).
48 Ibid., p.19.
49 Application of game theory, for instance by Przeworski (1992), represents a distinct challenge to the 
structural approach. On the contest between the structural and contingent analyses, see, for example, 
Bratoon and van de Walle (1997:19-27).
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because it only describes the environment in which decision-makers operate. However, 
this does not undermine the significance of structural analysis, especially when we look 
at the entire event of withdrawal as a 'process.'
By 'process,' we mean a set of three steps: the pressure for change, the decision 
to withdraw, and the institutionalisation of the new civil-miliary relationship. In 
explaining the decision, the action focus is useful, but to explain the pressure for, and 
the subsequent institutionalisation of, withdrawal, there is no doubt that the structural 
focus is indispensable. For example, attention has to be paid to political structure 
which determines the availability of civilian leaders to whom the military may hand 
over government responsibility (or make partners in a new coalition). The economic 
aspect is also significant: the process by which economic crisis delegitimises the 
military's claim for better economic management under authoritarianism, and the way 
in which social mobilisation and the rise of a middle-class—as the result of economic 
growth—increase the demand for demilitarising the political system.50 Even the aspect 
most unlikely to be the direct trigger to withdraw—i.e. the international system—is 
important in assessing the way in which the influx of international values, such as 
human rights and democracy, undermines the legitimacy of military rule.51 The action 
approach, on the other hand, explains things not covered by structural approaches, 
such as the military's motivation and rationale to disengage and its optimal timing. 
Thus, in understanding the entire process of military disengagement, both structure and 
action are indispensable and mutually supporting rather than conflicting. This
50 The relationship between economic change and the military has been a controversial issue. Jose Nun's 
(1970:329) classic thesis—first presented in 1967—insists that professional armies in Latin America have 
middle-class origins and have acted as representatives of middle-class interests, compensating for that 
class's inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group. Huntington (1968:222) elaborates 
this insight and concludes that the military's historic role is to open the door to the middle class and to close 
it to the lower class. However, this Nun-Huntington hypothesis does not show how the officers of middle- 
class origin protect middle-class political demands such as for wider political participation and freedom of 
the mass media. Regarding Indonesia, there is also an argument that dwifungsi's claim to be a social 
dynamiser is an idea representing the middle-class interest (Indonesia Reports [Political Supplement], No.19, 
December 1986, pp.7-8). But we have repeatedly seen that ABRI views the rise of the middle class as a 
political threat. Apart from the middle-class argument, Putnam's (1967:97) quantitative cross-national 
analysis stresses that socio-economic mobilisation in general undermines the military's role in politics, 
because it may increase the number of political actors and diffuse political resources available to the 
military. Huntington (1968: Chapter 1), on the contrary, argues that, as social mobility increases, the 
political system may fail to absorb social demands, resulting in political disorder which invites praetorian 
military intervention. O'Donnell's (1973) influential study concludes that the most likely consequences of 
modernisation (with high social mobility) in Latin America are bureaucratic-authoritarian military 
regimes, due to the increasing demand for wage repression to encourage capitalist economic growth. Ruhl 
(1982), who retested Putnam's analytical indicators, also rejected Putnam's thesis on empirical grounds. 
More recently, Danopoulos (1988:4) insists on the positive correlation between high levels of socio­
economic development and the degree to which the military is disposed to let go of political power. But a 
causal relationship is not provided here.
51 Welch (1993:75,86,88) argues that civil-military relations in Third World countries are facing serious 
fundamental challenges due to the collapse of the Second World in 1989. The collapse of communist regimes 
affected the Third World through diminished military aid and greater emphasis on peace-keeping. The 
legitimacy of military rule may also be undermined by the loss of rationale in the form of the threat of 
international communism.
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assessment resonates with general scholarly efforts to conceptualise how the structure 
regulates the action and how the action reproduces the structural environment.52
This general interest among social scientists in the structure-action interaction 
has inevitably influenced the study of democratisation and military disengagement 
from politics. One recent approach has been to place an analytical unit between action 
and structure—namely institution. This approach, generally referred to as the 'new 
institutionalism,' tries to bridge actions and structure by analysing the mediating role of 
institutions both in regulating action patterns and in producing policies that affect the 
structural pattern .53 Although this has not yet become the mainstream approach in 
scholarship on democratisation, there now seems to be a consensus about the need for 
a balance between structural and action explanations.
It is in this theoretical context that our doctrinal focus in the analysis of 
military extrication process should be located.54 One characteristic of doctrinal study 
is that it can potentially bridge different analytical levels. For example, it can cover 
state-military relations and the individual officer's political perception. It can also 
bridge the gap between the military's corporate identity and internal cleavage within 
the officer corps. Moreover, our focus mediates the analyses of 'universal' military 
values—such as professionalism—and their 'indigenous' applications.
Given these analytical ranges, the doctrinal study encompasses two processes 
of military extrication from politics: the process in which democratic demand (i.e. 
structural pressure) is perceived by individual officers and reflected in the doctrine’s 
interpretative change; and the process in which military officers—based on their
52 Skocpol (1985:21) suggests that "organisational configurations, along with their overall patterns of 
activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions, 
and make possible the raising of certain political issues." In civil-military relations, the structure-action (S- 
A) interaction was presented, for example, by Suh (1987: Chapter 2). However, his model presents the S-A 
flow in a simple linear direction, excluding the feedback process of how actions regulate actors and 
structure. One of the influential works which successfully included the feedback loop in S-A analysis was 
Giddens' 'structuration theory.' However, one criticism of Gidden's theory is its lack of attention to the role 
of intermediators in the process by which individual actions influence the structural reconfiguration. See 
Thompson's (1989) vivid evaluation and criticism of structuration theory. In more recent civil-military 
relations studies, the S-A issue is often presented in terms of organisation-behaviour interaction. See 
Crouch (1997) for an attempt to analyse the interaction of organisational structure, ideology, culture, and 
political behaviour in comparing Southeast Asian militaries’ reactions to democratisation
53 See O'Neil (1996) and Bratton and Walle (1997:41-45) who employ this neo-institutional approach in 
their analysis of democratic transition. Bratton and Walle argue that it can overcome the major weakness of 
the contingency approach to democratisation, that is 'excessive voluntarism' which creates a problem of 
'presentism'—by heavily discounting the past—and a lack of predictive power as a comparative political 
theory. Both these studies are strongly inspired by the study of DiMaggio and Powell (1991). For an 
excellent overview of 'new institutionalism' and its differences with 'old' studies of political institutions, a 
recent work by Selznick (1996), who is labelled by DiMaggio and Powell as a representative of the 'old 
institutionalists,' is helpful. The term institution does not refer to formal organisation, but is defined as "a 
social order or pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process and owes its survival to relatively 
self-activating social process." This includes, for example, rituals, cultures, ideologies, laws and social 
beliefs. See Jepperson (1991:145).
54 In making this point, I am indebted to Professors Philip Selznick, John O'Neil and Fred Riggs, who have 
suggested the validity of examining military doctrines as institutions and analysing the changing military 
roles mediated by doctrinal change.
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doctrinal re-interpretations—conduct policies (i.e. actions) which encourage 
democratic space in the political structure. In other words, the doctrinal focus is 
helpful to mediate the S-A analysis, while at the same time it relieves us from 
borrowing a psychological approach to assess officers' political perceptions. As seen in 
the previous sections, our study of the DSN bridges the analysis of the individual 
officer's belief-system and the construction of military regimes in Latin America. The 
process of regime demilitarisation should be examined in the same framework.
Extrication Problem II: Analytical Questions
We have argued that the process-centred view of military extrication treats 
different approaches as mutually supportive. However, in the scholarly attempt to 
understand the changing patterns of civil-military relations, there are some analytical 
problems which are still unsolved. In this section, we examines three of them—namely, 
intervention level, culture, and the role of professionalism—which are related to the 
problem of dzvifungsi discourse in Indonesia.
Danopoulos suggests that there are four factors determining military 
withdrawal: (1) the nature of intervention—whether the military functions as a 
praetorian moderator, a guardian, or a ruler; (2) the performance of soldiers as 
political governors—the degree and pace of legitimacy deflation; (3) professional 
military concerns—institutional incentives to go back to the normal military function; 
and (4) the availability of acceptable alternatives—whether the military can find 
reliable civilians or not.55 Regarding (2), although legitimacy deflation is a significant 
indicator, there are many cases in which the military dominates politics without public 
legitimacy. This implies that the 'loss of legitimacy' is too vague to be regarded as a 
determinant of military extrication.56 Concerning (4), presence or absence of the civilian 
alternative largely depends on the military's preference, thus it is hard to reduce it to 
the level of comparative generalisation. Factors one and three have been subject to 
more extensive debate.
Levels of Intervention
Any attempt, like that of Danopoulos, to conceptualise the nature of military 
involvement tends to be categorical or typological. Welch, for instance, argues that 
military involvement should be assessed along a spectrum, marked at one pole by 
unquestioned dominance of military officers over all political decisions and at the 
other pole by untrammelled control by governmental officials. He then distinguishes
55 Danopoulos (1988:7-13).
56 A similar assessment is presented in Stepan (1986:77).
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three 'levels of intervention,' namely military influence in politics, military participation 
in politics, and military control of government.57 The aim of identifying these levels is 
to characterise the changing position of the military in politics. This kind of approach 
follows Finer’s classic description of four levels of intervention—influence, blackmail, 
displacement of the civilian cabinet, and supplantment of the civilian regime.58
Criticism may be derived from at least three perspectives. First, as Luckham 
asserted, Finer's typology would make it difficult to account for the structural and 
behavioural similarities of the military in countries where military intervention has been 
pushed to different levels, such as Haiti, Batista's Cuba, and the Dominican Republic 
and Paraguay, but where the military role in society and politics is very similar.59 In 
other words, the typological approaches adopted by Finer, Danopoulos and Welch 
look only at the different political status of the military at a given time, and makes it 
more difficult to perceive the similarities or 'likness' which undoubtedly exist between 
certain levels of military intervention. As we will see later, this question of likeness 
becomes a central issue in understanding the problem of incomplete extrication, which 
cannot be covered adequately by the 'level' analysis.
Secondly, from a political process perspective, Lovell and Albright recently 
have argued that the notion of the civil-military distinction failed to take account of 
the behaviour of the military as an interest group.60 This point is applicable to the 
typological approach to the level of military intervention, which makes it difficult to 
deal with the dynamics of change—for example, movement from 'participation' to 
'influence'—which can activate lobbying (overt or covert) or political assertiveness on 
the part of the military. Since intervention analysis treats the position (or status) of the 
military in politics as the dependent variable, military politics resulting from a shift in 
the level cannot be covered within this framework. Thus, in facing the problem of 
military re-intervention in politics, level analysis can say little about its dynamics.
Thirdly, typologies of intervention levels become useful cross-national 
indicators only in comparing militaries where boundaries between military and political 
roles are sufficiently clear. If the boundary is blurred, distinctions between the 'ruler' 
and the 'moderator' or between 'participation' and 'influence'—that try to identify the 
military function in the government—are insufficient for grasping the potential power 
of the military which still engages in far-ranging political activities.61 Analysis of this 
sort can unintentionally mix two types of militaries (boundary-clear and boundary- 
blurred) and place potentially different militaries at the same intervention level. From 
this perspective, it should be noted that LIPI's divifungsi study in 1996-7 employed this
57 Welch (1993:74-75). The same distinction is presented in his famous previous work (1987:13).
58 Finer (1962:86-90).
59 Luckham (1971:21).
60 Lovell and Albright (1997:7).
61 Hanneman's (1985) cross-national quantitative measuring of the level of intervention shows that existing 
typologies of the military role in politics are insufficiently detailed.
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framework by arguing that ABRI should reduce its political role to the level of 
'participation' from the current level of 'dominance,' and should gradually decrease it 
to 'influence.'62 As a political platform, this study expressed a collective demand for 
demilitarising the Indonesian polity. However, viewed from the standpoint of 
extrication theory, the typology does not seem to be appropriate to the case of ABRI, 
which has traditionally rejected the boundary in accordance with its diuifungsi 
doctrine. ABRI may interpret 'influence' as synonymous with tut zuuri handayani, 
which—according to official interpretation—has already been manifest and 
implemented since the early 1990s. The level analysis, therefore, may employ a 
framework unsuitable for the military, which sees no clear boundary between military 
and political roles.
Above all, the approach which sees the extrication phenomenon as movement 
along a continuum of civilian and military influence cannot deal with the problem of 
blurred political-military boundaries shaped by a country's experience.63 Because of 
this limitation, some scholars employ cultural approaches in the study of military 
extrication.
Culture
Rebecca Schiffs theory of cultural concordance rejects the current tendency of 
emphasising the separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of the 
civilian sphere over the military to prevent domestic military intervention and secure 
military withdrawal. By contrast, the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, 
accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, political elites 
and society, in order to prevent domestic military (re)intervention. Schiff identifies 
long-standing cultural values as the prime source of determining the type of mutual 
accommodation.64
This approach is insightful in the sense that—unlike the intervention-level 
analysis—it does not presuppose a clear boundary between political and military 
affairs and it recognises military decisions as the product of political consensus. 
However, the cultural approach invites methodological questions. Once we see culture 
as the determinant of the concordance style, we are turned away from the perspective
62 Indria Samego, "Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian," in Indria Samego, et.al., Peran Sospol ABRI: 
Masalah dan Prospeknya, Jakarta: LIPI, March 1997, p.231.
63 A similar problem can be found in the study of democratisation in general, which tries to categorise the 
level of democracy or the degree of authoritarianism in developing countries, by using a continuum between 
democracy and authoritarianism. Several concepts such as pseudo-democratic, semi-democratic, soft- 
authoritarian are placed along the continuum but, viewed from a country-specific stance, some cases show 
that democratic-authoritarian, or 'responsive-repressive' characteristics are not contradictory but 
mutually supportive for regime maintenance. See Crouch (1996: Chapter 1) which advocates this perspective 
by examining the case of Malaysia.
64 See Schiff (1995:7-9, 12); (1997:120, 122-123).
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of power. In other words, concordance, or a political pact, often reflects a state of 
uneven equilibrium enforced by the powerful military. Civilian acceptance of this 
equihbrium is not always driven by 'cultural values' but often by a fear of coercion or, 
at best, a pragmatic calculation of political strength. There is no doubt that a country's 
civil-military interaction is influenced by cultural factors, but if we make culture the 
independent variable in the explanation of military (dis)engagement, rational-choice 
aspects of political decision making tend to be left aside, and this is not consistent 
with dominant paradigms in contemporary social science.65
Apart from the methodological problem, our doctrinal study of dwifungsi—and, 
to lesser extent, the DSN—leads us to see culture as a political tool of domination 
rather than as a mediator, or a 'shared value,' for the making of elite agreement. As 
seen in previous chapters, manipulating culture and tradition is one mode of military 
legitimation of its political involvement in Indonesia. Both the concordance theory and 
our doctrinal study respect the important role played by culture in determining the 
pattern of civil-military relations. However, the former emphasises its role in 
formulating collective consensus among elites, whereas the latter underlines the 
military’s tactical interpretation of indigenous culture to control political discourse in 
favour of military engagement in non-military affairs. Perhaps both aspects can be seen 
in a single military regime, so that the difference is not a matter of significance. 
However, as a comparative analytical tool, our approach to culture seems to be less 
abstract and more user-friendly, since it enables researchers to adopt the 'official' 
description of culture to analyse how it is used to justify military intervention.
Professionalism
Returning to Danopoulos' four factors motivating the military to disengage, let 
us now focus on the third factor—professionalism. Danopoulos argues that "the 
disposition or motivation to disengage refers to a situation in which the military 
becomes convinced that the time has come to return to its prescribed professional 
mission ."66 This view provides a significant theme in the scholarly analysis of how
65 King, Keohane and Verba's brilliant study suggests that the concept of culture can be a hindrance to 
empirical evaluation of theories and hypotheses. Therefore it should be avoided in constructing causal 
theories. For details, see King, Keohane and Verba (1994:99-114). A similar evaluation can be applied to 
Huntington's (1984:210) interesting argument that: "countries that have relatively stable authoritarian rule 
are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated 
between despotism and democracy. In the latter, neither democracy nor authoritarian norms have deep roots 
among the political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting authoritarian norms is displaced 
by broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones." Here, 'consensus' and 'norms' are treated as 
independent variables, but, like culture, they are too abstract and unobservable to form the basis of a 
concrete causal hypothesis. Another case is Pinkney's (1990:163) cross-national study which concludes 
that, with few exceptions, right-wing military regimes have generally fewer objections in principle to 
withdrawing from politics than those on the left. This is not a cultural approach, but an example of using 
unclear independent variables.
66 Danopoulos (1988:7). Here, professional mission refers to external defence tasks.
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domestically-involved militaries are transformed into externally-oriented ones—or, 
borrowing Stepan’s terms, shift from 'new' to 'old' professionalism. However, at a 
different level of discussion, of relevance to ABRI, it remains a question whether or not 
it is relevant to link professionalism with the military's 'motivation' to withdraw. It 
should be noted at the outset that neither non-professionalism (i.e. lack of corporate 
loyalty to the nation) nor hyper-professionalism (i.e. overloyalty to the nation and 
overconfidence in its managerial ability) motivates extrication, since the former may 
undermine the top leadership’s decision to disengage for the sake of the nation, while 
the latter confirms the officer corps' distrust of civilians.67 Although we may exclude 
these extreme cases, we still have to accept—in order to see professionalism as a 
motivation to disengage—an argument that the military decides to withdraw because it 
wants to be a professional military. Needless to say, this is a weak thesis because the 
term 'professionalism' here already contains apolitical connotations. The argument 
defining professionalism as the 'disposition' to extricate, therefore, tends to be 
tautological.68 If the motivation has to be found, it is usually the desire of the military 
to improve its public image, or to end internal military splits.
This assessment is, of course, not to dismiss the link between professionalism 
and extrication. Characteristics attached to professionalism—such as autonomy, 
cohesion, corporate interests, and loyalty to the nation—may influence the 'pattern' of 
withdrawal. For example, a degree of institutional cohesion helps explain the 
difference between chaotic and organised withdrawal. Maniruzzaman's data-rich 
study suggests that abrupt military withdrawal from politics is common in the case of 
non-professional militaries, whereas professional militaries maintain an effective chain 
of command and tend to plan their withdrawal.69
Institutional autonomy is also a significant factor influencing disengagement 
patterns. Bratton and van de Walle found that African soldiers—relative to Latin 
American—were reticent about handing power back to civilians and initiating managed 
transitions.70 The reason for this was the weak autonomy of the military vis-a-vis 
social structure. They argue that, instead of professional training, nationalistic 
sentiments, and shared esprit de corps, African militaries in general are riven by political 
factionalism and patronage systems based on ethnic solidarities in the ranks. Thus
67 For a similar assessment, see Lissak’s (1976:19) classic study of Third World military role-expansion.
68 We can rephrase Danopoulos's above quotation as follows. "The motivation to sto p  p la y in g  po litics  
refers to a situation in which the military becomes convinced that the time has come to return to an apolitical 
m ilita ry ."  The right question here is why the military wishes to be apolitical, and the answer to this 
becomes the motivation to withdraw. A similar problem can be found more generally in the literature—for 
instance, Finer (1983)—which emphasises 'preconditions' for military withdrawal—such as presence of 
alternative civilians and the need for civil-military pacts. These 'prerequisites' are treated as factors of 
extrication, but they are also the consequences of withdrawal; thus one ends up saying that civilianisation 
needs civilians. Among many criticisms of this 'precondition approach' to military extrication, see Pion- 
Berlin (1995) for one suggesting its tautological nature.
69 See Maniruzzaman (1987: Chapters 3 and 4).
70 Bratton and van de Walle (1997:171).
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military reinterventions are usually driven by a defence of patrimonial material 
privilege .71 In this sense, the lack of institutional autonomy—or high social 
permeability—of African armies makes it difficult for them, in comparison with Latin 
American counterparts, to adopt stable disengagement plans through the command 
structure.
In sum, professionalism is a significant focus not because it explains the 
motivation to disengage, but because it illustrates the (in)ability of the military to 
arrange the transformation of its 'institutional' orientation in an organised way. 
Without this ability, any withdrawal attempt may face disruption. Viewed from this 
standpoint, ABRI's relative position can be found somewhere between less- 
professional African and historically-professional Latin American cases. Although 
ABRI's professional standards were undermined by Soeharto's (and Sukarno's) 
neopatrimonial manoeuvring, as discussed previously, this has not penetrated as 
deeply as it has in African armies. ABRI's professional identity is much stronger and 
its sense of 'national interest’ is entrenched. Its command structure is well established 
and—in comparison with African cases—its ethnically diverse officer corps largely 
shares the profession's corporate values. ABRI officers themselves have also insisted 
on these aspects. If so, it is safe to judge that ABRI at least possesses sufficient 
professional capacity to transform its institutional role orientation via the decision of 
the top leadership—if it so decides. Confirming this point through the comparative 
perspective is important because it now appears that, unlike African cases, ABRI's 
accommodation to managed withdrawal is therefore not unlikely if there is a will on 
the part of the current ABRI leadership. This assessment undermines one primitive 
justification of dzvifungsi: that ABRI may use guns if it is segregated from politics.72
Extrication Problem III: Dilemmas of Incomplete Transition
In the previous two sections, we have discussed the general dynamics of the 
extrication process and some problems in its theoretical terrain. Our final focus is on 
the question of incomplete withdrawal, which reveals some common dilemmas in the 
process of democratic transition and implies the importance of revising military 
doctrines in order to prevent military reintervention. Our attempt at employing the 
lesson of the DSN for the better assessment of the prospects for dzvifungsi needs to 
clarify the 'dilemmas’ and problems of doctrinal rewriting.
The term 'withdrawal' is a concept to explain a 'characteristic' of military 
behaviour, but it cannot encompass the 'degree' of that behaviour because of its
71 Ibid., pp.215-216. Their empirical study concludes that the most anti-democratic military reinterventions 
fit this pattern in Africa.
72 See Chapters 2 and 6 for this rationale.
230
Chapter 7
relativist nature. Viewed from the military, its abandoning of direct government 
'responsibility' is obviously a withdrawal phenomenon, but in the eyes of civilian 
democratisers such a step may be perceived merely as alleviation of political control 
without disturbing military ascendancy.73 The difference in standpoint leads to 
different assessments of the same event. Thus, it should first be noted that when we 
discuss the issue of incomplete extrication we deal primarily with the perspective of 
those who want to civilianise the polity and establish a strong civilian control 
mechanism.
Incomplete extrication typically may be found in the struggle over two issues— 
(1) the handling of past human-rights abuses by the military, and (2) the revision of 
professional military missions. When the military abandons government responsibility, 
civilian successors are almost doomed to face the popular demand for prosecuting the 
military that has committed human rights violations during its rule. Absorbing the 
demand is decisively important in consolidating the political legitimacy of the new 
civilian government.74 The dilemma, however, is that the military's instincts of self- 
preservation may provide a motive for reintervention when it finally understands the 
government's inability to let the 'patriot' military withdraw with 'honour.' A common 
feature in Latin America, Fitch suggests, is that total withdrawal is unlikely without 
guarantees that human rights abuses and other crimes committed during the previous 
government will not be prosecuted.75
The other dilemma is in choosing between the need to revise the military's 
professional mission, and the need to avoid threatening its institutional autonomy 
(and the possible backlash from doing so). However, the new government needs to 
ensure that the military's autonomy is not too great, as this may allow some civilians— 
who are unsatisfied with the new government leaders and seek to advance themselves
' 3 The concept of 'government responsibility' is borrowed from Sundhaussen (1984) Although he himself 
does not emphasise it, the concept greatly contributes to the study of Third World military politics. It gives 
us an analytical lens to examine the military which has given up government control but still plays a very 
active role in the process of political decision making—a phenomenon which cannot be covered by the 
dichotomous view of withdrawal and intervention.
74 Prosecution is especially important to show the new government's commitment to democratic principles, 
social justice and the rule of law. See Huntington's (1991:213-214) listing of the reasons. On the political 
strategy of the civilian authority using the human-rights issue to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a-vis 
the military, and its limitations, see Zirker's (1988) study in the case of Brazil.
75 Fitch (1986:35). Argentina is suggested here as exceptional. But a year after Fitch's publication, a 
military coup was attempted to oppose prosecution of human rights. In 1988 two additional military 
uprisings were attempted. Although civilian governments led by Alfonsin and later Carlos Menem 
suppressed all of them, the government decided to pardon those officers who had been charged with human 
rights violations and even with coup attempts. Huntington's (1991:231, 252) well-know policy advice to 
Third World democratisers was: if [regime] transformation occurs, do not attempt to prosecute 
authoritarian officials for human rights violation. The political costs of such an effort will outweigh any 
moral gains. But, he says, if prosecution is morally and politically desirable, do it promptly against the 
authoritarian leaders, not against middle- and lower-ranking officials. Against 'new' coup attempts, 
however, he recommends to ruthlessly punish the leaders of coups against your new government. Thus, he 
distinguishes between 'past and present,' and between 'human-rights and coups.' Our focus in this section is, 
of course, on past human-rights abuses.
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in the 'democratic' competition—to 'knock on the door of the barracks.' Moreover, it is 
argued that a 'moral' institutional status and a creditable/honourable role in 
accomplishing (but not setting) national goals must be provided for the military, within 
a functioning political democracy, while at the same time its messianic self-image has 
to be modified.76
Such balancing of policies to minimise the dilemma is not easy, but the goals are 
very clear—i.e. to segregate the military from the political arena and to depoliticise the 
military institution. Scholars have argued that these can be achieved by infusing, or 
restoring, apolitical professional missions. In other words, as Huntington puts it, the 
emphasis is on rewriting doctrines and revising curricula in service academies.77 To use 
a familiar concept in our study, military doctrines have to be reshaped to define the 
clear boundary between military and political affairs and exclude the latter from the 
professional mission of the military. It is in this process of restructuring missions and 
establishing strong control mechanisms that conflict may intensify between the new 
civilian government and the military, as the latter sees such policy initiatives as 
threatening .78 After all, the legacy of human-rights violations and the revision of 
military missions are the two issue-areas of greatest potential conflict between the new 
civilian government and the military, and contain serious dilemmas for democratic 
civilians. Because of this, many regimes have experienced a long period of incomplete 
military extrication.79
Incomplete withdrawal is, therefore, a situation in which the military has 
transferred government responsibility to civilians but retains ambitions and significant 
power resources to threaten the new civilian authority. It reflects demilitarisation of the 
government while maintaining the militarisation of the political system.80 Thus, the 
fundamental change in the military's political perception is scarcely recognised at this 
stage. At the height of its rule, the military rejected participatory democracy for the 
achievement of 'national objectives' as determined by professional officers. When faced 
with democratic pressures later, the military relaxed its political control or, in other
76 See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32, 35). They also emphasise that, in order to achieve these ends, the 
military spirit of professionalism has to be secured by democratic civilians. According to them, 
professionalisation is often disturbed by civilian leaders who want to install officers loyal to their 
aspirations in high military office, even if that means jumping ranks or appointing less professionally 
competent candidates.
77 Huntington (1996:6). We fully discuss the way to rewrite doctrines in the next section.
78 See Stepan (1988: Chapter 6). To emphasise the danger of a threatened military, Danopoulos (1992:20) 
suggests that the crafting of civilian control should include "group participation and a sense of involvement 
in the definition of the broad methods and means of governing, conflict resolution, leadership selection, 
foreign and security policy goals, and the ways of distributing wealth." However, giving such broad 
participation may undermine a new civilian effort to demarcate the political-military boundary.
79 Zagorski's (1992:46) empirical study suggests that the incomplete period took 18 months in Argentina, 5 
years in Brazil, 7 years in Chile, 6 years in Peru, and 5 years in Uruguay. Indonesia’s transition from the 
Soeharto to the Habibie government has been in progress for a year, but similar dilemmas are already 
visible.
80 Rouquie (1987:375).
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words, deregulated the political market.81 The decision to extricate itself was most 
unlikely to have been the outcome of the military's commitment to civil-society values, 
but largely of the assessment that it was the safest way to restore the internal cohesion 
of the military. Looking at these developments, Nunn concludes that Latin American 
officers under the civilian authority still endanger (re)democratisation, as they view the 
growing civilian political culture as a threat to military nationalism and to 'national 
values.' When threatened, he continues, they tend to fall back on tradition, national 
values, geopolitics, and national security to justify their continued existence.82 The 
reality of imperfect withdrawal has led many scholars to conclude that it is 
'prerogatives' retained by the military which have left civil-military relations unchanged 
in essence and have hindered civilian governments in their efforts to consolidate new 
democratic regimes.83 The 'prerogative approach' has become a major tool for analysing 
the problems of incomplete extrication.
However, this approach essentially assumes the status quo. Is it true that civil- 
military relations have not been advanced? If so, can we deduce an explanation 
exclusively from the fact that the military still 'holds' these prerogatives, as Zaverucha 
insists? Explaining the scope and depth of prerogatives can certainly help us 
understand the perceived corporate interests of the military, but we should note that 
these prerogatives are not identical with military influence in politics. What is more 
crucial is the 'using' of the prerogatives. For example, in ABRI's case, what makes ABRI 
influential in the legislative process is not the holding of the prerogative, i.e. appointed 
military seats in the DPR, but the lobbying by F-ABRI. If F-ABRI does nothing, the 
prerogative is not a source of influence. Similarly, kekaryaan is a prerogative of ABRI— 
officers instead call it 'service'—but it has to be 'used' effectively in order to control 
politics. If ABRI merely has such a prerogative but lacks resources, legitimacy, and 
capacity, the intended purpose of the prerogative cannot be achieved. In this sense, the
81 See, for example, Black’s (1980) study of military perceptions during the Brazilian version of keterbukaan, 
which started in 1979 and was called political decompression (distensäo) or opening (abertura). According 
to Black, democratisation was perceived by Brazilian officers as allowing political participation by those 
who accepted the military's own interpretation of its 'moderating role' (p.635). Zirker (1986) found a 
growing nationalist inclination among the hard-line officers during abertura.
82 Nunn (1995:27).
83 For the best analysis of military prerogatives, see Stepan's (1988:93-127) extensive study of incomplete 
extrication under the civilian president, Jose Sarney, in Brazil (1985-90). He lists 11 areas in which the 
military seeks prerogatives—i.e. in the constitution; in its relationship with the chief executive; in 
coordination of the defence sector; in its allocation of cabinet members; in the legislature; in appointment of 
senior civil servants; in the intelligence sector; in the role of the police; in military promotions; in state 
enterprises; and in the legal system. Stepan's model was modified and updated by Zaverucha (1993:299), 
who concluded that: "civil-military relations did not advance, and particularly nothing substantial was 
done to curtail military prerogatives. Indeed the military continued openly challenging the constituted 
civilian authorities. Leaders of the democratic transition opted out of confronting the military over its 
scope for autonomy. In those rare cases when the Executive and Legislature tried to impose their will, the 
military threatened to disrupt the transition and the civilians simply resigned themselves to the 
continuation of military prerogatives."
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prerogative approach—which analyses 'conditions' rather than 'process’—does not 
allow us to draw conclusions about the actual military influence in the polity.
In fact, the status quo assumption of the prerogative approach is challenged by 
scholars who favour the political-process approach. Fitch, for example, argues that the 
recreation of political space and the diminished threat of violent repression has 
encouraged the re-politicisation of previously demobilised civilian sectors more rapidly 
and explosively than anticipated by most regimes. Despite the efforts of military 
leaders to control the selection of their civilian successors, the return to elections has 
typically produced unwanted results which cannot be repudiated.84 Similarly, Wendy 
Hunter's rational-actor approach leads her to conclude that: "over time, democratically 
elected politicians [in Brazil] have successfully contested the power of the military 
over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of influence."85 Civil-military 
relations, therefore, are not stagnant. The structure may remain the same, but the rules 
of the political game have greatly changed. Although the civilian authority may face 
difficulties in prosecuting military officers for past human-rights abuses, and may 
allow the military to retain its politicised professional missions, this does not mean 
that incomplete withdrawal results in political decay. The two most common 
dilemmas for the new civilian authority are no doubt critical to the politics of civil- 
military relations, but they are not everything. The practice of antipolitics is no longer 
legitimate and democratic civilians freely compete to mobilise the masses.
In sum, as with our earlier discussion of structure-action (S-A) approaches to 
the understanding of extrication, the condition-process approaches in the analysis of 
incomplete withdrawals should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary in 
explaining different aspects of the same event. A problem emerges only when one 
approach oversteps into the territory of the other and tries to generalise about the 
entire event. Such an 'obtrusive' conclusion may cloud the original merit of the 
approach. In analysing dilemmas of incomplete extrication, this has to be remembered. 
We have seen that past human rights abuse by the military poses a major dilemma. 
But, does this allow us to say—as Huntington and others say—that making human 
rights abuses a non-issue is a prerequisite for successful transition? It can be argued 
that if the military is divided during the extrication process, human rights issues can be 
used by military softliners to purge the hardliners, which may smooth the transition.86
84 Fitch (1986:30).
85 Hunter (1995:427). Her detailed case studies of labour-rights, budgetary allocation, and development 
projects leads her to conclude that military prerogatives are not necessarily translated into effective 
influence over policy outcomes. See Hunter (1997:71).
86 There is likely a scholarly consensus to look at the different interests involved in the process of 
authoritarian breakdown which is characterised by internal division within the military between hard- 
and soft-liners. However, the literature seems to have favoured a dichotomy of 'civilian vs. military' in the 
handling of past human-rights abuses. Here, the role of the continuing internal split is less focused. The 
military, which retains old prerogatives, is said to become defensive in the face of civilian attempts at 
undermining its corporate interests and institutional autonomy. However, this perspective limits our 
observation of the pluralistic political process. When the key officers in the new military leadership—
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In Indonesia's transition to the post-Soeharto regime, past human-rights issues have 
been needed, to some extent, in consolidating the new ABRI leadership under Gen 
Wiranto who used these issues to weaken the power base of his rival, Lt-Gen 
Prabowo, in Kopassus and Kostrad.
Crafting Internal-External Doctrinal Transformations
We have examined major issue-areas of military extrication and concluded 
that: (1) our doctrinal focus provides a middle-range perspective to fill the gap 
between structural and action explanations; (2) neither intervention-level nor cultural 
explanations sufficiently cover the problem of the blurred politico-military boundary 
set by doctrines; (3) the degree of professionalisation may influence the extrication 
pattern, but is less likely to be its primary motivation (this is evident when the military 
is unwilling to be apolitical after the disengagement); and (4) civilian dilemmas about 
reducing military prerogatives are discernible, but they do not determine the entire 
civil-military power balance because the growing domain of civilian initiatives leaves 
the military unable to use certain prerogatives in the political process. Based on these 
assessments, this final section brings the DSN back into our discussion and examines 
the ideological-institutional problem of doctrinal transformation in consolidating 
political control of the military.87 Broadly speaking, the doctrinal transformation has 
two dimensions—external and internal. External transformation is concerned with the 
relative (or absolute) shift of military roles in society. Its focus is on military missions. 
Internal transformation refers to the change in corporate military perception and 
thought. We will consider these two dimensions—missions and thought—as the target 
of doctrinal reform for democratic civilians who endeavour to subordinate the military 
to government authority.
External Transformation
usually the softliners—endeavour to restore internal unity which has deteriorated as a result of their 
conflicts with the hardline group, they may endeavour to deal with the civilian authority on the issue of 
human rights, both in order to facilitate (and legitimise) the purging of the hardline faction and to strengthen 
the internal legitimacy of the current military leadership, by cultivating external support from the civilian 
elite in the government. If that is the case, the degree of the military's cooperation in the handling of past 
human rights abuses still depends on the logic of the internal military split, not the dichotomy of civil- 
military conflict. The new military leaders may find a technique to sideline human rights pressures by 
explaining the violations as the conduct of hardliners who deviated from the military disciplinary codes. 
The 'professionally-oriented softliners may think that, in order to defend the 'institutional' position of the 
military in the transition process, and to regain its internal cohesion, purging hardliners is a necessary step. 
Coping with democratic civilians is a rational choice if it helps to achieve that end.
87 Welch suggests that there is a commonality in the literature on Latin American militaries in that the new 
doctrine of national security has changed the military’s professional role and stimulated its political role 
expansion, but reasons for muting the 'new' professionalism remain unexplored in detail in the literature 
(1992:327). Doing so requires us to examine at least three aspects: mission, professionalism and doctrine.
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To begin with missions, current scholarship seems to have reached a grand 
consensus that the military's political duties under the DSN should be removed from 
the scope of professional military missions. In addition to military control of formal 
political institutions, the DSN also provided a rationale for the use of military 
intelligence to conduct missions quite different from those associated with external 
defence, for example infiltrating businesses, universities, labour unions and political 
parties.88 It is not enough for the new government to prohibit these activities if the 
military retains incentives to engage in them. The 'loss of mission' may simply confuse 
the military profession and stimulate its political reintervention. As seen earlier, what 
is said to be important is the provision of alternative but credible missions which do 
not harm democratic life.
Welch suggests that physical movement of troops to border areas, or outside 
the country for international peace-keeping efforts, facilitates transformation. 
According to him, the 'appropriate' mission would include relatively limited direct 
involvement in internal development or civic action.'89 In regard to limited involvement 
in development projects, O'Donnell and Schmitter cynically state that the military's 
role in running state and parastate enterprises can be useful in occupying the time and 
interests of officers who might otherwise find little else to do. Even at the risk of 
increasing the danger—and cost—of corruption, it exposes those officers to a range of 
nonmilitary contacts wider than those provided by the civilian 'coup-inducers.'90 
Except for the latter, which merely tries to keep the military out of political activity, 
these proposals are all aimed at redirecting the military's professional missions. Border 
defence, peace-keeping operations and, more ambiguously, civic action are typically 
suggested in this context.
Problems are easily found in both reality and theoretical assumption. The 
former raises the question of feasibility and the latter focuses on the dubious linkage 
between these missions and military depoliticisation. The feasibility problem can be * 
seen, for example, in Brazil. There, although civilian leaders considered shifting the 
military orientation to external defence missions, at the same time they knew that such 
diversion was not necessary in post Cold War Latin America, where social and 
economic issues loom large. Under these circumstances, President Pranco guided the 
military to expand its civic-mission programs since 1992; deploying troops for civic 
action is far less costly than training them for external missions. However, this tends to
88 On the relationship between the DSN and internal intelligence, see Zagorski (1992:55-58).
89 Welch (1987:22-23). Huntington (1996:10) similarly suggests peace-keeping missions because, although 
not conventional warfighting, they do involve the deployment of armed forces abroad in situations where 
they could be called upon to fire or be fired upon. Moreover, the involvement of the military in new 
international alliances and collaborative relationships can provide military establishments with 
constructive and demanding missions.
90 O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32).
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aggravate civil-military tensions because the officer corps regards the greater civic- 
mission role as less appropriate for soldiers who are professionally trained for 
national security.91 A simple but important question here is: why are its corporate 
interests thought to be threatened? A part of the answer lies on the officers' growing 
sense of gap between their role perceptions and newly assigned missions. Arranging 
new missions does not solve the fundamental problem if the military retains the mental 
legacy of the DSN. This leads us to discuss the second issue mentioned above—the 
assumption that new missions may distance the military from politics.
In the post Cold War international environment, the proposed new missions are 
no doubt helpful to give credible and honourable roles to the professional militaries 
with a civilian-control philosophy. It is, however, too early to expect the same outcome 
in the case of professional militaries with the DSN legacy. Their perceptional universe 
may even identify these missions as a source of strengthening commitment to their 
long-term doctrinal beliefs, resulting in a growing gap between their self-image and the 
real situation. The case of ABRI—a professional military with the dwifungsi 
mentality—may contribute to the understanding of this.
ABRI has been involved in peace-keeping missions organised by the United 
Nations since 1957. Its troops—called Garuda Contingents—have been deployed to 
various places seventeen times, half of them during the 1990s. Officers like Lt-Gen 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Brig-Gen Edi Budianto—a close ally of Prabowo—earned 
good reputations for their leadership during such operations.92 For ABRI, involvement 
in peace-keeping missions not only provides a rationale for claiming its good 
relationship with the international community and for maintaining its 'professional' 
capacity judged by international standards, but also reinforces ABRI's long-term 
commitment to dwifungsi practices. When asked about his experience in Cambodia, a 
navy intellectual, Rear Admiral Kustia, insisted that:
[Ojne reason why ABRI earned a high reputation among foreign military observers 
was that it was only ABRI personnel who got close to the rakyat [people] in 
Cambodia. Other foreign soldiers asked the local people not to come inside the 
fence of their camps. Our soldiers were the opposite. They welcomed locals to visit 
them and sometimes gave medicines which were prepared for their own use.... 
Although other foreigners were surprised, it was not something special for ABRI 
because they had been trained with dwifungsi and AMD. They just did what they 
had done in Indonesia. ABRI's motto is that "what is good for the rakyat is what is
91 For details, see Hunter's (1994) cross-national comparison of civilian initiatives in redirecting military 
missions and their problems. In Brazil, reducing the military budget also worked negatively as officers 
became unable to maintain their living standards and many started to find second jobs. Thus, these civilian 
attempts are generally seen as serious threats to the corporate interest of the Brazilian military. See ibid., 
p.643. In New Order Indonesia, a similar concern was expressed by ABRI in the Back-to-Basics document 
we saw in Chapter 3.
92 Bambang Yudhoyono was the leader of Garuda Contingent 7 to Cambodia (1991), while Edi Budianto— 
a classmate of Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin at Akabri—led Garuda Contingent 14 to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in 1993.
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good for ABRI." Our experience in Cambodia showed that the dwifungsi mission 
was universally applicable.93
Similarly, Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, who was involved in the Cambodia 
mission, recalled that:
Success in Cambodia was the product of dwifungsi which trained soldiers with the 
spirit of professionalism and self-dedication. Giving medicines to the local people is 
a common activity designed by Opster [territorial operations]. We just used it in 
Cambodia and we just got a high reputation. There is nothing special.^4
ABRI's participation in peace-keeping missions has demonstrated its 
professional capacity to international society, but has not revealed any contradiction 
between internal and external security missions. Indeed, the peace-keeping mission 
encourages ABRI to retain its traditional political doctrine. Military thinkers can argue 
that dwifungsi missions have proved ABRI's appropriateness in the international arena, 
and thus reinforce the process of dwifungsi re-legitimation.
ABRI's civic missions have similar effects. They include disaster relief, family 
planning, reforestation, rural food productivity, AMD, and more broadly defined 
socio-cultural development.95 There is no doubt that these civic missions have 
contributed to the improvement of national life, but along with their overt purposes, 
these missions have provided ABRI with a constant basis for the internal socialisation 
of its messianic role self-perception. Regarding civic missions, ABRI has insisted that: 
"it is not influenced by cultural-based peculiarities but is united in its nationalism. 
ABRI officers, therefore, are in a good position to assist the government in maintaining 
social harmony."96 This standard perception easily translates into the idea that ABRI 
is an agent of national integration and modernisation, while civilians are self- 
interested; or that ABRI dedicates itself to the national interest, while civilians care 
only about their sectional interests. Needless to say, these organisational self-images 
have been at the core part of dwifungsi legitimation and therefore have motivated 
broader political activities.
Under these circumstances, the peace-keeping and civic missions may be 
ineffective in keeping the military out of politics. Rather, it is highly probable that if the 
mission shift is attempted by civilians, the officers' messianic self-image will identify 
the gap between their broad national concerns and the limited role given to them. This
93 Interview with Rear Admiral A.A. Kustia, Coordinator of Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff, 3 
October 1996. During the UN peace-keeping operations in Cambodia, Japanese Foreign Minister, Koji 
Kakizawa, who visited the country, commented that among foreign military observers, Indonesian troops 
seemed to be the best disciplined and most friendly towards the local people.
94 Interview with Air Vice-Marshal Graito Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI Commander in the Field of 
Industrial Affairs, 26 November 1996.
95 See The White Paper, pp.48-54.
96 Ibid., p.54.
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gap may open the officers' eyes to the civilians' inability to protect the 'national 
interest' and their lack of understanding of the military's competence to do so. Such a 
perception encourages military resentment towards the civilian authority, as in the case 
of Brazil. It is in this context that the argument stressing external warfare, border 
defence, peace-keeping and civic actions as alternative professional missions to secure 
military non-intervention cannot be accepted without substantial reservation.97 The 
argument only becomes relevant where the military does not see any serious 
contradiction between its self-image and the reality. Perhaps it is limited to 
professional militaries which are inspired by the civilian-control doctrine.98
Internal Transformation
This is not to deny the significance of mission transformation, but to insist on 
its likely failure if not accompanied by internal doctrinal transformation, that is 
counterbalancing the military’s self-image as embodied in the DSN or dwifungsi. This 
transformation is crucial in the process of democratic transition in order to prevent the 
military from developing an interpretation of democratisation which is quite different 
from that of the civilian authority. The gap in civil-military perceptions becomes an 
impediment to formulating the target and means of democratic reform—including the 
degree of military extrication and the assignment of alternative military missions.
In the case of Brazil, according to Stepan, the professional military, with the 
mental legacy of the DSN, accepted that democratisation was a necessary process but 
believed that it required 'self-guards' (or control mechanisms) in order to be 
accomplished. Here, the interpretation of national security was tactically adapted to 
emphasise the military's leading role in promoting the 'principle of self-defence of 
democracy.' It was in this process that the military attempted to neutralise the 
emerging political opposition—the legitimate expression of dissenting opinion about 
government policy—by labelling it as 'contestation,' and seeing it as a systematic 
attack on the regime itself and thus illegitimate and subject to repression according to 
the self-defence principle 99 Similarly, in Indonesia, the military—which accepted the 
need for democratisation—developed techniques to neutralise democratic pressure
97 Regarding external warfare in general, Odetala's case study illustrates that the mission may even 
undermine the professional standard in the cases of African militaries. He suggests that the conduct of wars 
created the necessity for rapid crash-training as well as 'quick' promotions within the military because of 
manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Premature promotions of more junior officers to act in more senior 
positions adversely affected organised growth of the professional military institutions (Odetola 1982:24). 
This may be an extreme case, but it casts doubt on the assumption that the external defence mission promotes 
professional orientations.
98 We intentionally avoid using the term 'Western professionalism,' which is often used by scholars in 
explaining the non-interventionist military, to avoid the cultural-value orientation contained in the 
terminology which inclines to the 'excessive universalism' of linking it to democratisation and 'Western' 
values.
99 See Stepan (1988:50-51).
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under the late New Order regime. As examined previously, dwifungsi employed the 
kewaspadaan approach, which incorporated the concept of globalisation in order to 
delegitimise the opposition in the name of defending the principle of Pancasila 
democracy.100
In these circumstances, the core military thinking has a commonality—i.e. the 
fusion of the sanctified image of 'national interests’ and messianic self-role perception. 
Here, the nation is recognised as an organic entity whose interests are embodied in the 
state in which the government only handles its daily activities while the military—as a 
national representative—is expected to be the 'direct' guardian of the sacred national 
interest .101 This set of perceptions, which motivates the military to ignore the 
government is the target of internal doctrinal transformation. In this regard, Zagorski 
insists that "the strategy includes the redefinition of armed forces' sphere of 
competence, [so] as to induce them to alter both their technical and nationalist 
conceptions." Reformers, he continues, must promote a view of nationalism that links 
loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the democratic regime.102 This idea resonates with 
Stepan's assessment of educational problems in the Brazilian military. He relates how, 
in the war college courses, social and political conflicts were not accepted as a 
constituent element of a democracy. The recurrent assumption was that conflicts are 
dangerous. Then the DSN implanted a perspective of the state as the agent for 
structuring civil and political society so as to dissuade the articulation of conflict 
where possible, and to repress such articulation when necessary. Thus, Stepan 
continues, the democratic leadership of the state has to play a role in creating new 
doctrines of national defence that provide positive alternatives to these ideas and
100 More fundamentally, the New Order military's interpretation of democratic pressures tended to use the 
systems approach to neutralise criticism. The 1995 White Paper argues that "the range of domestic political 
problems has expanded basically because the rate of growth of political aspirations has far outstripped the 
rate at which the practice of democracy has matured. Imbalance between these two factors can disturb 
political stability" (p.10). This interpretative model—which seems to borrow Huntington's (1968) political 
order thesis—allowed ABRI to view criticism as a matter of system disequilibrium, obscuring the aspect of 
policy failure of the regime (and ABRI) as the cause of growing political aspirations.
101 These are common perceptions of political militaries in developing countries. Lissak (1976:20) argues 
that their role perception stems from the distorted development of an otherwise legitimate distinction 
between the nation and the state. This distortion is manifested by an officer corps which considers itself the 
exclusive embodiment of the will of the nation and views all other functional groups as expressing only 
partial and temporary interests. Their self-image as guarantor of the permanent interests of the nation 
provides (in their eyes) the necessary legitimacy for them to assume the right to rule. Finer (1962:26) also 
discusses that: "the moment the military draws the distinction between nation and the government in power, 
they begin to invent their own private notion of 'national interest' and from this it is only a skip to the 
constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian government." These self-images are strengthened 
by military professionalisation in two ways: first, the indoctrination of national loyalty; second, the 
paradoxical reality that the profession's life-style gradually alienates officers from the rest of society. 
Feld's (1968:65-66) excellent study suggests that this alienation inclines the officer corps to assert that it is 
bound by a unique allegiance to the state, the constitution or a national tradition rather than to any 
particular regime (government).
102 Zagorski (1992:82).
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should include a curriculum with more serious attention by social scientists to the 
inevitable role of conflict in any polity.103
Limiting the professional sphere of competence, reorienting the content of 
nationalism, and introducing the idea that political conflicts are needed for a viable 
political system are, therefore, considered necessary for transforming military thinking 
under democratic transition. The question thus becomes how civilians can initiate this 
process of internal transformation. The institutional redesigning of civil-military 
burden-sharing is central to this. Stepan, for example, suggests the need for 
establishing new national-defence colleges under a civilian Minister of Defence and the 
systematic professional incorporation of the military into a civilian-led national- 
security council. For him, the latter may reduce the military's sense of isolation, create a 
more effective system of mutual exchange of information and grievances, and thus 
enhance the capacity for democratic control.104 Zagorski further insists on the need for 
consensus—within the council—that doctrinal change does not assume civil-military 
politics to be a zero-sum game and presupposes mutual dialogue about national 
security and the military’s role in attaining it. The next step, according to him, is to 
institutionalise civil-military burden-sharing in formulating four layers of military 
doctrine—namely the grand strategy, strategy, tactics and policy.105
The significance here is that the civilian authority is expected to have full 
control over 'entrance' and 'exit,' i.e. grand strategy and policy, while the military 
retains autonomy in the two fields in the middle. This division of labour is considered 
to be helpful in neutralising DSN thinking and institutionalising check mechanisms. 
Although no doctrine has yet fully supplanted the DSN in Latin America, these new 
institutional settings have neutralised officers’ incentive to displace civilian rule under 
the flag of DSN.106 These programs designed for the internal transformation of military 
doctrine are expected to reduce the perceived gap between new missions and the 
military’s self-image, and, in effect, smooth the process of external transformation in 
the long-run.107
103 Stepan (1988:143-145).
104 Ibid., pp.144-145. Similar institutional reforms are recommended by Christopher Donnelly, special 
adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] 
Secretary-General, in referring to the cases of Eastern European militaries which faced a wave of political 
demilitarisation (Donnelly 1996).
105 For details, see Zagorski (1992:83). The grand strategy—identification of primary enemies and threats— 
should be formulated by civilians with military advice. The strategy—how to combat them—should then be 
developed by the military with the approval of the civilian authority. Tactics—how weapons and 
organisations are to be used—should be almost entirely under military direction. The policy—the provision 
of manpower, material and other military resources—should be almost entirely under civilian control.
106 The erosion of DSN has diversified political and ideological positions within the officer corps. From a 
rational-choice perspective, Pion-Berlin (1997:18) argues that, with the military institution less sure about 
its central missions guided by the doctrine, officers calculate that the costs to resistance far outweigh the 
cost to cooperation.
107 Our argument here is not aimed at generalising the direction of military reform which is, to a large 
extent, determined by country-particular factors. Rather, the attempt is to clarify the configuration of the 
transformation process which is applicable to many civil-military patterns under democratic transition. It
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ABRI and Civilians: Establishing the Procedure?
Based on this assessment, what can be said about ABRI's possible path to 
internal transformation? We have discussed four major procedures:
(1) shrinking the professional sphere of competence;
(2) revising the content of nationalism;
(3) socialising the idea that political conflicts are normal, and indeed necessary, for 
any stable polity; and
(4) institutionalising civil-military burden-sharing in formulating the defence- 
security framework.
These programs seem to be applicable to ABRI's case too, though, of course, special 
attention should be paid to Indonesian particularities. The following discussion 
considers procedural direction rather than the program's contemporary feasibility.
Concerning (1), ABRI's professional competence has incorporated dwifungsi 
management, as discussed in Chapter 3. Limiting this ultimately means clearly 
demarcating the defence and political fields and having ABRI personnel retreat from 
all political assignments. It requires comprehensive approaches. But even, say, 
confining and overseeing the role of intelligence—BIA and intelligence sectors in * 
territorial commands, Kopassus and Kostrad—may greatly shrink ABRI's professional 
competence in influencing daily political life, because information is the dynamo of 
professional military operations. Therefore, the reform procedure may involve the 
establishment of an intra-military norm that sees domestic intelligence—such as 
surveillance of labour movements and campus life, as well as the manipulation of 
political party affairs—as a deviation from the professional criteria of the security 
apparatus.
Second, regarding (2) and (3), the role of Pancasila must be considered. 
Although this vague national ideology has been frequently used as an exclusive 
doctrine against regime critics under the Soeharto regime, its literal content recognises 
social plurality and harmony. It can therefore be utilised by future civilian leaders who 
may try to induce ABRI to review its perception in such a way as to recognise political 
conflict as a necessary aspect of the political process—not as a threat to security. Such 
reform requires two steps: (a) formulating an explicit interpretation of Pancasila that 
does not see political conflict as a threat to national unity; and (b) (re)defining the 
relationship between ABRI’s role and Pancasila. The first of these steps should be 
accomplished exclusively by civilian initiatives, while the second can be left to ABRI’s
is beyond our focus to formulate catch-all alternative missions, partly because our analytical focus is not 
on grand theory, and partly because it is too early to evaluate this issue in the context of Indonesia’s 
rapidly evolving civil-military relations.
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professional prerogative.108 Once the political use of Pancasila is to a certain extent 
confined, ABRI's commitment to the nationalist symbols (Pancasila and UUD45) is 
less likely to become a source of political repression. A reform-minded officer, Maj-Gen 
Agus Widjojo, actually envisaged the need to eliminate the dogmatic political views 
often presented by ABRI officers, in order to conduct the military's internal reform 
smoothly in the post-Soeharto Indonesia.109 This process should involve the 
reassessment of ABRI's very organisational identity as guardian of Pancasila.
Finally, (4) refers to civilian involvement in the formation of the defence- 
security doctrine and burden-sharing at each policy level. In the current Indonesian 
context, the National Defence Security Council (Wanhankamnas)—a presidential 
advisory body—may be identified as the place to initiate doctrinal change at the top 
level. This inevitably requires its functional expansion—from the current one of 
formulating the GBHN—under civilian initiative. Appointing civilians to the posts of 
Menhankam, Menko Polkam, Mendagri and Lemhannas governor also falls within the 
scope of new institutional designing. In terms of doctrinal revision, both Wawasan 
Nusantara and Ketahanan Nasional—as grand strategies—can become civilian fields 
with military advice, while the middle-range strategies based on Sishankamrata and 
Hankamneg are left for military autonomy. In policy implementation, the Council 
oversees policies at the national level—for example, kekaryaan, F-ABRI, dispatch of 
special forces, and defence intelligence—whereas at the regional level, the conduct of 
various territorial operations could become subject to the governor’s authority. By 
controlling 'entrance and exit,' the future civilian authority may initiate the internal 
transformation which is needed for civilians to neutralise ABRI's distorted political 
views as reflected in dwifungsi s kewaspadaan approach. Justification and 
implementation of this hardline mode of dwifungsi can, to a large extent, be regulated 
by the initiatives of democratic civilians to redefine military threats at the level of 
grand strategy and prevent such operations at the policy level.
ABRI's political extrication is of course a different question. Up till now, ABRI 
has not indicated a wish to disengage from politics. What is publicly advocated by 
some officers is the need for dwifungsi adjustment. However, when/if the time of the
108 As seen in Chapter 6, ABRI may insist that there is no civil-military dichotomy under Pancasila. 
However, our discussion here focuses on the strategy of non-military forces which want to reduce the 
influence of ABRI in politics. From this perspective, the distinction between ABRI and others, or the 
military and civilians, is inevitable. Although Pancasila and UUD45 have been used by Soeharto and ABRI 
as tools of exclusion, civilian empowerment of these regime symbols has been an effective critical activity in 
the sense that it uses the regime's own language to criticise military policies as deviations from Pancasila 
and UUD45 and directly attack the very core of the regime's ideological project. See Rasyid (1994:349) and 
Liddle and King (1996:29-30) for vivid evaluations of this mode of resistance. Rasyid was recruited by the 
Habibie government as the chairman of the Study Team for Political Laws (Tim Pengkajian UU Politik) 
which was formed to revise the notorious five political laws. It is possible that his assessment of Pancasila 
will become a tool for engineering future civil-military relations, and he himself admits the efficacy of the 
approach (Interview with Professor Ryaas Rasyid, 29 October 1998).
109 Interview with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, Assistant to ABRI Commander for General Planning (Asrenum 
Pangab), 27 October 1998.
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generals passes away in the near future, Indonesia's civil-military relations will enter a 
transition phase like that in many of the DSN-inspired states discussed above. The 
manner in which dwifungsi is adjusted or even abandoned can take many paths, but all 
will at least involve the four procedures of internal transformation noted above in 
order to eliminate the doctrinal basis of possible military re-intervention and to 
incorporate ABRI into the process of regime democratisation.
**********
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Chapter 8
C onclusions
Today's interpretation of dwifungsi is different from that 
of the pre-New Order period. Today, ABRI is recognised 
as a sociopolitical force equal to other sociopolitical forces 
in society, whereas in the past ABRI was just called on to 
play a sociopolitical role.
— Soeharto, at the leadership meeting of FKPPI, 18 June 1995
Answering Puzzles
We have examined ABRI's responses to the growing democratic pressure during 
the late Soeharto era. It was in the context of the keterbukaan movement that ABRI 
problems began to be discussed openly and the criticism of dwifungsi became a central 
political issue in public debate. As discussed in Chapter 2, political space to discuss 
this previously taboo issue was at first a by-product of contestation between Soeharto 
and Moerdani's ABRI, as each side used this space to put pressure on the other. 
However, the space was gradually seized by political society following the initiative 
taken by outspoken newly retired generals who had contributed to the consolidation of 
the New Order in the early period. The dwifungsi criticism gradually became less 
restrained and officers found it increasingly difficult to curb the escalating critical 
debate and demands for dwifungsi reform. Criticism of dwifungsi was also facilitated 
by the rise of a new generation of officers who had made no actual contribution to the 
struggle for national independence, and who could, therefore, claim no special political 
legitimacy from that struggle. Together with this, ABRI's total subordination to 
Soeharto’s personal interests during the final few years became another important 
factor. Discussion in Chapter 2 detailed these developments and helps to answer the 
first working question raised in the Introduction. Facing democratic pressures, the New 
Order ABRI attempted to defend its dwifungsi legitimacy in two contradictory ways: 
either by accommodating its stance, or by identifying the pressure as a national threat 
which should be eliminated.
For example, in its doctrinal development, dwifungsi s sources of legitimation 
have been diversified in order to seek a stronger rationale. ABRI's first systematic
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doctrine under the New Order—i.e. the new Tri Ubaya Qakti which intended both to 
standardise ABRI's new mode of political involvement and to eliminate PKI 
supporters—was legitimised by the restoration of political order following the coup 
attempt. ABRI's political activism was also explained as legitimate due to the 
historical commitment of soldiers toward nation-building since the independence war. 
This legitimation scheme was, however, challenged as kekaryaan was institutionalised 
and it could no longer be claimed as a measure to restore political stability; it was 
rather increasingly perceived by civilians as political domination. In facing the growing 
criticism, ABRI established the doctrinal distinction between dwifungsi and kekaryaan 
at the end of 1970s, aiming to safeguard the former from the criticism directed at the 
latter. As the criticism intensified in the early 1980s, thanks largely to the disenchanted 
revolutionary-generation officers who launched Petisi 50, ABRI moved to further 
expand the sources of dwifungsi legitimacy. The 1982 guidebook was prepared to 
systematically explain the various legitimacy bases—namely historical, philosophical, 
legal, cultural, geostrategic, and national defence. The diffusion of legitimacy 
arguments was expected to counter any type of dwifungsi criticism. Then, following the 
regeneration of the officer corps in the mid-1980s, the concept of professionalism was 
infused into the dwifungsi language as a means of strengthening legitimacy. It was 
argued that, with professionalism, ABRI could better manage dwifungsi—an 
interpretation which uncoupled dwifungsi from the historical legitimation that had been 
questioned by critics after the retirement of most of the revolutionary-generation 
officers.
The 'infusion' of the professionalism concept, however, showed a different face, 
as a small group of officers developed a campaign called "back-to-basics" in the early 
1990s. This movement, presenting itself as an effort to professionalise ABRI, implied a 
concern about the growing gap between ABRI's institutional interests and Soeharto's 
political orientation, and also implicitly warned about ABRI’s declining autonomy from 
Soeharto, including its political role. Younger-generation officers who had been 
involved in this movement finally declared more explicit concerns in the mid-1990s, 
when the final army seminar under the New Order identified the problems of the 
current government, amidst the Soeharto-orchestrated crackdown on the popular 
political force led by Megawati. In referring to the arrogance of governmental power 
and insisting on the need for alleviating state control over society, the reform-minded 
officers who led the seminar now defined dwifungsi as a tool for restoring the distorted 
state-society relationship. Our examination in Chapter 3 identified such doctrinal 
developments during the New Order, which would provide an answer to the second 
question we raised in the Introduction.
Chapter 4 analysed a policy arena—internal security operations---- and tried
to assess how the civil-military struggle over human rights accountability had 
developed and how ABRI’s response to it had been changing. It was soon after the
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dissolution of powerful security apparatus, Kopkamtib, that ABRI's abuse of human 
rights became an issue for open pub He debate through the emergence of criticism and 
protest against the 'security approach.' This theme could hardly be interpreted by 
ABRI as attacking Pancasila and the Constitution—a logic ABRI had used to repress 
popular protest demanding dzvifungsi elimination. This new social space for criticism 
of the military was institutionally entrenched by the creation of the National Human 
Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the first legitimate mechanism within the regime 
which checked ABRI's excessive use of force and challenged ABRI's earlier one-sided 
explanations about military shooting of civilians. It was this organ that politically 
protected the role of NGOs in pressuring ABRI's traditional internal security practice. 
Pressures from NGOs—which were seen by ABRI as a storehouse of radical leftists— 
might not have been brought into the formal political process without the bridging role 
of Komnas HAM. This new political paradigm promoted a new political institution, 
i.e. ABRI's adoption of disciplinary measures (the Military Honour Council/Officers' 
Honour Council) for the handling of human rights abuses. As a result, it gradually 
became a standard procedure for ABRI to show some degree of policy accountability, 
in contrast to the 1970s and 80s. These processes all indicated that ABRI's traditional 
framework for internal security conduct had started to erode and be subjected to some 
institutional restrictions since the late 1980s, and they contributed to the diminishing 
military control over civil-military communication in the age of keterbukaan. Our 
examination of this development provides a half-answer to the third question we 
posed in the Introduction.
The other half was examined in Chapter 5. We discussed how ABRI's 
perception of human rights was linked in the minds of officers to the issue of 
'globalisation.' Although—on the one hand—ABRI had responded to the domestic 
reflection of this international phenomenon by endorsing the need for revising the 
security approach and human rights assessments, there was—on the other hand—a 
move within ABRI to revive the utility of its traditional vigilance doctrine to maintain 
the autonomous political power ABRI had enjoyed since the beginning of the New 
Order. The ideology of communist threat (Balatkom) was reproduced for this purpose, 
rationalising military repression of regime dissent as a necessary measure to defend the 
Pancasila state. For military hardliners, the concept of globalisation provided a perfect 
opportunity to claim that the penetration of 'foreign-values,' with the influx of 
liberal/radical thinking, would endanger Indonesia's political stability based on 
Pancasila values. Our analysis showed that the incentive for such ideological 
adaptation came from ABRI's institutional inertia which—since the early days of the 
New Order—had routinised its organisational efforts to produce a logic for legitimising 
the relevance of dzvifungsi permanency in the changing society. However, it was ABRI's 
total subordination to Soeharto—especially since the mid-1990s under the Feisal- 
Hartono leadership—that characterised the application of this ideological project for
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the repression of popular democratic movements. We examined the details of these 
developments which provide the other half of our answer to the third question asked 
in the Introduction. The resulting dogmatisation of ABRI’s social communication, 
however, encouraged the emergence of revisionist views within the officer corps, and it 
contributed to the diversification of military thinking in the face of democratic pressure 
during the final years of the New Order.
The diffusion of military thinking was reflected in our contextual analysis of 
dwifungsi discourse which attempts to answer the fourth question in the Introduction. 
Chapter 6 illustrated the development of critical views on the current conduct of 
dwifungsi within the military. We saw the emergence of an opinion which insisted that 
the current representation of ABRI in legislative bodies had produced a disparity 
between the professional and political duties in the officers’ military life. A concern 
about the declining neutrality of ABRI's political role—due to its backing for Golkar— 
was also discussed within the officer corps. We emphasised, however, that although 
these reformist views are significant in themselves in understanding officers' 
professional concerns, they are not necessarily synchronised with the views of civilian 
democracy advocates. Revisions were sought in terms of political programs, not of 
dwifungsi principles. As we repeatedly discussed, dwifungsi was the core of ABRI’s 
organisational identity and was thus a principal corporate interest which had to be 
preserved in the eyes of serving officers. Regardless of the hardline-softline distinction 
within ABRI in its response to democratic demands, ABRI—as an institution—has 
endeavoured to maintain the legitimacy of its involvement in non-military fields as 
programmed by its doctrine of political activism. How has society tried to undermine 
ABRI's position? Apart from public protest, we have examined the role of 'insider' 
criticism in opening up a dialogue with ABRI and in spreading awareness of dwifungsi 
criticism within ABRI—a role which could hardly be accomplished by non-regime 
critics. This political space has provided a fertile ground for reform-minded intellectual 
officers to play a bigger role in civil-military relations during the late New Order. The 
contest over dwifungsi (de)legitimation was largely shaped by the interactions between 
three critical approaches and two defending theories. Through the analysis of these, 
this study clarified ABRI's discursive techniques to (re)interpret social conditions in 
favour of dwifungsi perpetuation by inventing (and proliferating) culturalist and level- 
of-development approaches. The former was largely an adjustment of the traditional 
mode of legitimation while the latter was a product of younger-generation officers who 
wanted to avoid dogmatic response but were still committed to the organisational 
effort to defend dwifungsi legitimacy via rational communication with dwifungsi critics. 
ABRI's adaptation in the arena of civil-military discourse was one of three highlights in 
this chapter.
The second highlight was ABRI’s distrust of the civilian capacity to handle 
national politics and its own fear in regard to intra-military cohesion. ABRI's claim
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that its political involvement is a reflection of its practical role as a 'national' guardian 
in the context of its distrust of civilian politicians was long standing. However, this 
claim was weakened by ABRI's own concern about its internal cohesion which, it said, 
would be undermined if soldiers were permitted to vote in elections. ABRI's 'privilege' 
of appointing representatives in F-ABRI to legislative bodies, therefore, seemed less 
concerned with the national interest than with preserving its own unity.
The third highlight was the aspect of 'non-debate.' We have examined how 
ABRI's territorial system has become more and more autonomous in establishing 
mechanisms of political surveillance, by transforming military technologies into 
political missions designed in accordance with the concept of territorial management. 
The failure to incorporate this problem into the scope of dwifungsi discourse 
represented a 'defect' of New Order civil-military communication which consequently 
permitted the emergence of a pragmatic view within ABRI that envisaged the possible 
scrapping of the dwifungsi concept as a measure to alleviate the pressure on ABRI if 
social criticism were to reach an unmanageable level. The evolving discourse on 
dwifungsi provided ABRI thinkers with the prospect of maintaining ABRI's core 
political role solely by consolidating the territorial system, with or without the concept 
of dwifungsi. As democratic pressure intensifies in the post-Soeharto era, this new 
thinking can potentially become a norm within the military elite. For democratic critics 
aiming to undermine the military’s political influence, it is essential to incorporate the 
territorial system into the scope of open debate by demanding the establishment of a 
civilian check mechanism.
This assessment was further strengthened when we observed authoritarian 
regimes in Latin American where the military developed a politico-military doctrine to 
justify its permanent, everyday, and all-fields political involvement but was later 
forced to extricate from politics in the face of growing democratic pressures. 
Discussion in Chapter 7—which deals with the fifth question in the Introduction— 
revealed that, despite ABRI's customary claim that dwifungsi is unique to Indonesia 
and thus should not be seen as parallel to military meddling in political affairs in other 
countries, there are significant similarities in officers' role perceptions, political beliefs, 
doctrinal targets, modes of legitimation for political involvement, and the practice of 
political intervention. The fate of the DSN (National Security Doctrine)-inspired 
militaries provided two lessons in regard to the Indonesian military. One was the 
problem of 'incomplete transition' to civilian rule, and the other was the need for a 
tactical crafting of internal doctrinal transformation in a way that would guide military 
minds to support democratisation. We saw how Latin American nations preserved 
military prerogatives during the transition period and how these became 
impediments—if used effectively—to the civilian effort to proceed with democratic 
reforms. Transition to the post-Soeharto regime may also involve this problem, 
especially in handling the case of past human rights violations. Politicians who seek
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political advantage by using this issue may strengthen officers' distrust of civilian 
leaders and provide an incentive to block democratic transition. It is in this context 
that—as seen in the case of DSN—we emphasised the need for internal doctrinal 
transformation to neutralise the military’s motivations to reverse the reform movement. 
This must involve the redirection of officers' professional commitment from one that 
aims at political surveillance to one which values smooth transition to a more 
participatory polity as a premise for national stability. The concept of 'democratic 
professionalism' may be attractive for ABRI officers whose elitist identity and 
paternalistic self-image as "national dynamisors" now seek a new noble commitment to 
the nation in order to restore their damaged social credibility in the post-Soeharto era.1
The assessments above are all presented with equal weight. Rather than 
providing a single conclusion about ABRI's response to democratic pressure, I have 
tried to depict its various responses in different fields. This study's thematic approach 
provided a set of independent analyses with different focuses in each chapter. This 
enabled me to elucidate the arenas in which civil-military contests developed and 
provide a systematic description of complex military responses to democratic 
pressures. As my interest lies in this point, it should be emphasised that ABRI's 
struggle with democratic pressure is reflected in all arenas we have examined, not just 
in the arena of frequent media coverage related to daily political events. Empirically 
proving this point is the principal goal of this study as a contribution to scholarship on 
Indonesian civil-military relations.
Post-Soeharto Reflections
Finally, what are the implications of our assessments for the transition to the 
post-Soeharto regime? The emergence of reformist views among the officer corps had 
been encouraged by a growing perception that Soeharto's pursuit of private political 
interests had brought negative impacts on both civil-military relations and the 
military's organisational life during the late New Order period. As we discussed, such 
perceptions were found primarily among officers who had been affiliated with the 
education sector, such as Seskoad, Sesko ABRI and Lemhannas. Institutionally, this 
phenomenon might have been expected as it is a manifested organisational goal of 
these bodies to study and propagate the long-term corporate interests of the military 
institution. The deterioration of the military image in society and the declining
1 I borrow the term "democratic professionalism" from Fitch's recent study on DSN during and after the 
civilian takeover of governments in Latin America (1998:175-213). Consult Chapter 2 for the events 
facilitating the rapid decline of social trust in ABRI since the mid-1990s until the fall of Soeharto. ABRI’s 
problems in the past soon became the central issue in the mass media which was 'empowered' by the formal 
removal of press censorship by the new government under President Habibie. This triggered the total 
collapse of ABRI's credibility in society.
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organisational coherence within the military—due to institutionally irrational personnel 
transfers and promotion practices—were inevitably major concerns for those officers 
who were in the positions to pursue the above tasks. And if the problems were 
perceived to have originated from an external factor, i.e. Soeharto's personal interests, 
it was not surprising to see a growing complaint within the officer corps about ABRI’s 
unconditional subordination to Soeharto, which was most apparent during the Feisal- 
Hartono leadership. As we examined, such a perception was presented repeatedly 
within the military community via its internal media. Concepts like 'ABRTs dilemmas' 
and the 'need for professionalisation’ often became hidden transcripts to express 
officers’ concerns linked with this problem. Assessing this intra-military atmosphere is 
significant for our understanding of the origin and orientation of ABRI’s reform projects 
after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Military reform is not simply the reaction to the 
social demands for democratisation in the post-Soeharto Indonesia, but is largely a 
reaction to Soeharto's control of the military going back to the early 1990s. The reform 
incentives had been accumulating for nearly a decade.
It is in this context that the orientation of post-Soeharto military reforms 
should be understood. The assessment that ABRI was 'used' by Soeharto for his 
personal agenda is dominant among current military elites. However, this effectively 
leads them to think that dwifungsi should be 'reformed' to 'normalise,' or, using their 
terms, to 'reposition' and 'reactivate' ABRI's political role.2 Of course these postures 
may somewhat reduce military engagement in political affairs, but what should be 
noted is that the military’s "return to the barracks" is still far from their minds. Student 
movements which demand total elimination of dwifungsi are still resisted by ABRI 
which identifies them as the radical left, or commimist-inspired—and thus a target of 
military kewaspadaan (vigilance).3 Instead, a gradual reduction of ABRI's political role 
has been advocated by the Wiranto leadership, but the goal is 'normalisation,' not 
elimination, of dwifungsi. This 'normalisation' is not aimed at abandoning ABRI's belief 
in its traditional 'guardian' role—a belief that soldiers always possess political 
responsibility for national development. Thus, the military's 'permanent' political 
commitment is still seen as relevant. This point should be noted first.
However, this perceptional continuity itself does not necessarily constitute a 
threat to democratic prospects. As discussed in Chapter 7, military doctrines like 
dwifungsi and DSN have provided incentives for officers to conduct political activities 
on a permanent, everyday, and all-fields basis. If two of these settings—i.e. everyday
2 These were insisted by the Wiranto leadership at the first post-Soeharto ABRI seminar held in September 
1998 under severe pressure from society to reform ABRI's political role in the direction of regime 
democratisation. The seminar committed ABRI to the 'redefining,' "repositioning,' and 'reactivating' of 
dwifungsi. See the seminar paper, Peran ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI 
dalam Kehidupan Bangsa [Makalah Awal Seminar ABRI], Bandung: Sesko ABRI, September 1998.
3 Wiranto's use of this kewaspadaan approach was prominent in September 1998; the month traditionally 
used to emphasise the danger of the Communist resurgence during the Soeharto era. About its adoption by 
the Wiranto leadership, see '"Hantu PKI di Era Reformasi," Tajuk, 1 October 1998.
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and all-fields commitment in political affairs—were to be dismantled, the continuation 
of their messianic role belief which insists on their 'permanent' right to engage in politics 
may not seriously disturb the development of a democratic system, if the permanency 
is limited, let's say, to military participation in the MPR. If it is true—as frequently 
claimed by old generation generals—that the original dwifungsi never committed ABRI 
to day-to-day political activities, the 'new' dwifungsi which was interpreted, for 
example, by Soeharto (see his quotation above) is the real target for reform. For civilian 
leaders who may envisage the dilemma of incomplete transition, a pragmatic 
arrangement might be the tactical endorsement of ABRI’s self-dignity as the national 
protector, while rigidly defining the target of protection. It is the democratic political 
system that has to be emphasised as the target, not such vague concepts as Pancasila 
and the Constitution.
Therefore, two types of transformation are required for civilian leaders to 
incorporate the military into their effort to democratise the political system.4 One is to 
derive a consensus from military leaders that the 'normalisation' of dwifungsi is aimed 
at replacing the 'new' version with the 'old' one, not just returning to the version that 
was first adopted at the beginning of the New Order and based on developmentalist 
ideology. The other is to provide a clear definition of the target that the officers' 
guardian self-image is intended to protect. National ideology—i.e. Pancasila—and the 
Constitution are too broad for this purpose as they only motivate the military to 
involve itself in all fields of national life. The military mind should be transformed 
from one committed to these values into one which sees the creation of a democratic 
system as an urgent need for national stability and development in the age of 
globalism. This study hopes to appeal to both civilian and military elites to recognise 
the significance of such a transformation of military thinking for the future prosperity 
of Indonesia's political life.
**********
4 Note that we argue about 'incorporation,' which should be distinguished from the civilian 'struggle' to win 
democracy over military resistance. My discussion here is only limited to the former side, but it does not 
mean to disregard the view based on the latter stance. .In observing regime change, both are important 
aspects. Also, I do not deny the possibility of civilian leaders becoming preoccupied with the political game 
and using the military for their political advantage. Our discussion below is only applicable in a situation 
free from such a development, as reflecting my 'trust' of many respected civilian and military leaders in 
Indonesia.
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Appendix 1: Military Area Commands, 1985-1998
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Appendix 2: ABRPs Ethic Codes
Pancasila (Five Principles)
1. Belief in the One God
2. A just and civilised humanity
3. Indonesian unity
4. Populism guided by wisdom in consultation and deliberation
5. Social justice for the whole Indonesian people
Sapta Marga (Seven Pledges)
1. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.
2. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are
responsible and know of no surrender.
3. We are Indonesian knights who are devoted to the One God, and who defend
honesty, truth and justice.
4. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state
and nation.
5. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and
observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldier's attitude and oath.
6. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task with
courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to state and nation.
7. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and the
Soldier's Oath.
SUMPAH PRAJURIT (SOLDIER'S OATH)
1. Be loyal to the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on
Pancasila and UUD45.
2. Be loyal to the laws and maintain military discipline.
3. Be obedient to laws and maintain military discipline.
4. Execute duties with a full sense of responsibility to the military and the Republic of
Indonesia.
5. Firmly preserve military secrets.
11 Asas Kepemimpinan ABRI (Eleven Leadership 
Principles of The Indonesian Armed Forces)
1. Taqwa:
2. Ing ngarsa sung tuladha:
3. Ing madya mangun karsa:
4. Tut zvuri handayani:
5. Waspada purba zvisesa:
6. Ambeg parama arta:
7. Prasaja:
8. Satya:
9. Gemi nastiti:
To believe in and obey the One God 
To give the right example and lead from the front 
To be a driving force from the middle 
To guide from behind
To supervise subordinates and have the courage to
correct them if necessary
To be able to decide priorities
To be modest and to avoid excess
To be loyal to superiors, colleagues and subordinates
To live frugally
254
10. Belaka:
11. Legawa:
Appendixes
To have responsibility for one's behaviour
To be willing to hand responsibilities and positions to the
next generation when the time comes
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Appendix 3: DPR Seats and the New Order Elections 1971-1997
1971 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997
Golkar vote (%) 62.8 62.1 64.3 73.1 68.1 73.4
seats 236 232 246 299 282 325
seat (%) 51.3 50.4 53.4 59.8 56.4 65.0
P P P vote (%) 27.1 29.3 27.8 16.0 17.0 23.6
seats 94 99 94 61 62 89
seat (%) 20.4 21.5 20.4 12.2 12.4 17.8
P D I vote (%) 10.1 8.6 7.9 10.9 14.9 2.8
seats 30 29 24 40 56 11
seat (%) 6.5 6.3 5.2 8.6 11.2 2.2
F -A B R I seats 75 75 75 100 100 75
seat (%) 16.3 16.3 16.3 20.0 20.0 15.0
N on-ABRJ* seats 25 25 25 - - -
seat (%) 5.4 5.4 5.4 - - -
Total seats 460 460 460 500 500 500
*
Civilian representatives appointed by the President.
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